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This dissertation examines change in civil-military relations.

Many

countries of

Latin America and indeed the world have struggled in recent years to hold their armed

forces accountable for

human

rights violations they

have committed

in the past. In

Latin

America, there has been a gradual progression towards uncovering the truth about such
crimes and ultimately prosecution of members of the military for them. After examining

competing explanations for and discussing the pattern of that change
Chile. Peru

is

offered as a recent addition to the

authority over the

armed

forces.

While

that argues that transnational activist

I

list

in

Argentina and

of countries attempting

to assert this

find that the Peruvian case supports scholarship

networks should be credited with leading states to

adopt and institutionalize the norm of human rights accountability over their armed

forces,

I

also find that institutional, cultural and rationalist factors ser\ e to limit the

transformation of civil-military relations.
often enjoy

human

moments of powerful

Though

transnational activist netw orks can

influence over policy-making, the return of the

rights accountability to the realm

of normal politics

and the weak institution of

the judicial system present formidable obstacles to the consolidation of the rule of law.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One of the most

notable developments in Latin American politics over the

twenty years has been the military

s

weakening

power. With few exceptions, the

political

military has refused to overthrow governments and seize

economic, social or
the pattern

of military intervention

feature of the Latin

Even

in

political crisis in the third

American

into the

last

power even

in the

wave democracies of the

face of

region. In fact,

realm of politics, once deemed a permanent

political landscape,

seems now

to

have been reversed.

countries that have largely avoided outright military control of government,

historically the

armed forces of Latin America enjoyed wide

policy, veto threats to

its

latitude to

shape defense

control over military budget and personnel matters,

prosecution and punishment of military officers implicated

in

grievous

and prevent

human

rights

abuses. Yet in the last decade of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-

first

century, the military

was forced

to

bargain from a weakened position in an effort to

maintain some of these prerogatives, usually with
substantial checks

demands

1

On

on

its

autonomy, or

to

concede

much
to

greater civilian oversight and

new regimes

challenges to military

1

in these areas.

this trend, see

Pion-Berlin Civil-Military Relations 2001; Hunter Eroding Military

Reforming Civil-Military Relations 1995:
Sigmund Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America
993; Arceneaux
Bounded Missions 2001 Bachelet Jeria Los estudios comparados y la relacion civilmilitar 2002: Cruz and Diamint The New Military Autonomy in Latin America 1998.

Influence in Brazil 1997: Hungtinton

1

:

When

the third

wave of democratization swept Latin America

military leaders across the region

their

the

power did not disappear;

armed forces

domains

J
)

in

such a

in

way

for the military

handed power hack

many cases,

and buffer

for the military

military, granting

all

reserve

(

for accountability for

Augusto Pinochet guaranteed continuing

by reserving seats

military officers

managed by

these political transitions were

from public pressure

it

for crimes

committed during

its

political

in the legislature for representatives

amnesty

However,

to civilian governments.'

as to preserve special enclaves of power

past crimes. In Chile, for example,

power

in the 1980s,

of the

his

authoritarian government, and assuring continuity and stability in internal military

matters by appointing himself head of the armed forces.

gave up governmental control

in a severely

weakened

Even

in

cases where the military

position, as in Argentina, the threat

of military rebellion was strong enough to keep certain protections of military interests

in

place even as others were being eliminated. Pacted transition (in which the groups ceding

power

to a

new regime

maintain sufficient strength to negotiate to protect their

such as that of Chile, seem

to offer the greatest obstacles to full assertion

interests),

of civilian

control over the military, and the total collapse of the military regime after Argentina

defeat in the Falklands

War seemed

regimes found there were very
institutions

'

On

to

lower these

barriers.

Yet in

real limitations to their capacity to

all

cases

new

civilian

reform their military

and subject them to democratic forms of oversight and accountability.

the third

wave of democratization,

See Valenzuela

see Huntington Third

Democratic Consolidation

s

Wave

1991.

in Post-Transitional Settings

1992.

Such

limitations constituted obstacles to

democratic consolidation,

what the

literature

which democratic norms,

the state in

practices have been fully entrenched in a political system and

route to

that

power and

pattern of governance. That there

commonly

was nothing

and

institutions

become

refers to as

the only acceptable

inevitable about a state

had turned away from overtly authoritarian forms of government actually

consolidating democracy

became only too obvious

electoral democratization assured

what

O

as the 1990s progressed.

Donnell calls

4

While

vertical accountability

voters ability to hold their representatives accountable through the ballot box.

inherently imply

due

to the

horizontal accountability.

When

that

it

is.

did not

horizontal accountability exists,

it is

presence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and

factually willing and able, to take actions that span

from routine oversight

to criminal

sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies

of the

state that

may

be qualified as unlawful.

If

any agency of the

state is

exempt from

such accountability, the norms of democratic consolidation remain unattained. Clearly,
the case of civil-military relations in

many of these

in

countries, horizontal accountability

did not exist in that the courts, legislature, and even executive were effectively checked

from holding the armed forces responsible

4

For a sense of the vast

consolidation

w as more

literature

for

unlawful actions. Though

in

many

cases

on democratic consolidation, and the recognition

elusive than the

wave of transitions

at first led

many

that

scholars

Schmitter The Consolidation of Political Democracies 1995: Hagopian
Regime Change: Authoritarian Legacies. Politicial Representation, and the
Democratic Future of South America 1993: Wiarda Dilemmas of Democracy in Latin
America: Crises and Opportunity 2005: Linz and Stepan Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation 1996: Diamond Developing Democracy: Toward
Consolidation 1999: Mainw aring. O Donnell and Valenzuela Issues in Democratic
to believe, see

After

Consolidation 1992.

this

exemption from democratic control was based

weakness of legislatures,

parties

of horizontal accountability

power

relations, the institutional

and especially the judicial system compounded the lack

such

in

in

states.'

Gradually, great changes have transformed civil-military relations in the newly

democratic regimes of Latin America. Militaries across the region have been weakened

by considerable cuts

and budgets, and the institutionalized power of the

government (such as

military within

defense) and

in force size

its

seats in the legislature

influence over explicitly political matters (such as economic policy and

foreign affairs) have in

many

cases been effectively challenged and minimized. In

Argentina. Chile. Uruguay and Brazil this shift

accomplished gradually over the fifteen
electoral

democracy, but the change

writes, the

and control over ministries of

is

to

twenty years since their return

to

undermine the

away from

to search for explanations

to gain

How

On the

in

institutions, but

of the evolution of civil-

democratic controls over the military

role of accountability in democratization, see

Accountability

its

strong a determinant of civilian

of power between the armed forces and the institutions of the

'

and

the negotiated or de facto arrangements that prevailed at the

time of these countries transitions to democracy.

governments capacity

state

of their institutions within the confines of the democratic system/'

These considerations lead us
military relations

to civilian,

nonetheless impressive. Today, as Pion-Berlin

armed forces generally work not

to protect the interests

was

in civil-military relations

New Democracies

Institutionalization of Mistrust

1999 and

O

state

is

the initial balance

during the transition?

Donnell.

Horizontal

Horizontal Accountability: The Legal

2003: Diamond Developing Democracy: Toward

Consolidation 1999: Diamond
1999: Mainwaring and

Pion-Berlin

came

Military

et al. Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America
Welna Democratic Accountability in Latin America 2003.

Autonomy and Emerging Democracies

to a similar conclusion in

1992.

Reforming Civil-Miliar} Relations
-

4

p.

86. Huntington

1995.

Under what circumstances

is

that initial balance

changed so

that

new

opportunities are

created for civilians to create military subservience to civilian oversight and

accountability? Perhaps

it

has been successive rounds of rational and strategic interaction

over civil-military relations that have enabled civilians to exercise a
military, and for the military to

may

accommodate

itself to a

new bargaining

control over the

position.

Or

it

be the changed international environment, so clearly less tolerant of military

dominance over

political affairs, that has

caused

this

change.

Do

including the constraints on military prerogatives imposed by the

democratic governance
both the military

role

new

in these states, explain the

perception of

s

of the military have changed

transformation? In short,

we

its

role in society

i.e..

institutional factors,

new

institutions

change over time? Or

is

it

of

possible that

and the perception of civilians of the

has political culture undergone a significant

seek a compelling explanation of the change

in civil-military

America has witnessed.

relations that Latin

Civil-Military Relations over

Perhaps the

first

Human

step toward understanding change

is

Rights
recognizing that

monolithic phenomenon. In 1992. David Pion-Berlin effectively argued

that,

it

is

not a

while the

balance betw een civilian governments and militaries in South America had clearly tipped
in favor

these

of the civilians since the third wave of democratization, the relative power of

two groups varied both among

states

and areas of authority.

He examined

the

varying levels of autonomy enjoyed by the aimed forces of Argentina. Brazil. Chile.

Uruguay and Peru

autonomy

after their return to

in these states

democracy

in the 1980s.

He compared

over ten areas: personnel decisions: force

military

levels: military

education and doctrine: military reform: military budgets: arms production and

procurement: defense organization: intelligence gathering: internal security: and human

For each of these areas, he rated the military

rights.

He

s

autonomy

as low,

medium

or high.

then arranged these issue areas across a professional-political spectrum. Control by

the military over overtly professional matters (junior level personnel decisions, military

doctrine, military education, and military reform) remained high in these states, with the

important exception of force levels (over which the military enjoyed low autonomy).
Control over those areas which

professional-political

in

fall

between the professional and the

Pion-Berlin

s

political (the

spectrum) include arms production procurement,

military budget, defense organization, and senior-level personnel decisions. In this range

of areas, the military enjoyed

medium

clearly political in nature, including

to

low autonomy.

human

Finally, in those areas

rights, internal security,

gathering, the author found that the military maintained high

rights

and medium

lev els

of autonomy

in internal security

most

and intelligence

autonomy over human

and intelligence gathering

matters.

While Pion-Berlin concluded

that the military

had managed

to preserve its

autonomy over core professional areas by ceding authority over more

clearly political

matters, he noted the exceptions of the areas of force levels (a core professional area

which nonetheless was characterized by low military autonomy),
political function

human

marked by

greatly varied, but overall

rights (a political matter

between

civilian

military autonomy), and

which nonetheless was ranked as demonstrating

extremely high military autonomy
fault-lines

medium

internal security (a

levels).

He argued

that these exceptions indicated the

government and military conceptions of their respective

6

interests

and

autonomy

rights. In the case

same
to

field as

rights, the military

both rightfully part of

in this field as

institutional survival

of human

its

continued to perceive

war powers and

as vital to

and strength, despite the civilian government

squarely falling under

its

own jurisdiction

s

its

perception of this

and a matter properly belonging

elements of the executive, legislature, and courts.
In explaining his

coding for military autonomy

in the field

of human rights. Pion-

Berlin explains that.

With

the return to democracy, the issue has been

whether officers could be

brought to justice in civilian courts for having committed
during times of peace

To

human

rights offenses

the extent that the military has successfully

immunized itself from all judicial prosecution, then military autonomy is higher.
Where the armed forces have been initially subject to civilian prosecution but
have subsequently overturned court decision, then autonomy is lower. And
autonomy is lowest where the military has been forced to comply fully with
civilian laws.

In four of the five states

examined by Pion-Berlin

enjoy high levels of autonomy over
displaying a

medium

insulated

officer corps

its

level

human

rights:

in this article, the military

continued to

only Argentina was coded as

of autonomy here. In the other four cases,

the military has

from judicial prosecution for past human rights offenses.

He

explained:

Typically, the military argues that civilian courts have no jurisdiction over

committed during times of war. Legal boundaries aside, the South
American militaries have fiercely resisted the courts because ultimately they fear
that indictments against even a handful of officers could easily implicate others
violations

along the chain of command, dragging the entire institution

From

this

integrity

angle of vision,

human

down

rights trials constitute attacks

in the

process.

on the corporate

of the military. They also represent a repudiation of military practice,

since officers perceive their counterinsurgency

campaigns

to

have been well-

fought and honorable and in the best interest of the nation. The armed forces self-

bestowed immunity from prosecution has weakened the independent powers of
armed forces personnel above the law. The failure of

the judiciary and placed

P. 90.

7

government to bring officers to justice for human rights violations is perhaps the
single most serious obstacle to full democratic consolidation, because it
effectively immunizes soldiers against prosecution, thus reducing the costs to
repression in the future.

Human rights matters

therefore serve as an important indicator of the balance of

new democratic

influence between the military and

was

clearly

still

evening

its

regimes, and in 1992. the military

prerogative to control issues in this

field.

Six years

later,

another article by Pion-Berlin (this one co-authored with Craig Arceneaux) added
insights

on the question of evolving

this piece", the authors note that

many of the newly

civil-military relations over

human

human

rights policy. In

rights issues topped the executive

democratic states in Latin America and

new

agendas of

that, surprisingly,

some of

these states were taking concrete steps to exert control over these issues despite the fact

that the

armed forces had refused

to

cede control over

this

touchy area

in the past.

Perhaps more surprising, however, was the fact that in some cases the military accepted
the

new

assertiveness over

human

rights matters

at least

up

to a point,

and

in

contradiction to the predictions of previous scholarly research on civil-military relations

in this area.

Wendy Hunter

s

research confirmed this assertion: in Argentina. Chile, and

Brazil, the pessimistic assumptions

by

earlier scholars that the

America would go unchallenged by new

civilian

disproven. Nevertheless, she too found that

8

'

regimes

human

in a

armed forces of Latin
host of areas were

rights accountability

remained the

P. 97-98.

Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux

Tipping the Civil-Military Balance

comparative analyses that come to similar conclusions, see Agiiero

1998. For other

Las Fuerzas

Armadas en una epoca de transicion: perspectives para el afianzamiento de la democracia
en America Latina 1999: Agiiero and Starks Fault Lines of Democracy in PostTransition Latin America 1992: Basombrio Iglesias Militares y democracia en la
America Latina de los 90 (Una revision de los condicionantes legales e institucionales
para

la

subordinacion

1

999.

8

issue

which produced

and the area

in

which

the

most tension between

most successfully blocked

the military had

governments continued

fact that civilian

1

at all. therefore,

In 2006.

even when

civilian leadership

to

and the armed forces,

civilian initiatives.

The

push the human rights accountability agenda

"

requires explanation.

it is

this

clear that this trend

means

toward civilian control over human rights issues

directly challenging entrenched military interests

-

has continued

and even accelerated. Argentina has overturned amnesties granting members of the armed

immunity from prosecution

forces

have been held

in

many

for crimes

committed

in the past; truth

commissions

countries of the region and are increasingly being followed by

prosecutions of individuals: the power of military courts has been severely restricted; and
a smattering of prosecutions have

gone forward

exceptionally, in Peru regime transition

challenge military autonomy

in

nearly

in

Chile and Argentina.

was immediately followed by

all fields,

but most clearly

More

drastic

in the

measures

area of

to

human

rights accountability.

Rather than try to explain change in Latin American civil-military relations in
entirety, this study explores

change

human

is

most

rights accountability

10

democracy,

it

is

of human rights accountability. Because

the political issue over

which

the

an excellent indicator of change

Focusing on human rights accountability

Hunter Eroding Military Influence

1

armed forces proved

governments immediately

resistant to ceding control to civilian

transitions to

since.

in the area

997.

9

its

satisfies a

after their countries

in civil-military relations

worst case scenario

logic:

by

selecting the issue area

newly democratic

where imposition of civilian control proved most

states,

civil-military relations to

we

difficult for

can better isolate the factors that have most strongly shaped

overcome patterns of the

past.

Argentina. Chile, and Peru share not only a continent and similar origins as
nation-states, they are also united

government

authoritarian to civilian

continued to resist

by their experience of third wave transition from

civ ilian control

in the

1980s. In

all

these cases, the military

of human rights issues after their states transition

democracy, and by the early years of the twenty-first century,
varied success at reversing or reducing military control over

for their officers and replacing

What varies among

it

with

new measures aimed

all

had made attempts of

human

at

to

rights accountability

increasing accountability.

these cases are the timing, strategies, opportunities, institutions,

sources of pressure for change, and degrees of success characterizing these struggles.

Scholars of transitions to democracy have long recognized the importance of the
accountability question

from authoritarianism
with a

difficult choice:

of this country

s

to

to the consolidation

democracy, or from

What should be

of democracy.

civil

war

When a

to peace, the

the fate of those

who

state transitions

new regime

is

faced

routinely violated the rights

citizens before the transition? Decision-makers attempt to anticipate the

reactions their choice will provoke. If those

who have committed

the violations are held

accountable before a national or international court of law. will the domestic public and
international

community view

this as victor s justice

and authoritarianism?

If implicated

individuals are purged from the institutions of state, will they reorganize outside the state

and soon pose a major threat

to it?

Should they instead be granted a blanket immunity for

their crimes so that they will support the

new regime and

10

not attempt to reassert their

1

1

power, or will such protection simply allow these individuals

and contravene the

rule

of law? Will silence from the

to

new government

provoking public opposition or the appearance or weakness, or
demonstrating

its

willingness to

democratic regime to do

if

accommodate

all

continue to amass power

parties?

will

it

And what

delegitimize

strengthen

is

a fragile

it

by

by

it

new

the implicated parties are nevertheless popular with the

public?

The
In the

fate

of a new democracy

1980s and 1990s. a

specifically

on the concept of

by new democracies
1

abuses.

new

in

may

indeed hinge on the

accountability question.

branch of democratization scholarship emerged to focus
transitional justice

.

which encompasses the choices made

dealing with those responsible for large-scale crimes and

To do anything about former

perpetrators in a

new democracy

is

fraught with

Yet as democracy has spread internationally, so too has the

complications and

risk.

expectation that

requires accountability and the fair application of the law to protect the

citizenry; hence,

it

doing nothing

has

become an

increasingly difficult choice for a

regime to make. Their choice seems constrained by pressures from
international

figures

community w ill not

by a regime

tolerate old-fashioned elimination

all sides.

The

of troublesome

that claims to be democratic. International institutions

human rights community

new

and a vocal

(both domestically and abroad) refuses to tolerate inaction or

amnesties. Public opinion must suddenly be satisfied to keep the

new government

in

power. Yet prosecuting individuals or holding the military accountable will surely

provoke

1

their ire

and perhaps

their rebellion

(whether

This literature examines political choices about

victims as well as those

who have

to

respond to those

been the victimizers, but

primarily on the question of dealing
authoritarian regime or during

how

political or literal).

w ith

armed

who have been

this dissertation will

focus

perpetrators of political crimes under an

conflict.

11

In the last several decades, states

demands by

several means. In

armed forces

some

have attempted to satisfy

cases,

this diversity

new democratic regimes have

from accountability they have demanded,

the protection

of

granted the

in essence a

negation of transitional justice. In others, prosecutions have gone forward, with both their

pace and reach varying widely. While most such prosecutions proceed within the
domestic judicial system,

in the

1990s a host of international courts and tribunals took a
1

leading role in prosecuting

human

*»

Most

"

rights abusers.

by innovating new mechanisms which allow them

to

states,

however, have responded

pursue some degree of

accountability without immediately resorting to prosecutions or direct confrontations

with still-powerful groups.

One such mechanism

body, officially sanctioned by the

state,

is

Commission

countries have

now held

is

commission, a temporary

focused on uncovering the pattern of abuse which

characterized a period of time under investigation.

Reconciliation

the truth

1-5

The South African Truth and

no doubt the most famous of these bodies.

official truth

14

but over thirty

commissions. Some, like those in South Africa and

Sierra Leone, involve public hearings of victims before not only judges, but also

l_

See. for example, scholarship

on the

International Criminal Tribunal for the

Former

Yugoslavia, including Hazan Justice in a Time of War 2004: Hagan Justice in the
Balkans 2003: Kerr The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
2004.

On

international tribunals

more broadly

see Bass Stay the

Hand of Vengeance

2000.

'

On

truth

14

On

the South African truth

commissions generally, see Hayner Unspeakable Truths 2001; Rotberg and
Thompson. The Morality of Truth Commissions 2000.
commission, see (among numerous valuable contributions)
Inside South A frica s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission 2000; Krog Country of My Skull 998: Leebaw Legitimation or
Judgement? South Africa s Restorative Approach to Transitional Justice 2003: VillaVicencio and Verwoerd Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and
Boraine

A Country Unmasked:

1

Reconcilation Commission of South Africa 2000: Tutu
1999.

No

Future Without Forgiveness

television cameras and even the accused perpetrators:

the truth

commissions of El Salvador and Chad,

responsible for the perpetration of massive

The

stated objectives

most others do

explicitly

human

name

Some, such

not.

individuals held

most do

rights violations: again,

of these bodies vary from case

as

to case, but the literature

not.

on

transitional justice typically cites the following possible objectives: locating victims of

human

rights violations

and hearing

their testimonies,

overcoming denials of the

truth

and responsibility, identifying violators of rights and/or responsible parties and
institutions, establishing

reforms of the state

an

official

history of the country

prevent future abuses, legitimizing a

to

promoting national healing and reconciliation.
Other options certainly

exist. States

troubled past.

^ proposing

new democratic

regime, and

s

1,1

may

opt to offer reparations or apologies to

the victims of violence either along with or in lieu of confrontations with the perpetrators

of the violence. Purging those responsible for human rights violations from the armed
forces and other institutions of the state holds

the powerful backlash that often results

responsible for violations of

difficult to

human

Though

but without producing

from prosecutions. Prosecutions of

rights remains the rarest,

implement of the options available

further in Chapter 2.

them accountable,

state actors

most controversial and most

to a transitioning state, as shall

be explored

the 1990s witnessed the proliferation of international

tribunals and courts to try violators of human rights, such as the International Criminal

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and

L'
its

As

ability to

also
16

Ignatieff puts

it.

one of the greatest strengths of Truth Commissions

may be simply

narrow the range of permissible lies. Ignatieff Articles of Faith
Ball The Truth of Truth Commissions 2001.

1996: see

Chapman and

Desmond Tutu

No

Future Without Forgiveness (1999) is probably the best-know n
articulation of the argument in support of national reconciliation and forgiveness.
s

13

the International Criminal Court, such bodies only exercise jurisdiction over states that

agree to submit themselves to

and have been the exception

it.

human

generally reigns in the sphere of international

human

rights violations

to the impunity that

rights. Typically, those guilty

of

have faced neither international nor domestic courts for their

1

crimes.

Though much
last

twenty years,

insightful transitional justice literature has

many

been developed over the

important questions remain unexplored, and assumptions about

the political motives and strategies behind efforts to create accountability for military

violators of human rights have often

of all major political actors are

gone untested. At times, the reputations and survival

at stake

when

periods of authoritarianism or violence.

is

what conditions produce the

political

a state

One major

determines

how

to

respond

to recent

question motivating this study, then,

opening necessary

to institutionalize

mechanisms

of human rights accountability over the military?

There are major winners and losers
military,

most obviously, stands

that

to lose greatly

emerge from these processes. The
from the careful documentation and

moving public testimony of citizens victimized by

the state.

argued that the best reason to not

after a

to avoid

judiciary

provoking the military

may

settle

accounts

to reassert its

Samuel Huntington has

democratic transition

power. Similarly,

political parties

their successes

and failures

in

to

and the

prosecuting those responsible for

abuses. Furthermore, uncovering the truth may. instead of satisfying public

al

simply

be either completely discredited or publicly legitimized by truth

commissions or by

1

is

On

demand.

prosecutions of human rights violations by state actors, see especially Nino Juicio
mal absoluto 1997: Hesse and Post Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg
Bosnia 1999; Neier War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror and the Struggle for

Justice 1998.

14

further enflame

will to

demands

even when the

for prosecutions of those responsible,

go farther does not exist and when such prosecutions (which

expensive, divisive,

etc.)

may

18

such circumstances, truth commissions and/or prosecutions might not even

enhance the legitimacy of democratic governance.

clearly

be numerous.

not serve to promote national reconciliation, economic

prosperity, or a return to peace and normalcy.

In

may

political

commissions

failed to satisfy public anger over the past,

In Chile

and Argentina, truth

and lack of further action against

perpetrators has been a source of criticism of subsequent democratic regimes. In

Argentina, attempts to prosecute the leadership of the political junta for

unexpectedly provoked the courts and
level officers,

which

civil society to

in turn lead to a series

the president squelched

Argentina and Chile

s

all

its

launch a full-scale attack on junior-

of military rebellions

that

only stopped

future attempts at prosecution of the military.

return to democracy, accountability for

remains an explosive and divisive

crimes

human

Decades

when

after

rights violations

political question.

The wimiers from successful campaigns

for

human

rights accountability

typically include the victims of the violence in question, as well as their families, and the

national and international organizations

Because non-state actors

which have sprung up

that represent neither large

to

champion

numbers of votes nor

financial resources are the primary beneficiaries of such efforts,

their cause.

significant

we must ask how such

actors are. at times, able to realize their agendas and influence state behavior in

appear risky to state actors.

18

As explored

in

Chapter

II.

ways

that

understanding the influence of

*

Huntington Political Order

in

Changing Societies 1968 and The Third Wave 1991; on

the political and institutional obstacles to transitional justice see Magarrell and Filippini

La justicia penal y
Justice 2000;

la

verdad en

la

transition democratica

Minow Between Vengeance and Forgiveness

15

2006; Teitel Transitional
1998.

non-state actors in the field of

actors

were able

human

to use leverage

rights invites us to test the possibilities that these

enhanced by international networks of support and

on the

behavioral change: that they

domestic institutions

to bring pressure

altered the normative

framework of the national debate and hence helped

and the public
their goals

s

state for

perceptions of acceptable behavior: or that they were able to achieve

because politicians rational self-interests coincided with them.

The Research

My research draws on both the extensive
on the wealth of transitional justice
the intersection of these

What

factors shape the

literature

Project

literature

on civil-military relations and

developed over the

outcomes of negotiations over
after

the military offers support for the

intrusive civilian oversight.

self-interest as best served

regime transitions? Previous

new regime

(and promises not to use

Both the military and

can the civilian

controls over the military and reduce

'

In addition to the

works

its

the

new

size

state

its

itself:

literature has

monopoly on

civilian

regime perceive

their

to a later date.

Only

gain sufficient institutional

and threat level enough

to risk

cited above, the transitional justice literature includes, for

example. Kritz Transitional Justice 1995: Hayner Unspeakable Truths 2001

and the Rule of Law in New Democracies 1997. The
is explored more fully in Chapter II.

Transitional Justice
relations literature

At

from prosecution and

by deferring the question of accountability

literature suggests,

19

civil -military relations in the area

force) and the civilian politicians agree to protect the military

1

twenty years.

and new civilian leaders agree to a trade-off:

that in these situations the military

with time, the

last

two bodies of literature an important question presents

of human rights accountability during and

assumed

alter politicians

16

:

McAdams

civil-military

institutionalizing

mechanisms of human

rights accountability over the military. Chapter

assesses the evolution of civil-military relations over

Argentina and the scholarly

literature that

At the end of Chapter
South America, that of Peru

II. I

in

explain

in the

how

to

a

more

recent case of regime change in

test the

oversee a

First.

I

rights accountability over the military should

offer the hypothesis that the

new

in

like those

of Chile. Brazil

democratic regime to impose

have been greater than

comparative cases and closer to that of Argentina during
hypothesize that

competing arguments scholars

pacted transition

or Uruguay, therefore suggesting the capacity of the

human

its

transition.

in

these

Second.

I

Peru, to a greater extent than in Argentina or Chile, a highly

organized sector of civil society with the backing of a transnational activist network

was able

and

region and isolate the impact of factors the

Peruvian case does not share with the others.
Peruvian military was not able

rights matters in Chile

has evolved to account for such change.

2000. allows us to

have derived from previous cases

human

II

to insert itself into the process

2"

of negotiating the transition, and that the

influence of this set of actors allow ed the

new Peruvian regime

to quickly institutionalize

principles of accountability that the Argentine and Chilean governments struggled to

assert in the years after their transitions. In Argentina, the military ultimately resorted to

threatening violence to prevent

military

w as no

long able or

human

w illing

rights accountability for

to wield

such

its

threats. In other

abuses: in Peru, the

w ords.

1

hypothesize

See Keck and Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders 1998. Youngers Violencia Politico y
Sociedad Civil en el Peru 2003. Keck and Sikkink are credited with identifying

phenomena. They define such
networks as including those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound
together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and
services. The idea of the TAN as key actor in human rights struggles is explored in
more detail in chapters II and IV.
transnational activist networks as important political

17

that the

main determinant of whether military

institutions are able to successfully

negotiate during a regime transition for protection from accountability for

violations

is

rights

the relative leverage the military and relevant transnational activist network

enjoy over civilian institutions of government
In Peru, the

human

human

TAN had much

rights

at

the

moment of the

transition of power.

greater leverage over the state than did the

military at the time of the regime transition in 2000.

The calculus of civil-military bargaining during

transitions

is

clearly changing,

and analysis of the Peruvian case can bring us much closer to understanding the actors
and strategies
levels

that

shape the outcomes of these power struggles

of uncertainty.

By

building on the literature on transnational activist networks and

the alliances that enable domestic civil society to

political arena

of transitioning

states.

I

become

transition and democratic consolidation. Chapters

of regime change

increasingly

also hope to contribute

behavior of these groups, which have been under-studied

stud\'

context of high

in the

in Peru, specifically

III.

in the

knowledge about the

in the

IV and

empowered

V

context of regime

offer a detailed case

focused on changes in civil-military relations

during that transition. Though the Peruvian military peacefully handed political power

over to civilians in 1980.

Each

it

remained a powerful force

in

Peruvian politics

electoral cycle or crisis elicited predictions of a military coup.

military served as the

until

2000.

During the 1990s. the

backbone of the authoritarian Fujimori regime:

its

support for the

1992 self-coup carried out by Fujimori underscored the collaboration between the
president and the military.

the area of

human

rights

The military acted

virtually

and control of areas under

the collapse of the Fujimori regime

came

unchecked by the government

state

of emergency

status.

Yet when

in 2000. not only did the military not rebel,

18

in

it

submitted to immediate changes

in its

high command, reductions

powers, direct challenges to the authority over
throughout

its

history,

)

set

how

had enjoyed

officials.

about dismantling the corruption and impunity that characterized the

of the

on two

to rely

it

the transitional administration of President Paniagua

armed forces of the 1080s and 1990s. Given
institutions

rights issues

and prosecutions of numerous military

Chapter IV explores
(2000-2001

human

in its institutional

the total collapse of public trust in

all

but especially in Congress and the justice system, Paniagua opted

state,

institutions outside the traditional state institutions to

determine crucial

matters of transitional justice: the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (to decide

whether amnesties for members of the armed forces should be upheld and whether those
convicted under Fujimori

s

extensive antiterrorism legislation deserved retrials

civilian, rather than military courts)

human

rights violations

reforms of the
of the

human

rights

(to assess responsibility for

committed during the previous twenty years and recommend

and the armed

state

and a Truth Commission

in

TAN

at

w ork

Relying on these institutions met the demands

forces).

in Peru,

and

in

both institutions

members of that

TAN

held particularly strong influence.

In Chapter V.

my

case study of Peru concludes

w ith an assessment of civil-

military relations and transitional justice efforts during the Toledo administration (2001-

2006).

When the

institutions

activists

power

of the

based

regime
state

human

was

in a strong

to shape the

include

fell in

2000. the military

greatly

domestic

new regime

s

s

w eakened, and
human

rights

agenda. The

rights accountability for

bargaining position vis-a-vis other

a

committed network of transnational

movement did enjoy unprecedented

initial

outcome of the

members of the

19

transition

seemed

military, a reversal of the

to

impunity under which the military had operated throughout Peruvian history. But
that the ability

of actors outside the

was

that the military

human

state to affect civil-military relations

able to maintain

many of its

traditional sources

The Peruvian case helps us

rights accountability.

find

soon eroded and

of protection from

determine the conditions

to

under which transnational activist networks and their partners
are able to affect

I

major changes, but also the strong barriers

in

domestic

civil society

to their sustaining that

influence.

Ultimately, institutional weaknesses, the delegitimization of the state in the eyes

of the public, and the rational choices of politicians served
the military

s

exemption from accountability for human

courts. In particular, the

movement of the

to

block greater efforts to end

rights violations in civilian

transitional justice

agenda out of the

InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
into the judicial

system of the country presented challenges

agenda. The public

s trust in

to the legitimacy

the legal system (and indeed in

continued to erode over the course of Toledo

s

all

institutions

of that

of the

state)

presidency, but public trust in the armed

forces rebounded. Transitional justice efforts such as truth commissions focus in large

pan on changing public perceptions, especially
the rule of law prevails.

Once

took over responsibility for

system
the

may

public

work of the

human

truth

trust in the rule

of civilian courts

trust that

rights accountability, public distrust in the legal

commission might have made

in

in

of law. This gave the armed forces (with their

greater public approval) the opportunity to reassert

s distrust

of creating public

commission concluded and the courts

actually have reversed any gains the truth

development of public

much

the

in the sense

order to return

20

its

human

interests

by playing on the

rights cases to military courts.

They were

also able to recover their

financial, political

few years

and

rights accountability:

it

the fact that politicians

for research

democracy

is

true of

is

both the public

lobby Congress and the President for

s

in

Chapter VI.

norms and

I

is

even more true of human
is

corrupt and inept and

practices.

conclude by reflecting on the implications of this study

who

in

Latin America.

I

also suggest that the

seek to influence civil-military relations offers rewarding

avenues of research, as does the military
political realities

Peru today

sense that the state

on the consolidation of democracy

proliferation of actors

had been so severely jeopardized only a

incentives to promote reform have diminished that severely limit

the consolidation of democratic

Finally, in

to

institutional supports that

What

before.

power

by improvising

s

continued capacity to adapt

political tools to protect

21

its

most

itself to

new

vital interests.

new

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE AND CASES
As we approach
civil-military relations,

the question of

it is

helpful to keep in

factors relevant to this study. First.

between the armed
the theoretical

offer

two

I

will

forces, civil society

models

human

mind

the variety of actors

examine the

and

that help us explain

democracy

literature

change

in

human
human

of two Latin American countries

as part of Huntington

briefly introduce the case of Peru

s

third

and causal

on the relationship

civilian state leaders in Latin

brief case studies that highlight the role of

civil-military relations

wave

and suggest

of

rights accountability in the context

.

that

America, and

rights policy.

Second.

will

rights debates in the evolving

underwent transitions

Argentina and Chile. Finally.

how

I

that country s experience

I

to

will

with the

struggle traced in this chapter can contribute to theory-testing and theory-building.

I.

At

first

Evolving Debates about Civil-Military Relations

glance, the study of civil-military relations in Latin

America looks

like

an

outdated endeavor. The early literature on civil-military relations established the
traditional pattern of civil-military relations in Latin

America,

in

which the armed

forces,

often the most developed institution of the state, enjoyed a privileged status that entitled

and endowed them with the responsibility

them

to special rights

state

whenever government

blossomed

in the

to intervene in affairs

failed to serve the interests of the public.

1

The

of

field then

1970s as earlier predictions that military modernization would

1

The early literature that established the problematique of civil-military relations in Latin
America includes Johnson The Military and Society in Latin America 964: Lieuwen
Arms and Politics in Latin America 1961; McAlister Fuero Militar 1957: Huntington The
1

Soldier

and the

State

1

957.

;

contribute to democratization in developing countries ran up against the hard reality of

military coups

d

elat

and regimes across Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

In Latin

America especially scholars produced an embarrassment of research riches as they
explored the causes and characteristics of military power over the
the continuity provided

by the

cultural under-pinnings

including the historic role of the cciudiUo (or

under his

command

and Society, were

as the saviors of the state.

able to combine

thought with McAlister

horseback

Some,

like Alfred

s

of the tradition of military fueros (or special privileges) from
7

According

to these scholars,

the capacity of Latin

)

stressed

and the armed forces

Stepan

in his

emphasis on corporatist

focus on the Latin American military

s

Many

of Latin American society,

man on

Howard Wiarda

state.

s

its

1978 State

political

institutional inheritance

Spanish predecessors.

2

deep-rooted cultural and institutional legacies constrained

America

modernize

to

in the teleological

progression toward

Western democracy some of the scholarship of the 1960s suggested.
Others located the causes of Latin America

change rather than continuity. Guillermo

O

turn to military authoritarianism in

s

Donnell in particular led the way by offering

the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism (BA).

O

Donnell, like Samuel Huntington,

argued that military praetorianism could be explained as result of uneven modernization
within the state and increasing volatility in the public sphere as a result of economic

change. While Huntington emphasized the strength of the armed forces relative to other

institutions

of the

state,

most

BA

scholars narrowed in on military regimes sense of

chaos in the public sphere as demanding their intervention into

'

The

literature that cast suspicion

on modernization

theorists

politics.

Growing public

predictions for civil-

and Society 1978 and Military in Politics 1971
Wiarda Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change 1973: Finer Man on
Horseback 1976.
military relations included Stepan State

demands, spurred on by economic growth and populist

1

politicians

from the 1930s

to the

950s. unleashed the power of the masses and the danger of subversion. The armed

now

forces of the region, subscribing

than a

man on horseback

as

ideal

its

image of a technocratic bureaucracy rather

to the

of national leadership, imposed

national security state

.

in

War

military regimes rationalized their

given the international Communist
In the 1980s. scholarship

America of the

led to the evolution throughout Latin

which

regimes to

economic growth." The confluence of social

deliver stability and hence insure continued

mobilization with the Cold

BA

power

as necessary

threat.

on Latin American

civil-military relations experienced

another great shake-up. Suddenly, militaries were retreating to the barracks and handing

power over

the state back to civilians and electoral systems.

economic policy

failures

and internal divisions during

pointed to a variety of crises of legitimacy

Though Karen Remmer lamented
and performance

to explain

They might w ell be
quantify, but they

that

O

terms

in

suffered disastrous

power, and scholars

to explain their ultimate surrender

of power.

the return to the concepts of legitimacy, effectiveness

regime change, few could ignore or avoid these concepts.

slippery concepts, difficult to plug into causal arguments or to

seemed even more relevant

to the political context

of the 1950s. when Seymour Martin Lipset

variable to explaining the distribution of

"

their

Most had

first

of the 1980s than to

embraced legitimacy as the crucial

pow er among

4

state actors.

Donnell Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism 1973: Huntington

Political

Order

in

Changing Societies 1968.

4

Among the most influential and insightful pieces of the academic literature on military
regime breakdown are Rouquie Military and State in Latin America 1987: Remmer
Military Rule in Latin America 1989 and New Wine or Old Bottlenecks? 1991:
r

24

Regardless, by the 1990s the cycle of civil-military relations and

appeared to have come
regimes. Those

who

full-circle,

sought

to

having dealt with both the

rise

its

scholarship

and demise of military

make sense of the wave of regime change of the previous

decade divided between triumphalists declaring the decline of authoritarianism
throughout the world as the Cold

War ended and

more pessimistic scholars who continued
relations

and democracy

in the region.

bemoan

to

the state of both civil-military

Ultimately, the

first

predicting an end to military coups as a path to political

latter

group was largely accurate

power

in Latin

who warned

embraces elections and

democracy

against treating

civilian leadership

came

to

in

America, but the

group provided insights contemporary scholars are continuing to explore.

particular, those

that

democracies multiplied, and

electoral

as the natural status

In

of a

state

dominate the debate over

democratization. In the area of civil-military relations, such scholars warned that the

domains of influence

military often continued to exert control over

the course of negotiating the return to civilian leadership.

reality

of authoritarian governance

in Latin

between democracy and dictatorship,

Where

it

reserved to itself in

the Cold

War and

the

America had promoted a simple dichotomy

in the

990s scholarship embraced a variety of

1

approaches to tracking democratic quality and the persistence of power relationships that
failed to reflect principles

O

Brien and

Cammack

of liberal democratic governance.'

Generals

in

Retreat 1985: Danopolous

From

Military to Chilian

Rule 1992.
"

Research that emphasized the military

7

s ability to

includes Stepan Rethinking Military Politics

democratic Means?

America

1

1

1990: Cruz and Diamint

exert considerable political

988: Hagopian

The

power

Democracy by L nderT

New Military Autonomy

in Latin

power and
Reforming Civil-

998. That which emphasized the dramatic decline of military

predicted normalization of civil-military affairs includes Huntington

Military Relations

1995:

Sigmund Approaches

to the

Study of the Military

in Latin

.

A
and

fundamental question that concerned scholars of civil-military relations during

after the third

control of the

wave of democratization,

armed

forces and the

new

then,

ideal

was how

to define civilian,

democratic

of civil-military relations. There were

important antecedents for this debate, certainly, especially in the difference of opinion

between Samuel Huntington,

who embraced

the notion

of the armed forces as a

hermetically sealed institution, cut off from the rest of society because of
nature and incompatibility with liberal ideals, and Morris Janowitz.

greater interaction between the

armed forces and

who

its

hierarchical

envisioned

civil society as vital to the

democratization of civil-military relations. For Huntington, democratic civil-military
relations represented an effect of the professionalization of military institutions,

turn required high levels of military autonomy.

military

s

To Janowitz. on

which

in

the other hand, the

self-seclusion from other democratic institutions and society at large

were

roadblocks to the process of democratic consolidation and liberal civil-military relations.

Hence

this

debate can be cast as one over the appropriateness of modernization vs.

civilianization of the

The most

armed

6

forces.

influential concept to

articulation of the difference

aimed

emerge from

this

between objective and

forces. Subjective civilian control implies the

debate was Huntington

subjective

s

civilian control of the

supremacy of civilian decision-

America 1993. The research that evolved from the insights of both strains of literature,
and on which this project seeks to build, includes Diamint Control civil y Fuerzas
Armadas en las mievas democracias latinoamericanos 1999: Pion-Berlin Civil-Military
Relations in Latin America 2001
’

Pedraglio.

Tamayo, and

Castillo

Mi li tares 2004; Hungtinton The
Soldier 1971: Feaver

Fuerzas Armadas: Control Civil y Relaciones Civiland the State 1957: Janowitz The Professional

Soldier

The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington. Janowitz, and

Question of Civilian Control

1996.
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the

makers over the

institutions

of the armed forces, but

such a

in

way

as to violate the

principles of military professionalization and autonomy. For example, as

Peru

civ ilian

presidents have enjoyed varying degrees of control over the

since the return to

democracy

However,

in 1980.

this control

we

shall see. in

armed forces

was most often achieved by

intervening in the promotion of military leadership as to place presidential cronies in

command. While

this lent presidents like

power over

the behavior of the

the military

and damaging

control of the

armed

relations in order to

civilian

its

forces,

armed

Alan Garcia (1985-1990) a higher

forces,

it

level of

also had the effect of de-institutionalizing

capacity to guarantee national security. Objective civilian

on the other hand,

utilizes

democratic reform of civil-military

advance the armed forces capacity for defense while ensuring

supremacy. According

to this

model, the aim

is

power

not simply to minimize the

of the armed forces relative to civilian regimes, but to maximize military capacity for
defense while eliminating the dynamic of competition between

institutions

of the

state.

civil ian

and military

Huntington identified four characteristics essential to objective

civilian control:

1

)

a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of

the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the

military to the civilian political leaders

and military policy:

3) the recognition

area of professional competence and

who make

the basic decisions

on foreign

and acceptance by that leadership of an

autonomy

for the military:

and 4) as a

result,

the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention
in the military.

Huntington Stare and Soldier 1957 and

Reforming Civil-Military Relations

9-10: on the application of these concepts to the Peruvian case, see Pedraglio.

1995.

p.

Tamayo

and Castillo Fuerzas Armadas: Control
Rospigliosi Las Fuerzas

reforma de

las fuerzas

civil y relaciones civil-militares 2004. ch. 2:
Armadas y La Democracia 2001 and La frustracion de la

de seguridad.

2006. For an excellent review of the evolving

debate over civil-military relations, see
fuerza

armada en

el

Peru

Tamayo Hacia un

2003. on which

my treatment

draws upon.
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control civil democratico de

of the literature in this chapter

la

Subjective control

is

easier to achieve than objective control, but

can often

it

diminish the long-term likelihood of objective control and leaves open the possibility of
institutionalist forces

within the military reacting against the threat to their

professionalism. Rather than establishing the supremacy of civilian institutions over

military ones, moreover, establishing subjective control merely

group of civilians asserting that power.

When

empowers

the civilians in control of the state change,

the problem of asserting authority arises anew, dependent as the authority

and

ability

of previous leaders

to

paraphrase Huntington, there are

coopt or coerce the military to

many paths

relative to civilian leaders (cuts in

supports, intervention into

to

size, elimination

civilian control (the auto-professionalization of military personnel

forces,

ends.

the will

To

of institutional

one path

structures, etc) but only

system of independent democratic institutions

own

its

was on

diminishing the power of the military

budget and force

command

the particular

that respect the

to objective

and bodies,

a

working

autonomy of the armed

and clearly delineated and accepted norms of civil-military relations).
For twenty years, scholars have employed the concepts of subjective and

objective control in civil-military relations, but have often rejected Huntington

conclusion that objective control requires less civilian

As

the brutality of military regimes throughout Latin

problem was not so
in this experience

the region

much

convincing evidence

would inevitably develop

civilian control

in military affairs.

America made painfully

autonomy

a lack of military

interference

as a great excess of

that, left to their

own

s

devices, the

it.

clear, the

Few found

armed forces of

into highly professionalized institutions accepting

and democratic norms of ci\

il-military relations.
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J.

Samuel Fitch and

of

.

Abraham Lowenthal.

for

example, pointed

to

abundant evidence that high levels of

military professionalism had generally resulted in military interventions in Latin

America, not objective civilian control.
In the 1990s. the literature

suggested

in

Arceneaux.

Chapter

that

I

of

this text

on

7

civil-military relations reflected the reality, as

and the work of authors such as Pion-Berlin and

even years after the return

to

democracy, the armed forces of Latin

America often held decision-making power over matters

that rightly

power of civilian governments. Robert Kohn and Rut Diamint.
any country

in

which decisions about security policy, including the

procedures of military operations, resided

in military

Often, this problem arose as

much from

the

example, argued that
size,

power and barred

altering such policies, democratic civilian control of the

exist.

for

belonged under the

organization and

civilians

from

armed forces could not be

weakness of civilian

effectively direct defense policy as from military resistance.

9

said to

politicians to

Marcela Donadio widened

the debate by reincorporating non-state actors into the discussion, and

embracing the role

of ideas as well as power. She argued that three factors should be considered: the
attitudes of

members of the

military, particularly their acceptance or rejection of the idea

of political intervention on the part of the armed forces: the will and capacity of civilian
politicians to exert effective control over defense policy:

state

and armed forces. Where the armed forces continue

of a tutelary role of the military, or where they

Fitch and

Agtiero
g

Low enthal Annies and Politics

fail to

in Latin

and societal attitudes toward the
to impart to recruits the values

impress upon their members the

America 1986: on

El futuro de las relaciones civil-mi litares en Chile

Kohn Los Fundamentos Olvidados

this point, see also

2001

del Control Civil sobre los Militares en

Gobiernos

Democraticos 1997: Diamint Control Civil y Fuerzas Armadas en las nuevas
democracias latinoamericanas 999.
1

1

principles of civilian

supremacy and democratic norms, objective

be thoroughly consolidated. If the public persists

in

perceiving the armed forces as a

legitimate alternative to democratically elected leadership, and

government
Finally,

fails to

where

civilian control cannot

where democratic

achieve public legitimacy, civil-military relations remain

civilian leaders lack either the will or the capacity to

policy, they abdicate their democratic responsibilities to the

in peril.

manage defense

armed forces and endanger

1

the consolidation of objective civilian control."

In other words, as Paul

interest

Sigmund argued,

the

armed

forces had

group competing for influence over resources and policy.

1

by many scholars of civil-military relations has tended

this notion

direction of the rationalist

paradigm

in political science,

become one more

The acceptance of
to tip the field in the

which emphasizes

strategic

action based on self-interest. Groups, organizations, and individuals are treated alike by

rationalists:

each are driven by a

set

of preferences that lead the actors to behave

they believe will help them achieve their goals. Understanding change

determining the interests of the political players

who

is

in

ways

a matter of

exercise control over decision-

making. the varied levels of power amongst these players, and the strategies employed by

them

to attain their goals.

virtually all

111

Because few

political actors

can simply impose their

decision-making and political change results from interaction

Donadio Las relaciones civico militates y

la

11

civil

democratico de

Sigmund Approaches

to the

2003: see also

Fuerza Armada en

el

Peru

Study of the Military

in

Latin America

la

30

among

several

construccion de instituciones en America

Latina: enfrentando la crisis de las jovenes democracies

un control

will,

Tamayo Hacia

2003.
1994.

Given

actors.

must take the

that political actors

and influence of others

interests

into

account to achieve their goals, rationalist explanations often involve analysis of how
coalition building

and bargaining

Rationalism

its

leads to

wide

applicability. Still, the

political realities. Critics

bounded

outcomes.

an appealing approach to explaining political phenomenon

few core assumptions lend

because

complex

is

strategies affect political

it

a high degree of elegance and a flexibility

have pointed out that actors demonstrate only

may

not

seem

rational at

all.

for

example,

unless one accepts that preferences and perceptions are highly actor-specific.

rational to a suicide

which

assumptions clearly represent a simplification of

their preferences

rationality

in part

What seems

bomber depends very much on subjective assumptions others cannot

assume. Similarly, the assumption that interests are fixed renders the approach overly

static:

do change,

actors

after all. Particularly in the context

wisdom of engaging overly

models of political outcomes seems

strict rationalist

questionable. In these situations, the rules of the

of tlux. change

is

inevitable,

of regime transitions, the

game

are largely

and expected outcomes are more

unknow n

or in a state

difficult to predict.

Yet compelling arguments for the application of rationalist approaches to politics
have been made by
politics

many

scholars, not least

such as regime change.

1

'

among them

Wendy Hunter

s

those

work over

who

the last decade provides

compelling evidence of the applicability of rationalist arguments
civil-military relations.

lj

Hunter, like other rationalists, begins

Barbara Geddes Politician s Dilemma 1994
1

'

See Hunter

Brazil
State

is

study large shifts in

in explaining

w ith

the

changing

assumption

that

perhaps the best example.

Reason. Culture, or Structure? Assessing Civil-Military Dynamics

in

200 1 Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers 1 997.
and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military s Role in Argentina. Brazil
.
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the

main goal of politicians

will see an

advantage

in

is

political survival. In post-authoritarian states, politicians

when

challenging the military

the actions of the military

negatively impact the popularity and survival of the politicians. However, in situations of

economic or

hold the same preferences: legislators

political crisis, not all politicians will

(who generally have

little

to fear directly

from a coup, which typically only replaces the

executive) will continue to challenge the military

if this

improves their popularity, while

presidents will seek the support of the military, even if this requires sacrificing

some

degree of political autonomy to the military (a rational choice meant to optimize the
president

s political

survival).

For presidents, then, challenges

to the military are

calculated to win political gains with the public without antagonizing the military to the

extent that they put the regime in danger of a coup.

Typical of rationalist approaches to transitions
occurring

in distinct

phases or stages. Guillermo

0

is

a treatment of political change as

Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter.

Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Transitions (1986). are credited with

in

first

popularizing this analytical approach to democratization in Latin America, and numerous
scholars have carried on the tradition. In particular, scholars sought to differentiate the

actors, interests,

and conditions prevailing during the stages of authoritarianism

s

demise,

the formative transition stage, and democratic consolidation or deconsolidation in the

wake of transitions. Adam Przeworski

clarified

another most of all: the degree of uncertainty in
calculations and interact to establish

elaborated in her seminal article.

and Chile

1996. and

w hat

sets these stages apart

w hich

new political

political actors

arrangements.

Dilemmas of Democratization

from one

must make

As Terry Lynn

Karl

:

^Continuidad o Cambio? Las relaciones civico militares en

Argentina. Chile v Peril Democraticos

1998.

their

of the game during a regime transition expands
the boundaries of contingent choice. Indeed, the dynamics of the transition
revolve about strategic interactions and tentative arrangements between actors

The absence of predictable

rules

with uncertain power resources aimed

at

defining

who

will legitimately be

game, what criteria will determine the winners and
losers, and what limits will be placed on the issues at stake. From this perspective,
regime consolidation occurs when contending social classes and political groups
entitled to play in the political

come to accept some set of formal rules or informal understandings that determine
who gets what, where, when, and how from politics. In so doing, the}' settle into
predictable positions and legitimate behaviors by competing according to

mutually acceptable

For Karl. then,
collapse

is

it

is this

14

rules.

where

phase

the uncertainty

superseded by strategic interactions formulating

pivotal transition

moment

successor regime and

its

itself

level

revolutionary, and reformist.

employed by key

new

that is especially important in

rules

of the game, the

determining the type of

modes of transition:

The mode of transition

is

pacted. imposed,

determined by the strategies of

actors and the relative strength each holds. Karl defines

democratic transitions dominated by political pressure from the masses over

employing

strategies of

transitions as pacted:

s

of consolidation.

Karl and Schmitter identify four unique

transition

provoked by the previous regime

compromise

mass ascendant

as reformist: elite dominated,

transitions

marked by

elites

and

compromise driven

the use of force as

revolutionary: and those controlled by elites wielding force as imposed. Democratization

by the purely revolutionary or imposed routes have been virtually nonexistent in the
history of Latin America, as both tend to be plagued by instability and break

rapidly

and

the}' are. in an}' case,

not inherent!}’ democratic.

Most common

down
to the Latin

14

Dilemmas of Democracy in Latin America 1990. p. 6. This section also draws
on Karl and Schmitter Modes of Transition in Latin America. Southern and Eastern
Karl

Europe

1991

Transition

.

and

On

pacted transitions, see also Linz and Stepan Problems of Democratic
Consolidation 1996: Munck and Skalnik Leff Modes of Transition and

Democratization

1997.

American experience
in

compromise

interests

is

the pacted transition to democracy, in

to protect their

own

vital interests.

of the most powerful actors

in the

which strong

Because pacted transitions protect the

regime, and because they have already proven

themselves capable of compromise, they enjoy the greatest chance
survival. Transitions to

engage

elites

democracy driven by reformist public

at

consolidation and

pressures, on the other

hand, are weakened by the persistent threat of a reassertion of the power of previously

dominant

political actors,

such as the military, and the greater degree of uncertainty

inherent to the competitive politics that

initial

deals struck by elites

of further democratization or the
society, or

the other hand, pacted

foreshadow great constraints on democratization

transitions might well

regime;

would emerge. On

any other group

left

may become

rise

of new

out of the

frozen

political

initial

in the

new

into place, closing off

contenders (such as parties,

avenues
civil

pact) in a type of corporatist

arrangement.

Although Karl

s

political actors seek to

situate

focus on the strategic choices and interaction that take place as

maneuver through

transitions to

democracy seems

Dilemmas of Democratization squarely within

argument

is.

in fact, heavily

at first to

the rationalist tradition, her

weighted towards structuralism. In

fact,

most

rationalist

explanations of change in civil-military affairs embrace concepts beyond power and
interests in their arguments. Structuralists incorporate other factors that influence the

outcomes and context of strategic bargaining among the
structural

arguments

can include analyses of society, the

can include everything from social
systems.

What

unites

actors.

them

is

class, to

state,

As

Pion-Berlin writes,

and the global order and

governing institutions, to international

attention to the impersonal forces that drive individual

34

behavior.

L"

Karl

s structuralist

rules, constraints, strategies

institutions

One
determine

states

when

set

the

organizations, rules and regimes

arguments have often prevailed

in

in the

and human

Arceneux examined

scholarship dealing with

rights policy in democratic

human

rights

and

civil-

Tipping the civil-military balance:

Argentina and Chile

.

Pion-Berlin and

the utility of three different approaches to understanding and

rights issues. First they

and transitional approaches. Traditional scholarship on the military

in

assumed the military was powerful enough

to

newly democratizing Latin American
prevent

operating within Latin American

outcome of civil-military bargaining over human

traditional

to

democratizing states of the region. Such

military relations in Latin America. For example, in

predicting the

past.

of structuralist arguments also examines domestic institutions

shape civilian and military behavior

examine

conditioned by the political

political actor are nevertheless

and socioeconomic structures inherited from the

how

institutions

she writes that, though old

and power balances are upset during regime transitions, the

each

political choices before

bent becomes clear

human rights

states

initiatives threatening to their authority or prestige.

The

transitions

argument, on the other hand, was not willing to take military strength as uniform and

claimed instead that the chances for

human

rights initiatives in these states to

meet with

success depended greatly on the balance of pow er and influence between the military and
other key actors during the transition. While the traditional argument dominated research

on the Latin American military
that a

transitions approach

manage

L>

the transition to

into the early 1990s. a

wave of new scholarship argued

examined the conditions w hich enable the armed forces

democracy

in

to

such a way as to maintain their control of human

Pion-Berlin Civil-Military Relations 2001. p.

14.

rights matters.

By honing

military to democratic

in

on the

moment of the hand-over of political power from

government and establishing the balance of power between the

power players

at that

moment, they believed they could predict

agendas

in the

wake of the

rights

strong armies taint

outcomes
indelible

new democracies with

to their favor. In transitions

mark on

institutions or

They argued

transition.

that

the course of

in

restrictions, thus tilting

by collapse, weak armies
16

on future policy.

The

human

controlled transitions,

programmatic

fail to

leave their

transitions approach, in keeping

with the strategic bargaining strain of rationalist arguments, focuses on power as the
explanatory factor shaping civil-military relations.

While acknowledging the contribution of both these approaches. Pion-Berlin and
Arceneaux conclude
success

that

evidence shows not only that there were instances of policy

thereby disproving the traditional argument that the military necessarily

retains veto

power over human

but also that these are not fully explained

rights issues

by the transitional balance of power.

Instead they propose an institutional

model and

hypothesize that institutional concentration and autonomy in the executive branch are the

most important determinants of outcomes
comparative case studies of Argentina and
gains occur

when policymaking

authority

Through analysis of the

in this conflict.

Civile,

is

they determine that

Human

centered in a few hands and where the

president can use institutional channels suitably closed to military influence.

of concentration and autonomy
success.

16

P.

result in policy setbacks:

For example, as we shall explore

rights

in the case

634.
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mixed

Low

levels lead to

levels

moderate

study section of this chapter:

Argentina has been moderately successful

in

pursuing a

human

rights agenda,

whereas Chile has experienced more mixed results Not only were Argentine and
Chilean human rights programs proposed in the face of military opposition, but to
varying degrees, they were implemented as well. Notwithstanding their setbacks,
the democratic governments of both these countries accomplished more than
traditional scholarship would have predicted.'

As
meant

to

the incidence of prosecution,

punishment and other accountability mechanisms

respond to grievous human rights violations committed by members of the

once-all-powerful militaries of Latin America proliferate, our ability to test the accuracy

of the Pion-Berlin/Arceneaux argument grows. If we accept Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux

s

(

argument

that the traditional explanation

transitions

argument

is

was once

rioht. but

partly right, but insufficient:

us a fuller picture of the long-term likelihood of

and

human

no longer: that the

that an institutional angle gives

rights accountability for these

tl

military actors,

we

will learn greatly

by applying the model

to other states in similar
k

•

circumstances to those of Chile and Argentina.

K

#

A

better understanding of the impact

of
N,

!r

bargaining positions during transitions and the consequences of institutional factors (and

1

Vl

what institutions matter)

wav towards

after the dust

tracing the process of

of transition begins

human

rishts

to settle

policv-makine

H

would bring us

a fair

As

Pion-

in these states.

§
3

Berlin concludes in another piece.

Civil-Military Circumvention:

How Argentine

State
^
<

Institutions

Compensate

for a

Weakened Chain

of

Command

.

automatically translate preferences into policy because their will

institutions.

17

P.

An institutional

powerful actors cannot

is

mediated by political

approach has the advantage of explaining

633-4.
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in

what areas the

.

military

is

and

not able to

is

make

its

presence known.

It

does so by identifying those

procedural or structural characteristics of governing agencies that either open up or

restrict the military s

Some

18

access to centers of power.

more on

structuralists focus

international, rather than domestic, factors.

rapid and far-reaching changes civil-military relations in Latin

recently can.

some

structuralists argue, largely be explained

the end of the Cold War:

new

international pressures for

The

America have undergone

by changes resulting from

economic cooperation, peaceful

negotiation of inter-state conflicts, and less repressive military tactics (which can no

longer be justified as part of a necessary response to an

Communist

threat).

combination of these changes implies changing roles for the military

However, given
Latin

American

argument

that the conflicts that

less than compelling.

have often most often driven military power

and rationalists alike have run up against the reality that human

of low

politics

self-interest to adopt activist stances, either at

P. 155.

high politics

2001 and Aguero

and the Military

in

For example, Lowenthal Partners

Post-Cold

War

internal nature

one

War

The Changing

which

by

human

rights (like the

in Conflict:

and Bargaining: Civilians

2001

The United Stales

in Latin

America 1987

ought to improve civil-military relations in Latin

International

of securin' threats

states are less driven

Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina

Institutions. Transitions,

Southern Latin America

prioritizes the international

in

or in the realm of international

Shaping Post-Authoritarian Regimes

suggests the end of the Cold

in

home

For similar arguments, see Trinkunas

America; Desch

.

issues of defense or economics,

and Venezuela

|g

in

19

rights typically constitute an area

Unlike

in these states.

are internal rather than international in nature, others have found this

Structuralists

affairs.

The

Environment and Civil-Military Relations
this position on the basis of the

1998 rejects

in the region.

For another structuralist analysis that

dimension, see Wendt and Barnett

Formation and Third World Militarization

1993.
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Dependent State

environment) offer activist states fewer rewards for intervening
states.

The

electoral benefits to be

domestic affairs of other states

powerful

write,

may

be high, especially

might then be applied

state interests in the

to the influence

in a

commodity

ists

in the

sense of creating precedents

precedents which. Pion-Berlin and

to the activist state itself. In the

politics

absence of

realm of human rights, the field

of non-state actors, including

organizations, and social activ

by dealing

low

of other

had are few. while the costs of intervention into the

for eroding the sovereignty of other states

Arceneaux

in the affairs

human

is

largely left

rights groups, parts of international

domestically and abroad. These actors derive influence

vital to the strategic interactions

of traditional

(public legitimacy) and by changing the actors perceptions of their

own

political actors

interests

(ideas).""

Hence, the addition of structural factors to

rationalist explanations

does not

exhaust the potential explanatory approaches. Culturalist, or what Pion-Berlin sometimes

calls

Subjective

.

approaches have received less attention from political scientists

interested in civil-military relations than

have

paradigm represents a broad array of research

rationalist or structuralist approaches.

interests

The

united by their general concerns

about ideas and more specifically about beliefs, attitudes, and interpretations that guide
political behavior.

not always

seem

'

to

Scholars in this field argue that ideas

fit

simple rationalist predictions

-»o

-

ideas

w hich change and may

fundamentally shape the behavior

On the low-high politics distinction and its role in determining which actors will be
drawn to activism on an issue, see Arceneux and Pion-Berlin Transforming Latin
America 2005. ch. and 2. The high-low distinction is based on a long tradition in the
international relations literature, going back to Keohane and Nye Power and
1

Interdependence 1977.
Pion-Berlin Civil -Military Relations 2001, ch.

1.

of individuals and the organizations of which they form a
interests

that

political actor, they

shape that actor

time.

of a

of a

The

s identity,

would

and the ways

in

we

We cannot understand the

understand the ideas and beliefs

which these ideas and

socialization that occurs within organizations turns ideas

such as the

political culture

scholars examine the

ways

in

political culture

encompasses research
norms, the

latter

that focuses

of which

is

of the military.

beliefs

and

change over

beliefs into part

Some

culturalist

which organizations incorporate new information and ideas

into their political culture, a process

all

argue, until

part.

known

as political learning. This broad approach

on domestic

political culture! s)

often referred to as

these scholars are interested in

the process through

about right and wrong held by individuals

)

about proper behavior for a given identity

).

on the role of norms within the

constructivist

state in

scholarship. In essence,

which principled ideas

become norms
22

First, lets

shaping

and on international

(

(

beliefs

collective expectations

consider

some of the

civil -military affairs;

then

we

research

will turn to

the role of non-state actors operating outside or across state boundaries in shaping the

norms

that

govern

Clearly, the

norms

in the values

American

like

J.

armed forces themselves

Samuel Valenzuela find evidence of

in these

norms.

2

'

Brian

Loveman

argues that even in 1999. for

military.

>">

"

2

'

The socialization of human
Wendt and Katzenstein 1996. p. 54.

Risse and Sikkink

Jepperson.

Valenzuela

is

of military institutions in Latin America, others are deeply skeptical

of any significant change
the Latin

rights.

that guide the self-perception of the

of central concern here. While scholars

change

of human

state actors in the field

Military Attitudes toward

Know If Anything Has Changed?

rights

Democracy

For other

1999. p.

7.

quoting

America: How
examining the role of

in Latin

literature

40

norms

Do We

Democracy and human rights remained ambiguous terms more instrumental
rhetoric imposed by the United States and its temporary Latin American civilian
norms. Military institutions continued to press for amnesty
human rights abuses and to emphasize political stability and

allies than inviolable

decrees for earlier

respect for law and order as requisite conditions for development."

Even

if military 7 attitudes

have changed, the question of whether such change

cause or an effect of changed power relationships remains open. Jennifer

volume

Political Learning

and Redemocratization

Learn from Political Crises? (2000) examines

in

Latin America:

how political

Do

McCoy

new

a

edited

Politicians

actors internalize

understandings of reality based on evaluations of experience and

s

is

new

information. This

:

work

builds on several strains of political analvsis

which have developed since

the 1960s.
c

.

including

psychological theories of cognitive change

.

!1

among decision-makers.

organizational theories of bureaucratic or corporate behavioral change, and social

learning theories of policy change.

McCoy

The findings of this varied pool of scholarship,

argues, remain underspecified, particularly

How ever,

\

scholars have persuasively demonstrated

when

it

comes

to learning

by groups.

some of the conditions which

are

conducive to learning, such as high degrees of uncertainty, traumatic experiences, and
h

shifts in personnel."'

i

i
3

armed torces in consolidating democracy, see Kalil Mathias
Pensamiento y papel militar en America Latina en el umbral del siglo XXI 1999: Nunn
The South American Military and (Re)Democratization: Professional Thought and SelfPerception 1995: Perelli and Rial Changing Military World Views: The Armed Forces
of South America in the 1990s 1996.
resocialization

~4

"'

ot the

Loveman For La
Ch.

1.

For

Patria 1999.

p.

influential literature

274.

on the conditions under which

political learning occurs,

see. for example. Adler and P. Haas Conclusion: Epistemic Communities. World Order
and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program
992: Nve Nuclear Learning and
1

the United States: Soviet Security

Theoretical Speculations

Regimes

1987: E. Haas

1991.
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Collective Learning:

Some

Political learning

come

can

in

learning results from the valuation of

for the learner in the struggle to

results

two forms, according

new

advance

from valuation of new norms and

as right, rather than simply as necessary.

institutions

)

own

own

its

interests,

So both

purpose and ends, are engaged

new

integrated

the question of

actors, institutions

earlier, since states typically

human

rights at

campaigns

home

to address

politics affairs

have

human

states,

rights.

because they are seen

develop an

learn to manipulate those

whose sense of their own

(or their

constructivist models,

rights accountability has increasingly

its

explanatory models.

As suggested

inherent self-interest in addressing issues of

such issues. Foreign

but within the domestic realm

champion human

game and

or internationally, non-state actors often

of other

-

newly established democratic regimes and

and forces into
little

sake

political actors that

among proponents of culturalist and

armed forces over

represents an advantage

in real learning.

scholarship that examines the tension between

their

it

instrumental

while normative learning

own

rules for their

advantage, and political actors

Particularly

McCoy:

information because

understanding of the changed or changing rules of the
rules to their

to

move

to the forefront

states are less likely to intervene in

of

low

giving domestic actors greater control over the issue area,

it

is

often principled networks of individuals

As Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin

write,

who

those individuals are

driven more by principles and norms than by interests. Consequently, the key motivators

for

change

suasion

is

shift

from

employed

interests to ideas as

we move from

to attempt to override politicians

high to low

politics.

Moral

lack of interest or cooperation.

Admittedly, the capacity of non-state actors to effectively use moral suasion to

alter state

behavior depends in large part on their ability to change politicians sense of their

42

own

self-interests, but they

do so by embracing a discourse of norms and principles. Though
the centralized power, coordination,

such principled non-state actors lack

enforcement mechanisms necessary

have

at

times been successful

at

state to alter

its

changing

state

When

by convincing other

behavior.

large

they

to easily turn their convictions into results,

behavior by convincing politicians that

failure to adjust their behavior will result in loss

international arena, and

and

of legitimacy

at

home

states to bring pressure

or in the

on the offending

26

numbers of citizens mobilized

to pressure their

governments

to reject

:

impunity

in favor ot justice tor the

human

victims ot

rishts violations perpetrated

under
c

authoritarian systems, they used the greater ease of communication

national boundaries to network with activ

publication of Margaret

this

new phenomenon of internationalized

largely

by the

s

Activists

Beyond Borders

pressure groups gained a

TANs

are

at the

in

the

1998,

new name:

networks of activists, distinguishable

held up the

human

rights

movements popping up throughout Latin

end of the twentieth century as one of their main case studies of the

Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin Transforming Latin America 2005.

of NGOs and

With

centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation.

Keck and Sikkink
America

travel across

across the region and beyond.

Keck and Kathryn Sikkink

transnational activist networks (TANs).

~h

ists

and

civil society in

ch.

1

and

2.

On

the role

shaping post-transition civil-military relations, see Diamint

1999; Fuentes La respuesta
Global Hitman Rights 1981: Khagram et al
Restructuring World Politics 2002. For the related social movement literature see
Me Adam. McCarthy and Zald. eds Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements
1996; Morris and McClurg Mueller Frontiers in Social Movement Theory 1992.

Estado y sociedad

al

tema militar

civil ante la

1999:

Nanda

cuestion civico-militar

et al
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civil

phenomenon of TAN
began

influence

in politics,

both domestic and international, and even

book by highlighting

their influential

the success of

one such

TAN

in

combating

the impunity military perpetrators of massacres had enjoyed in the past."

TANs work by

building

international organizations

in

When

international system.

new

links

order to

between

civil societies, states,

multiply the channels of access to the

a state refuses to respond to pressures from domestic civil

society, activists often turn to building partnerships in other states

organizations in order to gain greater visibility

leverage over their

own

effect

(NGOs). blocked from influencing
international partners

resource exchange.

.

state policies at

more powerful

entities,

the

2

upon

internal pressure

Activists

points of

international partners. This

dense network of information and

ways

to bring pressure

on

on the

The domestic groups amplify

international partners to exert external pressure

same time they maintain

Keck and Sikkink

new

state in

usually states or international

organizations, to influence the state from without.

influence by calling

to build

in international

home, create linkages with

to build a

international partners seek

question by calling upon

and

Domestic nongovernmental organizations

and use these linkages

The

home and

at

by building pressure from these

state

boomerang

the authors term the

and

on

their

the state at

it.

Beyond Borders 1998. On

international networks

transnational activism, see also Risse. Ropp. and Sikkink The

and

Power of Human Rights

Network Analysis 1973; Risse-Kappen Bringing
McAdams, Tarrow and Tilly Dynamics of
Contention 2001; Tarrow Power in Movement 1998 and The New Transnational
Activism 2005. Parallel to the literature on TANs is that of epistemic communities;
Haas s introduction to Knowledge. Power and International Policy Coordination 1997;
1999; Boissevain and Mitchell

Transnational Relations Back In 1995;

Peterson

Whalers. Cetologists, Environmentalists and the International Management of

Whaling

1992.

On

norms, see Katzenstein Culture of National Security 1996;

Norms and Decisions 1989; Lumsdaine Moral
Koltz Norms in International Relations 1995.

Kratochwil Rules.
Politics 1993;
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Vision in International

The

actors that

make up

TAN can

a

nodes

following possible actors as

in a

he greatly varied.

Keck and Sikkink

list

the

TAN:

and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy
movements: (3) foundations: (4) the media: (5)
churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals; (6) pails of
regional and international intergovernmental organizations: and (7) parts of the
{

1

international

)

organizations; (2) local social

executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments.

But

TANs

rely

above

initiate the effort to

all

on the work of nongovernmental organizations, which typically

organize and campaign around an issue of concern to them. Unlike

traditional interest groups.

NGOs

motivated by monetary or power

and the

TANs

interests, but

they help build are not primarily

by a commitment

to a set

they value sufficiently to expend time, energy and resources to protect.

within

civil society

organize to lobby for changes

principle in question, they typically form

partners

Keck and Sikkink suggest

NGOs, who

areas

most

likely to

Human
produce

rights

When

activists

behavior that threaten the

then reach out to the plethora of

in order to multiply their (often limited) influence. In

particular, the} build linkages to international

advocacy network.

in state

of principles

NGOs

(INGOs). key components of any

and environmental issues have been the two issue

NGOs

and

TANs

over the

served as the organizing principle for between 22 and

last

30%

30 years. While human rights
of all international

betw een the 1950s and the 1990s. the number of human rights

INGOs

NGOs

quintupled over

that period.

In Latin America, a

coups and

human rights TAN began

political repression

became

salient features

to

emerge

in the

of the regional

1970s as military

political landscape,

energizing a new activism both within affected states and in Europe and the US. Between

1981 and 1990. the number of human rights

NGOs

in Latin

America increased from 220

to 550. considerably

human
style

more than

movement, powerful examples came from

rights

of networking produced

region

in the

existed in Africa. Asia, or the Middle East. Within the

new

whose

following years. In particular. Chilean organizations like the Vicaria de

INGOs

of networking with

on Latin America and
symbolic protest

Human

Madres de
like

NGOs;

a factor in

Mayo

adopted

International, the

US

political

Washington Office

end

its

repression.

human

rights

network emerged composed

private foundations (like the Ford Foundation,

supplied crucial resources); pails of

became

Plaza de

Rights Watch. and using information campaigns and

to pressure the state to

of INGOs; domestic

la

Amnesty

Eventually, a powerful Latin American

rights

.

organizational models copied by activists across the

Solidaridad and the Argentine group

strategies

political entrepreneurs

some governments

aid policy);

(like that

of the

which

US when human

and parts of regional and international

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In particular, the InterAmerican Commission for

Human

Rights and the InterAmerican Court for

Human

Rights (organized under the

Organization of American States), and the LIN Commission on

UN

Committee on

Human Rights

Particularly after Argentine

served as central

NGOs

IGO nodes

Human
in the

Rights and the

network.

discovered the usefulness of working with

international organizations with expertise in forensics to aid in the project of

documenting

state

violence via disappearances and massacres, foreign

American Association
role in the

for the

NGOs

like the

Advancement of Science played an increasingly important

TAN.
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TANs typically employ
( 1 )

four strategies to amplify their influence:

information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically

usable information and

move

it

to

symbolic politics, or the ability to

where it will have the most impact: (2)
call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make

sense of a situation for an audience that

frequently far away; (3) leverage

is

upon powerful actors to affect a situation where
weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and (4)

politics , or the ability to call

accountability politics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously
-)

stated policies or principles.

-

o

Information politics has been a central part of human rights campaigns, as domestic

NGOs

human

collect information about

rights violations in order to

international attention, justify moral arguments,

demand policy change
this as the

facts

human

that

rights

w ill

and create incentives for the network

human

reduce the threats to

methodology

.

in

command

w hich

rights.

Some have

described

investigating and then reporting the

of human rights violations in order to create a sense of urgency for change.

Infoimation about
violators

up before

In the area

military, the

NGOs

in

rights abuses allow s

TANs

to

mobilize shame

.

- "'

holding the

international attention.

of human

rights, these

main abuser of human

new networks

focused especially on the

rights in the region at the time.

Though domestic

countries like Argentina had none of the traditional sources of power

emphasized by
like the

human

to

realist

explanations of political change such as arms or money, groups

Mothers of the Plaza de

military regime by attacking

its

Mayo

found that they w ere able

legitimacy.

Even

to gain leverage

over the

authoritarian governments rely in part

on domestic and international legitimacy to maintain themselves

in

power, so domestic

28

P. 16.

Ibid: see also

cited

Thomas Holding Governments Accountable by

by Keck and Sikkink.

p.

1

9.

Public Pressure

1993:

NGOs

used symbolic politics

at

home

(such as protesting in the capitol

s

central plaza

with pictures of their disappeared sons and daughters and using their identity as mothers

to discredit

any government attacks against them) and information and leverage

with their partnerships

improvements

in the

legitimacy, the

TAN

in the

human

TAN to convince other states

reduce

Human

reliance on repression, hence the

TAN

accountability politics. Given these successes.

Rights and

Amnesty

Throughout Latin America, a

campaigns

to

up

their

advantageous

to

employed

write that

the classic

network of activists on human

state violations

campaigns were successful when they were able

International.

skillfully than in Argentina.

fluid but dense

combat

it

also successfully

Keck and Sikkink

boomerang process was executed nowhere more

issues organized

demand

successfully prevailed upon the state to invite investigatory groups

the harsh light of international scrutiny, the regime found

its

to

rights situation in Argentina. In an effort to shore

from the InterAmerican Commission on

Under

governments

politics

of human

to gain leverage

rights.

These

over the

rights

TAN

state,

often by

convincing third parties (other states or international financial institutions) to link the
state s

access to funding or international support and legitimacy to improving their

behavior. States that were vulnerable to reputational or financial leverage were good

targets for such

campaigns; where the

support in jeopardy.

TANs

state did not

value the legitimacy or financial

could expect greater obstacles to successful campaigns.

Keck and Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders 998. p. 107; see also Brvsk From Above
and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in
1

Argentina

1993.
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many of these same groups

After the transition to democracy,

demands

pressure the state to respond to

continued to

for accountability over the military.

Absent

from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). transnational

political pressure

activ ists,

judges and lawyers, few politicians seemed likely to directly challenge central military
prerogatives while they

The human

state.

curb

its

still felt

TAN

rights

vulnerable to the military

which had successfully pressured the Argentine

abuses of human rights was deeply involved

and testimony

in

human

rights,

in

state to

members of the

supplying

court cases against perpetrators. Yet. as

TAN was unsuccessful

next section, the

hold

in the efforts to

military accountable before the courts for violations of

the evidence

intervene in the

s ability to

we

achieving accountability for

shall see in the

human

violators in the years immediately after the Argentine transition. Within a

much of

rights

few years of

the return to democracy, even the convictions of the Argentine junta leadership had been

overturned by a

new amnesty,

and despite the

TANs

in the

The

efforts

human

despite the fact that

92%

of the public supported such

trials

of what Keck and Sikkink considered one of the most successful
'

1

rights world.

clearest articulation

of the role of TANs

in altering state

behavior in the area
-> -)

of human rights

is

(See Diagram

in Appendix).

series

1

of stages,

the

first.

spiral

TANs

model offered by Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink."'
According

to this

model.

campaigns move through a

pressure states to alter their repressive behavior by invoking

norms, publicizing information and mobilizing partners

31

TAN

in the international

community

Ibid. p. 109.

Risse and Sikkink

The

socialization of

international law as a source of

Sikkink

International

Human

human

Rights

human

rights

rights

change

Law and

nonns

in Latin

1999.

On

the role of

America, see Lutz and

Practice in Latin

America 2000.

to

influence the state in question.

The

state reacts

with denial, spurring greater domestic

opposition and met with sustained pressure from the

tactical

TAN;

concessions to the

TAN.

these concessions are followed by a growth in influence

of relevant domestic groups engaged

in the

human

rights

pressure the state into regime change or policy change.

human
the

centerstage in societal discourse

rights takes

norms

itself

and

alters its

Ultimately the state grants

campaign,

As

the

who

ultimately

norms of respect

for

the state finally institutionalizes

behavior and discourse to reflect that change.

This model suggests a powerful role for non-state actors in shaping state behavior,
but as others have noted, such actors are likely to face great resistance on the

state:

In the

realm of low

politics,

sovereign states are usually equipped to hold highly

motivated nonstate actors and less motivated state challengers
Risse and Sikkink

necessarily exist.

map

An

which

yet. a sustained

chan above

campaign may yet win
is

that

out.

the existence of

norms gather strength

signifies: if the

The
fact,

spiral

model

does not

change has not

What Risse and Sikkink do argue

human

[have] increased significantly over time.

international

bay.

optimist might argue that the model does not indicate the length of

about the passage of time

networks

at

implies an inevitability and a causality that, in

the passage of time each arrow in the flow

occurred

pan of the

rights institutions, norms,

and

They write of a norms cascade

as they are institutionalized and as a wider

group of actors become socialized into accepting

50

human

rights norms. After 1985. a

in

"

norms cascade occurred
campaigns

of human

in the field

move through

should

initiated after this point

rights: therefore, the}' predict,

the stages of their

TAN

model more

quickly than those which began before the cascade occurred.

Beyond
to

move

change

this the

model

offers

little

Expansion

along the arrow connecting

or

Human

consistent behavior

to suggest that

assuming centerstage

rights

or

information as to timing:

it

in

new

it

may

and

discourse

Regime

and

political space

in societal

take decades

Rule

might take mere days. The Risse and Sikkink model appears

regime change

is

likely to

produce immediate behavioral change

in the

area of human rights. Similarly. Arcenaux and Pion-Berlin suggest the concept of

moments can help
of their

own

states that

us understand the

self-interests,

moments when low

their behavior.

for agents

Moments

are

who w ould normally

to

understandings

sudden importance, or when

politics gain

such influence

in

brief periods of time

be offstage

definition exceptional situations, in

which

mov e

less

ways

of opportunity can close as quickly as

it

opens.

that

have a decisive impact

when windows of opportunity open

front

and center.

They

are

by

powerful actors gain influence, and

traditional interests can be overridden, but they are transitory

moments, for the window

j4

On norms cascades, see especially Finnemore and Sikkink
Dynamics and Political Change 1998.
'

in states

normally protect themselves from foreign influence on low politics issue

suddenly become more permeable

on

phenomenon of change

International

4

Norm

Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin Transforming Larin America 2005. ch. and 2. The
concept of moments here complements the more commonly employed concept of
opportunity structures. See. for example. Tarrow Power in Movement: Social
1

Movements and Contentious

Politics 1998.

While

this

dramatic change in

forces,

it

TANs

study finds strong evidence of the potential for

human

rights matters that

transformation of human rights policy

deeply challenge the interests of the armed

moment of transition and

also finds that a focus on the

too simplistic.

is

to effect

Though

its

implied

influential

human

rights

networks have repeatedly accompanied and buttressed other pressures from regime

change

in Latin

(as. again,

America, they have rarely been the primary cause of that regime change
7

those straight-forward arrows of the Risse-Sikkink model suggest).

though they have ultimately

won major

changes

in

civil-military relations, as the case studies of Chile

human

And

rights policy in the area

and Argentina offered below

demonstrate, they have also pushed up against the barriers of politicians rational

and the

interests

of

institutional structures that limit the transformative capacity

self-

of such

moments.
In the following chapters.

model

to

major changes

America. However.

I

will also

it

show

does a

institutionalizes the

groups

expand

in a

that,

state

More

political

space

in Latin

while the model provides an insightful outline

importantly,

accept an international

norm domestically
new

and human rights policy

falls short in several respects. First,

question of timing into the model.

How

will demonstrate the applicability of the Risse-Sikkink

in civil-military relations

of the process of change,

of change.

I

?

Does

the

it

it

does not integrate the

fails to identify

norm

way

in

?

Does

it

the

mechanisms

matter

how

which the relevant

the state

societal

shape the outcome of policy change? Does the

type of transnationalized pressure influence that policy change? This study finds that the

differences in the

mechanisms of change have

a

major impact on the outcome of human

rights policy change. Finally, the Risse-Sikkink

ways

in

which

and ultimately

II.

tell

us enough about the

rational self-interests

institutional structures, political actors

political culture limit

Two

model does not

may undo human

and facets of

rights policy transformations.

Cases: Argentina and Chile

inter-related failures

of the

new

particularly relevant to this study: reserve

democratic regimes of Latin America are

domains of power controlled by the armed

forces and the failure of the legal systems of these states to create the

rule

of law

Each

.

of these weaknesses contributed to the continued difficulty of depoliticizing armed
forces, establishing civilian

supremacy, and gaining the public legitimacy necessary

allow for the consolidation of new regimes. After the return to electoral democracy
Latin America, most

influence and

armed

forces of the region maintained

power over questions normally

advanced democracies. In

particular, the}

rights violations, a privilege the}' secured

amnesty and then protected
and. in

some

cases,

enjoyed immunity from prosecution for

on the way out of office

after the transition

by employing

their control

The Argentine and Chilean examples
armed forces used
1983. Argentina

to protect their legal

w as governed by

in

some forms of political

by courts or elected officials

settled

to

in

other

human

via legal decrees of

through a variety of institutional levers

of the

state s coercive

power.

offer insights into the formidable

power

the

immunity under new democracies. From 1976

a military regime.

Human rights

violations

to

abounded

during this period as pan of the countersubversive campaign launched by the regime and

" On the importance of integrating

rationalist

and norms-centered approaches, see the

special edition of International Organization from the Winter of 1998. especially
Finnemore and Sikkink International Norm Dynamics and Political Change 1998.

soon

to be

known throughout

number of victims

the world as Argentina

Estimates of the

dirty war.

s

by the regime hover around

killed or disappeared

thirty thousand,

while cases of other human rights violations, including torture, involved
Military control over the country

mismanagement combined with

seemed unshakeable

until 1982.

its

way

Months

later, in

amnesty

6

when economic

Deeply discredited and

out of power the military nevertheless published the

Final de la Junta Militar to

~

a conflict with England over the Malvinas/Falkland

Islands resulted in British victory and collapse of military' rule.

delegitimized. on

many more.

officially

deny complicity

in

human

Documento

rights abuses.

September 1983. the Ley de Paciftcacion Nacional was passed, granting
and security forces for

to both subversives

committed between

May

25 1973 to June

17. 1982.

all

repression and violations

The

courts, however, immediately

pronounced the law unconstitutional.

When,

in

December 1983. Raul Alfonsin assumed

democratic government, he demanded

full investigation into

committed under the military regime. At
a National

office in a return to civilian,

first

human

the investigation

w as

rights abuses

placed in the hands of

Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP). The Commission

s

On the Argentine dirty war, see Cohen Salama Tumbas Andnimas 1992: InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights Report on the Situation of Human Rights

task

in

Argentina 1980: Verbitsky El Vuelo 1996 and Civiles y militares 1987; Mignone
Der echos humanos y sociedad: el caso argentino 1991: Guest Behind the

Disappearances 1990: Nunc a Mas: The Report of the Argentine National Commission for
Disappeared 1986; Amnesty International Report ofAn Amnesty International
Mission to Argentina 977; Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos Cifras de
la Guerra Sucia 1988. For a longer view of the role of the armed forces in Argentina, see
the

1

Potash

Army and Politics

in

Argentina

Pion-Berlin and Arceneux

1

980.
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1998.

was

to establish the identity

CONADEP

s final

report,

of the victims and what violations they had experienced.

Nunca Mas, was based on 50.000 pages of evidence

name

9.000 disappearances, but did not

detailing

the parties responsible for the abuses.

Alfonsin demanded the military courts hold the leadership of the military regime
responsible for the crimes documented by

lawyer was

in part elected

CONADEP.

was

exceeded

that the

that criminal trials

to

be

guerillas. Alfonsin s

tried, as

should those

of implicated officers were essential to Argentina

punishment

that

who

trample people

s

Game

Without

is

a

basic liberties

help restore belief in individual liberties and recreate democratic authority.

s

s

consciousness essential to bringing about radical political

change. Impartial allocation of blame to those

Goti

who

Malamud-Goti and Carlos Nino, made impassioned

democracy. Together they advanced the argument

political tool to raise the

rights

and committed human rights abuses. Alfonsin and his

senior presidential advisors. Jaime

transition to

Montonero

commanders of the Proceso ought

their military orders

arguments

human

on his promises to seek justice for the abuses perpetrated by

the military over the course of their fight against the

position

Indeed, the former

End offers

prosecution of state criminals,

a powerful analysis of the

among them

that they

of an authoritative judiciary, the restoration of public

arguments

3

will

Q

Malamud-

in favor

of

can contribute to the consolidation
trust

and confidence

in the rule

of

law. individuals sense of self-respect, deterrence of future violations, and the creation of

rights-based democracy.

'

s

Malamud-Goti Game Without End 1996.

p. 4-5.

On

this

phase of the Argentine

Acuna and Smulovitz Adjusting the Armed Forces
in the Southern Cone 1996: Norden
Military Rebellion in Argentina 1996: Acuna Juicio, castigos y memorias: derechos
humanos yjusticia en la politico argent inct 995.
transitional justice experience, see

democracy: successes,

failures

and ambiguities

1

to

Furthermore, they argued,
the nation

s

human

in the 1980s.

The

rights

best

trials

known

incarnation of the

general public

mood was

movement,

a hardline position

and military, who participated

in the dirty

pushed prosecutions of former

ERP

the Argentine political scene

the

Mothers of the Plaza de

on prosecutions:

war must be brought

supportive at least of justice for

had committed the vast majority of the

demands being made by

satisfy the public

movement, which exploded onto

Mayo, was widely respected and took
civilian

would

political violence.

and Montonero

in

1983. the military

was

the

mood. According

most unpopular

9

military,

Though Alfonsin

guerillas, the

those,

to justice/

members of the

The

who

initially

overwhelming focus of

the transitional justice initiatives under his administration targeted

military. This certainly reflected the public

all

members of the

to several polls

institution in the country,

conducted

followed by the

police.

At

first,

the Alfonsin administration

wanted prosecutions

military courts, so as to allow the military to regain public trust

human

rights violators.

minimize

officers

The

fears

military as a whole.

However, the military courts would serve

On

final

of

also

strictly as trial courts,

judgments about convictions and

the Mothers of the Plaza de

Mayo,

was

it

see

Malamud-Goti Game Without End 1996.

trial

and making appeals to civilian

clear Alfonsin s plan

was

backfiring: the

Bouvard Revolutionizing Motherhood 1994:

Fisher Mothers of the Disappeared 1995.
4(1

would

itself

February 1994. Congress approved changes to the military justice code

federal courts mandatory. Within months,

9

by cleansing

of a politicized witch-hunt to destroy the institution of the

granting the military courts 180 days to conduct each

“

proceed within

role of military courts. Alfonsin believed,

whereas civilian federal courts would make
acquittals. In

to

p.

56

58-59.

military courts stalled, refusing to pursue cases, and most civilians distrusted the military

courts and directly pursued cases in federal courts instead. In October 1984. after the

Military

Supreme Court

failed to convict the

commanders of the Proceso.

assumed jurisdiction over human

appellate court

rights trials, thereby reversing a

Supreme Court decision which had affirmed the jurisdiction of the
these cases. In

December 1985.

guilty of serious violations of

sentences. In a decision

Members of the

human

known

against superior officers in

five of the nine

rights

stem the

tide

commanders of the Proceso were found

and sentenced

to serve lengthy prison

command of the

areas where abuses were committed.

41

military strongly opposed the prosecutions with threats of another

upon President Alfonsin

to prepare legislation

of new cases being brought against officers and soldiers. The Punto Final

legislation. Pion-Berlin

and Arceneaux write, was

military complaints, and thus

in effect, place a sixty

the law

military courts in

as Item 30. the court stated that cases should next proceed

military uprising, and ultimately prevailed

to

the federal

was passed by

day

remove

limit

all

designed to curb the

trials, nullify

excuses for provocation in the future.

It

on the issuance of new indictments. After a tough

the legislature, but instead of cutting off legal action,

it

would,

battle,

provoked a

deluge of new indictments, involving some 300 summonses for alleged perpetrators
within the armed forces to appear in court, as the deadline approached.
Panicked, and unconvinced the Punto Final decision would prevent prosecutions

of lower ranking officers in future, junior officers rebelled against their commanders
April 1987. The response of President Alfonsin

the

Due Obedience Law

protected

all

officers

w as

to rush a

in

new law through Congress:

below the rank of colonel from criminal

prosecution. This massive concession, based on the logic that most of the atrocities

committed

in

the dirty

war were ordered by

military

commanders and

carried out by

lower-ranking officers simply fulfilling their duty to those commanders,

satisfy the

armed

forces. Three

more

military rebellions

provoked by new revelations of military

directly

still

did not

would take place by 1990. each

atrocities

and

legal

procedures against

officers.

The lessons observers drew from the pitched
administration and the military over the question of

members of the
varied greatly.

military

A

battle

human

a battle the military, for the

waged between

the Alfonsin

rights accountability for

moment, seemed

to

have

won

right-wing minority continued to defend the military as heroes whose

abuses were the inevitable outcome of fighting subversion. The Mothers of the Plaza de

Mayo and

their allies in the international

human

criticism of Alfonsin for being intimidated into

that prosecution

amnesties. Those

that military

in their

who had warned

instability

saw

their

regimes in Chile and Uruguay would

Argentine experience as good reason not to allow democratic elections. Even

some of those who
utility

new

community was scathing

of members of the armed forces would provoke

argument vindicated, and feared
interpret the

rights

originally advocated the prosecutions

now

critically reassessed the

of those early policies. Most notably. Jaime Malamud-Goti. one of the two

Alfonsin presidential advisors responsible for formulating the
policies,

argued

that, in hindsight, the

conflict, rather than a

means of

human

rights trials

initial transitional

had become a new source of

deauthoritarianizing the polity.

58

justice

In postdictatorial.

fragmented societies, there

is

an

and

indirect,

ironic,

consequence of human

rights trials:

the trials tend to erode the very democratic authority they are devised to restore

be that the negative effects of such

The Argentine case

human

trials

outweigh the positive.

indicates the

most important reason

It

may

42

to

doubt the capacity of

democracy and the consolidation of a

rights trials to contribute to the transition to

rights-based polity: the weakness of the judiciary. Attempts to restore justice and

establish

democracy

that

hinge on

courts in an untenable position.

authoritative. Citizens

competence,

must

To

trials

of guilty parties from the past regime place the

fulfill

trust that the courts will act

that they will enforce the

decisions must be

these goals, the courts

law equally for

with impartiality and

all

those

who have

violated

it

without consideration of political consequences, and that their decisions will carry the

full

weight of the law. Yet the very question of who

violations

those

to

hold responsible for

human

the military only or their civilian counterparts? senior officers only or

who committed

abuses?

etc.

is

a political one. decided

rights

all

by the president and

Congress as well as the courts. The legal ambiguity created by competing civilian and
military jurisdictions

meant

that for at least the first three years

court decision could be considered

the judiciary were universally

simply

inept.

authoritative

condemned

And. most

crucially,

trials,

most members of

Under such circumstances. Malamud-Goti

was

writes,

it

may have

been

to both judicialize politics (replacing

reform and public debate about the complex nature of Argentine

political

A

Malamud-Goti Game Without End 1996. p. 5-6. On impunity for members of the
armed forces in Argentina, see also Basombrio Iglesias Impunidad y Castigo: Un
Dilema Actual 2001.
'

no

as inexperienced, ideologically motivated, or

inevitable that the effect of human rights trials

institutional

.

of human rights

violence with prosecutions of one select set of blame-recipients) and politicize the
judiciary (creating the perception and the reality of a legal system driven by personal

opinions, not fair and equal application of the law).

The new protections from prosecution aw arded

to the

armed forces may have

confirmed Argentines sense of the failure of electoral democracy
the trials themselves

were deeply problematic. Military claims

targeted as bearing sole responsibility for abuses were

contained a kernel of truth:

exclusively

-

it

members of the

counterargument from

who had committed

was

uncomfortable
that

it

means

is

political

regime. The

after all those

therefore weak, arbitrary and

transitional justice posed.

naive, without first resolving the structural

state terrorism possible, to use

full

stop

and

punishment

4-1

due obedience

laws circumscribed the

members of the

military

was hardly

settled. In 1995.

renewed pressure

end to military impunity emerged as a reaction to shocking revelations by former

members of the

military about their involvement in

gruesome human

Congress approved a Constitutional amendment asserting that no
could apply to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

43

almost

of trials for most of the members of the armed forces, the question of legal

accountability for

for an

was

new

was not going

compromises

for modifying a political system.

In Argentina, though the

possibility

more powerful because they

administration

shortcomings that made military regimes and
as a central

were unjustly

that they

military to establish the credentials of the

abuses, civilian or military, and

Malamud-Goti concludes

advance justice, but

a political choice to use prosecutions of

civil society that the

unfair, also reflected the

to

Ibid., p. 21.
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rights violations.

statute

of limitation

Though Congress was

signaling

its

willingness to keep the door to future prosecutions open, the law

the executive. Furthermore, opinion

was divided over whether

was never

ratified

by

the law should apply

44

retroactively.

In this context

of legal ambiguity, attempts

to construct

human

rights

accountability in the courts developed an ad hoc and fragmented quality.

held

truth trials

Some

courts

based on the argument that no amnesty could be granted for individual

cases until they had been fully investigated. Others pursued justice

in

cases not explicitly

who had

included in the amnesty laws, such as those involving military officers

kidnapped the babies of the disappeared and then put them up for

illegal

adoption.

General Jorge Videla himself was indicted and tried for such crimes. Not only Argentine

<

courts, but

even European ones entered the

fray. Particularly in Spain, trials

proceeded

\
*

t

whenever Argentina allowed

extradition. This

seemed

to contribute to a

consensus within

(

\
i
h

the Argentine public: roughly two-thirds of the public were, by 2003. eager to see officers

v

t

charged with

human

rights violations brought to justice, but they

wanted them

b

tried in

-

t

Argentine, not foreign, courts.

4'

r

Meanw hile,

reform of the military institutions of Argentina did proceed. The end

5

1

V

ol the

Cold War and the National Securitv Doctrine, which identified internal subversion

as the

most important

»

*1

targets

as part of an international

44

Dealing

w ith

Etica y justicia en

el

1994: Hershberg and

On

Communist netw ork

the past (2)

after the dictatorship

of Latin American militaries and portrayed such subversives

Economist. Sept

that

6.

was

by the United

2003; see also Martinez and Gascon

debate por los derechos humanos

2000: Zagorski

battled abroad

2003: Abregu

Human rights
democracy
cono sitr 2005.

Civil-military relations and Argentine

Aguero Manor ias mil it ares sobre

la represior

en

el

military revelations of human rights violations, see Verbitsky El Vuelo 1996.

45

Ibid.
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States, contributed to an international context

oversaw reductions

in military

conducive

to military reform.

Alfonsin

budgets and force size and the passage of the 1988

National Defense Law, which restricted the mission of the armed forces to external

By

defense.

the end of the 1980s. the Argentine military had been severely

over the 1990s. their role

Menem

in security affairs

would be

introduced the Argentine military to a

new

weakened;

radically changed. President Carlos

type of mission: United Nations

peacekeeping operations. The Argentine military would contribute over 1.400 troops

As Deborah Norden has

international peacekeeping operations over the next decade.

pointed out. this

politics, but

new

role not only

minimized the likelihood of military intervention

had the combined benefits of offering the military a

prestige, financial support

alliances in the region

from the UN, and a

vital part in the

and especially with the United

States.

to

new

into

mission, greater

process of solidifying

4 '’
It

had the added benefits of

exposing the Argentine armed forces to greater civilian oversight and

to the highly

professional military institutions of advanced industrialized states.

Despite serious economic challenges. Argentine democracy was also being
reestablished over these years. Indeed, if

Malamud-Goti was

right in arguing that

punishing state criminals before reforming the structural failures that allowed political
violence to proliferate in the

first

place

was

the

wrong way

to rebuild

democracy, by the

beginning of the twenty-first century, most Argentines seemed to feel that a major

4

"’

Norden The Transformation of Argentine Security

of the transformation of civil-military relations

Norden Military Rebellion

in

peacekeeping operations as a

wave democracies,
Military

Building

s

Role

in

in

1

996; for an excellent overview

Argentina through the mid-1990s see

Argentina: Between Coups ancl Consolidation 1996.

new

area of activity for the

armed forces of many

On

third

and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the
Argentina, Brazil and Chile 1996; Child Peacekeeping. Confidence
see Hunter

State

1996.
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obstacle to completing the consolidation of their democratic system

impunity of human rights violators

Though

in the military.

was

the continuing

civil-military relations

improved steadily over the 1990s. the key questions of human

had

rights accountability

remained controversial. In the mid-1990s, several former members of the military
admitted to the abusive tactics employed by the armed forces
practice of disposing of drugged victims by throwing

commander of the armed

in the past,

including the

them out of aircraft. The

forces had even offered a public apology for the role of the

military institutions in the abuses of the 1970s. yet no motions

were made toward

reopening judicial procedures.

When Nestor Kirchner took
were back on the
officers,

table. In a

office as President in 2003. suddenly these questions

bold move, he immediately dismissed 52 senior military

an unprecedented purge which,

who was

among

others,

Kirchner for using the purge as a means to

home

province of Patagonia, most interpreted the

military institution

was expected

to

embodying

army commander,

as wise, as a smaller,

money by

weaker

finally enacting

4

August 2003. the Argentine Senate voted
fulfilling a

move

commanders from

and establish the authority of the president as the

civilian control of the military.

obedience law s,

install military

both save the country

substantial cuts to the military budget,

In

the

accused of human rights abuses during the military regime. Though some

criticized

his

removed

to annul the full stop

and due

campaign promise of President Kirchner. The debate then

proceeded to the Supreme Court. In June 2005. the Supreme Court declared the laws
unconstitutional in a 7-1 majority, launching a

4

Argentina

s

new

president:

new wave of judicial

The empty-handed

2003.

63

social

democrat

procedures and a

Economist.

May

31.

deep sense of uncertainty within the military. Estimates of how
officers

many

soldiers and police

might face charges varied wildly, from 400 to thousands. President Kirchner

decided not to annul the pardons granted

Congress

to

do

so, but rather to

created a situation

commanding

where

officers

treat senior officers

ranking officers

officers in the past, nor to ask

allow the courts to determine the issue. Because this

officers could be convicted for crimes for

which

their

enjoyed immunity, the military leadership called upon the courts

to

and Montonero guerrillas already protected by pardons and lower-

now

allowed under the

commanding

vulnerable to prosecutions equally. The

new

court decision began in June 2006.

Change towards human

first

human

rights trial

48

rights accountability over the Argentine

armed forces w as

achieved gradually over the course of some twenty years. Though a strong transnational

and domestic network of activists maintained a campaign for human rights policy-change
throughout the period, a

slow reduction

shift in the

in the threat

balance of political powers within the state and a

of military aggression was necessary before that

accountability could be established.

international actors took

on a higher

In September 1973. the

America

s

A similar pattern occurred

tradition of civilian

though

profile there.

armed forces of Chile staged what became Latin

most notorious military coup. The

leaving in the rubble the

in Chile,

air force

bombed

the Presidential Palace,

body of President Salvador Allende and the long-established

government. General Augusto Pinochet promptly established a

military regime technically led by a military junta, but in fact based

48

on the concentration

Rohter Argentine Ruling Revives Cases of Dirty War Victims New York Times
2005 and Argentina: Impunity Gone, 'Dirtv War' Trial Benins New York Times June 21.
2006.
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of power

in his

own

hands. During the seventeen years of the Pinochet regime,

three thousand individuals

were

thousands were tortured. As

in

killed

many

by

state security forces,

and perhaps hundreds of

authoritarian states, repression

responsibility of state intelligence agencies; in Chile.

DINA

(la

dirty

war

human

.

in

1978 Pinochet issued an Amnesty

rights violations

Though

members of the armed

was

Law

the

power

to appoint a

Security Council.

for life

and

set

The

in

1

to

approved by

4g

new

10. 1978.

Constitution signaled

armed forces

The armed forces leadership retained

a limited democracy.

constitution,

opponents.

1973 and March

1.

re-established in 1980. the

number of senators and

s

preventing the prosecution of

the continuing authoritarianism of the state system by granting the

extensive tutelary roles

the special

forces from legal action over the

committed between September

Constitutional order

became

Direccion de Inteligencia

Nacional) became synonymous with state terror against the regime
In order to protect the

at least

fill

half the positions on the National

plebiscite, also

made Pinochet

a Senator

an exceptionally high bar for Constitutional amendments (a two-thirds

majority in both houses of Congress and an electoral system

w hich

virtually guaranteed

"""

no

part>’

could gain such a majority).

In 1988. Pinochet held a plebiscite to determine

for eight

forcing

more

him

years.

The public

to call for

to

extend his presidency

rejected such an extension, shocking Pinochet and

open presidential elections

Pion-Berlin and Arceneux

w hether

for

1989 and a

final

Tipping the Civil-Military Balance

end

1998.

to the military

On human

rights

abuses during the Pinochet regime, see Kornbluh The Pinochet File 2004; Dinges The

Condor Years 2004; Ensalaco Chile Under Pinochet 2000.
11

Maldonado

Prieto

Derechos Humanos en Chile 2004;

Chile

Untying the knot Economist Oct 23. 2004: Castro Sauritain
militares en Chile

1999.
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s

new

constitution:

Las relaciones civico-

regime. Patricio

Aylwin became president

protected the continuing

example. Pinochet

s

remove commanders

remained

judicial designees

to shelter the military

their

own

of commanders-in-chief except
to civilian

substantial levels

civilian

prerogatives,

hands

at a

in

time

The Chilean

public support.

new

The

president

s

and reaffirm

fall

below

its

1989

budgets, and the sendee

its

power: service

when

they

of authority remained

was

in the

retained the role

Armed Forces

a clearly pacted transition in

which

hands of the outgoing military leaders and

regime was greatly constrained

in its ability to

among them immunity from human

challenge key military

rights prosecutions.

human

rights

Moreover, as

movement was

limited by the capture of influence by the political parties and by the public

movement represented only

returned

enjoyed high levels of popularity and

still

transition, then,

new law

real level, service

commanders

wartime. Furthermore, the

Claudio Fuentes writes, the influence of the Chilean

that the

right to

retained control over retirements, promotions and assignments, a

commanders controlled

the

in office.

forces over the state. For

chief of the military was revoked by a constitutional organic law.

in

decreed that the military budget could not

power

March 1990. but numerous provisions

power and influence of the armed

Other provisions continued

commanders

in

s

greatly

perception

the narrow interests of the families of the victims of

1

state violence.'

Fuentes

La respuesta

civil al

tema

militar

1999;

Maldonado

Prieto

Las relaciones

2002 and Derechos Humanos
en Chile 2004. On the balance of power between the outgoing militar}’ regime and the
new civilian one. particularly as it impacted questions of human rights, see Moulian Chile
actual. Anatomia de an mito 1997 and A Time of Forgetting: The Myths of the Chilean
Transition 1998: Atria Estado. militares y democracia: La afirmacion de la supremacia
civil en Chile 2000; Garreton Las condiciones socio-politicas de la inauguracion
democratica en Chile 1990; Otano Crdnica de la transicion 1995; Cavallo La historia
civil-militares

en Chile durante

oculta de la transicion

1

la

transicion democratica

998.
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On

of

the question

forces. Pinochet

legal accountability for

abuses perpetrated by state security

and General Matthei issued stem warnings against any attempts

at

prosecutions of members of the military, citing Argentina as an unacceptable precedent.

In

August 1990, the Supreme Court,

the 1978

rights

groups continued to

institutional legacies

adopt a

with Pinochet era appointees, ruled that

any cases brought against members of the

the cases to the military courts,

by the

filled

amnesty decree was constitutional. Military courts claimed exclusive

jurisdiction over

human

still

human

file

human

Though

rights cases, the courts simply

and

civilians

forwarded

where they were inevitably dropped. Greatly constrained

of the Pinochet

rights strategy of

truth

era. President

Aylwin 1990-1994 chose
(

to

)

and possible justice or justice

to the extent

This contrasted starkly with the rhetoric of the Concertacion (the political

possible.

alliance of the Christian Democrat. Socialist

and Pro-Democracy parties

effectively challenged the Pinochet regime in

when

transition,

they, as

'

creating the Chilean National

Commission) and

Commission released

its

1

989 and have held power

that

had

since) before the

Moulian writes made the crimes of the military regime

to its oppositional discourse.

the Rettig

military.

2

In April 1990.

Aylwin issued

a presidential decree

Commission on Truth and Reconciliation

selecting

its

central

members. Less than a year

(also

known

as

later, the

report on the disappeared, identifying, as Pion-Berlin and

Arceneaux summarize:

2279 deaths and 957 disappearances mostly at the hands of the state security
agents who operated between 1973 and 1989. Although the report omitted the
names of perpetrators, it did send to the courts incriminating information,
enabling

Moulian

some

A Time

courts to reopen judicial inquiries into

human

rights infractions.

of Forgetting: The Myths of the Chilean Transition
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1998.

p.

1

7.

The commission

s

suggestions that victims be morally rehabilitated and that their

survivors receive material compensation

was

swiftly endorsed by the congress,
'

which created

Though

a national corporation to fulfill those missions/

the president offered his apologies

repression, and though the air force

on behalf of the

acknowledged

its

state to the victims

of past

responsibility for the patterns of

abuse documented, the navy, army and carabineros refused to do

so.

They

criticized the

report in bitter attacks and found the political parties of the right supportive of their

position. In the

wake of the

truth

commission

in their belief that the disappeared

Pinochet,

who

had simply

s report,

many regime

fled the country or

supporters persisted

gone underground.

continued as the head of the armed forces until 1998. used his privileged

position to perpetuate military impunity.

W hen Pinochet

from prosecution were challenged, he did not hesitate

s

own power and immunity

to call

upon members of the

military to stage public demonstrations of power. In both 1990 and 1993 he

movements by members of the

large protest

for his

removal from the military

prosecution/

"

la

respuesta civil
4

military, first in response to politicians

command and

then

when

his

son was threatened

calls

w ith

4

Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux

Nacional de

oversaw

On Chilean

Tipping the Civil-Military Balance

1998: see Comision

Verdad y Reconciliacion (Chile) Informe Renig 1991 and Puentes Ta
al tenia militar

1999.

civil-military relations after the transition to

democracy, see

Chile

s

armed forces: Unraveling a tortured past The Economist Dec 4. 2004: Maldonado Prieto
Derechos Humanos en Chile 2004 and Las relaciones civil-militares en Chile durante
la transicion democratica 2002: Rojas Aravena Civil-military relations in postauthoritarian Chile 2001:Fuentes La respuesta civil al tema militar 1999. On the role
of military justice in Chile, see Mera Figueroa La Justicia Militar en Chile 2000.
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human

Chile contains a strong

battle for

the first

Latin

human

human

rights

rights

and a return

TAN

to

rights

movement, and indeed

democracy which

Latin America.

in

Human

is

it

was

often credited with

rights organizations

pressure.

human

As

rights

the Risse-Sikkink

was

model suggest, the

TAN

that

emerged around Chilean

able to force the Pinochet regime into tactical concessions, and clearly

his leadership

human

provoked regime

rights groups in Chile,

little

accountable before the courts for

transition.

human

Pinochet

s arrest in

rights violations

Chilean as

w ell

international

heads of

state.

to extradite

as Spanish citizens.

human

in the

members of the

was achieved

Chilean headlines

England/" Pinochet spent the next several years

Spanish courts attempted

him

Eventually. Pinochet

Court ultimately declared him

to face trial for

The courts argued

rights nullified the

might confer

Yet despite the continued activism of

progress toward holding

Then, in 1998. human rights were back

On

throughout

and campaigns to mobilize the public and international

the desire of Pinochet himself to gain the public legitimacy a referendum

"

spawning

America modeled themselves on the Chilean network of domestic NGOs,

international organizations,

upon

the Chilean

human

that

military

in the 1990s.

in the

in legal

wake of

limbo, as

rights violations against

Pinochet

s

violations of

normal immunity from prosecution enjoyed by

w as

returned to Chile, and the Chilean Supreme

unfit to stand trial

due

to senility.

He was. however,

forced

on questions of transitional justice, see Roht-Arriaza
The Pinochet Effect 2005: Special edition of the Venezuelan journal Nueva Sociedad,
Memoria. Impunidad y Derechos Humanos Mayo-Junio 1999; Montoya and Pereyra El
caso Pinochet y la impunidad en America Latina 2000: Dorfman Exorcising Terror 2002
and Mas alia del miedo: el largo adios a Pinochet 2003; Macedo Universal Jurisdiction
2004: Davis The Pinochet Case 2003: and Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin Transforming
the impact of Pinochet

Latin America 2005. ch.

5.

s arrest

1

to resign his Senate seat,

and several other

and tax evasion, proceeded, destroying
dictator.

legal cases, including

charges of corruption

myth of being an honest

his already threadbare

6

Moreover, the
prioritize the issue

political fallout

of Pinochet

of human rights accountability

included renewed pressure to

s arrest

in

Chile once more.

judicial activism began, with sensitive cases and controversial rulings

headlines.

The

international attention focused

upon the lack of human

accountability in Chile provoked by the Pinochet cases effectively

courts into reopening

what had only years before been

Though, as Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin argue,

to

opportunity

for Chilean

to hear their cases,

In

and

August 2003.

wrongdoing

The European

human

new

courts

immunity

more

was launched

in

shamed

the Chilean

to

exchange for

courts continued to hear cases related to disappearances,

covered by the amnesties. President Lagos argued

moment of

decisions created a

(particularly torture) during the Pinochet era

officers reduced sentences or

rights

would be an exaggeration, they

rights advocates to

initiative

regular

politically untouchable cases.

effectively pressure the courts

to pressure to the state into altering

a

making

claim that the European courts

decisions caused the change in the Chilean courts

certainly acted as a catalyst.

A new period of

human

rights policy.'

uncover evidence of military

by offering lower-ranking

vital information.

Furthermore,

which were not deemed

that, in fact.

Chile had

greater progress in the field of human rights accountability than

it

to be

made much

was given

credit for:

over 300 cases were open in the courts in 2003. and the power of civilian courts over

Dealing with the Past: That Other September

th
1

Economist Sept

Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin Transforming Latin America 2005.
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6.

ch. 5.

2003.

1

members of the

military in

human

rights cases

was accepted by

the

armed

forces. Critics

were unimpressed: few members of the military had actually been sentenced, and the
s

'

amnesty laws remained

in place.

If progress in the courts

was slow, developments

in the legislative

sphere

suddenly advanced. In October 2004. a cross-party agreement was struck to reform the
constitution and eliminate

Pinochet

era.

many of the

vestiges of military

power

over from the

left

Since the return to democracy, military leaders opposed to reform had

gradually resigned, and even politicians on the right found they had more to gain in terms

of popularity by supporting the constitutional reforms than by blocking them. One-time
supporters of Pinochet ultimately found their political survival depended on their
distancing themselves from the deeply-tainted image of the former dictator.

Denial of military responsibility for massive

human

longer a viable political position either, particularly after a

rights violations

December 2004

was no

report of a

Congressional commission released newly collected information about the abuses. After
hearing the testimony of

some 35.000 former

political detainees, the

commission

concluded that torture was a regular practice of the armed forces under Pinochet. As The

Economist reported,

the report overturns the

myth

minded. over-enthusiastic subordinates. Instead,
financed by the budget and practiced in

it

that torture

is

w as just

the

work of sick-

revealed as a systematic policy,

more than 1.100 detention

centers around the
"J

country.

And. even more importantly, not even

the

armed forces dispute the

:

facts.

All

branches of the armed forces admitted to the charges in the report. The reaction of the

Dealing with the Past: That Other September

th
1

Economist Sept

6.

2003.

armed forces and public
the response with

to the torture

which the

but not torture) report

truth

was met.

commission

s report

marked

a

huge departure from

commission (which covered disappearances and deaths,

Still,

though 27.000 individuals

who gave

testimony

before the torture commission were promised a pension and certain benefits as reparation,

many made

clear that

what they ultimately desired was the prosecution of their

torturers.

This remained extremely difficult to realize, due to the continued existence of the

amnesty laws and a lack of evidence

would stand up

in court.

The Peruvian Contribution

III.

A comparative

that

case study which incorporates the Peruvian example offers both

points of similarity and crucial points of departure. Peru, like Chile and Argentina,

enjoyed a

shift

from military

to civilian-led

governance as part of the third wave of

democratization, and like the armed forces of nearly

all

Latin American states, those of

Peru maneuvered to maintain their privileges and power within the
transition.

state after the

Like the Chilean transition, the Peruvian one featured a political pact that

enabled the military to maintain continuity in

its

high

command,

budget, and control of

security policy in the years immediately after the transition.

The

crucial difference (for this study)

between the Peruvian case and those of

Argentina and Chile relates to the timing of the political violence relative to the transition
to

democracy. Whereas Chile and Argentina

human
assert

rights abuses during military

human

-

s

armed forces acted

regimes and

rights accountability over the

as perpetrators of

new democratic regimes

aimed forces

struggled to

for such abuses, in Peru the

controversial state violence took place after the return to civilian, electoral democracy.
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For

very hour of Peru

at the

movement launched

a bloody

administrations would

campaign

s

return to the democratic fold, a brutal subversive

campaign

empower

the

to destroy the state. In turn, successive

armed forces

to carry out

of human

that included the systematic violation

of Argentina and Chile, the human rights abuses

in

an anti-subversive

rights.

Compared

to the cases

Peru took place over a longer period

of time and resulted from both guerrilla and military

h"

brutality.

Indeed, the context of internal subversion and national security threats contributed

to

Peru

s

break with democracy under President Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s by

supplying a compelling justification for authoritarian measures. Over the course of the
1990s, a growing literature warned that

many

partially consolidated democracies, often

democracies of the third wave were

prone

at

best

to backsliding into authoritarian or anti-

democratic behavior: Peru under Fujimori stood out as a powerful example of this

phenomenon. Though

in truth

in the 1980s as well. Fujimori

there

s

were deep

dramatic

failures of

self-coup

democratic governance

in

Peru

of 1992 and his gradual destruction

of the institutions of democracy thereafter provide powerful evidence of the fragility and
uncertainty of regime transitions and the democratization process. Rather than developing

democratic principles of civil-military relations. Peru

611

For

literature that highlights the differences

s

return to

democracy

after

1980

and similarities between the Perm ian and

American cases of transitional justice, see Basombrio Impunidad y Castigo:
Actual 2001 Basombrio Cuatro razones para entender la impunidad en el
Peru 1999. On Sendero Luminoso s rejection of the idea of human rights, see
Basombrio Sendero Luminoso and Human Rights: a perverse logic that captured the
country 1998: on the ambiguity in international law around human rights violations by
non-state actors, see Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 2004. Tome I.
other Latin

Un Dilema

;

led a

more complex, but only barely
61

The dramatic changes

1990s.

the

all

less troubling civil-military relationship in the

that followed the fall

of the Fujimori regime are therefore

more worthy of study.
Like Chile and Argentina. Peru benefited from a strong, united group of

principled actors

who

partnered domestic activism and organization with international

ones, took their campaigns to the venues capable of enhancing their leverage over the

Peruvian

state,

and attempted

to construct institutional

mechanisms

principled positions into state behavior. In the immediate

fall

in

of the Fujimori government, Peru

s

human

to integrate their

wake of regime change

community enjoyed

rights

after the

greater success

advancing the agenda of human rights accountability for members of the armed forces

than any other country in Latin America. Chapter 4 explores the

rights transformation in Peru,

and assesses the factors

moment of human

that contributed to

its

possibility.

Chapter V. however, indicates the abundant evidence of continuing barriers to
transformation.

The armed

forces continue to enjoy greater

power

relative to non-state

actors to lobby the state to protect their

own

human

state institutions, particularly the judicial

rights

from the weakness of key

Despite the radical changes in the
rights accountability for the

relations.

61

The

While the

human

literature highlighting
4.

regimes generally, see

O

and they benefit

Peru

On the

s

on how non-state actors

hybrid

regime

question of hybrid,

in the

1990s

illiberal,

in the area

America, for

rights field in Latin

armed forces remains a sticking point

literature that focuses

extensively in chapter

interests,

system.

now human

in civil-military

in the

is

of

domestic and

employed

and semi-authoritarian

Democracy 1994: Zakaria The Future of
and Levitsky Democracy with Adjectives 1997: Ottawa}
Donnell

Delegative

Freedom 2003: Collier
Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism 2003; Levitsky and Way
The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism 2002: McSherry The Emergence of
Guardian Democracy
1998.
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international realms provides a persuasive

document
field is

here.

I

model

for the

moment of transformation

I

ultimately conclude that the ability to effect normative change in this

profoundly limited by the institutional weaknesses, imbalances

rational self-interests of actors within the state.

As

the literature

on

in

power and

partial

and unconsolidated democracies suggests, politicians enjoy great capacity
the institutions of the state in order to tip the

human

to

manipulate

outcomes of transitional processes

favor, particularly in the realm of the judiciary,

be the norm for sensitive

democracies

where

in their

political interventions continue to

rights cases. Despite Peru

s initial

success

in

prosecutions of members of the military accused of human rights violations,

expect there too that resolution of the issue must await a larger

promoting

we

should

shift in the electoral

incentives of politicians and the consolidation of a judicial system entitled to greater

public legitimacy.

CHAPTER

III

PERUVIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

1980-2000

1980-1985: Transition to Democracy and to Internal Conflict

moment

Since the

it

gained

its

independence. Peru

military battles for control of government.

The

power of the generals has hung

heads of civilians

who have

has been tied to civil-

military has typically been the winner in

these battles, as they have governed the country for

out of office, the

s fate

more than

like the

half

its

history.

Even when

sword of Damocles over the

sought to guide the destine- of the

1

state.

Yet military rule

in

Peru has often defied expectations. The military regime which governed Peru from 1968
to

1

980. a period during which most of the continent

was trapped under the crushing

heel

of bloode- dictatorships, was surprisingly humane. Contrary to the Latin American trend
of the period, in the early years of this regime the military government was decidedly
left-wing.

The regime

at first

sought to incorporate the working class and poor into a

corporatist system, but ultimately

unleashed

a

new phenomenon

increasingly divided military

miracle for the state,

On

this

it

came

to

for Peru

at last

view the

civil society

mobilization

as a threat to the state.

accepted that

handed power back over

it

was

When,

in

had

1980. the

failing to achieve an

to civilians.

it

economic

This sequence supports the

broad pattern in Peruvian history, see Masterson Militarism and Politics 1991

Armada y Sociedad en

Peru Moderno 2001 Palmer Peru: The
Authoritarian Tradition 1980; Villanueva 100 Ahos del Ejercito Peruano: Frustraciones
y Cambios 1971; and Einaudi The Permian Military: A Summary Political Analysis
and Fuerza

el

;

1969. For an early and influential treatment of Peruvian politics in scholarly comparative
literature, see

Stepan The State and Society 1978.
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literature

on authoritarian regime breakdowns

bloc, particularly

between hard-line

and

that finds that divisions within the ruling

soft-line

groups, are a necessary condition

regime breakdown.'

for

The 1980

who became
man

transition

was

president in Peru

restorative in

s first

transition had.

a figurative sense: the civilian

democratic election

power

the military had ousted from

more than

in

in

twelve years was the very

1968. Fernando Belaunde Terry. The

however, been dragged out over three years, during which the

controlled the transition by forging informal alliances with the

Revolutionary Party

transition.

(APRA) and

While these

parties, representing the center-left

PPC
its

The new Constitution

leaders and

Belaunde

special prerogatives

s

American Popular

the Popular Christian Party (PPC). forging a

included in the pact, parties of the

excluded.'

left,

See

O

pacted

and right respectively, were

along with unions and popular organizations, were

reflected the consensus

between military and

APRA

and

Popular Action Party (AP) that the military should maintain

and privileges and

that,

given the history of executive-legislative

deadlock typical of civilian government preceding the military regime,

'

military’

it

should retain

its

Donnell and Schmitter Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 1986: Przeworski

Democracy and the Market 1991

:

O

Donnell Counterpoints 1999. The military regime

On this

is

Booth and Sorj Military
Reformism and Social Classes 1983: Lowenthal The Peruvian Experiment 1975: Malloy

typically referred to as the Docenio.

period, see

Authoritarianism. Corporatism and Mobilization in Peru

1974.

On

corporatism

Wiarda Toward a Framework 1973 and Corporatism and National
Development 1981: Malloy Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America 1977:
Pike and Stritch The New Corporatism 1974.
generally, see

'

On

the 1980 transition, see Cotier

Civilians

in

Peru

Institution Building

1986: Mauceri

Military Interventions and Transfer of

The Transition

1997.
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to

Democracy and

Power

to

the Failures of

right to intervene if

government

senior of'cers of the Peruvian

civilian rule

'

power.

Still,

were

failed to function.

As Mauceri and Cameron

armed forces who agreed

explicit about the fact that they

democracy seemed on the mend

country passed one widely-accepted litmus

when

4

test

in

put

Yet

to a negotiated transition to

were leaving government but not

mere

Peru: a

five years later, the

of a democratic transition

s

consolidation

all

APRA

was not well

party.

in Peru.

At the very moment

that the country returned to the

democratic fold, four interconnected phenomena were emerging to threaten the

democratic regime.

First,

subversive warfare broke out. with two guerrilla

directly challenging the state.

the larger Sendero

4

new

On

the

peacefully passed the presidency from Belaunde of the Popular Action party to

it

Alan Garcia from the

the

it.

new

movements

The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and

Luminoso. or Shining Path, launched bloody campaigns

electoral democratic system

and

h

to terrorize the public.

to

undermine

Second, narcotrafficking

Dilemmas of Democracy in Latin America 1990; Karl
Modes of Transition 1991 Linz and Stepan Problems of Democratic
and Consolidation 1996: Munck and Skalnik Left' Modes of Transition and

pacted transitions, see Karl

and Schmitter
Transition

Democratization

;

1997. The 1979 Constitution

available online at

is

http://bvirtual.bnp.gob.pe/libros_titulos.php

'

h

Cameron and Mauceri The Peruvian Labyrinth

On Sendero Luminoso.

1998.

see Palmer Shining Path

of Peru

1

994; Degregori Sendero

Luminoso 1985. One diftcil es Ser Dios 1989. El nacimiento de Sendero Luminoso 1990:
Gorriti Sendero 1990. The Shining Path 1999: Koppel Peru s Shining Path 1993;
McClintock Revolutionary Movements in Latin America 1998: McCormick The Shining
Path and Peruvian Terrorism 1987. The Shining Path and the Future of Peru 1990. From
the Sierra to the Cities 1992: P. Stern Sendero Luminoso 1995; J. Stern Shining and
Other Paths 1998: Strong Shining Path 1992; Tarazona-Sevillano Sendero Luminoso and
the Threat ofNarcoterrorism 1990. The National Security Archives has organized the
hundreds of documents the LIS government released to the Peruvian Truth Commission
in 2001 Among the documents are CIA analyses of the evolving Sendero threat. Many of
these are available online at http://\vw w.g\vu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/
.

r
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expanded rapidly

in

Peru after the 1970s. and soon Sendero Luminoso was cooperating

with narcotraffickers to finance their subversive operations. Third, the 1980s was a period

of serious economic decline for Peru, which exacerbated the fourth problem, growing
corruption within the

state.

Each of these problems

intensified the tensions in civil-

military relations in the 1980s and presented deep challenges to the consolidation of

democracy
At

in Peru.

first

Belaunde

security, but the

armed

Sendero Luminoso as a genuine threat

group quickly graduated from hanging dogs

attacks on military, police, and civilians.

Gonzalo
blood

failed to recognize

,

the

in its

movement espoused Maoist

revolutionary project.

president in 1985.

total control

much of the

By

in

public places to full-scale

Led by Abimael Guzman, or President

rhetoric and promised to unleash a

river

of

the time Alan Garcia succeeded Belaunde as

countryside was under a state of emergency, under the

of military authorities, and thousands of Peruvians had already fallen victim

to the conflict.

While Sendero Luminoso claimed

to be fighting

on behalf of the

marginalized and impoverished Indian population of the countryside,

became

group

that

literal

and figurative

the primary victim of the

cross-fire. Civilians

military forces in their hunt for Sendero

if they

to

armed

w ho w ere

it

was

conflict, increasingly

this

caught in the

suspected of cooperating

members became

very

w ith

easy targets for retribution, yet

seemed uncooperative w ith the military they might be considered supporters of

Sendero and therefore enemies of the

Obando

state.

Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996
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1998.

Belaunde

Luminoso

s initial

hesitance to promote a military response to the Sendero

threat reflected the fact that, at least for the first several years of his

administration, the president and his civilian administration considered the military a

greater threat to the regime than the guerrillas. Belaunde

political

power by

cutting the budget of

on and intimidated

civilian politicians

development of the military

s

intelligence units,

its

and

appease the military by approving virtually

economic

remained high.

Among

to

system.

all

s

and by blocking the

Though Belaunde attempted

to

military budget and arms requests, even as

decline, discontent within military ranks

and soldiers there was consensus

officers

check the military

which had routinely spied

civil society in the past,

new planning

the country slipped further into

moved

that the

armed forces

should replace the police forces responsible for combating the insurgents before 1982.
but the question of

leftist

how

best to respond to the insurgency

was more

divisive.

The old

core within the military favored a comprehensive response to social unrest,

including socioeconomic

potential supporters

means

to

win the

After 1982. Belaunde

him

minds of insurgents and

their

and to respond to the legitimate complaints of poor peasants. But a

growing contingent of the military pressed

represented led

hearts and

s

for a

more hard-line response.

recognition of the genuine security threat Sendero

to place the

campaign under military

responsibility.

Under

the 1979

Constitution governing the country, doing so necessitated the declaration of a state of

emergency
emergency,

in all those

many

zones

in

which the military now became

active:

under a

state

constitutional guarantees of the rights of citizens in these zones

suspended. For example, Article 23

1

of

were

of the 1979 Constitution allowed for the suspension

of freedom of association and travel and the inviolability of the home. Most significantly.

80

.

the state of

emergency

status

meant

armed forces exercised

that the

of

political control

the zones. Furthermore. Belaunde favored the hard-line response of military leaders like

General Clemente Noel Moral, whose

dirty

war

policies regularized the practice of

disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture. The socio-economic

minds

strategy.

military' leaders,

hearts and

Belaunde found, was too expensive, angered too many of the ascendant
and would create even more avenues for the expansion of military

authority into social and economic aspects of governance. Ironically, this

Sendero Luminoso had hoped
insurgents forced the state to

institutions

for:

become complicit

rights abuses

the insurgents/'

By

human

state into a violent response, the

in its

of democracy and the rule of law and

International and domestic

human

by provoking the

was just what

project to destroy the nascent

to alienate the public further.

rights groups organized to loudly

8

denounce

committed by both Sendero Luminoso and the armed forces fighting

1984.

mass graves had been uncovered, and thousands of Peruvians

Q

Ibid; Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004 Tome II. p. 247-255;
Tapia Las fuerzas armadas y Sendero Luminoso: dos estrategias y un final 1996. On the

debate within the government on whether to grant the armed forces this extension of

power, see El Comercio Oct 25. 1980:

Aug

22. 1982: Jan 6. 1983.

The

tradition of

suspension of constitutional guarantees under regimes of exception, see
Constitution of Ty ranny
g

•

1

Loveman The

993

was accurately summed up by US Ambassador to Peru Anthony Quainton.
December 20. 1990 confidential State Department cable: One cannot
appear neutral
and survive. If you are radical right. SL tries to kill you. If you are
terrorist, only the police and military try to kill you. If you are in the middle, both the
terrorists and the soldiers want you dead. See. for overviews of the human rights
situation. Americas Watch Abdicating Democratic Authority 1984: Americas Watch A
ATir Opportunity for Democratic Authority 1985: Diez Canseco Democracia,
militcirizacion y derechos humanos en el Peru 1985. On August 13. 1984. a classified
U.S. Embassy cable reported that human rights abuses by the military were becoming a
concern to the US and notes that the embassy brought these issues up with the Peruvian
prime minister and the army commanding general. Declassified document available
The

situation

who wrote

in a

through the National Security Archives. See also annual State Department reports on

81

.

had been killed by both sides. Critics claimed Belaunde was incapable or unwilling to
reestablish civilian control over the

war

to

armed

emerge, and was only too happy

protection from legal accountability

was

forces,

was allowing an Argentine-style

to protect the military

in

1

justice. In fact,

part of an explicit deal negotiated

and army commander General Rafael Hoyos Rubio
had ousted Belaunde from office

from

the

same

military

968. According to Masterson,

dirty

by Belaunde

commander who

the agreement

guaranteed the armed forces complete independence on internal and professional
matters and

immunity from misdeeds during

command promised

forces

Pion-Berlin has argued, this

the Docenio. In exchange, the

armed

to confine its activities to strictly professional matters.

is

essentially the

transitioning states throughout Latin

As

same bargain the armed forces of

America were soon

to strike,

exchanging protection

from human rights accountability and maintenance of certain key powers and perks for

The understanding Belaunde developed

respect for civilian control over policy-making.

with the armed forces was fortified by Belaunde

s

continuing defense of the military'

from charges of wrongdoing. And. rather than restrain the military
given up power. Belaunde encouraged the military in
the latest Hare-up

human

Tome

had only just

confrontations with Ecuador in

of a centuries-long border dispute. The Perm ian military

victory in battle with

command,

its

that

Ecuador strengthened Belaunde

s

s

decisive

relationship with the military

as did his continued support for high military budgets and the acquisition of

rights in

III, p.

Peru and Conrision de

la

Verdad y Reconciliation Informe Final 2004

23-41
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1

1

sophisticated

new military

equipment. According to Masterson,

not reflected in pubic budget accounting

regime and accounted for nearly

Belaunde publicly

Amnesty

30%

).

railed against international

when they used human

to those

expenditures

under the military

of the national budget."

human

rights organizations

such as

a tool for the destruction of Permian

International (which he called

democracy

were nearly equal

real military

rights abuses

committed by the Peruvian military

to

dissuade the U.S. Congress from granting Peru military aid. Despite great personal

danger and intimidation. Peruvian nongovernmental organizations, funded

in large part

by international nongovernmental organizations and foundations, continued to document

numerous cases of large-scale human
security forces.

The transnational

rights violations by both the rebels

activist

network

that

and government

emerged from the collaboration of

Peruvian and international rights organizations was effective

at

lobbying the U.S.

government; State Department reports on Pern regularly included information these
groups passed to them about incidents such as the 1983 massacre of eight journalists in

Uchuraccay. the execution of over 200

terrorists suspects in the

1986. and the 1988 killings of roughly 30 peasants in Cayara.

1

wake of prison
Though

riots in

civil society

has

always been considered weak in Peru, labor and peasant unions, church-based

10

Masterson Militarism and Politics in Latin America 1991. p. 271 See also McClintock
and Valias The United States and Pent 2003. On Pion-Berlin. see Ch. I of this text.
.

1

US

State

Department annual human rights reports on Peru. McClintock and Valias The

United States and Peru 2003. See also declassified documents available through the
National Security Archives. For a

more

detailed treatment of the transnational activist

network that grew from the Peruvian human rights

83

crisis,

see Chapter

IV of this

text.

organizations, neighborhood associations and

themselves

in the early

1980s.

By

human

rights groups continued to assert

the end of the decade, the

both state and insurgent violence would sap

much of the

growing economic

crisis

strength of civil society.

Despite the pressure from these groups, the foundations of a dangerous

1

and

'

new phase

of civil-military relations had been established over the course of the Belaunde
administration. Military interest in direct

command of the

and Belaunde had reduced some of the military
context of the subversive threat, the

was

vastly

s

power of the

political

state

had greatly diminished,

power over

military at a local and regional level

expanded by 1985. with much of the countryside under

And. ominously, large-scale human

rights abuses

the state. But in the

direct

army

control.

committed by the armed forces

(in

response to equal brutality by the insurgents) were denied or defended by the president as
vital to national security.

Ij

The

but in exchange en joyed a vast

generous arms expenditures,

conduct of

its

military

new

was now

of a threat

sphere of power over the

total legal

to civilian

Perm ian

government,

countryside,

impunity, and virtually unlimited autonomy in the

counter-insurgency campaign. Only weeks before leaving office. Belaunde

cemented the new era of military impunity via

commanders

less

in

charge of all officials within

Law 24150 which

state

placed military

of emergency zones and declared

that

12

See Tovar Yelasquismo y Movimiento Popular 1985: Mauceri State Under Seige 1996
and An Authoritarian Presidency 2006.
Ij

See Obando

Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996

polltica en el Peru: 1980-1988 1989.

84

1998; Desco Violencia

members of the

As we

courts.

protecting

military

would henceforth only be subject

shall see. the military justice

members of the

to the jurisdiction

of military

system would become the principal shield

military accused of

human

14

rights violations.

1985-1990: Civil-Military Relations at the Boiling Point
Before he became president. Alan Garcia and the Leftist political opposition

Belaunde had been

critical

of the abuses perpetrated by the military

Yet Garcia,

struggle against Sendero Luntinoso.

the loyalty

and Garcia

history,

Garcia

of the military command.

s

s

APRA and the armed forces

presidency promised renewed tensions

institutional integrity.

command

had a long and troubled

in civil-military affairs.

s.

Instead of respecting

Garcia politicized military promotions

in

order to

fill

with those loyal to him. and cemented that loyalty by corrupting those

commanders with personal
the resources they

course of their

Belaunde. was desperate to ensure

strategy was. at least initially, the reverse of Belaunde

the military

the high

s

like

in the

to

privileges and wealth. Instead of granting the

demanded

to fight the

armed forces

counter-insurgency campaign. Garcia curtailed

military spending and vetoed major purchases of new equipment, including the air force

purchase of numerous Mirage jets. And. instead of allowing the military autonomy in

campaign and supporting those members accused of human
confronted and removed military

14

See Contision de

Obando

la

rights abuses. Garcia

commanders who embraced

dirty

war techniques.

Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004 Tome

Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996

15

Ibid.

85

its

1998.

II. p.

1

270-5:

"

s

The key
officers he

Gareia

to

deemed

s

a threat to his administration

military prided itself on the meritocracy of

sparked explosive

new

feuds, within the

respect for their military

members of the

argued

that, as the

violating

army

commanders and

remove

human

his

it

directly

was necessary

it

of the

was rumored

state

APRA.

-

and

trusted to fight

part

APRA.

some

way

Sendero Luminoso without

forces.

officers

its

When,

were considered mere

in 1998. a rightist counter-

Command, emerged
armed

their proxies appeared high.

APRA

|h

s

officers lost

of the Ministry of the Interior and hence

the Rodrigo Franco

commanders

against any challengers to

Garcia

Low-ranking

conflict

with strong

among

Coups and armed

the

uprisings were

being plotted by junior-ranking officers of the army against their

superiors, by military

well.

interventions

rights policies as a convenient

links to the Ministry of the Interior, the likelihood of

institutions

The

to re-arm the police forces of the country to take

by much of the armed

subversive group loyal to

in particular.

s

loyalists.

enemies from positions of power. Furthermore. Garcia

under the control of Garcia and

APRA mercenaries

the removal of

and their replacement with

human

up the campaign. Because the police formed

were

was

rightly interpreted Garcia s targeting of

armed forces could not be

rights,

forces

promotions, so Garcia

its

military leadership for their

for the president to

armed

assertion of control over the

aggressive

new

s

against the state, by the Rodrigo Franco

control of the state, and in

all

Command

likelihood by others as

stance had brought civil-military relations to a boiling

point.

16

Ibid.
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As coup
Luminoso and
Sendero

plots proliferated, so too did

the

forces.

The

power and reach began

s

In bold displays,

shutting

armed

down

rights abuses by both

insurgent threat continued to

to threaten citizens

so that, by

1

990.

of Lima as well as the countryside.

power

grid in various parts of the city.

Suddenly the war was not only

a concern of poor Quechua-speaking Indians in the mountains:

capital

grow

Sendero

undermined any sense of security via car bombs and by repeatedly

it

the

human

was panicked. From 1989

to 1992. political violence

than three thousand Peruvians per year.

1

By

1

990.

32%

now

even the middle-class

claimed the lives of more

of Peruvian

territory

and

49%

of

IQ

the population

From 1988

fell

within emergency zones and therefore were under military control.

to 1991. there

custody in Peru than

The growing

in

were more cases of disappearances of individuals taken

any other country

in the

much

19

strength of the insurgency and the sense of crisis throughout the

country meant Garcia was unable to respond
military over

world.

into

of the countryside.

It

to the steadily

swelling power of the

was widely acknowledged,

too. that the failure

of the courts to successfully prosecute suspected insurgents rounded up by the military

was encouraging

the military to continue to engage in a regular policy of extrajudicial

1

McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru 2003. p. 69: on human rights
abuses during this period, see Desco Violencia politica en el Peru: 1980-1988 1989 and
Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 2004.
Degregori

Shining Path and Counterinsurgency Strategy

Ibid. p. 92.

For reports on the

19

Mendez A

human

1994.

p. 84.

rights situation during the Garcia presidency, see

Certain Passivity’ 1987 and Tolerating Abuses 1988: Americas Watch

Derechos hutnanos en

el

Peru 1986 and "Human Rights Developments" 1989.
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and forced disappearances: the military simply considered the

killings

to effectively deal

incompetent

state

with insurgents through the courts and so took matters into their

own

hands.'"

As Fernando

Rospigliosi and Alfred Stepan each found, this situation resulted

the worst of both worlds.

On

the one hand, distrust

among

the political parties for the

military grew, occasionally erupting into congressional hearings in

military were dragged before Congress to be questioned.

terrible security crisis in the country,

to the military,

instituted.

whose leadership

w ithout any

no attempts

Mixed messages were being

to

committed abuses

fundamentally

sent by the

clearly felt outraged and vulnerable

was publicly challenged by Congress or
abuses

the other hand, given the

forces suspected of having

the course of the counter-insurgency campaign, and

were

On

which members of the

with a few politicized exceptions, no legal action

was taken against members of the armed

military procedures

in

effective challenge.

the administration

when

alter

government

their integrity

and yet continued

Members of the armed

in

to carry out

forces regularly and

loudly complained that the only effects of congressional challenges to military policy

were

to aid the terrorists in their psychological war.

the executive stoked discontent within the military.'

However.

US embassy

The lack of political backing from
1

cables reflect the reality that Garcia acknowledged in

private the necessity of catering to the military

s

fears of

human

rights accountability.

wrote:
analysts
j

See, for ex.

McClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003 on

Rospigliosi Montesinos

this point.

y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Stepan Repensando a

militares en politica 1988.

88

los

US

human

most explosive issue in government-military
armed forces have watched with significant degree of concern

rights [are] potentially the

relations. Peruvians

judicial processes in Argentina leading to conviction of top generals for

human

Garcia apparently communicated adequate assurances to army
and navy commanders in this regard A key issue from military s vantage point
is whether trials of military personnel accused of rights violations will take place
within military or civilian systems of justice. Human rights groups and important
senators
have pressed for cases to be brought to civilian court. Military has
Our
vigorously argued contrary to protect its institutions and individuals
rights violations

understanding

and plans

is that

weigh

to

president understands sensitivity of this issue for military

in to

swing outcome of decision

at the

appropriate

Should decision go against military, process could ultimately be

time

destabilizing

Hundreds of Peruvian

officers

have participated

in anti-subversive

actions and could ultimately be called to account for their actions."

In light of civil-military tensions. Garcia backpedaled on his early

human

rights activism.

After Garcia called for military intervention to suppress prison riots staged by Sendero

Luminoso

unarmed

prisoners, a decision that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of

commanders

prisoners. Garcia blocked efforts to prosecute the military

early period of Garcia

s

attempts to reduce the

involved.

The

of the internal conflict came

barbarity

to

1

an end."

The

military' did lose certain prerogatives

changes damaged military effectiveness and

under Garcia, but

institutional integrity,

military relations and the rule of law. Recall Huntington

objective

and

subjective

civilian control of the

s

many of the
democratic

distinction

policy

civil-

between

armed forces discussed

in

Chapter

II.

Garcia asserted subjective control over the armed forces, attempting to diminish the

power of those

institutions to threaten his administration,

politicizing the hierarchy of command

by intervening

in

and

and by employing alternative sources of coercive

7 *>

" US Embassy

cable. Jan 14. 1986. declassified

and available through the National

Security Archives.

" See

declassified 1986-7

Informe Final 2004

Tome

US embassy
III. p.

43-66:

cables on this matter:

Ames

89

Comision de

Informe al Congreso 1989.

la

Verdad

power

(the police

and paramilitaries).

No

institutionalized democratization of civil-

military relations had been estaf shed, and the institutional integrity of the arr

was severely diminished. The
a

military

was

not

empowered by

the

government

comprehensive and effective counterinsurgency plan, and indeed

Sendero w as

economic

in

many ways decimated due

to

its

d forces

to institute

capacity to fight

budgetary crises provoked by Garcia

policies.

Garcia

s

attempts to block the political influence of the armed forces over his

government often

armed forces and

faltered. In order to coordinate the air. naval

and army branches of the

of the individual commanders of these

to reduce the political influence

branches in his government. Garcia created the civilian post of Minister of Defense
April 1987.

A

military

coup w as staged by
r

anger over reduced military funds and his

Though
they

the other branches of the

made

s

air force officers the

new

reflecting

attempts to collar the military politically.

armed forces agreed

their opposition to the idea

same month,

in

to put

down

the air force rebellion,

of a possibly civilian defense minister know n to
-M

the president. In turn. Garcia backpedaled

As Obando

concludes,

the

on

his plan to appoint a civilian to the post.”

armed forces

lost

nearly

all

pressure on the Peruvian state during the Garcia period, except

protecting

its

at

when

it

came

to

human

rights violations

and corruption.

the national level

were more than

offset

cadres from investigation for

However, any losses of power

of their capacity to exert

~4

Masterson Militarism and Politics in Latin America 1991,
Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996 1998.

90

p.

by the vast

273; see also

Obando

expansion of local and regional political power and influence the armed forces were
developing via their direct control over emergency zones. In these areas
authorin'

was

The
All in

all.

the army.

fell

government

the performance of democratic

it

was

and further

by 12.3%

utterly disastrous.

economic plans,

for this, as his

further

~

of the Peruvian government was limping weakly along back

rest

disappointing

in

into

far

more even than

1989: inflation reached

fell

in the

the midst of hyperinflation

7.650%

by 47.6% and

his corruption in office, led

statistics are

real

wages

was

itself the

decade

in

which

and rapidly plummeting standards of living, public support for
and

country

s

Obando The Power of Peru

in particular for political parties

oldest and

most popular

s

Armed

Forces

buckled. Garcia

political party until

s failed

1994.

p.

it

s

was

TO

presidency."

Hence, unlike
to stronger

112-113.

economic and political failures
see Crabtree Peru Under Garcia 1992 and McClintock Prospects for

the Garcia administration generally, and

Democratic Consolidation
Taylor

.

by

back from collapse. In

most of South America, where the armed forces were adapting themselves

specifically,

GDP

Between 1985 and

lost

.

On

s

for blue-collar workers fell

pull the country

(temporarily) decimated by association with Garcia

"6

Peru

overwhelming: Peru

the following year.

democracy could not

the institutions of the state

APRA

Lima.

1980s was more than

55%." For Peru, as for much of Latin America, the 1980s were a
to electoral

in

Alan Garcia himself deserves much of the blame

economic decay."* The

1989. white collar salaries

even the return

the only state

From Fujimori

in a

to

its

Least Likely Case: Peru

Toledo

2005.

p.

1989.

567.

On the crisis of the party system, see Graham Peru s APR.4 992. Kenney Fujimori s
Coup and the Breakdown of Democracy 2003; Tanaka Los espejismos de la democracia
1

1998.

91

state institutions

Cameron,

and

and

civilian oversight

far less

power, according

power of the Peruvian armed

the political

forces

Mauceri and

to

was dramatically expanding,

and those weak mechanisms of accountability and civilian supremacy that had survived
into the

1980s were diminished.

military

coup

_g

As

the 1990s approached, anticipation of a possible

particularly if the results of the

One coup

armed forces were already
plan, developed

dissatisfied civilians,

elections

was completed

in

in

11

Though

norms and codes of conduct had

in years before, to inflict total defeat

Luminoso

since 1980. until the late 1980s most

military felt constrained to openly challenge the

failure in

context of a

in the

upon

the military had been critical of the civilian government

effectively fight Sendero

power during

government due

the previous military regime.

particularly the business

to

volumes, was based on the belief frequently

to be

order to allow the armed forces of Peru, like those of the Southern Cone

campaigns against subversive

rebels."

some

October of 1989. The plan (sometimes referred

violent subversive threat to the state. Democratic

their

proven

conjunction with

expressed by military leadership that democracy could not survive

in

(later

plotting such a venture.

by military commanders

as Plan Verde), elaborated over three

dropped

were considered

grew, fueled by frequent minors

unsatisfactory to military leadership

accurate) that the

upcoming

By

to their

the

capacity to

members of the

own

recent

1988. enough of the public, and

community, loathed the Garcia government

military adventure in politics look worthwhile to some.

s

in

The

to

make

a

new

idea that the military

was

the

Mauceri and Cameron Unholy Alliance: Drugs. Corruption, and the Peruvian Military
During the Fujimori Administration 1998.
h

See Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch.
Parts of the Plan del
Golpe were published in Oiga in 1993: see also Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion
Informe Final 2004 Tome II. p. 327-333.
1

92

.

only institution efficient, organized, and nationalistic enough to protect the national
interest (rather than the

narrow

which they saw as motivating

self-interest

politicians) had never been uprooted

all

from the culture of the armed forces. Indeed the

authoritarian and corporatist tendencies underpinning military opinion had

stronger over the course of the 80s.

state,

The plan advocated long-term

grown

military control of the

suppression of the free press, neoliberal economic policies, and a detailed plan for

defeating Sendero.

Only two things seem

to

have prevented the plan from being put into

action: the anticipation that the conservative, neoliberal

the

elected

upcoming

elections and put

many of these

Mario Vargas Llosa might win

policies into place himself,

and clear

messages from the international community, including directly from the U.S. embassy,
'

that

no military intervention against the electoral process
Civil-military relations had reached a perilous

armed forces were divided and weakened by Garcia
the promotions process.

They once more perceived

s

in

new

Peru would be tolerated.

1

low-point. Institutionally, the

intrusions into and manipulation of

civilian

government as an enemy,

corrupt, incompetent and threatening, a force to be controlled or defeated. Left to fight a

losing battle against Sendero

officers

Luminoso with few er resources and no

and soldiers perceived attempts

to

hold them accountable for

political support,

human

rights

abuses as an unwarranted restraint and a tool of political attack wielded against them.
Peruvians, ever

more threatened and

insecure,

were increasingly

likely to accept this

view.

Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch.
The United States and Peru 2003. p. 133.
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1..

McClintock and Valias

The Rise of Fujimori
In the world of Peruvian politics, the

name

Fujimori.

An

elections. Fujimori

anti-system, anti-party,

was able

to capitalize

catapult himself into the presidency

1

s

Hybrid Regime

990s will forever be synonymous with the

come-from-no where candidate

in the

on the national security and economic

1990

crises to

and then remain there for a decade. Both his

electoral success and ten years in office can. in large part, be explained

the political strategy of neopopulism. Unlike the

populism

by the success of

that typified Latin

presidencies of the 1930s and 1950s. neopopulism relies on a leader

American

s ability to

appeal to

unorganized sectors of society; rather than the middle classes and unions, neopopulists
reach out to the poor and

members of the informal economy. They do

so with charisma

and by promising to effectively respond to the problems plaguing those audiences, but
(again, in opposition to classical populists) they also

do so by attacking rather than

building and strengthening the institutions of the state and of governance.

The Peruvian public hated
political class,

and he was an

political parties,

outsider

:

and Fujimori had none: they hated the

they did not trust the courts or Congress, and

Fujimori promised he would not allow them to stand in his

of the will of the people.

democracy, a government
quasi-direct. largely

mass of people.

The strategy of neopopulism
in

which

is

way

as he acted in the

conducive

name

to delegative

a personalistic, plebiscitarian leader rules based

unmediated relationship

to a

on a

heterogeneous, mostly unorganized

This was what Fujimori offered the people of Peru: their response was

overwhelming. That the Peruvian

state had. like those

exhibited a tendency toward excessive presidentialism

94

of the

made

rest

of Latin America, long

the turn to

neopopulism

seem almost

inevitable. (For

example. Planas points out

during the Belaunde administration and

60%

that half the legislation

passed

of that passed during the Garcia

administration were laws decreed by the president. Y~

Scholars of neopopulism point to the presence of crisis and vital to the success of

neopopulism and as

While

electoral strategy.

institutional

As Kurt Weyland

writes.

weaknesses, especially inchoate, fragmented party systems,

provide important permissive conditions for the emergence of personalistic
leaders, grave, urgent

problems confronting a country trigger [the neopopulist s]
power Fujimori unexpectedly emerged

often dramatic rise to prominence and

out of total obscurity

in a

country that had suffered hyperinflation as

w ell

as brutal

insurrectionary violence and equally brutal military repression. Thus, crises bring
forth neopopulist leadership: they delegitimize the established

political class

and

pave the way for outsiders: weaken intermediary organizations, especially parties
and interest groups, and thus upon up opportunities for personalistic leaders: and
induce

who

many

shrouded

Of course,

citizens to run considerable risks

lack a promising track record and

to

are therefore

in uncertainty.'"

the big promises neopopulists

must be shown

by supporting untested newcomers

whose promises of salvation

achieve

at least

make

to get elected

some of the dramatic

face of crisis, or else be booted out of office quickly.

make them

results they

With no

vulnerable: they

ve promised

part} to protect

in the

him and no

Quote from Weyland The Rise and Decline of Fujimori s Neopopulist Leadership
On neopopulism and delegative democracy, see Crabtree Populisms Old and
New 2000: Roberts Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism 1995:
Weyland Neopopulism and Neoliberalism 1996. Clarifying a Contested Concept
2001. Rise and Decline of Fujimori s Neopopulist Leadership 2006: O Donnell
Delegative Democracy 1994. On presidentialism in Latin American politics, see
Mainwaring and Shugart Presidentialism and Democracy 1997: Linz and Valenzuela
Failure of Presidential Democracy 1994: in Peru see Planas El Fujimorato 1999 and
Mauceri An Authoritarian Presidency 2006.
2006.

""

Weyland The Rise and Decline of Fujimori

14.

95

s

Neopopulist Leadership

2006.

p. 13-

ideology to uphold. Fujimori

s

presidency would be vulnerable

morass of the

deliver on his promise to bypass the institutional

and hyperinflation

immediately reversed course upon winning

to be

and

known

stabilize the

of 126

Luminoso. Congress,

many

)

in

new

new measures which

his

forces legal

to

economic shock programs (which

early in his administration were vital to his

.

the president introduced to the

hardline antiterrorism laws aimed at defeating Sendero

which Fujimori

s

supporters held minority status along with

they hoped might end the conflict.

was decree

against the

by Mario Vargas Llosa. he

other small parties, raised objections, despite the public

refused to act on

the security

fix

The success of Fujimori 's attempts

economy through

Fuji shock

as the

office.

consolidation of power. Then, in September 1991

legislature a series

state to

Though he had campaigned

neoliberal policies and austerity measures advocated

came

he were not able to

crises.

Fujimori took bold action on both fronts.

control inflation

if

01 7-90- JUS which

amnesty for any human

s

Among

would grant

rights abuse accusations,

all

approval of the tough
the proposed laws they

members of the armed

though when Fujimori

supporters in Congress allied with those of Alan Garcia, they were able to muster

s

enough

votes to grant ex-president Garcia immunity from charges of human rights violations in
the Lurigancho and El Fronton cases. Fujimori railed against legislators

alike as traitors, jackals,

and weak on

4

security.’

neopopulism had promised was quickly coming

4

Comision de

la

The confrontation Fujimori

s

to a head.

Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004 Tome
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and the courts

II.

p.

336.

Once

again. Peru

bucked the trends sweeping Latin America. As democratic

regimes were strengthening
full

consolidation

in Chile.

which had seemed

smoothly through three elections
self-coup

(

Argentina. Brazil and Uruguay. Peru

(at least to

hit a

outside observers) to be

major roadblock.

s

journey

to

moving

In 1992. Fujimori

executed a

cmtogolpe ) by dismissing Congress, essentially eliminating local

government offices only recently established

as

mechanisms of decentralization of

government, suspending the Constitution, dissolving several ministries and much of the
legal system,

and declaring a

state

of emergency during which he ruled by decree.

Meanwhile, the armed forces and national police occupied Congress, the Palace of
Justice,

and the offices of newspapers and

opponents and potential

Armed

critics

TV

stations.

They rounded up

of the autogolpe. That night, the Joint

Forces issued a statement strongly supporting Fujimori

Fujimori

s

public message to the country

s

political

Command

actions.

of the

When

was videotaped. General fJermoza was by

his

0

side."

Coups were already

part of the Peruvian political reality, but this

one was unique,

not only for having been led by a popularly elected president, but also for that president

ability to

s

maintain public approval throughout the majority of his tenure in office. The

Among the

most frequently advanced explanations for the autogolpe are Fujimori s
frustration with Congress, where his coalition s lack of a majority meant he could not
There are numerous insightful and often competing
scholarly accounts of the autogolpe. See. among others. Kenney Fujimori s Coup and the
unilaterally

impose

his agenda.

Breakdown of Democracy in Latin America 2004: Institute de Estudios Peruanos Peru
1992: La democracia en cuestion 1992: McClintock and Valias The United States and
Peru 2003: Cameron and Mauceri The Peruvian Labyrinth 1997: Conaghan Fujimori s
Peru 2005: Ferrero Costa Peru s Presidential Coup 1993: Klaren Peru: Society and
Nationhood in the Andes 2000: Tulchin and Bland Peru in Crisis: Dictatorship or
Democracy? 1994: Mauceri The Transition to Democracy and the Failures of
Institution Building 1997: Cameron Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru 1994 and
Self Coups: Peru. Guatemala. Russia

1998.
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)

autogolpe

itself

proved exceptionally popular, with surveys indicating that

public approved of his dismissal of Congress and
16

Even years

the judiciary.

later, for

94%

many, Fujimori

s

88%

of the

approved his plan to restructure
decision to single-handedly destroy

and then recreate government was considered proof of their former head of state 's
democratic credentials, rather than as signs of authoritarianism. To his apologists.

Perm ian

Fujimori was exactly what the
things done and

is

among

in the

demands

s

the public, exhausted and disappointed by the failures of their leaders

becoming

president,

done

all

(as he referred to the judiciary)

and the partydocracy

upon

interests).

s

palace of injustice

the

means

Fujimori went out of his

to

way

sen e

to depict the

judiciary as corrupt and Congress as refusing to cooperate with the president
’

national agenda.

Situation de la

Success?

on the

7

'

Ferrero Costa

Fujimori

of Congress (by which he meant

the corrupt and divisive system of parties that used Congress as a

rather than Peru

elites.

he could to encourage and profit from the

public s distaste for government by issuing scathing attacks

politician s

gets

autogolpe indicated the strength of anti-politics

1980s and angry over the corruption and fecklessness of political

had. since

who

a strong leader

not fooled by the corrupt and ineffective system of political parties and

patronage. The popularity of Fujimori

sentiments

labyrinth

Peru

s

Democracia en

el

Coup

Ames. Bernales. et
Peru (2000-2001 2001: Weyland A Paradox of

Presidential

1993. p. 33. See also

al

2000.

Degregori La Decada de la Antipolitica 2000: Cotier and Grompone El Fujimorismo:

Ascensoy Caida de an Regimen Autoritario 2000; Ames. Bernales. et al Situacion de
Democracia en el Peru 2001 Seligson and Carrion Political Support. Political

la

:

Skepticism, and Political Stability in

New

Democracies 2002.

On

the fate of political

under Fujimori, see Tanaka Los espejismos de la democracia 998. Kenney The
Death and Rebirth of a Party System. Peru 1978-2001 2003. Levitsky and Cameron

parties

Democracy Without

1

Parties? Political Parties and

98

Regime Change

in

Fujimori

s

Peru

The public was

further elated in

September 1992. Abimael Guzman, the architect

and icon of the guerrilla movement Sendero Luminoso, was captured

bombing campaign

Lima

in

at a

time

when he claimed

s

military court and sentenced to

drop

its

in

life in jail.

leader, quickly fell apart. Ironically,

DINCOTE.

His capture was followed by a dramatic

it

was

the result of inspired police and investigative

a small unit not tied to or influenced by Fujimori but benefiting

Fujimori

s

ability to

emergency and

in

the

put in a cage, tried by a

though Fujimori capitalized on the capture

intelligence cooperation with U.S. allies.

2003.

was on

confrontations between the armed forces and Sendero Luminoso. which, without

enhance his popularity,

to

massive

a

that the Shining Path

Guzman was

shocking and thrilling the nation.

edge of victory,

amid

rule

On public

'

Nevertheless.

Guzman

s

to

work by
from

capture contributed

conduct a self-coup, dismiss Congress, declare a

state

of

while maintaining high levels of public approval.

by decree

opinion reflecting attitudes of distrust toward the institutions of the state
Public Opinion

Latin America, see Lagos

2003. Latinobarometro polling data, and

June 23. 1991 polling data in La Republica and National citing Institute de Economia
Aplicade polls that found 71% of the public diapproved of the performance of Congress.

76%

supported a reduction in the number of its members, and

creating a unicameral Congress

April 18.
'

'

s

g

Peru

.

For Fujimori

s

s

political parties, see

Terrorism Trials

On economic

supported the idea of

public statements attacking the courts.

Expreso Oct 14. 1990. Dec
1995. La Republica July 28. 1990 April 10. 1995.

Congress and

47%

10. 1990.

Feb 24. 1991.

The Economist October 30. 2004.

Political

1995.

Cameron

policy under Fujimori, see Mauceri State under Siege 1996.

and Mauceri The Peruvian Labyrinth 1997. Crabtree and Thomas Fujimori

Economy

1998. Roberts

Wey land Neopopulism

Liberal State in Peru

1996.

Against the Odds

Peruvian Economic Strategies in the 1990s
support for the autogolpe. see

Peru: The

Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism

and Neoliberalism

1996: Wise

s

Weyland

2006.

On

A Paradox
99

Kay Fujipopulism and

2006: Sheahan

the

Redirection of

the impact of economic policy

of Success?

2000.

on

Fernando Rospigliosi. Carlos Ivan Degregori, Enrique Obando. Carlos Rivera.

Henry Pease Garcia and others have argued

that the role

of the military

is

4(1

understanding the events of 1992.
interruption of Peruvian

In a sense,

democracy

a

it

is

misleading to

self coup, for in fact

it

1992

call the

was

central to

the product of

cooperation between the executive, the military, and the national intelligence agency.
Factions within the military had

grown impatient with

of the Belaunde and Garcia governments, and

the

bumbling and recurrent

when Fujimori

crises

shot to electoral victory in

1990. he faced the immediate possibility of a military overthrow.

The likelihood of a

military uprising reflected not only frustration within military ranks over political

corruption and ineptitude, but also the fact that Peruvian troops operated under conditions

downright

NeM’sw'eek described as

pitiable.

Facing constant shortages of food and

equipment, and paid a mere $23 a month, troop morale was so low before
desertion had

military

is

become rampant. After

so badly off

it

may

the autogolpe. reporters

not be able to defeat terrorism even

are running the country with President Alberto Fujimori.

argued that Fujimori

s

warned

decision to stage the autogolpe

off an uprising of underpaid officers against their high

Hermoza. who had been jeered by

officers in a

In fact,

that

now
some

992

that

the Peruvian

that the generals

military analysts

was influenced by

command,

1

the need to head

including General

meeting just two w eeks before the coup.

4,1

Degregori and Rivera Peru 1980-1990: Fuerzas armadas, subversion y democracia
1993. Rospigliosi Montes i nos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Obando The Power of

Peru

s

Armed Forces

1994. Pease Garcia Los anos de la langosta 1994.
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.

The autogolpe allowed Fujimori
opening

among

new avenues

empower

to

dampen

loyalty of the

Fujimori

s

divisiveness within the

the military.

the rank-and-file. Fujimori issued an

The
after

to

And,

to

cement military cooperativeness

emergency pay hike

election to the presidency, he retreated to the Circulo Militar to negotiate

Montesinos. a shadowy aide

clear that

41

for soldiers.

armed forces commanders had already been guaranteed. Hours

with the armed forces commanders, relying heavily during

administration.

armed forces by

42

Though

who would soon come

to play the

the details of these negotiations

what emerged from them was

this

may

process on Vladimiro

key role

in his

never be fully known,

it

is

the consolidation of power in the hands of

Fujimori. Montesinos. and the head of a reorganized arm}'. Fujimori and Montesinos

shrewdly moved

to

remove

military'

and elevated powerful new actors
President of the Joint

Command

commanders perceived

to the military

command.

as a threat to the

In

1991 they installed a

command

structure ensured Fujimori the support

of the armed forces for his attack on the institutions of the Peruvian

albeit in a

manner

ill-suited to

new

of the armed forces. General Nicolas Hermoza. These

decisive interventions into the military

essence a continuation of Garcia

new regime

s tactics to assert civilian

state

and were

control over the militar}

in

-

.

democratic reform. In exchange for loyalty to Fujimori, the

armed forces would receive more than Garcia ever

offered, including wide-ranging

41

Lane with Larmer and Schmidt The Soldiers Story 1992. p. 44. Corroborated by
declassified US embassy cables available through the National Security Archives.
*>

4

On Montesinos. see Bowen and Holligan El espia imperfecto 2003, Michnik The
Montesinos Virus 2001 Degregori La Decada de la Antipolitica 2000: Montesinos.
Toda la hist or ia 2001
‘

:

101

protections for military prerogatives, effective

limitations on press reporting

powers.

immunity from prosecution, new

on military operations, and further expansion of military

43

Fujimori

s

moves

to

check the

threat

instead coopt the military into supporting

of a challenge from the barracks and to

him provided

military alliance [that] underpinned the regime.

nature of this alliance within the

decried Fujimori

first

militarization

s

institutions of the state, he held

44

the

main

state.

civil-

Politicians and analysts realized the

few months of Fujimori

of the

axis of the

s

presidency and regularly

While the president attacked

all

up the military and the presidency as the two

capable of responding to the demands of the public. The president remained

other

state

powers

in the

Circulo Militar for weeks after his election, establishing his cabinet and calling

politicians to

meet with him there

an active military officer to
his election,

many

fill

to initiate planning for his

the position of Minister of the Interior.

sensed the militarization of the

Fujimori might eventually attempt his
military control

w ould

new

own version of

He

also chose

Hence even before

administration and

w arned

bordaberrization.

by which

that

be consolidated under the guise of a civilian, elected presidency.

Fujimori encouraged such rumors

4

government.

when he

referred to the

Mauceri and Cameron Unholy Alliance

armed forces

as the

Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005
Obando Fujimori and the Military: A Marriage of Convenience 1996. For Hermoza s
own account of plotting the 992 coup, see his Fuerzas Armadas del Peru 996. Due to
'

1998.

1

1

limitations of space.

the press and the

I

w ill

not directly address the question of the relationship between

armed forces

in Peru.

On

this topic, see Rospigliosi

El arte del engaiio:

2000 and Instituto Prensa y Sociedad Prensa
anos de relaciones tormentosas en el Peru 2002.

las relaciones entre los militaresy la prensa

y mi lit ares:
44

Obando

forces.

treinta

refers to this relationship as a

presidential-led symbiosis

Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996

Los anos de

la

langosta 1994.

102

1998.

p.

with the armed

379. See also Pease Garcia

fundamental

pillar

of his government. Others simply worried

that the confrontation

Fujimori was provoking between the institutions of the state would likely result in a coup

d

etat.

whatever

The

4

its

'

form.

early consolidation of the executive-military alliance

impossible without the third element of the new

Montesinos. Fujimori

s

most important

pow er

would have been

triumvirate. Vladimiro

political advisor.

Montesinos also became de

facto head of the national intelligence agency. SIN. Also a former lawyer for

drug dealers, he had been a Peruvian army officer

in the

charges of selling secret documents to the United States.

Montesinos used

Montesinos proved

two weaknesses: an army

had

rights violations,

and a

that

political

organization or a social base.
military depended in pail

rights abuses.

1970s. but had been expelled on

As Umberto

his connections in the military to position

the military and the executive.

lost its prestige

to

be

Colombian

Jara explains.

himself as a bridge betw een

the nexus capable of uniting

because of subversion and human

unknown, absolutely

solitary,

w ithout

a political

Montesinos relationship w ith powerful members of the

on his past

efforts to protect

them from prosecution

for

human

The triumvirate of pow er he now helped construct enabled Fujimori

carry out the audacious overthrow' of his

own government

to

with the certainty that he could

maintain a monopoly on the use of force.

4

Quote is from Gestion Oct 12. 1991. See also El Comercio and La Republica Aug 24.
1990 and Jan 29. 1992. El Universal Sept 17. 1990. Expreso Oct 14. 1990 and Feb 24.
1991 Warnings to this effect were so common that Henry Pease Garcia referred to his
own account of the 1992 autogolpe a Chronicle of a Death Foretold (Los alios de la
'

.

langosta 1994).
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In essence.

Montesinos had brokered the following

the legitimate democratic face of a

developed

in

regime that would

in fact

1989 by members of the military (working

disgusted by Garcia

s presidential disasters).

deal: Fujimori

in

put

in

would sen e

as

place the coup plan

conjunction with civilians

The 1992 autogolpe followed

the earlier

plan in great detail, except for the key difference that, rather than the armed forces

overseeing the

(Plan

state.

new

regime, the elected President would preside over the remaking of the

Verde envisioned

a puppet presidency with the

power; Fujimori and Montesinos managed to coopt

armed forces wielding

plan to

this

fit

their

own

real

goals.)

Military leadership involved in negotiating the transition with Montesinos and Fujimori

no doubt recognized the benefit of this democratic veneer,

as. since the

War. they could no longer count on the international community

end of the Cold

to tolerate military

authoritarianism.

In

exchange

the military

for sharing

power with Fujimori and

would receive something more fundamental

counter-subversive strategy would

now

be put in place.

his right-hand

to their interests,

It

was

military circles that the reason Sendero continued to thrive

state

full

anyhow:

force and capacity. Congress had. in the

Political-Military

of the

state.

s

months before

was because the Peruvian

The autogolpe allowed

in

w ith

their

the autogolpe. blocked

counter-insurgency plan, including those

Command

their

a widely held belief within

of the 1980s had held the armed forces back from prosecuting the conflict

several provisions of Fujimori

the

man. Montesinos.

w hich

granted

each emergency zone control over civilian sectors

the president to enact the counter-insurgency plan in

104

its

entirety, with the

terrorists

added bonus

that the

problem ofjudges

failing to convict suspected

could be solved by removing the overwhelming majority of them from their

positions and replacing

them with regime supporters.

To Fujimori and

his allies

4h

apparent surprise, the autogolpe met with immediate

and concerted pressure from the Organization of American States,
states,

to hold

including the United States, and in

new

elections. Fujimori

international

community might

some cases

international financial institutions,

more concerned about
inflict

the

upon Peru than about

agreed to hold elections for the presidency and to establish

body

to write a

Fujimori

s

new

economic damage the
image

his

first

new Congress.

4

in their

-

eyes

a temporary legislative

Rather than end

adventures in authoritarianism, however, he had simply changed strategies.

For one thing, the

4h

constitution and finally a

many of its member

See Obando

new

constitution meant Fujimori could run for office anew, while the

Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996

1998: Rospigliosi

Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. C'h. 1. Institutionalist factions unwilling
bargain within Montesinos and those opposed to the idea of any interruption of the
constitutional order

had been, or would soon

replaced with leaders amenable to the plan.

be.

to

purged from the armed forces and

Some of these

institutionalists

w arned

the

US

as early as 1990 about Montesinos pow er and the growing control of his intelligence
agency over the country, and others staged a failed counter-coup against Fujimori in Nov
1992. These officers were soon pardoned by Fujimori in order to reduce tensions with

these factions within the

armed

Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis
Summary. Who is Controlling Whom? Oct 23.

forces.

Center. Counterintelligence Periodic

See

1990:

Peru Military Unease Growing. Dec 23. 1992. Declassified, available through National
Security Archives; and Robles Persecution Contra Militares Institucionalistas Gaceta
del Peril (Argentina) Aho 4. No. 44. May 1995 (reprinted in Crimen e Impunidad 1996).
4

The 1993 Constitution is available at http://bviilual.bnp.gob.pe/libros_titulos.php: see
Comision Andina de Juristas La Constitucion de 1993: Analisis y comentarios 1994.
On the question of the role of the armed forces in the new Constitution, see Obando

also

Seguridad. defensa nacional v fuerza en

la

constitucion de 1993

Analisis Internacional

1993 and Fuerzas armadas y constitucion 1993: on the role of Congress
to the pattern

of violence and

Infor me Final 2004

Tome

state failure

III. p.

in contributing

from 1980-2000. see Comision de

205-246.

105

la

Verdad

previous constitution had banned consecutive presidencies by the same individual. (This

change foreshadowed a trend soon
tradition

to

sweep South America and end

of banning immediate presidential reelection.

bicameral Congress with a single

4S
)

New

elections to replace the

80-member chamber tasked with

Constitution granted an overwhelming majority of these seats to

coalition: similarly,

when

a strong majority in the

won

the 1995 legislative elections

new

80%

of the magistrates

provisional magistrates

new

members of his

were held. Fujimori

political

s allies

The president would use

agenda upon the country, and secured the regime from

dismissing

writing a

held

unicameral. 120-member Congress. (The president himself

a resounding victory in the presidential elections.)

to force his

the long-standing

in the legal

legal scrutiny

this bloc

by

system and replacing them with

whose appointments were granted and revoked

by

directly

his

administration.

In the

meantime. Fujimori ruled alone, without any

(from April 1992 to January 1993).

He

strengthen the hand of the military, his

in place the

Many

In 1994. President

reelection in

Menem

this

main and

months

time to immediately and vastly
crucial allies in government,

by putting

reforms the armed forces demanded as necessary to successfully defeat

Sendero Luminoso.

48

used

restraints, for nine

of these reforms had formed part of a packet of 126 special

Menem

exchange

of Argentina would persuade Congress

for a shortening

of the presidential term.

to

allow his

In 1996. a year after

successfully returned to the Argentine presidency. Brazil

s

President Fernando

won the Congressional votes needed to amend the Constitution to
allow reelection. And in 1999. President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was granted the
opportunity to stay in office for as many as twelve more years when the Constituent
Henrique Cardoso

Assembly he had called introduced a reelection provision into the Constitution. See
Conaghan. Making and Unmaking 2001 For US reaction to the autogolpe. see .Yen'
York Times April 7 and 1. 1992 and declassified document President Bush s Call to
.

,

Fujimori 22 April. 1992

1

available through the National Security Archives; for

reaction, see Ferrero Costa

Peru

is

Proceso de retorno 1992.

reprinted.
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in

which

the

OAS

OAS

resolution on

expedited

legislative decrees

by the executive

wrangling, Fujimori argued, had prevented their
autogolpe.

4"

The Ministries of the

Interior

control of hard-line factions from the

would be under

in

1991. but continued Congressional

full

implementation

until after the

and Defense were consolidated under the

armed

forces,

meaning

that

even the police force

the control of the army, the strongest of the individual

armed

forces.

Fujimori extended the political control of the military over zones in a state of emergency.

He passed tough new
terrorists to be tried

anti -terrorist

laws allowing military tribunals for suspected

by anonymous, hooded judges: such courts helped assure the low

conviction rates for alleged insurgents, long a source of military outrage, would be

reversed.

Between 95 and

97%

of the cases

conviction."" In addition. Fujimori

political

writes,

"

in

in

Congress routinely blocked attempts by

executive intervention in cases concerning

human

rights abuses

standard, critics being accused of supporting terrorism and subjected to

harassment by the security services,

4

majority

by the new military tribunals resulted

opponents to investigate suspected abuses of power by members of the military.

As Taylor
became

s

tried

who

operated their

own

death squad.

The new

See El Comercio Sept 28. 1991. Relevant Legislative Decrees include No. 726. 734

and 738 related

to the entry

of the armed forces into universities, prisons, and regions not

of emergency, published in El Pemcmo Nov 12. 1991. Also published in the
were Laws 740 and 741 related to the rondas campesinos and self-defense
committees, which could now receive arms from the military: No. 734. 749 and 752
related to the organization of the System of National Defense, the fundamental military
codes, and establishing Miliary-Political Command establishing the authority of the
military over all civilian government in zones under state of emergency; and others.
under a

same

state

issue

Ml

Years later, it would be proved that thousands of individuals were wrongly convicted
by these military tribunals and set free. Youngers Violencia Politico y Socieclad Civil en
el

Peru 2003.

p.

255: for earlier criticisms see especially Colegio de Abogados de

Proyecto de reforma de

Comentario

al

la legislacion antiterrorista

proyecto de reforma de

1994 and Hurtado Pozo

la legislacion antiterrorista
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1994.

Lima

laws also gave the military the power to arm and organize rondas campesinos (civilian
self-defense groups) throughout the countryside/'

existence for years, the armed forces

numbers of armed

now

Though

these groups had been in

effectively exercised control over large

civilians in the countryside.

In particular, the changes reflected military preoccupation with protecting their

officers

from charges of human

in the courts.

Many

officers

often resorts to brutality

A

former

rights violations, either in the press or

acknowledged

in private that

more

When the army

crucially

does

fight,

it

:

member of an

elite

Peruvian antiterrorist unit told Newsweek that

government troops routinely used electric shock and other torture on suspected
terrorists. He said soldiers were frequently ordered to carry out extra-judicial
executions of suspects and were instructed to cover up the killings by burning
bodies or throwing them into lakes and rivers. The army officially denies such
reports. But many military men say privately that it is pointless to take prisoners,
given a corrupt and intimidated judicial system that has released 85 percent of the
J
7.000 terror suspects arrested since 1982/
In fact, the

new

large-scale

human

counterinsurgency plan developed after 1989 emphasized a reduction
rights abuses, relying instead

on fewer and more selective

assassinations and covert operations based on better intelligence.''

31

~

Taylor

From Fujimori

to

Toledo

2005.

p.

in

4

569.

2

Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch. 1. On the rondas
campesinos see Degregori Las rondas campesinas y la derrotci de Sender o Luminoso
1996; Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 2004; Starn Hablan los Ronderos 1993; US
Southern Command cable September 8. 1992. declassified and available through the
.

National Security Archives.

Lane with Larmer and Schmidt The Soldiers Story

M

On

this

change, enshrined

in

Directive

of the Armed Forces, see Comision de
Tome II. p. 285-306.

la

1992.

p. 44.

01-PE-DI-JUN86JUL90 of the

Joint

Command
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“

This disastrous situation did reflect a genuine failure of the legal system to send
those arrested on charges of terrorism to

jail,

due

to a

combination of factors, including

general incapacity, threats by terrorist groups to seek revenge, and corruption. This

reality

of large scale human rights abuses perpetrated by the armed forces

failure

of the legal system

vulnerability of

created two

the

armed

noted, virtually

were convicted:

all

in

official detention

arrest

forces to charges of human rights violations,

forces. First, they

demanded and received tough new

laws to ensure that those indiv iduals they seized as collaborators with

Sendero Luminoso would remain

While

response to a

hold terrorists legally accountable, and the ensuing

members of the armed

demands by

anti -terrorist

to

in

in jail

and not be

those brought before the

new

set free

by intimidated judges. As

military tribunals on charges of terrorism

exchange, the military showed a marked trend towards employing

of suspected

terrorists rather

and imprisonment of alleged

than large scale disappearances or killings.

terrorists represented a

genuine improvement

over the disappearances of the past decade, the Peruvian truth commission would

later

argue that these policies too constituted violations of the basic rights of the people,
including violations of due process. Hence, though less numerous,

violations

human

rights

became a more and more premeditated and systematic element of

counterinsurgency strategy, and the legal system became more directly involved in the
limitation of citizen s abilities to protect themselves

" The

from

arbitrary state action.

best and most comprehensive treatment of the issue of the pattern of arrest and
imprisonment since 1980 can be found in De la .Tara Basombrio Memoriay Batallas en
Sombre de los Inocentes: Peril 1992-2001 2001. See also Comision de la Verdad informe

Final 2004.
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Second, the armed forces demanded and received Fujimori
strengthening the tradition of special military fueros.

system under the control of the armed forces,
juridical security

y

'

would be

s

support for

case via a parallel legal

in this

to ensure the military s

demands

for

were granted expanded

protected. Separate military courts

any case involving a member of the military, including

rights to exercise jurisdiction over

cases of human rights violations, despite the fact that such courts failed to meet standards

new

of due process. In essence, these
to

jail

ensured that alleged terrorists would go

reforms

even when evidence against them was weak, while members of the military would

not be punished even

human

if

weighty evidence existed of their direct involvement
and would

rights violations. Military courts could

in

massive

accomplish both

7

objectives.'

Human

rights groups critical of the

mounting evidence of impunity
wrath: he regularly referred to

Vl

Democracy

Rospigliosi

s

new

legislation under Fujimori

for military abuses

them

as

the legal

Bleak Prospects

became

principal targets of Fujimori

arms of subversion,

1994.

p.

and the

accomplices of

45.

of conviction of a military officer for human rights violations is
indicative of the role of military courts in minimizing accountability for human rights

One

rare case

Telmo Hurtado w as convicted by a military court in 1992 for involvement
1985 Accomarca. Ayacucho massacre. However, in 1993, Telmo Hurtado was

violations.

the

in

discovered to not only have been released from prison years earlier under the orders of

Army Commander

General Villanueva Valdivia, but then to have been promoted from

Lieutenant to Captain.

He remained

conviction. All together. Hurtado
least

69

civilians,

prison for

s

in active duty in the Peruvian

US

him less than tw o years in
Agency cable. Dec 21. 1993.

children earned

Defense Intelligence

Declassified and available through the National Security Archives.
contribution of the court system
rights abuses
p.

the

role in an incident that resulted in the deaths of at

many of them women and

abuses of authority.

army despite

both military and civilian

from 1980-2000. see Comision de

247-280.

110

la

On

the overall

to the pattern

of human

Verdad Informe Final 2004 Tome

III.

s

1

and

terror,

front organizations

to insulate the military

from

for terrorists.'

8

Similarly, Fujimori strengthened tools

critical press reports. In 1990.

Fujimori responded to press

reports linking specific military officers with the 1987 killing of a reporter by issuing a

presidential decree

emergency zones
hostile to

forces.

making

illegal.

any reporting

When

in

As Conaghan

writes,

focused on

human

that

horrific cases did

come

to light,

The lengths

to

which Fujimori and

officers serving in

both civilian and military officials were

rights violations

by government security

they were usually covered up or remanded

system and quickly dismissed

to the military justice

reigned.

naming of military and police

the

conduct of the war. impunity

In the

his congressional allies

were willing

to

go

order to protect the military from charges of human rights violations were soon to be

demonstrated.

Another new measure of the

antiterrorist

laws allowed the armed forces access to
1

university campuses, believed to be strongholds of the insurgency

1992,

Lima

s

La Cantuta University was placed under

s

supporters/

military control. In July, nine

students and a professor were abducted from the campus.

The perpetrators w ere

Grupo

squad working under

paramilitary group called

>,s

C’olina.

an

During

elite military

NlcClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003.

p.

part of a

135.

Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 24. See also Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas
Armadas 2000. Ch.
The press media did regularly report on human rights cases both
1

.

before and after the autogolpe.
1991. Expreso

Dec

26. 1991,

Rospigliosi Montesinos

726 published

in

Among

hundreds of examples, see El Comercio July

El grupo colina anda suelto

Oiga June

y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch.

El Peruano

Nov

12. 1991.

1

1

1.

6.

19, 1995.

See Legislative Decree

army

supervision of the

hl

intelligence service

Montesinos. Grupo Colina was also suspected

in the

in the

to be orchestrated

a

November

Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima. Family

to

1991 massacre of

members of the La

Cantuta victims initiated legal investigations into the case, but attempts

documented

by

disappearance of 35 university

Huancayo and

students from the Universidad del Centro in

seventeen people

widely believed

to force officers

have been on the campus the night of the disappearances were blocked by

General Flermoza.

who

cited security reasons and accused the investigating legislators of

being in collusions with the

terrorists.

The Supreme Court upheld lower courts

arguments that the families had provided insufficient evidence

that the

La Cantuta

students had ever existed; their bodies had not been found/'

Opposition politicians were moved to hold hearings on the matter, during which a

congressman revealed

that

he had received a

Commanders. Majors and Captains
intelligence agents

had participated

letter

(COMACA)

in the

from a renegade group of
confirming suspicions that army

La Cantuta disappearances and

that

both

Montesinos and Hermoza had overseen the operation. Hermoza appeared before the
committee

to

deny the allegations and

injure the reputation of the army.

61

Conaghan Fujimori

intelligence officers in

s

charge

members of Congress with attempting

p. 67.

For chilling accounts of military and

rights abuses, see

Rights Violations Under Fujimori

US embassy

cable

Systematic

Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004

On

the

La Cantuta

Tome

case, see also

III. p.

la

Verdad y

141-164.

US Embassy

cable. Sept 22. 1993. declassified

and available through the National Security Archives: Hermoza Rios quoted
Unsettled accounts: militarization and
la tierra broto la

verdad 1994.

On

Human

June 30. 1994. Declassified and available through the

National Security Archives; on Grupo Colina generally see Comision de

Ibid.

to

The following day the army issued an incendiary

Peru 2005.

human

to

memory

in

postwar Peru

la

Burt

De

of human rights abuses during the
Verdad In forme Final 2004 Tome III. p. 68-

the overall pattern

Fujimori government, see Comision de

in

1998 and Aprodeh

164.

1

12

statement accusing opposition Congressmen of supporting a terrorist conspiracy against
the state with their investigation.

More

threateningly.

Hermoza ordered tanks

through downtown Lima for the next two days. Conaghan writes:
for opposition

consumption.

It

was

armed forces would not

that the

a reminder to Fujimori

tolerate

any attempt

to

and

to roll

The event was not just

[his congressional bloc]

blame them

for

human

rights

abuses. Apparently getting the message from the tank parades. Fujimori denounced
z:

efforts at

tarnishing the

image of the

military.

Though Minister of Defense General Victor Malca attempted
events by pledging the military

s full

to

cooperation with the investigation, tension

continued to mount. General Rodolfo Robles, the third highest ranking

Army, sought

protection in a foreign

embassy

COMACA charges. Within days, the military
Jusiticia Militar. or

statements, insubordination, and insulting the

kill

s

went public

to

himself.

member

confirm the

highest court (the Consejo

armed

forces.

of the

for

Supremo de

making

false

A CSJM judge appeared on

statements were the result of mental problems and his anger

over not moving up military ranks

ought to

as he

CS.TM) issued multiple charges against Robles

television saying Robles

downplay these

More

faster.

The judge went

so far as to suggest that Robles

than fifty army generals echoed the judge

s

outrage by issuing

a statement calling Robles a felon and coward. Fujimori affirmed his confidence that

Montesinos w as innocent of any connection

6

to the

disappearances or to a death squad.

Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. 68-9. See also reporting in Oiga April 26. 1993 and
Obando Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996 1998. COMACA, like the group
Leon Dormido first organized during the Garcia administration to criticize the corrupt,
'

co-opted leadership.

1
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Public opinion polls, however,

showed

disappearances were the work of an
denunciations.

52%

38%

that

army death squad: among

believed him and

73%

block

to

its

those aware of Robles

backed the congressional investigation.

Congressional fujimoristas, two of whom

commission, sought

of respondents believed the La Cantuta

power even

now took

seats

as the opposition

64

on the investigative

members of Congress who

spearheaded the investigation were receiving regular death threats. Martha Chavez and
Victor Joy

Way,

the

members of Congress considered most

loyal to Fujimori, introduced

a successful resolution to limit military officer appearances before the

only high-ranking officers, thereby

commission

to

ensuring that low-ranking officers could not offer

testimony damaging to those higher up

in the

chain of command.

Opposition

congressmembers walked out of the investigations, decrying the treatment of the military
as, in

Congressman Henry Pease

s

words,

a separate state within the state.

issued rulings preventing Montesinos from being called before the

allowing

Hennoza

to limit his testimony.

fujimorista/ opposition lines, with the

Fujimori

s

supporters

wrongdoing on the

knew

part

6"

CSJM

commission and

The congressional investigation

split

along

two groups issuing findings diametrically opposed.

their minority report,

of any

The

officers,

would be

which found no grounds

to suspect

the version approved by their majority

congressional bloc.

64

Ibid.

May

General Picon dice que General Robles deberia quitarse

la

vida

La Republica

Impunidad 1996. which includes articles
such as Gustavo Gorriti El
Svengali de Fujimori. Montesinos. El Traidor de la Democracia Peruana La Republica
Julv 4. 1994: Robles Denuncia Violacion de Derechos Humanos Por el SEC v el CGE
16. 1993.

See also Robles Crimen
accusations and the

relevant to Robles

(reprinted;

Ya!

Oiga

covered

May

10.

in all

major Peruvian daily papers

1993;

Conaghan Fujimori

s

e

state s response,

etc.

Peru 2005.

p. 70.
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May

6-8. 1993);

Robles

Basta

When

the bodies of the victims

were found, several of them with

through their skulls, a special prosecutor opened the case anyway.
his investigation in light

casef

of the CS.TM

h

International attention

s

decision to open

its

was again focused on Peru

s

bullet holes

He was warned

own proceedings on
human

domestic outrage was reaching a fever pitch, leaving Fujimori with

to stop

the

rights situation,

little

attempt to save face by announcing the arrest of four military officers,

and

choice but to

among them

a

major, for the La Cantuta murders. These four officers were portrayed as sick individuals

acting without the

knowledge of the

rest

of the military command. The families of the

victims and the special prosecutor continued to pursue officers they charged with

involvement

in the

case and to seek

trial in

the civilian court system.

question of civilian vs. military jurisdiction over the case
Court, one of the judges

nearly killed

Fujimori

s

when

who seemed

came before

to be leaning in favor

of dynamite exploded

a briefcase full

When,
the

finally, the

Supreme

of the civilian courts was

at his

home. Cynically.

supporters in Congress used the incident as grounds to change

Supreme Court

voting procedures, arguing that because placing a judge in the position of casting the

determinant vote clearly endangered the judge

sufficient to rule

on

jurisdictional questions.

s life,

With

the

a simple majority should be

new law

in place, the

necessary

majority on the Supreme Court was assembled and ruled in favor of the military courts.

The

officers and several others

now charged with involvement were convicted by

the

military courts only ten days later. Shortly thereafter. Fujimori reconfirmed General

M

For another scholars analysis of these incidents, see Rospigliosi Montesinos y
Las Faerzas Armadas 2000. Ch. 1 For US embassy and intelligence reports related to
'

Ibid.

.

Grupo Colina. La Cantuta. and Barrios Altos, see numerous
1994

to

declassified

1996 available through the National Security Archives.
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documents from

Hermoza
the

as the head of the

Perm ian

answered

truth

to both

armed forces command. After

the

fall

commission and prosecutors found evidence

Hermoza and Montesinos.

were again able

to

respond with

Grupo Colina had

that the

h

The 1991 Barrios Altos case was reopened by prosecutors
officers

of the Fujimori regime,

CSJM

in 1995. but military

rulings that they did not have to testify

before civilian courts or any investigations. Then, in the early morning hours of June 14.

an oficialista acting

at the

behest of Fujimori introduced a sweeping amnesty law

granting total legal amnesty to

all

military and police officers implicated in

abuses since 1980. The law passed, the convictions of the officers

were overturned, the

men were

released from their prison terms, and

against security agents outside the military courts

amnesty law was extremely unpopular:

Domestic and international human

85%

6

was

all

effectivelv killed.
•

new

These investigations continue

legal action

The 1995
68
'

its

passage.

rights organizations, along with the U.S. State

When one

judge chose not to apply the

Congress passed a second law demanding

in the case before him.

rights

La Cantuta case

.

of the public opposed

Department, protested the measure immediately.

new law

in the

human

at the

that all courts

time of this writing. See next chapter on

this.

O

Degregori
reactions

it

Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos

provoked, see also

Gestion June 13. 1995;
cable

Amnesty Law

in

El

No. no. no. no. no, no

Grupo Colina anda

Peru

June

Law 264790

suelto.

p. 77.
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the

amnesty law and

Ideele 77 (July 1995): 10-12;
.

19. 1995;

US Embassy

and available through the

Castigo y Impunidad

and 26492.

On

Oiga June

15. 1995. declassified

National Security Archives; Basombrio
are

2004.

2001 The relevant laws
.

abide by the amnesty.

When

a

few courageous prosecutors and judges threatened

continue the Barrios Altos investigation, the army
into the streets

without conditions

increase

the reality

was more complex.

command was

armored division brought the tanks

once more.

Though McClintock and Vargas write
to

s

to

the

and Montesinos were acting

that Fujimori

power and prerogatives of Peru

In fact, manipulation

s

armed

"

forces.

and politicization of the army

part of a broader pattern of corrupting the military

subservience to a small, self-interested leadership and to the

and subjecting

whims of the

it

to

executive.

As

Mauceri and Cameron write, the power relationships among Montesinos, Fujimori and

Hermoza were

a type of double-edged

sword

for the

armed

conduct antisubversive warfare without accountability for

forces, elevating

its

its

power

excesses, and yet re-

introducing the destructive cancer of politicization into the institution and diminishing

ability to operate effectively.

The same armed

forces

avoid damaging military unity and espirit de corps

widening powers by

promotion as established

1992 rendering previous

and that the high

64

in regulations

rules,

members of the

s

1

980

to

were now seeking

w ith personal

from the 1950s. were completely eschewed.

w ere

A

issued by the regime in 1991 and

such as that requiring the highest military rankings be

top

5%

of the graduates of the country

command be changed

Conaghan Fujimori

in

its

Professional criteria and seniority, the bases of military

of executive decrees and internal documents

reserved for

politicization

replacing longstanding institutional arrangements

connections and loyalties.

flurry

which gave up power

w ith

to

Peru 2005.

annually, void, and

p. 105-7.

70

Ibid.
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making

s

military academies,

political appointees to

command permanent. While

military

act without restraint, inviting

commanders

abuses of

its

latitude to

power, the dependence of top military

and Montesinos meant

for the political support of Fujimori

the institution

executive.

was now granted much wider

the military

that in

exchange

1

gave up

its

of serving as a check on abuse of power by the

historical role

As McClintock and

Valias write,

immediate beneficiary of these changes

the

was Hermoza. an undistinguished, second-rank

officer [who] apparently achieved his

promotion though a pledge of compliance with key decisions made by Montesinos and
Fujimori

According

including support for the autogolpe.

from exile several years

armed forces

one general speaking

after the coup, this reflected the preference

civilian dictatorship.

for a

to

Mauceri and Cameron point out

'

that the civil-military alliance Fujimori

Montesinos constructed defies traditional models of civil-military
the

two

military

as separate

is

and competing

intrusions of civilian oversight in internal matters

traded

for

away

armed

relations,

to protect their respective spheres

understood to act as a unitary rational actor protecting

integrity of the

of the majority of the

which

forces. Yet in Peru a faction

its

and

which

posit

of influence. The

autonomy from

directly affect the institutional

of the military leadership happily
7

control over basic matters of internal promotion and assignment in exchange

an enhanced capacity to pursue the selective interests of the power triumvirate and of

the regime s

chosen

allies

within the military

command. To Fujimori and Montesinos.

1

the

McClintock and Valias The United States and Pent 2003. p. 57. See also Obando The
s .Armed Forces
1994. Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996
1998. According to General Robles, speaking in exile several years after the coup, this
reflected the preference of the majority of the armed forces for a civilian dictatorship.
Quoted in d Ornellas Commentary 1994. p. 70.

Power of Peru

2

General Rodolfo Robles qtd.

in

d Ornellas

Commentary

118

1994.

p. 70.

.

armed forces were,

like all other institutions

of the

state,

malleable to their will; only

because military authority was key to carrying out the most egregious of their assaults on
the constitutional order

popularity

among

and because national security was so fundamental

would

the public

armed forces only appeared

to be a

it

to

Fujimori

s

be invited into the circle of power. In truth, the

genuine partner

in the

authoritarian project

underway: overall. Fujimori and Montesinos were leading the military

to an inevitable

4

Montesinos used SIN

crisis.

the system he

spy on members of the military to ensure their loyalty

to

to

and Fujimori oversaw. Those who remained loyal could count upon

receiving the political support from the president and Congress they had longed for in the
1980s. Congressional investigations were blocked: critics of the

armed forces were

blasted in the strongest language possible by the president himself: no oversight of

military expenditures

would be allowed. In

opponents with attempting

the military

actively

was so cozy

campaigning

Before the

that

'

en
4

On
la

w ho might

"

state.

a relatively

Obando

s

insightful essay
el

future

it

was under Montesinos leadership

Las relaciones civiles-militares en

s

that

el

Peru

2001

claims, for example, in the run-up to the referendum on the

Conaghan Fujimori

Ibid. p. 82. See. for

w eak and unimportant pan of the

President Garcia utilized SIN as a tool to spy on military

be plotting his removal, but

made such

Constitution.
7

SIN had been

late 1980s.

this point, see

The relationship between Fujimori and

critical.

uniformed officers were on several occasions caught

decada del 90: lecciones para

Fujimori

government and provoke military

for the president s reelection.

machinery of the Peruvian
leaders

to destabilize the

whenever they became too

intervention

Fujimori could charge his political

turn.

Pent 2005.

p. 62.

example. La Republica Sept

119

8.

1994.

new

7

the

its

agency became truly powerful. SIN
role increasingly

were

to be

aimed

became

at all

that

s

budget was multiplied

of serving as a

political police force,

opponents of the government. Death

unprovoked tax investigations, wiretapping, unfounded
campaigns were

its

most frequent

opposition politicians were

misbehavior would leak

power

left

its

out.

tools; journalists,

most

common

fifty

whose

threats, lengthy

brutal tactics

and

legal cases, blackmail,

members of civil

targets.

or sixty times and

society,

Though occasionally

and smear

and

stories

of SIN

SIN was always eventually cleared of wrongdoing and

unchecked. Stories that did come

to light

its

emerged when former members of

SIN. the military, or SIE. the army intelligence agency, fled the country to report abuses
they had suffered from their

killed.

own

agencies.

Many

of these individuals ended up beaten or

Montesinos undercover agents systematically

infiltrated

every agency of

government, creating a pervasive culture of fear and suspicion within the
extending Montesinos control to even' corner of government.
reduction in conflict with Sendero

weakened

Luminoso

threats to national security.

after

Guzman

by decree. Despite the

with insurgents. Fujimori
state

virtual

made no immediate

Though

and

the stark

capture would seem to have

Congress used increases

gang violence to legitimize new laws granting Fujimori the
security legislation

s

h

state

in

common

right to

make

crime and

national

end of organized armed confrontation

reduction in the

number of zones under

of emergency status nor any attempt to reduce the extensive powers of the armed

forces such status accorded.

period

was characterized

as

As

the Peruvian truth

commission would

counterinsurgency without insurgency.

later write, this

Fujimori

s

success

was in 1998. when an extensive
surveillance and wiretapping arrangement by which Montesinos monitored the
communication of members of Congress, the armed forces, and Fujimori s own cabinet
became public. This was further investigated after the fall of the government in 2000.
'

One

story of

SIN misbehavior

that leaked out

120

at

using the specter of terrorism to legitimize his authoritarian behavior, enhance the

power of his

allies,

New executive
the

SIN and

decrees

transfer[ed] significant

the military

to fight crime.

military

and discredit his challengers made

itself.

'

Diez Canseco notes. This

in the past

to

is

like

the police

agency and SIN operated

Fujimori

intelligence agencies reported to SIN.

Montesinos gradually consolidated

as an

and judiciary

to

giving powers to A1 Capone

extend the power ot SIN over the

each branch of the armed forces had

intelligence

all

too useful a logic to give up.

power from

Montesinos was ultimately able

Though

it

its

appendage of the executive

own

office,

which alone reported

under

to the president.

over the executive-military nexus of the

his control

regime.

Cracks

From 1993
held strong.

Hermoza

autogolpe. and.

w as

general

to 1998. the

s

power

power w ithin

in the

Power Structure

triumvirate of Fujimori. Montesinos and

the military

was

own

allies

u

W ho

77

In a

1997 poll conducted by Apoyo.

ow n pow er base and

53%

do you think controls the country, the military or the president?

of

answered

it

was

.

.

Youngers

a degree

of respondents to the question

Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004 Tome
sections on Fujimori government and Armed Forces.
s

Hermoza. the

within the military and accordingly secure a

netw ork of support that provided the general with his

autonomy.

greatly enhanced after the

gradually, just as Fujimori and Montesinos had co-opted

able to co-opt his

Hermoza

Human

Rights and Politics in Peru Today
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2000.

I.

119-121,

Tome

II

the military; only

38%

thought

it

was

the president.

(On

the other hand, public opinion

surveys that asked respondents to rank the most important individuals
usually cited Fujimori

first.

Yet once Guzman

s

Montesinos second, and Hermoza
capture

was followed by

in

the country

80

third.)

a precipitous drop in the strength of

Sendero Luminoso. division within the military ranks began

to resurface, as

McClintock

and Valias explain:

Many

top officers became

more concerned about

the authoritarian proclivities of

the regime and intensifying politicization of the military institution. In

1992.

some of these

government and.

officers plotted a countercoup against the Fujimori

in April 1993. others

charged Montesinos and Flennoza with

responsibility for the human-rights violations at

La Cantuta University. On both

occasions. Flennoza ordered his troops into the streets.

Though Hermoza w as

able to put

dow n

these attempts, he

challenges. In 1996 and 1997. individuals continued to

Hermoza and
Robles,

the military to

who had

numerous crimes

via

81

w ould soon

come forward

Grupo

to

face

much

greater

linking Montesinos.

Colina. General Rodolfo

fled the country years before after publicizing the

Grupo Colina, now returned

November

names of agents of the

Peru under cover of the 1995 amnesty law s

to continue his

denunciation of the death squad and blame the group for a recent bombing of a radio
o->

station in

1

Puno.

~

....

t

The

.

.

in

1996.

McClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003. p. 58. On the evolving
between Montesinos. Fujimori and Hermoza. see "L na historia de encuentros

relationship

T

y desencuentros" Gestion
oa

.

him

military resorted to intimidating Robles by arresting

Aug

21. 1999.

...

.

Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuevzas Armadas 2000.

Republica July

7.

p. 166.

.

Polls published in

La

1997 and Debate 95 (July- Aug 1997) respectively; both were

conducted by Apoyo.
81

McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru 2003.

p. 58.

O-)

~

For Robles

own

account of the Grupo Colina. see his Crimen e Impunidad: El Grupo

Colina v El Poder 1996. See also

US

embassy cable Dec

2.

1996. declassified and

To avoid

confrontation and mounting bad press. Fujimori sent a

Congress,

this

the CS.TM) for

case. Then,

one giving amnesty

to

Robles and any

any possible violations committed

to ease tensions with the military.

military leadership, keeping

Members of the

all

top

member of the judiciary

in the

much

to

(including

course of dealing with Robles

Fujimori waived the annual review of

commanders of the armed

military went

new amnesty law

forces in their positions.

two members of Grupo

farther to prevent

Colina from speaking out. Military intelligence agent Mariela Barreto was killed before
she could leak information about the group: another such agent. Leonor La Rosa

Bustamante, survived a brutal beating intended

on television

to

to shut her up.

She survived, only

denounce the group. Replicating the by now familiar

court quickly found four

low

level officials guilty for

La Rosa

s

Around

same

the

time, a flurry of news reports

beating, and the Minister

were alleging

its

The

CSJM refused to

traditionally protected the

suddenly

w ithdraw n.

news media

stations

and military guards

from possible

that

in

had

terrorist attacks

were

Investigative journalists later uncovered a military intelligence

program designed specifically
the

investigate,

own

that

Montesinos and members of SIN and the armed forces were deeply involved
narcotrafficking.

go

pattern, a military

of Defense intervened to prevent the congressional opposition from holding
investigation.

to

armed forces human

to target for intimidation

rights violations.

members of the

press critical of

The tension between the armed forces and the

available through the National Security Archives; and

La Republica May

16. 1993: for

an

overview of human rights abuses in this period see De la Jara Basombrio Violencia
politica y derechos humanos. 1980-1998 1998 and Comision de la Verdad Informe Final

2004 among numerous other reports

cited in the next chapter.

.

media was highlighted when

communique, printed
•

command

felt

compelled

to issue an official

every major newspaper and read on every television station.

in

.

•

•

the high

o-

.

accusing a major media executive ot detaming the armed forces.

Hermoza and Montesinos seemed impervious
induced.

84

but beneath the surface of the ruling triumvirate

was taking
and

place.

to eliminate

Montesinos was steadily moving

border dispute, though

last

s

strength, a

to extend his

Hermoza from power. His opportunity

new development. War

during the

to the public outrage these incidents

to

power over

it

had been widely believed that Pern

round of confrontations

in

s

decisive defeat of Ecuador

1981 had effectively settled the issue.

The Ecuadorian
was the

military decided

its

As

largely correctly

that the

it

had

doubted

in the past.

Peruvian military

s

struggle against the guerrillas and the drug traffickers, that

Peruvian military capability was suffering amid the nation

••

command

advances as effectively as

that President Fujimori s politicization

foreign ministry

'

write.

Peru would be able to counter

priority

J

the military

do so arose from a surprising

Apparently, as of approximately 1991. the Ecuadorian military

o

struggle

broke out between Peru and Ecuador over their long-standing

McClintock and Valias

that

power

s

economic

crisis,

and

of promotions within the military and the
7

o/

•

was undermining these

institutions.

Conaghan Fujimori

s Peru 2005. p. 143-150. Ultimately these cases were investigated:
two chapters, especially Ch 4. note 38. On Barreto, see La Republicct April 3.
2001; El Pernemo May 3. 2001; on La Rosa see

see next

84

Both Montesinos and Hermoza were, by 1997. deeply disliked by most Peruvians,
in Gestiou October 13. 1997 and conducted by
Apoyo.
according to polling results published

8^

On

i

the Peru-Ecuador confrontation, see Marcella and

Downes

Securin' Cooperation in

Hemisphere 1999: Palmer Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict 1997 and
Overcoming the Weight of History 2001: Bonilla Peru-Ecuador: Problema de
Vecinidad Ouehacer Tulio/agosto 1996.
the Western

86

McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru 2003.
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p. 78.

The Ecuadorian assessment proved accurate; though

the conflict

hundreds of lives and one billion dollars, the Peruvian military
uncoordinated and ineffective. Gradually, the two countries

would

result in negotiated settlement perceived (especially

favorable to Ecuador.

Though Fujimori scored major

s

would cost

response proved

moved toward

what,

s

make

general might

pride through a decisive victory.

international points for his

his fantasy

way on

the Ecuadorian front, he

forces; three generals

analysis,

were widely viewed as

armed forces

Next came

would not be

a hostage crisis.

the hostage-takers dragged

when

armed

armed forces by

political

payback and as a sign

s

that

Members of the
s

MRTA guerrilla movement took 72

residence in 1997.

As

negotiations with

on over four months, the military took over the

situation,

Though only one hostage and two of

involved in the operation were killed, every one of the fourteen

MRTA rebels was killed.

Though charges

that the military

rebels in cold blood after the) had surrendered

8

Ibid.
88

cities a reality

Though Hermoza would never

for insulting the

eventually executing a daring raid on the residence.

commandos

Ecuador worried the

tolerated.

individuals hostage in the Japanese ambassador

the 140

to restore the

able to punish dissenters inside the

CSJM

work

conduct during the confrontation with Ecuador. In Conaghan

the indictments

dissent in the

MIG-29 jets.

was

were indicted by the

criticizing the military s

in

of air force attacks on Ecuadorian

Peru decided to purchase eighteen Russian
get his

Some

1998.

in

by Peruvians) as highly

toward the accords. Hermoza pressed for a renewal of military engagement
Peruvian military

two sides

the

Ibid., p. 104.
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were

commandos executed

sent to military courts for

the

trial,

the

operation

Fujimori

was deemed an overwhelming
s

government

fell,

success. (As discussed in Chapter V, after

the bodies of the rebels

were exhumed and autopsies proved

they had indeed been killed after surrendering.) General
congratulated himself

in

public for his leadership in the affair, downplaying the role of

the president. This deeply angered Fujimori,

insufficient credit for the

attributed to the

Hermoza immediately

1

work of a

who had

similarly felt he had received

992 capture of Guzman, though

this success is universally

special investigative police force without connections to

Fujimori. Montesinos or the military. Fujimori publicly denied

Hennoza

s

account of

planning the hostage rescue and claimed he. Montesinos. and three army colonels

working with Montesinos had planned the event. Most Peruvian military
Fujimori

s

attack on

men who conducted

Hermoza. both

commanders

Hermoza. forcing Fujimori

command

to

saw

commander of the

the rescue operation, as a deep affront to the institution of the

forces. Regional military

forces

the head of the military and the

officers

demand

to

participated in a public

show of support

armed

for

hold a highly secretive meeting with the police and armed

their support.

But the combination of Hermoza

s

89

attempt to grab the spotlight from Fujimori

over the hostage situation and his extreme hawkish position on restarting combat with

Ecuador had alienated many of his

allies

and pushed Fujimori and Montesinos

to

marginalize the general. In August 1998. Fujimori called the top ranking military officers
together for a meeting

89

at

the presidential palace. After securing the approval of the rest of

•

Meet Over Military Support for Hermoza
Agence France Presse Dec 20. 1997. See also Richard Codings Despatches BBC
Online Dec 21, 1997; El Sol Chcivin de Huantar: modelo ck estrategia frente al tercer
milenio 1999: and Comision de la Verdad Informe Final Tome III. p. 129-132. For
Hermoza s own account of these events, see his Operacion Chcivin de Huantar 1997.
Ibid., p. 75;

Peru: Fujimori. Cabinet
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.

.

command. Fujimori shocked Hennoza by announcing

the military

then-Secretary of Defense. General Cesar Saucedo.

further

expand

commander
academy

his

power over

the military

by

and

to shift

by the

Montesinos used the opportunity

filling nine

from a triumvirate of power

to a virtual

military

copresidency with

Fujimori. Montesinos soon reduced the military to yet another tool of the president
reelection campaign,

among

1997. the

momentum

Perm ian

in

voices began to question the regime.

politics

41

had

out.

polls often

disapproval of many of the government

s policies,

human

issues.

‘

was not

likely to

4

rights

and constitutional or legal

indicated to the president that the public

Much more damaging to
the presidency.

Fujimori

The campaign

s

shifted,

Though Fujimori continued

Conaghan has pointed

popularity, as Catherine

s

other duties, requiring officers to collect information and

submit reports on the campaign throughout the country.

By

to

of the twelve military

members of his own 1966

positions with his closest supporters,

class,

40

his replacement

popularity

to

enjoy general

showed widespread

especially in the realm of military,

Nevertheless, these same polls

was

to orchestrate his

and more and more

punish him for such abuses.

4

'

his choice to pursue a third election to

re-reelection

began

in

1996 and. as

411

Ibid., p. 58.

Ultimately videos of meetings in which Montesinos. Fujimori. Saucedo

and others planned Hermoza

removal were made public. See Geslion. El Comercio.
Liberation. El Peruana, and La Republica March 16. 2001
s

41

Montesinos described the employment of the military in Fujimori s re-election
campaign in his testimony to Congress. Transcript. Congreso de la Republica. Primera
Legislature Ordinaria de 2001.

2005.

p.

December

20. 2001. Cited in

Conaghan Fujimori

164-5. After the fall of the regime, videos were released that

Peru
proved Montesinos
s

promotions and incomes of high-ranking military personnel.
See Gestion El Comercio. La Republica. and Expreso May 22. 2001

directly controlled military
,

“>

9"

93

Conaghan Fujimori

s

Peru 2005.

p. 5.

Ibid. p. 77.
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^
Conaghan and others have documented, required extraordinary

efforts

on the part of both

Fujimori and Montesinos to undermine any institutional blocks to the president
reelection, including those

which were established

incurred by Fujimori to secure his

president.

Montesinos and others

2000

who

in the

re-election led

new

many

profited from the

constitution.

s

The high

costs

analysts to argue that the

perverse institutionalization

constructed over the previous decade recognized that without a presidential heir apparent

to replace Fujimori, the entire edifice

would crumble, exposing

the abuses

held the system together. Yet the campaign proceeded, despite polling

as January 1996 indicating that a majority of Peruvians

were opposed

of power

numbers

that

as early

to the possibility

of

another Fujimori election.

As Conaghan

writes, the perceived necessity

led to a highly orchestrated

campaign

to

of perpetuating Fujimori

undermine the

institutions

of the

s

control

state:

away the obstacles to re-election required a comprehensive assault on
the autonomy of all institutions that had legal jurisdiction over elections. The goal
was achieved by enacting legal measures to ensure political control over the
Clearing

personnel of all relevant institutions and reformulating the rules governing the
prescribed powers of institutions.
in jeopardy,

new legal

government supporters

subterfuges to keep

together in the

ram

Whenever

it

in

Congress (known as

in play.

oficialistas)

found

The government majority, grouped

Change-90-New Majority

for re-election, ready to take

the re-election project appeared to be

electoral alliance, turned into a battering

down any

institution that stood in its

way. As

recently revealed videotapes show, the legislators met with Montesinos in his
office at the

they were

SIN and

listened to

him

plot out the political and legal strategies that

to use to pursue the re-election.

The

result

was

a progressive

evisceration of the checks and balances laid out in the 1993 constitution.

'

J

Ibid.

Many of the

details of

Montesinos use of SIN

Fujimori, especially his re-reelection campaign,

congressional investigations after the

fall

to

came out

promote the

political goals

in press reports

of the regime. See. for example. El

Comer cio

Jan 12,2001.
b

On this pattern of institutional destruction see also Youngers Deconstructing
democracy: Peru under president Alberto Fujimori 2000.
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of

and

Assistance came from the oficialista congressional bloc, supplemented by the votes of

members of Congress bribed

into joining the president

s

By

coalition.

the late 1990s.

Fujimori relied more and more upon bribery to hold together his political omnipotence, a

tactic that, as

we

C’onaghan writes, the vast

shall see. eventually backfired. In Peru.

criminal conspiracy of the state aimed not only

at

personal enrichment, but at maintaining

46

electoral authoritarianism.

Though scholars of Peruvian
political

boundary

on the term

qualified type of

democracy

electoral authoritarianism

a system of

that at

Peru

a system in

some

point in

albeit limited, delegative. or

into authoritarianism.

to describe

electoral authoritarian states. Schedler quips,

is

would agree

from the category of democracy

century. Unlike even partial democracy,

it

might debate just when Fujimori crossed the

into authoritarianism, virtually all

the 1990s. Peru slipped

some otherwise

politics

in the last

which

Many

have

years of the twentieth

parties lose elections,

opposition parties lose elections.

governance which maintains elections and formal

and the legitimate routes to and means of wielding

political

power, but

By

in

That

in

which those

make

violating the first principle

of democracy, contestation of political power through elections, such regimes earn
themselves the authoritarian

46

even without resorting

title

to

Conaghan Immoral Economy of Fujimorismo 2006. On

Congress, see also Gestion Jan

1

1.

2001.
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is.

political institutions

with power violate the rules of democracy so frequently and so seriously as to

genuine democratic political contestation an impossibility.

settled

widespread violence or

the buying of votes in

repression and despite the holding of formal elections.

Congress and courts assisted Fujimori
ensure his continuity in power.

Most
Constitution

.

9

asserting Fujimori

on which the

legal

battle

2000. the Peruvian

to

formation of an electoral authoritarian system to

Law

importantly. Congress passed the

provoked a storm of
fronts

s

From 1997

s

of Authentic Interpretation of the

right to stand for reelection in 2000.

and bureaucratic
over Fujimori

s

Conaghan has

battles.

2000

98

Predictably, this

detailed three different

reelection proceeded: the Constitutional

Tribunal (TC). the National Elections Board (JNE). and a referendum drive.
the end the efforts of all these bodies to challenge Fujimori

reelection

s

blocked, they serve as important indicators of the changing political

measures

to

which Fujimori and

the oficicilistas in Congress

g

For the clearest application of the

EA model

tide,

many

in

campaign were

were willing

to Peru, see the

Though

and of the
to stoop.

excellent

Legacy 2006. particularly the introductory’ and
concluding chapters by Carrion and the chapter by McClintock ( "Electoral
Authoritarianism versus Partially Democratic Regimes: The Case of the Fujimori
Government"). The idea of electoral authoritarianism as a model of governance w as
advanced in the April 2002 edition of the Journal of Democracy, with contributions by
Diamond. Schedler. Levitsky and Way. On the debate over Peru s democratic or
authoritarian status, see especially McClintock "Es autoritario el gobierno de Fujimori?"
1999; Cotier Politico y Sociedad en el Peru: Cambios y Contmuidades 1994: Lopez
Jimenez Peru: golpe. democradura y democracia 1993. (Democraclura implies the
simultaneous existence of some forms of limited democratic representation, authoritarian
caudillismo and a civilian government closely tied to military leadership which
contributions to Carrion The Fujimori

guarantees the military special treatment as a

Peruvian politics under Fujimori was a

Permanente La Republica

November
Reelection

1

7.

May

1997; Conaghan

12.

state

within a

permanent coup

:

state.

)

Some

described

Lauer Campana Electoral

1996: Javier Perez de Cuellar El Comercio

The Permanent Coup: Peru

s

Road

to Presidential

1998.

The Chair of the Judiciary Committee argued
running for reelection because his

that Fujimori

first election, in

was not banned from

1990. had taken place under the

previous constitution. Given that the 1993 constitution allow ed for presidential reelection,
a

win

in

2000 would, he argued,

of Fujimori, not a

third.

legally count as a second (and therefore legal) election

This rationale was the basis of the

Interpretation of the Constitution.

Law of the

Authentic

Together they moved

to oust

opponents of the reelection project, stack institutions with

control over these matters with supporters, and further

Despite the regime

catalyst for a

s

best attempts to silence critics, the reelection

newly united opposition

opposition and

undermine the

in civil society.

to Fujimori s

Among

power, both

campaign was

among

also

an

street

demonstrations, the

prompted the

OAS

OAS Human

first

the dismissed judges. In the

in

Lima

to issue a statement

judgement of the

at the

was met with
The

incident

time to participate

in

of concern after meeting with

OAS Human

Rights Commission, the

president and Congress were cooperating to undermine judicial

autonomy and

the functioning of the very courts intended to guarantee the rule of

human

the congressional

against the Fujimori government.

Rights Commission,

Assembly General meeting,

a

other outrages, the dismissal of three

Constitutional Tribunal magistrates over their anti-reelection stance

massive

legal system.

obstruct

law and protection for

99

rights.

Manipulation of the legal system, already a key component of the strategy to
shelter the military

reelection.

from

justice,

simultaneously served Fujimori

The judiciary had never enjoyed

the

s

goals of securing

good opinion of the people of Peru, but

the level of corruption and politicization of all branches of the judiciary

had been

displayed throughout this series of events in new and shocking ways. The concept of

judicial

autonomy was a joke

in

Peru under Fujimori, and both he and his supporters in

Congress were constantly coming up with new measures
posts in the legal system were held by allies, including

dependent on the government

s

to

guarantee that

many

all

important

provisional appointees

favor for their positions. In particular, political control

99

Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005: Jose Antonio Puertas Peru: OAS Commission
Concerned With Dismissal of Peruvian Judges Agence France Presse June 5, 1997.
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was exercised through
executive,

reform,

all

the creation of

new

institutions that

of which Fujimori claimed was part of his

funded

in part

could be manipulated by the

own campaign of

judicial

with World Bank funds for that ostensible purpose."

National Council of Magistrates was repeatedly blocked from performing

11

its

The
duty of

overseeing the appointments of judges and prosecutors, leading to the resignation of the
entire council in 1998.

To

replace the Council, the government created an executive

commission charged with overseeing

all

judicial reform efforts and led

by a

retired

navy

admiral with no legal experience. His replacement in this position was a former advisor

to the

Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar the highest military

seemed

.

could be trusted to conduct judicial reform

likely,

military justice or Fujimori

On

the surface,

it

his

campaign

Both individuals,

ways unthreatening

it

to

101

s interests.

appeared that Fujimori was tightening his grip on power and

ensuring his future in office. Yet with each

power and

in

court.

for reelection in

new measure

to eliminate

2000 he was inching closer

checks on his
to the line in the

sand the people of Peru had drawn: they opposed his bid for a third term in office. This

1(1(1

For example, the government created an executive commission empowered to oversee

the Public Ministry, thereby exercising

powers previously

reserv ed to the office of the

Attorney General, such as the assignment of prosecutors to cases. This commission was
controlled by Blanca Nelida Colan. a close ally of Montesinos.

how Montesinos and
vladivideos

Many

of the details of

Fujimori manipulated the judiciary came out in 2001 as the

discussed below were released. See. for example,

all

major Peruvian daily

newspapers on Jan 25. 2001.
1,1

This commission, like the one ov erseeing the Public Ministry, reported directly to the

president and

was unaccountable

powers were extensive, including

to the legislature or other agencies

setting budgets

personnel. Fujimori also manipulated the Judicial

of the judiciary.

and making changes

Its

to judicial

Academy, responsible

for the training

powers and then stacking its Executive
Council with allies. See Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005; Youngers Human Rights and
Politics in Peru Today 2000: De la Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobre jusiticia y derechos
of judges and prosecutors, by curtailing

humanos 2003,

ch. 3.

its

public rejection

is

even more significant when one considers the

Ministry of the Presidency (a

new

invention in Peruvian politics)

fact that Fujimori s

was consuming 40% of
1

the national budget to dole out presidential largesse to the public.

"'

Though Fujimori

continued to extend these patrimonial benefits, via development projects and food
throughout the country, the public

campaign had created
renewed activism

mood was

a sense of unity

in civil society.

beginning to take prominent roles

University students,

example, the

TC

magistrates

artists

and intellectuals were

demonstrations and organizing efforts.

in

to the international

at

home. Fujimori

community

removed from

opponents were turning

to exert pressure

on the government. For

in

another case before the

the Court ruled that convictions issued by the military courts of Peru

invalid. Fujimori

s jurisdiction.

Military courts continued to try

aggravated terrorism.

I(b

"'Taylor From Fujimori

Conaghan Fujimori

Human
this text

Rights
I

use

is

were

responded by removing Peru from the jurisdiction of the Inter-American

all

terrorism cases, usually ruling in

favor of life sentences for those found guilty of treason to the fatherland

"

s

Inter-American Commission on Fluman

Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. When,

Court

s

office for their opinion against Fujimori

right to run for reelection took their case to the

1ACHR.

The referendum

of purpose among opposition legislators and a

Blocked from effective legal action

more frequently

shifting against him.

aid.

s

When the US

to

Toledo

Peru 2005:

ambassador

2005.

all

p.

to

and

Peru told the press that the

state

269.

jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court for

available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/paises_ing/peru.html. Throughout

IACHR

to refer to the

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whereas

I

name. Removal of Peru from the IACHR
required cooperation from Fujimori s bloc in Congress, but testimony released in 2001
suggests that the police helped persuade Congress of how to vote on the issue. As
reported in El Comercio Jan 12. 2001. Carlos Regalado, a key witness on the question of

refer to the

Commission by

spelling out

its

should abide by the

IACHR

recommendations and

reinstate the dismissed

Congressman close

Ambassador

Jett

not to meddle in Peru

Hence, despite the

Guzman

capture,

s

and the new

to the military

by the

maintain popularity and legitimacy
support as the

economy weakened,

s

gain greater

power

of Sendero Luminoso

Fujimori's government

in the

the media, both

10
'

its

killings

were gaining

to control the judiciary

manipulate the media

in its favor.

Montesinos and

and

that in

the final years of the

in the

media who attempted

was

to

1

990s

to gaining control

of

to exercise

freedom from Montesinos

SIN

in

campaigning against opposition

made

public, with

legislators under Fujimori, testified

1999 the police colonel had called eighty officers into the environs of the

suggesting that this

was intended

to

remove Peru from

to intimidate

Congress

IACHR jurisdiction,

into doing so.

military court convictions of alleged terrorists, see. for example.

Life Sentence for 'Camarada Rita’
4

legislature,

The

In the years since the collapse of the Fujimori regime, a wealth of

Congress during the debate over whether

1

credibility.

Montesinos and his SIN devoted

information about the corruption orchestrated by Montesinos has been

the role of

to

by buying the loyalty of television, radio, and newspaper companies, and

by punishing those
direction.

wake of

eyes of the public. Already losing public

moves

much of their energy and money during

in the

was growing desperate

stories that leaked out linking

response, paralleling

to

reacted angrily by telling

president

internal affairs.

perhaps even Fujimori to the Grupo Colina and

government

a

"
s

virtual elimination

late 1990s.

TC

TC judges.

4

1

Agence France Presse June

Peru: Court President Criticizes

US

On

continuing

Military Court Upholds

26. 1999.

Ambassador's Remarks Agence France Presse

Jan 23. 1999.

Of the several Peruvian cases pending before the IACHR at the time, one of the best
known is the case of Baruch Ivcher. who. in 1997. had his Peruvian citizenship revoked
and his control of television network Channel 2 taken away after he allowed the channel
to broadcast stories critical of SIN. However, among the cases that prompted Fujimori s
withdrawal was one challenging the military courts 1994 conviction of four Chileans,
alleged members of MRTA. to life sentences in Peru.
1

134

the bulk of this information

coming from Montesinos own meticulous

Investigators uncovered the

most expensive and extensive network of corruption

history of Peruvian history, implicating

stolen from the state.

106

numerous individuals and

1

"

Though Montesinos used

totaling Si .9 billion

government

in its last

bribe paid to a television-channel

One

owner was about

single television channel s bribe

opposition politicians bribes.

right to

was

know

Congress

television.

'

The

altogether and [shut]

strategy of the

down

power, by Montesinos revealed

government was

When

to

damaging

stories

[deny] the public

to the

Ombudsman

s

How to

in

conduct

to the military did

were met with accusations of forgery and. on

McClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003.

McMillan and Zoido

that paid

the strongest of the

that

at least

occasion, prompted the military justice system to advance charges against

106

typical

attempts by the press and the opposition

the press before the Electoral Tribunal and the

news

five times larger than the total of the

of governmental secrecy, especially in regard

to pierce the veil

into the media, they

s

The

hundred times larger than

McMillan and Zoido conclude

of the military and the intelligence apparatus.

make

a

was

checks and balances on the Perm ian government
prelerence.

few

bribes to undermine judges, politicians, and the

media, the media drew the largest financial benefits from the corruption:

to a judge.

in the

John McMillan and Pablo Zoido have used the information on

individual bribes to analyze the priorities of the Fujimori

years.

records.

one

members of

Office.

p.

162.

Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru

2004.

108

Ibid.

from Conaghan cited in Youngers Human Rights 2000: Independent
Journalists Decry Harassment by Military Agence France Presse Sept 9. 1999.

Quote

is

s

Stories about

human

institutions, in particular,

and Fujimori

rights violations

were spun

regime

in the

s

s

favor.

assaults

on democratic

And Montesinos

had the resources to buy off most of the Peruvian media. SIN

s

budget, which

completely secret even from Congress, was roughly $1.5 million per month.

McMillan and Zoido estimate

that

this.

month by Montesinos

in

to

Of this.

whatever way he saw

fit.

Montesinos was also receiving approximately $750,000 per month from the

Ministry of the Interior and the military, as well as funneling

from

was

perhaps $400,000 was spent on operational costs,

leaving $1.1 million to be spent each

Beyond

certainly

state contracts. After he tied the country.

money

to

himself and SIN

Montesinos bookkeeper

testified that

up

$9 million were entering SIN each month by 2000.

Regime Collapse
In

May

irregularities

of 2000. Fujimori was elected

were so rampant

to a third

term

in office.

that international observers organized

The

electoral

by the OAS. and the

governments of Latin America. Canada and the U.S.. immediately declared
to

meet the standards of a

11,1

In Catherine

status

it

free

Conaghan

s

might have enjoyed

and

11

fair election.

words.
in the

By

"

it

insufficient

Election observers found evidence that

failing the election test.

Peru definitely

lost

academic discussions regarding hybrid regimes

any

in

Latin America. In scholarly debates over the evolution of regimes in Latin America. Peru

under Fujimori was sometimes cited as an example of delegative democracy or some

The concept of delegative democracy, developed first
O Donnell, describes hyper-presidential systems with weak mechanisms of
accountability. But the notion of delegative democracy also included the criteria that such
regimes were found on free and fair elections. The 2000 election rendered any lingering
questions about whether Peru was a delegative democracy effectively moot Fujimori s
Peru 2005. On the electoral irregularities in 2000. see NDl-Carter Center Peru Elections
2000 2000. The Peruvian press covered the activities of and statements from the OAS
ever single day over the course of the first two weeks of April as the first round of voting
other kind of qualified democracy.

by Guillermo

approached, according to

my survey of press

coverage synopses provided by

1

more than one million signatures had been forged

order to place Fujimori

in

s

name on

the ballot. After the first round of the election had been clearly tampered with, Fujimori s

opponent in the

race.

Alejandro Toledo, pulled out of the second round. Virtually no-one

considered the election legitimate, despite Fujimori

international

NGOs to

discredit the elections

regime would remain unshakeable

that the

was

claims that a conspiracy of

s

to blame.

in the face

a massive parade

swearing military allegiance to their commander
his

new term. When

in

the clear

of international

Montesinos and General Jose Villanueva Ruesta. Hermoza

armed forces high command, oversaw

To send

s

message

criticism, Fujimori.

replacement as chief of the

of military troops

in a

ceremony

chief before he was even sworn

the Clinton administration and the

OAS.

in for

after first threatening not to

recognize the results of the election, abandoned this stance, one newspaper headline read

The
directly,

itself.

111

l.OASO.

Tanks

it

The

OAS

had decided

would instead use

OAS

APRODEH

that, rather

its

than take the legitimacy of the regime on

new

clout to pressure the

Fujimori regime to reform

decided to send a high-level mission led by

OAS

Secretary-General

were there days in April when
it was not the case that every single major daily carried at least one news story about the
OAS mission. In addition, see the weekly news magazine Caretcts April 7. 14. 2000 and
all major daily newspapers coverage of Eduardo Stein s staunch criticism of the
elections, and Fujimori s attempts to alternately reject or appease those criticisms, on
s

news summary

April 27. 28. 2000.

On the

service. Indeed, only rarely

role of the

OAS

in the events

of 2000. see De

la

Jara

Basombrio Ensayos sobre justicia y derechos humanos 2003.
1

1

9. 2000 (also cited in Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 207):
La Republica. El Comer cio. Expreso and Liberation April 3. 2000. On the May

Liberation June

Gestion.

elections, see all

major daily newspapers

statement characterizing Fujimori

s

May 20-30.

2000. The

US

State

Department
all major
all major

was reported in
military ceremony see

election as illegitimate

May 30, 2000; on the
noteworthy that most press sources interpreted the military
ceremony as a sign of Fujimori s weakness and a poor attempt to assert authority.
Peruvian daily newspapers on

dailies

June

9. 10.

2000.

It is

137

Cesar Gaviria and Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, to Lima in June 2000.

The purpose of this mission was
and

democratic dialogue

facilitate a

president

s

to advise the

domestic opposition

decision to back off calling for

felt

new

government on needed democratic reforms

between Fujimori and

to

elections that

would meet

the

and

free

seeing

Still,

The mesa de

fair

few other options

112

by

dial ago. facilitated

the former foreign minister

Republic Eduardo Latorre. was composed of eighteen participants,

government ministers from the Fujimori
opposition,

two

Among

special invitees

the participants

s

administration, eight

selected by the

OAS. and two

of the Dominican

among them

four

members of the
representatives of civil

from the opposition were Congressman Luis Solari of the

Peru Posible party, whose Alejandro Toledo was the popular favorite to
until

s implicit

them, most of the opposition and key elements of civil society chose to engage

with the OAS-led talks.

society.

But the

betrayed by the international community

standards the just-concluded elections had so clearly failed.

open

his opposition.

w in

the elections

he pulled out citing fraud. The special invitees included Dr Jorge Santistevan de

Noriega, the national

human

rights

ombudsman, and Monsenor Luis Bambaren.

of the Peruvian Episcopal Conference as a representative of the country

"“On

the decision to send the

OAS

s

president

Roman

major daily
2000. For Peruvian

mission rather than invoke 1080. see

all

newspapers in Peru May 30. June 1. 2. 2000 and Caretas June 2.
press coverage of the OAS- ed mesa see El Perucmo June 8, 9. July 1, Aug 2. Nov 23.
2000; Expreso June 8. 9. July 1. Aug 2. Nov 23. 27. 2000; El Comercio June 8. 9. July

Aug
June

On

2.

Nov

8. 9.

the

23. 27. 2000; Liberacion June 8. 9. July

July

1,

Aug

Marcho de

2.

Nov

27. 2000;

Aug

3,

Aug

La Republica June

los Cuatros Suyos. see all

2000. as well as Liberacion

1.

2.

9.

Nov

July

1.

Aug

2. 8.

9 2000.

major daily newspapers July 28-Aug

2000. While Fujimori

s

been started by the armed forces and police

1.

supporters blamed the

outbreak of violence on Toledo, participants in the protests argued violence and a

protest.

1.

23. 2000; Gestion

in order to create

fire

chaos and discredit the

had

1

Catholic Church. Sofia Macher. executive secretary of the Coorclinadora National de

Derechos Humanos an
.

influential,

nation-wide coalition of human rights organizations

Though

(hereafter simply the Coorclinadora). also participated.

the civil society

participants did not have votes at the mesa, the combination of these forces, in the

of Andrew Cooper and
visible

rights

Thomas

Legler. tipped the balance of the

and transnationalized human rights constituency.

community was made

through the Coorclinadora

commission,

s

human

well-developed agenda for institutional reform.

The

OAS

democracy. This

talks

list

s

a highly

The agenda of the human

participation in the

mesa and

well-publicized public activism in favor of a truth

those accused of

trials for

Macher

clear both through

'

mesa tow ard

words

were based on

rights violations, an

end

to impunity,

and a

114

a twenty-nine point

agenda for reform of Peruvian

contained five substantive issue areas: judicial reform and

strengthening the rule of law; freedom of expression and the press: electoral reform:

congressional oversight and means to combat corruption; and civilian control over the

intelligence

sen ice and military and

the professionalization of the

armed

Fujimori wanted to clean up his image, the international community

going to have to act on the agenda established in these

1

'

Cooper and Legler

Venezuela 2005: De
2003. ch.

The
same

OAS

14

la Jara

The

A Model

role

of two mesas: the

OAS

Heading the

clear,

list

he was

of demands

defense of democracy in Peru and

Basombrio Ensayos sobre justicia y derechos humanos
for the Future?

2001. and McClintock

of the Peruvian human rights community and

in detail in

Chapter IV of this

its

s

response in the
international allies

text.

Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos 44 puntos para una plataforma basica

sobre derechos
IL"

tale

made

If

See also Cooper and Legler Intervention Without Intervening? 2006 and

in Peru:

issue.

covered

is

1

2.

A

talks.

11

forces.

humanos en

Cooper and Legler

el

Pern

A tale of two

Jan 2000.

mesas 2005.

the talks generated

were a

total

reform of the national intelligence service and

Montesinos removal from power. Though
series of events

would serve

to catalyze the talks

Vladimiro Montesinos standing
transformation over the

last

few

and

Andean

guerrillas in

uncovering the

in

OAS

US

a vital ally in the

In

Jordan and passing through Peru on

August 2000.

its

way

plot, the

supplied the Peruvian army in

with the regime. The mesa

demands

for reforms focused

s

the deal

s

architects

in actually

were a senior Peruvian general
at least

eleven deals

anew on Montesinos removal

116

September w as

w as soon dubbed

to

be a very bad month for Montesinos and the beginning of w hat

Vladivideo

the

opposition legislator

level

major anus

hands of

Jordanians version of events implicated Montesinos

who had

The

to the

a

CIA

Colombia, was discovered. While Fujimori praised Montesinos for

and a government contractor

16

slow, a

war on drugs,

region, and for a time an important

Among

1

was

had gone through a major

organizing the arms transfer.

from power.

talks

to elevate their importance.

eyes of the

in the

in the

2000 Montesinos was out of favor with the US.

shipment, originating

FARC

progress

Once considered

years.

the centerpiece of US policy on the

contact, by

initial

scandal.

w ith $15,000 was

A videotape of Montesinos bribing an

aired

on

television.

(No-one

is

sure

w ho

leaked

of Montesinos corruption and abuse of power was ultimately documented

in great detail.

See especially Feinstein

Blind .Ambition

Fujimori

s

Rasputin

2001 and

Montesinos:

2002. These online briefing books contain links to declassified

documentation and the Peruvian Townsend Commission

US

s final report. They leave no
aware of Montesinos involvement in human rights
violations, drug trafficking, and general corruption of the Peruvian state. For Peruvian
press coverage of the FARC gunrunning scandal, implicating SIN and the military, in the
last months of Fujimori s government, see La Republica Aug 23. 24 and 25. Sept 21.
2000

doubt that the

US was

fully

.
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1

1

this first

video to members of Congress.

One popular

theory

was

that military officers,

perhaps from the Navy, the most disgruntled of the armed services, stole the tape both for

money and revenge on Montesinos.)
crisis

was provoked. From

1

Public reaction

this point, the

was overwhelming and

a sudden

pace of events accelerated and seemed

to spiral

out of control. Fujimori promptly fired Montesinos and promised to disband SIN. the

Montesinos control, though many claimed

intelligence unit under

transferred the functions and

members of SIN

to the

in

simply

army. Over the weeks and months to

come, thousands of videos were discovered, many of them

which he soon abandoned

that he

in

Montesinos apartment,

a hasty departure from the country.

Many

of the videos

gradually became public, showing him bribing judges, politicians, and others. Virtually

no-one

in

government seemed clear of the
1

taint

of corruption, and rumors flew

in all

1N

directions.

In a surprising

elections and

vowed

move, before the month was

to step

down from

proven himself willing

to

everyone

Some

s

suspicions.

go

to

remain

office.

out. Fujimori called for earl}'

Given the lengths

in office, the hastiness

suggested that the videos would

to

which Fujimori had

of this decision fueled
direct!}'

implicate Fujimori

1

Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 228-9. See also McClintock and Valias The
United States and Peru 2003. p. 88: Clifford Krauss Fujimori's Fall: A Nation's Lion To
Broken Man New York Times Dec 3, 2000. For a sense of the fallout from the tapes, see
La Republica Sept 15. 2000: Car etas Sept 22. 2000. and the 2001 Townsend Report,
available online through the National Security Achives.
||0

#

^

#

The chief corruption prosecutor of Peru alleged

$15 million to leave the country

after the release

In.

2001

that Fujimori paid

Montesinos

Peru Spy Chief Said to Be

Aeu York Times May 10, 2001 Clifford Krauss Peru's NewVowing to Revive Democracy New York Times Nov 23. 2000. The

Paid Millions to Quit

Chief Sworn

in

of the video.
.

most complete record of the contents of the videos can be found in the 6 volume
Congreso del Peru En la Sala de la Corrupcion: Videos y Audios de Vladimiro
Montesinos (1998-2000) 2004.
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report,

in

wrong-doing, while others

directed by Montesinos or Fujimori,

he
the

still

was damaging enough

saw no other option

but to slink into the

had before the information got

whole network collapsed, the tapes gave [Montesinos]

anyone

who might

turn against him.

The

tapes also

dirt

on Fujimori

that

shadows with what public support

McMillan and Zoido

out.

of

to eliminate the possibility

Or perhaps Montesinos had such good

a viable Fujimori presidency.

the president

the reach of the corruption of the regime, whether

felt that

write:

In the event that

a threat he could use against

game him

the

power

to destroy the

1

president, so Fujimori could not fire him.
1

collapse of regime legitimacy.

Their release created an unprecedented

"Hi
"

Yet many explanations of Fujimori
factor: the military.

control over the

Many

s

decision to step

down

highlighted a different

analysts interpreted the decision as a sign that the president

armed forces had vanished along with Montesinos. who.

after all.

hand-picked virtually every senior police and military officer appointed over the
decade. Indeed,

brother-in-law

many among them were

was

at this

The day

general and

after the first

Montesinos called together 15 members of Congress
innocence:

into the

1

|g

when

room

See also Clifford Krauss

Fujimori's Fall:
120

Peru:

s

of the Vladivideos was aired.

to attempt to persuade

(center-left national daily

he maintained the military

s

them of his

commanders

support.

1-1

reporting on this swirl of speculation and rumors.

A Nation's Lion To

Ombudsman Views

last

commander of the armored

they remained unconvinced, he brought the armed forces

to underline the point that

had

old friends or classmates of Montesinos. His

moment an Army

division headquartered in Lima.

s

Crisis.

Broken

Man New

York Times Dec

3.

2000.

Rules Out Heading Transition Government

of Spain) Sept 23. 2000.
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El Pais

.

Before Montesinos fled Peru. U.S. officials and

OAS

Secretary General Gaviria

persuaded Panama to grant Montesinos asylum. Protecting Montesinos was justified, they
argued, to avoid

Fujimori.

It

was

him making good on
confirmed

later

threats to lead the military in staging a

coup against

Montesinos had previously collaborated

that, indeed.

with military officers to put together a plan to stage a military coup to maintain the

regime

intact

According

even

Fujimori stepped

if

down

or in case Toledo

to the plan, the military intervention

fair elections

and would promptly hand power

won

the

would be justified by

to a civilian interim

2000

elections.

and

calls for free

government. In 2001

Fujimori acknowledged the coup threats were one of the factors for his decision, and

General Villanueva admitted that Montesinos had indeed developed a plan to overthrow
Fujimori

s

government, though the general claimed he had rejected the proposal because

of his democratic convictions and fear of the economic impact a coup would have.

Though some

scholars, analysts

now With
.

"

and journalists had long been warning of

Montesinos unprecedented power over the military, these warnings had generated
public concern before

1

little

the sudden turn of events, the quandary Fujimori had

Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 230- For press analyses of the likelihood of a
military coup, some based on information that became public only after the fall of the
regime, see Gestion Feb 20. 2001 La Republica Oct 3. 2001 Anthony Faiola Army
1

.

:

Played a Key Role

How

in

:

Departure of Fujimori

Washington Post. Sept

18.

2000: Faiola

Power Unraveled Washington Post Sept 24. 2000: Kevin Hall
Military in Peru Continues Coup Threat Miami Herald Sept 27. 2000: Christopher
Marquis Fujimori Asks Washington for Backing on Peru Transition New York Times
Sept 30. 2000: and C. de Carlos Peru: General Predicts Imminent 'Democratic Coup'
Against Fujimori Madrid ADC Sept 2 2000. in which former General Jaime Salinas
claims that his contacts within the military were planning on staging what he called a
democratic coup within the next six months to oust Fujimori, whose government they
considered corrupt. According to Krauss (supra note 106) a coup was planned, but the
Fujimori

s

1

.

navy and air force balked. Marquis reported that the military had threatened a coup if
Montesinos w ere not granted exile. Villanueva s account came out w hile he w as in jail
in 2001: see El Comercio. Liberacion. La Republica, Gestion and Expreso Jan 15. 2001.
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faced for

became

year suddenly

at least the last

clear:

intolerable political liability for Fujimori (both at

of power over the military into his

Montesinos had become an

home and

own hands made him

abroad), but his consolidation

virtually untouchable.

Fujimori suddenly looked less like a semi -authoritarian strong

man and more

1

'

'

like a

puppet for Montesinos and the military Even after the release of the video. Fujimori
7

.

could go no farther than to

proved unable

fire

Montesinos and

vow to

track

showed

to fulfill that promise, as the military

him down. He quickly
itself

unwilling to cooperate

any action against Montesinos. whose silence on military misbehavior w as their only

in

hope

in

avoiding

Fujimori

s

trial.

Given military opposition

dependence on Montesinos

to

punishing Montesinos. and given

to secure the military s backing. Fujimori

saw no

Under other circumstances, he would not have allow ed

other option but to step down.

plans to be derailed simply because of a $1 5.000 bribe scandal involving an aide.
the groups pushing Fujimori

nonnegotiable demand

regime to reform had anticipated that

s

entire regime. Protestors filled the streets,

introduction of a transition government.

Fujimori

be.

Rumors of a

s

was

Montesinos removal

announcement

military coup

led

'

None of

one

the very one that could unravel the

demanding Fujimori

s

resignation and the

1-4

many

to

wonder what

the military

s

reaction

were everywhere. The commander of the armed

General Jose Villanueva Ruesta. waited several days after Fujimori

12

their

his

s

would

forces.

announcement of

For warning about Montesinos take-over of the military high command, see La

1999 and Gestion. Liberation and La Repub/ica, April 3. 2000.
Montesinos control of promotions within the military was ultimately proven by videos of
him deciding and doling out promotions among top commanders. For press coverage of

Republica Dec

1

1.

these videos, see Gestion El Comercio.
,

1-4

Workers Protest

in

Lima.

Demand

La Republica and Expreso May
Transition

Sept 29. 2000.
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22. 2001.

Government Agence France Presse

new

elections before publicly issuing a statement of support, further fueling

Only when Fujimori went

to

Washington

rumors dampened: the message

made

The press reported

clear.

that the

that the

by sending

the military leadership

US

backing for his

to seek

US would
US went

new

coup rumors.

plan were these

not tolerate any military uprising

out of

its

way

was

to clarify its position to

General Pace to meet with Perm ian Defense

Minister General Carlos Bergamino and the chief of the armed forces. General Jose

Villanueva Ruesta. to strongly advise the military to cooperate with the
the transition process.

W

ith

far greater

the

importance. Fujimori

s

in

absolute free

sufficient to guarantee a peaceful transfer

W hat

transfer.

12?

Kevin Hall

Lancaster

Coup

2000:

2.

climate of stability

If

Fujimori were to hand over power

from a witch-hunt

could be constructed to safeguard the

Miami Herald Sept

27. 2000: John

Washington Post Sept 29.
New York

Peru Turning a Colder Shoulder

2000; Clifford Krauss

Opposition Leader Says Montesinos Threatening With Military
19.

2000; David Gonzalez

Peru

s

Military Backs Fujimori in His

New Elections New

administration officials

York Times Sept 22. 2000. Marquis wrote that Clinton
were acutely worried that [Fujimori] might be ousted by military

Even months

officers loyal to his fired intelligence chief.

international press

question

before,

members of the

to whether he might call upon the military
do so and thought the possibility unlikely. The
relevant by October. Toledo Will Not Call Armed

had questioned Toledo as

vowed not
would seem much more

oust Fujimori; Toledo

Forces to Depose Fujimori

2000

before the mesa: the 1995

the military protection

Military in Peru Continues Threat

NO TIMEX Sept

Call for

mesa de dialogo assumed

Congress, he argued, would not be

Fujimori Makes Surprise Visit to Washington

1.

OAS

Fujimori wanted was a new amnesty law granting military and civilian

2000; Gestion Oct

Times Oct

in

of power.

w ithout guaranteeing

regime, no

the

new argument

amnesty law passed by the fnjimorista majority

new

fall,

chief representative to the talks. Justice Minister

Alberto Bustamante introduced a stunning

under the

mission and

~

government now

through new elections

OAS

to

to

NOTIMEX (state-controlled

.
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Mexican press agency) May

27.

officials (himself included)

immunity from prosecution over

including drug trafficking and

human

incorporated into the constitution to

this

new demand

the military,

rights violations,

make

actually reflected the president

and there were indications

Montesinos cronies

new proposal

rescinding

exchange impunity

new elections.

1-6

Bustamante made

Days before

this

clear the

OAS

to

dialogue included the ultimatum that

in future

it

unless he curbed military and

was

amnesty demand was

sudden demand was
that military

December would indeed

step

was

emanated directly from

here, at the

mesa de dialogo

,

over amnesty occurred.

announcement affirming

the military

It is

desperation to maintain the support of

perhaps not surprising that

is

that the ultimate confrontation

reform.

likely that

difficult.

Because Lord Axworthy had been making public

Fujimori would not receive foreign assistance

it

extremely

amnesty an attempt on the part of the military high command

statements since the previous June that the

secret policy abuses,

to be

Carlos Basombrio goes further, calling the

7

for

wide variety of crimes,

and for the amnesty law

that the proposal

in the military leadership.

for further

s

it

a

articulated, the

army issued

commanders scheduled

down on

trying to send the

a precondition for

any further

a public

to retire at the

end of

time. Several analysts and commentators believed

message

that, in

exchange

for several

Montesinos

appointees stepping aside peacefully, they wanted amnesty. Compliance with scheduled
retirement, however, struck no-one as a powerful bargaining chip, and the immediate

A document released by the

response to the amnesty proposal was outrage.
the Interior and

l2

of Defense

stated clearly the

Ministries of

motive behind the new amnesty: the 1995

Vecchio Opposition accuses Peru s Fujimori of forcing military amnesty 2000 and
Peru spy chief desperately seeks amnesty law military experts say 2000: Lama
Politics: Peru - Army Demands Amnesty In Exchange for Retirements 2000: Rivera
La reconcilacion segiin Bustamante ideelemail Oct 24. 2000.
'’

.
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amnesty laws now appeared insufficient
not

to guarantee that

becomes victims of revenge of those who blamed

the

members of the
armed forces

of the internal conflict with Sendero Luminoso. Yet even Fujimori
conservative opponents,

rejected this:

We

politically

group menaces

are not disposed to permit or tolerate that a military

politically polarized

and
12

interests.

for the brutality

echoing similar statements from a host of opposition leaders,

The country

of Peruvian society, the government and the opposition groups

ahead of its

s

military will

this military

So strong was the outpouring of anger

denying that the armed forces were attempting

The

is

group must comprehend that the nation comes
at the

suggestion that

the military joint chiefs of staff felt compelled to issue a public statement the

negotiations.

all

to

impose

their will

on

same day.

political

*"s

conflict

returned to Peru.

exploded even further as word trickled out

The question of Fujimori

Montesinos managed

to

s

that

Montesinos had

control over the military

came

to a

head as

evade capture. Military experts insisted that the military

leadership had decided to back the president and distance itself from Montesinos. but the

failure to locate

and capture Montesinos upon his return

possible conclusions: either Montesinos

was being

to

Peru seemed to lead to two

protected by Fujimori

-

or by military

12

Congressman Rafael Rev. quoted by Vecchio Opposition accuses Peru
forcing military amnesty 2000: Basombrio C'astigo y Impunidad 2001.
1

s

Fujimori of

")Q

"

Vecchio Opposition accuses Peru s Fujimori of forcing military amnesty 2000. See
New York Times editorial The Shadowy Politics of Peru Sept 19. 2000:
Opposition Gives Government 'Ultimatum' To Remain in Talks EFE Oct 9. 2000: Peter
Fiakim Putting a Country Together Again Christian Science Monitor November 6.
2000
also

.
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124

forces.

The

went careening through the

president, in a leather jacket,

with a large contingent of police personnel

in

tow

Montesinos. According to Catherine Conaghan.

confirmed

Lima on
Ruesta.

that, as the presidential

orders from Peru

s

search

of Lima

staged attempt to find

Testimony by military personnel

later

was underway. Montesinos was being hidden

in

top ranking military officer. General Jose Villanueva
7

L'°

Even members of Fujimori
and saw Montesinos

s

administration reacted with outrage to the gamble

return, the military

announcements, and Fujimori

for amnesties as a baseless ploy to protect the

First

in a clearly

streets

power had

his cabinet

practically vanished

political analysts

protection, as

by

Fujimori hurriedly called

7

and he soon gave up

thought the generals were

payment

in protest as

and military leadership. Fujimori

this point,

new requests

crumbling infrastructure of corrupt power.

Vice President Francisco Tudela resigned

emergency meetings with

s

his

s

negotiating

demand, though

sure to push Fujimori for broad legal

for staying out of the

Montesinos standoff. They [had] reason

to

worry. Human-rights activists [were] demanding the creation of an independent truth

commission.

Despite indubitable

Army pressure.

Fujimori was powerless to pass a

new

amnesty law without opposition support, impossible given the circumstances. Jorge del
Castillo, a

member of the

opposition within Congress,

laws should not be

made by

a

new government

coming

in.

'' 4

Contreras

is

government on

its

to clear the air.

Fujimori and The Fugitive

I

out.

2000;

4th Military Region
3.

2000:

a

Commander

Peruvian Government Deputy

NOTIMEX

Oct

Conaghan Making and LInmaking Authoritarian Peru 2001.
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Amnesty

They should be made when

•'A

v

as saying.

Indicating their intention to pursue

General Defends Montesinos La Republica Oct

Martha Chavez Admits Danger of Coup D’Etat

way

was quoted

4.

2000.

.

accountability for wrong-doing under Fujimori. Sofia Macher. head of the Coorclmaclora

filed

one of many criminal complaints against Montesinos linking him

money

laundering and other crimes.

On

murder, torture,

1

October 29. the farcical hunt for Montesinos ended with his fleeing the

country yet again and Fujimori

allies

1 "’

to

.

from the

taking the step of purging Montesinos strongest

at last

with Villanueva Ruesta. the heads of the

military' leadership, starting

force and navy, and Montesinos

air

brother-in-law. General Luis C'ubas Portal. Fujimori,

attempting to demonstrate he was also

in control

of the troops, temporarily confined

all

military personnel to their barracks. Nevertheless, a group of seventy renegade soldiers

led

by Lieutenant Colonel Ollanta Flumala and

the city of Puno. calling for Fujimori

the military. After taking an

s

his brother staged an

resignation.

Montesinos

armed uprising near

arrest,

army general hostage and occupying

and a purging of

the mining

Toquepala. the group retreated into the Andes with a team of elite troops

(Though the

rebellious group

pardoned them.)

was soon

1

Contreras

captured, an opposition-led Congress soon

coup were empty

Fujimori and The Fugitive

with the military high

threats

and

that

Unknown

no outright military

2000. Fujimori held several secretive meetings

command and Defense

Minister Bergamino

discussion that took place in those meetings can only be guessed
After Traveling to

hot pursuit.

This small group aside, however, the military seemed resigned to the

reality that their threats to stage a

*'

in

town of

Location with

Army

Chiefs

the tensions between Fujimori and the military, see also

Reportedly Divided Between Montesinos. Fujimori

EFE

in this period, but the

at.

Fujimori Returns

NOTIMEX
Armed

Oct 25. 2000.

Forces' Loy

On

alty

(independent Spanish press

agency) Oct 25. 2000.
Ij

“

Fujimori struggles to control army in crisis-ridden country

Reuters Oct

3

1

.

2000;

A Platoon-Size Mutiny in Peru, Floping to Force Fujimori Out New
York Times Oct 30. 2000 and Fujimori Fires 3 Top Aides In Military New York Times
Oct 29. 2000; Fujimori Replaces Top Military Commanders Agence France Presse. Oct
Clifford Krauss

28. 2000;

January

3.

Howard LaFranchi Macho

militaries flex

2001
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muscles

Christian Science Monitor

government had a prayer

McClintock and Valias

twenty-first century Latin America.

in

write:

Obviously, a coup attempt would have faced overwhelming opposition, both
internationally and domestically, including serious opposition

from other sectors
of the Perm ian military. In the view of many journalists, the coup threat was
merely a story cooked up by Fujimori and senior officers to solve the problem of
what to do with Montesinos and avoid the publie trial that the opposition were
demanding (a public trial in which these senior officers were likely to have been
1

incriminated.)

Still, at

the time,

^

and given recent

and Venezuela, the
opposition did not

fact that

failed attempts at military

coups

any coup would be highly unlikely

mean anyone was

willing to take a

might stage a military uprising anyhow. After

14
to survive U.S.

and

OAS

gamble on whether Montesinos

he had

all.

Ecuador. Paraguay

in

little to

lose,

and was working

hard to give his threats credibility by surrounding himself with top-ranking military allies

and

telling

In

years,

its

Fujimori

s

November,

cabinet chief,

if

the opposition

won

I

want

to

T

can stage a coup.

control of Congress for the

first

time

in eight

leadership going to a coalition led by the Popular Action party. Congress then

called for a vote to

remove Fujimori from

office, declaring

himself was by then increasingly implicated in the various

him

unfit to serve.

illegal

Fujimori

schemes Montesinos

had organized. The special prosecutor appointed to investigate Montesinos case argued
that a parallel investigation

of Fujimori

s

own misbehavior was

absolutely necessary. Fie

noted that Roberto Escobar, the brother of the Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar, had
testified that the

1

Medellin cocaine

cartel contributed SI million to Fujimori s

1990

first

McClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003. p. 154. Quote is from
Fujimori s grey eminence Latin American Regional Report Andean Group (Oct

3.

2000), p. 2-3.
L4
'

30.

Salas quoted Montesinos to this effect in testimony reproduced in

2000 and

cited in

Conaghan Fujimori

s

Peru 2005.

p.

230-1.

La Republica Nov

" Adding

presidential campaign.

to

Fujimori

s

woes was

the release of an official report

by the Defensoria del Pueblo (Human Rights Ombudsman) blaming the military for over
four thousand disappearances of workers, students, and peasants.

end

to the

In

impunity enjoyed by the military for such crimes.

1

'’

The

report called for an

6

Lima, hundreds of thousands of citizens protested against the regime over the

course of the year

s

developments.

1

'

On November

19.

Fujimori, on a trip outside the

country, fled to Japan and faxed his resignation to the legislature.

members of his own

By

all

accounts, even

cabinet were shocked by the sudden departure of the president.

Several military leaders decided Fujimori had the right idea and promptly fled the

country.

The Fujimori regime had collapsed.

x

1

Other juicy details of Ivlontesinos involvement w ith drug trafficking came from
in jail, who described how he had enriched himself to the tune

Peruvian drug traffickers

of $700 per kilo of cocaine leaving the country by protecting drug traffickers.
Ijh

The

report

was based on denunciations

families of the victims,

who blamed

the

filed

Army

by human

for

60%

rights organizations

and

of the disappearances. See

Defensoria del Pueblo La desaparicion forzada de personas en el Peru (1980 a 1996)
2000: El Comercio

Nov

1

7.

2000. The role of the Defensoria in Peru

s

human

rights

and

transitional justice experience are discussed in the next chapter.

See Conaghan Fujimori
L8
'

On

s

Peru 2005. Ch.

9.

Palmer Political Earthquake 2001:
Cameron Endogenous Regime Breakdown 2006: Marcus-Delgado and Tanaka
Lecciones del final del fujimorismo 2001 and Basombrio Peru: The Collapse of
Fujimorismo 2001 Members of the military who fled the country after Fujimori s fall
included Victor Malca, who also served as Fujimori s Minister of Defense. Reported in
El Comercio Expreso, La Republican and El Peruano Jan 1, 2001. Others were caught
attempting to flee the country, such as the former head of SIN and military commander
Julio Salazar. Reported in Gestion. El Comercio. Expreso. and La Republica Jan 3. 2001.
the regime s final collapse, see Balbi and

.

.
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Conclusions

The Fujimori regime operated on

the assumption th

within every institution of

the state, individuals could be persuaded to place personal interests

institutional

While some of these individuals could be corrupted with wads of cash, the armed

ones.

forces

greater importance to the regime

members of the

away

meant

their

payoff was bigger: not only did

military leadership seek personal enrichment and power, they also sought

fundamental concessions
trade

above

the military

s

to the interests

typical role

control over appointments and

intelligence collection, in

of their institutions. Though they were willing to

of checking

exchange

for Fujimori s subjective control the

carrying out their counter-insurgency plan.

internal security

I

of this

power of the president and even

advancement within the military and oversight of

were granted vast new protections from human

discussed in Chapter

the

text, control

rights accountability

armed forces

and a free hand

As Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux

in

argue, and as

over essentially political matters, such as

and protection from human rights accountability, were major

battlegrounds on which civilian governments and their militaries would fight for power

during Latin .American transitions to democracy.

The Peruvian
the fall of Fujimori,

remain

away

safe.

its

Would

military

s

gamble

pow er

accountability

pow er under Fujimori

cost

them

in

2000:

w ith

none of the protections and privileges they had enjoyed w ould
the Peruvian military, like those in the rest of

other powers but cling to

or had the

for

autonomy

in the area

South America, bargain

of human rights accountability,

relationships in Peru been so thoroughly disrupted that even

was now on

the table?

shape the impending battle over

What

human

political calculations

rights accountability?

152

and mechanisms w ould

CHAPTER IV
TRANSITION AND RE ALIGNMENT OF POWER

The speed with which Fujimori
Peruvians and international observers

would soon

steal

Even
still

if

s

2000-2001

regime collapsed came as a profound shock

alike.

In

March of 2000.

to

as the elections Fujimori

approached. Coletta Youngers wrote:

an alternative candidate wins

point
Peru will
Congress
seek to
new president and

highly unlikely

face a difficult transition period as the

at this

contend w ith the overarching pow er of the SIN and the military, the imbalance of
powers and the setbacks to the rule of law. The best case scenario for Peru is thus
one of a long and arduous transition, w ith the hopes that relatively free and fair
elections will take place in the year 2005. In either case, the Peruvian
rights

movement

will continue to voice the concerns of many

democratic change and respect for the basic

Youngers pessimistic predictions
partners within Peru

s

human

rights

excitement that gripped Fujimori

suddenly

at

for

s

human

rights

human

on the need

for

of all Peruvians.

1

Peru no doubt reflected the frustration of her

community. One can imagine the shock and

opponents when the long-awaited transition arrived

the end of 2000. setting in motion a

new

flurry of change.

New

elections for

the legislature and executive were held in 2001. but dramatic steps to alter civil-military

relations, eliminate

SIN. strengthen the means to protect democracy, and reestablish the

rule

of law began even

how

far

1

days of Paniagua

s

transitional administration. Just

such reforms might ultimately go remained unclear. Wherever the

administration

for

in the first

s

agenda embraced human rights accountability and the end of impunity

members of the

Youngers

military, the fingerprints of the Peruvian

Human

Rights and Politics

in

Peru Today

Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos: reflexiones sobre
Reconciliacion

2004.
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human

rights

community

2000; see also Degregori
la

Comision de

la

Verdad y

were

visible.

Before proceeding to analyze the changes

introduced by the Paniagua administration,

movement and

its

international

A

us examine the Peruvian

let

network of allies

Brave

in civil-military relations

New Human

human

rights

in closer detail.

Rights

Movement?

Scholars have long lamented the weakness of Peruvian civil society, but the

events of 2000 and 2001
features of Peru

is

s

may

give them reason to reassess. Indeed, one of the surprising

2000 regime

transition

was

clear that the fall of the Fujimori regime

and the ensuing transition were a

regime collapse and not directly attributable

regime legitimacy symbolized by
regime
within

s

collapse.

During the

civil society, in

major surge

mam

to

this mobilization

was indeed

and focused movement

human rights

matters.

The Perm

ian

human

rights

able to influence questions of transitional justice in part because of a

and respect these groups enjoyed

in

2000 and 2001. when

w ere proven justified,

events precipitated an apparent change in social attitudes, and virtually

international

of

partnership with key allies within the state and abroad, exerted a

in the legitimacy

were

result

it

a principal cause of the

of the complaints they had been making ox er the past decade

in the state

Though

popular mobilization, the massive loss of

transition, a highly organized

surprising degree of control over

community was

the powerful role of civil society.

discredited.

The

links these groups

had

built

all political

actors

with partners in

nongovernmental organizations, foreign governments, and international

bodies such as the Inter- American Court of Fluman Rights enabled them to turn this new
legitimacy into concrete outcomes in 2001.
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weak and divided

Civil society has historically been

the military

When,

regime

supported

initially

in the latter half

community groups and

influential

it

reversed

and active

to intimidation

Yet the human

1970s
sort.

leadership began to perceive the

in the

in the

1

support for

civil society.

1980s and continued

in the

Economic
1990s.

2

980s. had been weakened by

movements had

from Sendero Luminoso and

their

own government

rights

crisis

Trade

social

as well as

'

movement was.

strongest sectors of civil society.

late

its

economic conditions of the country.

the dire

s

unemployment. Grassroots

deindustrialization and high

succumbed

in the

trade unions organizing across Peru as a threat rather than a

worsened the decline of civil society

more

though

development, though only of a corporatist

its

of the docenio the regime

support to the military regime,

unions,

in Peru,

in these

same

The Peruvian human

years,

rights

emerging as one of the

mov ement was born

in the

1970s when, working with elements of the Catholic Church, family members of

political prisoners pressured the military

strength in the 1980s.

w hen high

lev els

regime to release them. The movement gained

of v iolence and

human

rights violations

Sendero Luminoso and the armed forces of the government led the movement

by both

to focus

on

an agenda of documenting abuses, seeking punishment for them in the courts, and
reforming the military to curb

its

abuses.

An early

1983 murder of eight journalists in Uchuraccay.

catalyst for the

When it became

mov ement was

the

clear that both the

congressional investigation and the judicial proceedings that followed were indicative of
a lack of

'

'

On

w ill on

the part of the state and judiciary to bring to justice those responsible.

civil society in Peru, see

Taylor

From Fujimori

to

Stokes Cultures in Conflict 1995.

Toledo

2005.

p.

570.

the

human

rights

community

formed around community

particular, these groups

family

members of the

1985, over

fifty

started to organize to respond to these failures. In

leaders, religious organizations,

disappeared, and a dedicated group of lawyers and activists. In

such organizations decided to work together under an umbrella

organization, the National Coordinator for

Human

Rights (the Coordinadora).

As

the

Peruvian truth commission wrote, the Coordinaclora quickly became the forum for

human

collective decision-making within the

representative organ

When,

in the

when
1

rights

community and

dealing with the public and the

most important

4

state.

was almost completely

990s. Sendero

its

destroyed, the prevalence of

massacres, extrajudicial killings, disappearances and other abuses committed by the

armed

forces also rapidly declined. Rather than disband or splinter in the absence of the

same pressing need
rights

had held the group together

movement quickly recognized

attacks

on the democratic

autogolpe. the

Fujimori

rights.

that

s

the

institutions

movement discovered

new

of the
a

new

threats Peru

state.

was

however, the human

facing from Fujimori

When Fujimori

raison

d

etre: to

Despite Fujimori

s

document and

best efforts to either stifle or placate the

the decade,

it

managed

fight

human

human

rights

to carve a large role for itself in the

debates and changes that rocked the nation in the

last

s

staged his 1992

abuses of power and to articulate the links between democracy and

movement throughout

4

in the past,

major

few years of the tw entieth century

Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome I. p. 39-40. Tome III. p.
293-318. For a detailed history of the Coordinadora s work, see Youngers I lolencia
Politicay Sociedad Civil en el Peril 2003: Youngers and Peacock Peru s Coordinadora
Nacional de Derechos Hwnanos: A Case Study of Coalition Building 2002;
Drzew ieniecki Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Hwnanos 2000. See also the
Coordinadora s declaration from its first national meeting Nos pronunciantos por la
vida 1985: its published reaction to the 1986 prison killings En defense de la vida. no a
la barbarie La Republica July 29. 1986: etc.
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and into the beginning of the next.

When

human

enjoy greater support from and activism

community began

rights

university students."

However,

to

as the twin threats

receded, so too did public interest in the

impunity

until the events

The human

rights

accountability for the

the

Fujimori announced the 1995 amnesty laws, the

human

of economic disaster and terrorism

rights

community

many human

in

state

rights abuses

the international

begin documenting

Peruvian

entire period.

movement. Amnesty

rights

human

human

rights violations

its

members

human

in the

6

scope of the violence and

in the 1980s.

Even

fact,

It

may seem

in 2000. nearly a

decade

Verdad v Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome

I.

strange

of the abuses that

many

mayhem

this

work under conditions

to gain public recognition

1980s and early 1990s. but. in

w ere unaware of the

la

held both the

International, for example, did not

rights organizations carried out this

were taking place daily

Comision de

bv non-state

abuses perpetrated by non-state actors. For nearly

had to work so hard

"

to

h

right

that these organizations

Sendero had provoked

end

were well ahead of much of

of intimidation and danger, but also widespread public disinterest.

Peruvians

for an

the Belaunde, Garcia and Fujimori administrations. Despite

to international standards; in this they

human

demands

committed by Sendero Luminoso and

rights groups such as the Coordinadorci and

and insurgents

s

Peru had persistently documented and demanded

the letial ambiguitv in international law surrounding

human

movement

of 2000.

armed forces throughout

actors,

among

-

perhaps most

that the conflict

-

w ith

after the conflict

was

p. 40.

Aprodeh Tan cerca de la muerte: reportaje a un grave atropello a los
el Peru 1997 and Peru: la practica estatal de la desaparicion
forzada, OEA 1990-2000 2001 Instituto de Defensa Legal Los grupos paramilitares
1989; Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Manifesto a los peruanos 1989;
Comision de la Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final 2003 Tome III. p. 293-318.
See. for example.

derechos humanos en

:
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defused, estimates of the numbers killed in the conflict hovered between twenty and

thirty thousand.

its

Only

final report in

after the

2003 did

a

Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission published

new

figure

become accepted: 69.000

Because the vast majority of the violence took place
middle class was able
conflict,

to distance

far

and information was much more easily controlled by the

typical reaction

was support of strong

bloodthirsty enemy.

Guzman

take one million lives in the

rights

community

name of the

revolution did

When,

community turned

to

s initial

to

on challenges

first six

all.

of hmefios the
,

a frightening and

little

of blood and

to strengthen the

in the 1990s. the

to

hand of the

human

rights

democracy, they again fought against the

years as president.

Not

until

Fujimori launched his

seek a second reelection did public opinion begin to

concerns of the Coordinadora groups.

were able

fear of

unwillingness to recognize the problem: Fujimori enjoyed incredibly high

approval ratings during his

campaign

When

concerns about treatment of terrorist suspects or

villagers alleged to support the guerrillas.

to focus

reality

for his followers to unleash a river

s calls

to raise

state.

military responses and a refusal to carefully

question the tactics employed in fighting what was. after

public

from Lima, much of the

themselves psychologically from the effects of the

Sendero directly threatening their world did intrude upon the

human

killed.

to affirm that,

whatever

its

By

shift to

match

the

2000. scholars such as Joanna Drzewieniecki

challenges, the Coordinadora

recognized as one of the strongest and most united

human

rights

was

universally

movements

in the

world.

Drzewieniecki Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Hinnanos 2000.
the dialogue taking place within the

human

rights
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movement

in the

p. 1.

For a sense of

1990s. see Basombrio

Throughout the 1990s. the network assembled under the umbrella of the

Coordinadora was truly impressive.
America.

Human

NGOs were vital
overall: the

in

Washington Office on Latin

Rights Watch and Amnesty International, two other key international
to the

work on

Comision Andina de

Law. The Comision Andina de
based

In addition to the

Lima and founded

the

Coordinadora and the human

Juristas

Juristas

is

rights

and the Center for Justice and International
an international nongovernmental organization

work focuses on questions of the

in 1982. Its

movement

rule

of law and

o

human

rights in Bolivia. Chile.

Justice

and International

Colombia. Ecuador. Peru and Venezuela. The Center for

Law (CEJIL)

is

an international

NGO focused on the

InterAmerican Commission and the InterAmerican Court for

1

991

.

it

growing

Rights.

Founded

in

has offices in Brazil. Costa Rica, and the US. Such groups have contributed to a

effort to

response to

extend the strong network of organizations in Peru to an Andes-wide

human

the domestic

rights challenges/’ But the foundation of the

NGOs which continued to

and Paz y

Coordinadora

is

and was

spring up across the country, including

organizations like the Asociacion Pro Derechos

I

Human

Humanos.

the Instituto de Defensa Legal,

Jusiticia.

Y Ahora Cite? Desafios para

el irabajo

por

los

derechos humanos en America Larina

1996.
8

See Comision Andina de Juristas Los problemas de la democracia en la region andina:

mecanismos de defensa y procesos de transicion 2001: Seguridad ciudadana y derechos
humanos 1999: Las t areas de la transicion democrat ica 2001 El control democratico de
la defensa en la region andina 2004: La Reforma del Sector Defensa v Las Relciciones
Civiles-Militares en el Peru 2005; Chiri Marquez Line amient os para una politica de
Defensa Xacional: Peru 2006-2011 2006: and Garcia-Sayan Vidas paralelas: Region
;

Andina: desafios y respuestas 1998.
4

www.cejil.org
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In 2000. the organization consisted over

from Catholic and Protestant organizations
from half a dozen

community enjoyed much
fiftieth

to secular ones,

hundreds of members. As

to

more than 60 member groups, ranging

1990s. El

Comercio

NGOs; now

human

political violence faded, the

rights

greater press coverage and an improved public image. For the

anniversary of the Universal Declaration of

Comercio included a

and with groups of anywhere

special feature

on human

Human

rights every

Rights, for example. El

week

for

rarely included stories about or press releases

one year. Before the

from human rights

they did so frequently. This can in part be attributed to the press

awareness of the Fujimori administration

s

attempts to

propaganda machine for the regime.

stifle the

Human

s

growing

freedom of the press and

was moving

convert

it

into the

mainstream, despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm in the public for challenging

into a

1

the Fujimori regime.

Fujimori

s

rights discourse

"

second term as president consisted of an endless sequence of moves

to

consolidate control over Congress, the judiciary, and even the media. According to the

Peruvian truth commission,

the constant denunciations of the

signified to the state the grave risk of losing public legitimacy.

human

rights

Unable

to

movement

buy the

support of human rights groups. Fujimori and Montesinos attempted instead to alternately

appease the groups with concessions

or.

more

frequently, discredit

campaigns including nationally broadcast attacks
Bustamante, for example, described the

human

ads. (Fujimori s Minister

rights

NGOs of the country

full-time to the destroying the reputation of the Peruvian

w orld.

)

them with smear
of Justice
as

government with the

dedicated

rest

of the

Hence, human rights legislation long demanded by the human rights community

Drzewieniecki Coordination! Nacional de Derechos

Youngers Violencia Politico y Sociedad Civil 2003.

160

Humanos 2000.

p.

38-40:

1

in the

country were passed

women

s

rights

particularly the

of the

Human

in these years,

and family violence, and

Comision Andina de

Ombudsman

Rights

inception in 1996.

it

s

including legislation on racial discrimination,

torture.

Juristas.

The human

won

office in

1

a

996.'

major concession with the creation
1

Youngers

human

rights

to file complaints

willing than before to

come forward

and seek redress. As a

to

make

their

demands

result,

heard.

Peruvian

human

influence within the country,

rights

it

community struggled

Given the disunity
its

new

had no such problem finding

Focus on international campaigns has a long

example of this

is

allies

tradition in Peru; a notable

the career of Javier Perez de Cuellar, the legendary Peruvian diplomat

As

rights lawyers brought the Peruvian crisis to the attention to the

Group on Forced Disappearances, which

The Defensoria del Pueblo

this office is to

and

and support

ultimately served as the Secretary General of the United Nations.

human

ally within the

to gain public attention

internationally.

1

people are more

pushing for reform.

state represented the clearest voices

w ho

its

at a practical level, instructing

within the political opposition to Fujimori, the Coordinadora and

If the

since

writes,

work. The office has contributed greatly to

generating pubic awareness of human rights issues and.

how

community, and

has obtained an unprecedented moral stature and has contributed

significantly to legitimizing

individuals on

rights

is

the

in turn sent repeated

repons

Human Rights Ombudsman

early as 1984.

UN

to the

Office.

Working

Perm ian

The purpose of

defend the rights of citizens against government abuse. Comision de

la

Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final 2003 Tome III. p. 307. Bustamante s comments
appeared in Gestion Oct 8. 1999. also cited in Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 200
Tome III. p. 307. See also Drzewieniecki Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos
2000 Youngers Jlolencia Politico v Sociedad Civil 2003 and La promocion de los
derechos humanos: las ONG y el estado en el Peru 2006: Unger Human Rights in the
Andes: The Defensoria del Pueblo 2004. The Defensoria s website offers a wealth of
information, including a digital library including
relevant legislation.

Go

all

of the institution

s

reports and

to http://wvvw. Defensoria. gob. pe/Defensoria.html
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government. Though these reports were largely ignored,

government

that international actors

were

it

sent early notice to the

of the prosecution of the counter-

critical

insurgency campaign and that international respect for the Peruvian state was
jeopardy.

'

According

to

Thomas Legler and Andrew Cooper,

in

the 1992 autogolpe

was

an important catalyst for linking the actions of civil society organizations in Peru with
those of their counterparts abroad

:

what Keck and Sikkink have called the boomerang effect.
Peruvian human rights activists who encountered hostility and repression from
Fujimori authorities toward their grievances turned abroad to cultivate
In a manifestation of

Human rights

international support and protection for their struggle.

organizations

such as the Washington Office on Latin America. Americas Watch, and
channeled support to the [Coordinadorci]

and democracy

in the

extremely

defend

in its struggles to

of a

difficult context

state

human

rights

of emergency. These

links were used to ferry information about human rights abuses from Peru to U.S.
government and public audiences. The links were not only with foreign civil
society organizations: the Coordinator communicated regularly with foreign
diplomats in Lima and frequently sent delegates to the Linked Nations and OAS.
In 1994. the Coordinator had the symbolic distinction of receiving the first highlevel Clinton administration delegation to visit Peru ever
efore meeting with the
government.
In
contrast
their
relative
absence
during
the 1977-1980
Fujimori
to
period, coordinated, cross-border civil society actions began to take on
significance around the time of the autogolpe in 992.
1

'

1

One major change

precipitated

by Fujimori

s

actions

democracy assistance money away from Peruvian

was

the redirection of LIS

state institutions

and

to civil society

organizations. These funds, directed to Peruvian partner organizations by U.S.

12

For examples of international reports on the Peruvian human rights situation from

TAN described

its

Amnesty International Caught Between
Two Fires 1989 and Human Rights During the Government ofAlberto Fujimori 1992:
Americas Watch Peru Under Fire 1992 and Americas Watch/Human Rights Watch
annual reports on human rights developments in Peru from 1992. 1994. 1995. 1996.
1997, 1998. 1999. 2000: Washington Office on Latin America Human Rights
Determination for Peru 1991 and After the Autogolpe: Human Rights in Peru and the US
partners in the

in this chapter, see

Response 2004. See also discussion in Comision de
III. p. 307 and US State Department Reports.
1

la

Verdad Informe Final 2003 Tome

Legler and Cooper Intervention Without Intervening? 2006.
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p. 88.

nongovernmental organizations, helped support

a

number of groups with

oppositional stances toward the Fujimori government.
assisted from

By

its

2000

election.

Transparency was recognized

domestic electoral monitoring body, and

by

first

in the

round victory.

in

preventing sinister
to ensure a

an even larger informal transnational

was

built in

Peru

in

2000. encompassing

the Peace Council, opposition

and international observer groups. Cooper and Legler characterize

cooperation as a triumph of networked multilateralism.

network

that de\

it

was

clear that the

same could be

this

I:>

said of the transnational

human

rights

eloped around the Coordinadorct. Coletta Youngers argues that the

successes of the Coordinadora which she labels
.

network of human

rights organizations in Latin

features that distinguish

countries. Perhaps

movement was

to field nine

Perhaps most importantly, the Transparencia-ND I

members of the Office of the Peruvian Ombudsman,

2000.

Institute.

most trustworthy

Transparency was able

2000 elections and was pivotal

coalition of electoral observation organizations

By

Transparencies

quick counts of the voting were considered

connection served as the nexus around which

14

as the

government from manipulating the vote count

forces within the Peruvian

decisive Fujimori

its

international observer groups.

all

thousand volunteer observers

parties,

Among them was

founding with funds and support from the National Democratic

the time of the

authoritative

14

clearly

it

from

civil society

most important

its ability

to unite

the

most successful country-based

America

.

can be attributed

organizations and

for the success of the

movements

Perm ian human

to several

in other

rights

under one banner, which greatly enhanced the

Legler and Cooper Intervention Without Intervening? 2006.

p.

92.

Society Aid in Peru

2000.

^ Legler and Cooper

Intervention Without Intervening? 2006. p. 95.
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Basombrio

Civil

effectiveness of the

local, national

movement and allowed

and international

been able to achieve.

Indeed,

enlisting the international

way

level in a

much of its

community

Coordinadora

the

that

to

link

its

work

at the

few country-based organizations have

success must be attributed to

in its struggles

and

its

strategy of

directly lobbying international

organizations and foreign states.

The Coordinadora repeatedly turned
United Nations, powerful governments

to the

like that

organizations in other countries for help in
contact with the Coordinadora through her

its

Organization of American States, the

of the United States, and

struggle.

work

at the

human

Youngers herself had extensive
Washington Office on Latin

America (WOLA). which collaborated closely with Perm

ian

human

rights activists to

bring the attention of U.S. legislators and presidents to the Peruvian situation.

also played a key role in facilitating the

US

government.

linkage

In particular, the

Coordinadora

accelerated greatly after the 1992 autogolpe.

Fujimori

s

s

US

when

WOLA

direct lobbying efforts with the

lobbying strategy aimed

of the question of human rights with

rights

at the

LIS focused on

drug policy in the Andes. This process
the attention of the

US

sharpened on

antidemocratic behavior. The Clinton administration went so far as to

postpone International Monetary Fund meetings to approve loans to Peru
Peruvian government agreed to

initiate a

Coordinadora and other Perm ian human

Commission

for Dialogue with the

rights groups.

164

until the

However, w hen the

Coordinadora found the Fujimori government was not taking
in

La Cantuta

reaction to the cover-up of the

Commission
The

for Dialogue.

1

role of international organizations in the

administration

Congress

was

large.

Coordinadora pulled out of the

"

Coordinadora and other human

US

killings, the

rights advocates

human

rights battles the

waged during

the Fujimori

Americas Watch repeatedly and successfully prevailed upon the

to block anti-narcotics

funding

to

Peru due to

human

though the effect within Peru was to make superficial changes
meeting the demands of the

US

in

rights concerns,

order to appear to be

Congress. In 1999. Fujimori rejected the

American Court of Human Rights jurisdiction over Peru. Several highly
Peruvian cases were before the court

of cases from Peru of

human

at

the time, and in

more

recent actions

American Court.

w as deluged by

Inter-

sensitive

the Court received

aimed

hundreds

at silencing the political

The Peruvian

opposition and the press and other complaints.

Peruvian government

all

OAS

committed by government agents during

rights violations

the worst years of the insurgency,

that the

and

this process seriously,

truth

commission w rites

an avalanche of cases before the Inter-

In June of 1999. the Court ruled that the sentencing of four Chileans by

a faceless military court to life in prison for treason should be ov erturned and that the

defendants ought to be granted a

new trial meeting

arguments by Fujimori and his congressional

16

the standards of due process. Despite

Peru would no longer recognize

allies that

Drzewieniecki Coordinadora Nacional de Der echos

Humanos

2000. For

WOLA

s

example WOLA After the
1994 and Youngers Peru Under
Scrutiny: Human Rights and US Drug Policy 1992. For the best overview of US-Peru
relations in the 1990s see McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru:
Cooperation at a Cost 2003. On the international component of the Coordinadora s
strategy see Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Objetivos del trabajo a nivel
internacional de la Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos 1993.
reports on the

human

rights situation in Peru, see for

Autogolpe: Hitman Rights in Peru and the

US Response
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the jurisdiction of the Inter- American Court, in

by ruling

that

Peru had no

legal

related to the country. Fujimori

his reputation

reputation

September of 1999 the Court responded

grounds for doing so and

s

that

would proceed with cases

opposition not only failed to block cases damaging to

from going before the Inter-American Court,

among

it

international organizations, the

EU

also severely

it

who

and the US.

importance of the Court as a key arena for Peruvian rights

battles,

damaged

his

recognized the

given the state of the

judiciary and the persistence of amnesty laws in Peru. In 2000. three particularly

important cases were before the Court, including those related to Baruch Ivcher

situation, the gutting

s

of the Constitutional Tribunal, and the involvement of Montesinos

and General Hermoza Rios of the 1992 La Cantuta disappearances. During the Paniagua
administration, as

Rights, before

we

shall see.

which 165 cases

Youngers also argues

Peru returned to the Inter- American Court of Human
related to Peru

that the

were pending.

Coordinadora drew strength from some of the

unique circumstances of the conflict with Sendero Luminoso.

and hypocrisy of the guerrilla movement (which claimed

Because human rights movements

in other Latin

critical

The egregious

human

rights

of Sendero as

American

states

brutality

poor Indians of

to fight for the

the countryside, while victimizing these very groups) led the

under the Coordinadora to embrace a position as

1

it

groups united

w as

of the

state.

tended to focus on

abuses by the state (which, typically, represented the bulk of abuses committed in those
states ), they

were more

easily targeted as

enemies of the

state

and could be more easily

depicted as rebel sympathizers to the public. Indeed, in order to minimize the credibility

1

For similar arguments, see Cano and Ninaquispe

demanda v

El papel de

la

sociedad civil en

la

promocion de justicia 2006: Diamint Estado y sociedad civil ante la
cuestion civico-militar 1999: Garcia Sayan "La tenaza de la democracia y los derechos
humanos" 2002.
la
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of government attacks against the human rights community as
terrorists, the

Coordinadora adopted the principle of refusing

accused of terrorism, though

many of their programs

league with the

in

legal assistance to those

ultimately focused on the unfairly

accused and imprisoned. Fujimori, his congressional supporters, and
the military did attempt to paint the

human

rights

movement and

Sendero sympathizers, but these groups continuing dedication
of Sendero

s

to

Coordinadora as

working with victims

violence and to documenting their abuses kept this slander from sticking.

Also, though

targeted as

the

many members of

much by

human

rights activists in Peru often risked their

the guerrillas as by the

armed

liv

forces, they did not

and were

es

have to operate in

quite as dangerous a set of circumstances as had their colleagues in El Salvador.

Guatemala, or Colombia. This allowed for much greater continuity

movement,

in the

as

well as the time to adapt and adjust a variety of strategies to combat the violence and

abuses their country suffered. In the

movement
for

to shift

late

1990s. this long-term learning allowed the

from a primarily denunciatory role

to

one of making specific proposals

reform and even shaping the eventual transition agenda.
Furthermore, the organization was on

another important ingredient in

many

Keck and Sikkink

s

occasions successful

at

recipe for a successful

achieving

TAN

campaign, creating a strong and direct link between grievances and those responsible for
them. In the 1990s. the Coordinadora led a lengthy campaign to address for the wrongful

imprisonment of many thousands of Peruvians convicted under Fujimori
laws. During this campaign, referred to as

In the

Name

of the Innocents,

Coordinadora emphasized building linkages with other groups

s

anti-terrorism

the

in civil society, including

church and university groups, and utilizing the media. Ultimately, public outcry over the
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painful stories of thousands of wrongfully imprisoned Peruvians led Fujimori to create an

Ad Hoc Review Commission, composed
Ombudsman and

of the Minister of Justice, the

a special representative to the president, to

Human

Rights

review convictions and

determine whether individuals names ought to be forwarded to the president for pardon.

When

the

Commission

for Fujimori s pardon.

s

mandate expired

He

the

Name

was

that the

Commission was forwarding

the

names of terrorists

too late to reverse the change in public attitudes that the

of the Innocents

convinced

on the pardoning of those convicted under his

his position

terrorism laws, claiming that the

it

had forwarded hundreds of names

it

did in fact grant 481 of these pardons.

Soon Fujimori reversed

pardon. But

in 1999.

for

campaign In

had already precipitated: large numbers of Peruvians were

Coordinadora was

right to argue that

been unfairly convicted and that Fujimori was wrong
organizations as guerrilla sympathizers. The

Human

many of their

to paint the

compatriots had

human

rights

Rights Commission of the Ministry

of Justice continued to review convictions, in seeming agreement with the

Coordinadora

s

claim that there were hundreds more innocent Peruvians in prison on

terrorism charges: they pardoned 32

more

prisoners.

The wave of pardons

also inspired

judges to review cases and ultimately absolve wrongly accused prisoners. Hence, in

some 1.087
1999.

Even

prisoners were absolved or pardoned between August 1996 and

the normally complacent Congress

was moved

to act: in

fall

of the Fujimori government,

December

1998 Congress

passed a law expunging the criminal records of those cleared of blame in
After the

all.

this process.

this trend continued; as discussed later in this

168

.

and the subsequent chapter, by 2003. hundreds more Peruvians were pardoned and freed
in the

process established during the Paniagua government and continued under Toledo.

By 2000.

the agenda of the

human

rights organizations

under the Coordinadora

had converged around two major themes: the aftermath of the conflict with Sendero and

new forms of authoritarianism on
category

fell

the 1995

the part of the Fujimori government. In the first

amnesty law and continuing impunity

committed by the armed forces

committed abuses of human
lengthy sentences). Also,
the military under state

(as

rights

most of the major players

for

in

human

rights abuses

Sendero Luminoso

had long since been arrested and imprisoned for

much of the country continued

of emergency

status, despite the

to be

governed more or

as well

problem of internally displaced peoples, occupied much of the Coordinadora

attention. Furthermore, the

legislation under

Coordinadora maintained

which military courts

tried cases

its

by

less

absence of serious conflict.

Overcrowding and wretched prison conditions and continuing reports of torture,
as the

who

s

challenges to the anti-terrorism

of alleged treason and special civilian

courts heard terrorism cases.

In 2000 the Coordinadora focused

reelection campaign. In the run-up to the

closely with other groups in civ

il

its

activities

2000

on Fujimori

elections, the

society to protest Fujimori

s

unconstitutional

Coordinadora worked
s

re-election bid. publicize

cases of intimidation of opposition politicians, and struggle against manipulation of

electoral monitoring agencies. In

1

See Comision de

la

Youngers words, the Coordinadora [was] playing an

Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome

III:

Youngers

Violencia Politico y Sociedad Civil en el Pent 2003. p. 344: Secretaria Tecnica de

la

Comision Ad Hoc La labor de la Comision Ad Hoc 2000: and especially De la Jara
Basombrio Memoriay Bat alias en Nombre de los Inocentes: Pent 1992-2001 2001
Fujimori and the Minister of Justice ended the pardons commission early (Expreso April
3.

2000).
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important role

in revealing the

fraudulent nature of the electoral process in Peru and in

advocating changes that would allow for a more level playing
targeted by the Coordinadorci

were judicial

and the lack of freedom of the press.
Coordinadorci was well placed, from

counter-reform

When
its

the regime

De

community, through the Coordinadorci

decisively intervene to prevent a

establish a consensus

among

s

new amnesty

la

Jara

Mesa de

Dialogo. to

Basombrio argues

participation in the mesa,

for

members of the

the participants in favor of

the issues

growing power of SIN,

the

human

that the

was

human

able to

military and to

rights accountability and

democratic re-institutionalization along the lines of the movement
agenda.

Among

collapse came, the

position within the

influence crucial questions of the transition.

rights

s

,

field.

s

long-cherished

14

As Drzewieniecki wrote

in

2000. despite the movement

innocent prisoners campaign, educating the public about

government

to adopt

human

influencing

some human

on issues

which

in

rights rhetoric to

improve

rights legislation, the

human

s

great successes in the

rights, forcing the

in its public image,

Coordinadora had been

and

less successful

the Fujimori regime or the Peruvian military [had] strong interest such

Events were about to

as democratic institutionality and impunity.

alter this situation in

dramatic fashion.

14

De

la

Jara

Basombrio Ensayos sobre justicia y derechos humcmos 2003.

''’Drzewieniecki Coordinadorci Nacional de Derechos
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Humcmos 2000.

p. 122-3.

p. 1.

As we

shall see. the

Perm ian human

rights

community reached

the apex of

its

influence over the state during the transitional administration of President Paniagua, in

the

immediate wake of Fujimori

human

rights

During

self-destruction.

s political

movement of the country would

new

utilize a

response to the delicate questions of transitional justice

this period, the

vehicle to shape the state

now

suddenly before

and enjoy

it.

unprecedented success with some strategies they had long pursued. In particular,

examine the

role

we

embrace a ground-breaking ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

human

will

of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission established by

Paniagua and the controversial decisions by the administration and Supreme Court

cases, the

s

rights
.

movement within Peru and

.

its

international partners in the

.

would play the decisive

role

a

.

the state s

in

.

management of transitional

7

.

to

In both

TAN

1

justice.'

The Paniagua Transitional Administration
In the

w ake of the

Fujimori regime collapse. Valentin Paniagua, voted into the

position of president of the Congress less than a

President.

To Paniagua and

mere interruptions

in the

Commission would soon
Paniagua

s

to the

w eek

"

la

to Interim

democratic governance of the country; as the Truth

write.

In 2000. Peru

began a new transition

to

22

democracy.

inaugural address of November 23. 2000 spoke of the need for

took office, the OAS-led

De

w as promoted

Peruvian public, the events of recent months were not

reconstruction and democratic re-institutionalization.

''

before,

Jara

Mesa de Dialogo had

Indeed, even before Paniagua

already dismantled

some of the

Basombrio Ensayos sobre justicia y derechos humanos 2003.

Contision de

la

Verdad v Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome
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I.

p. 37.

ch. 2

and

4.

)

institutional infrastructure

which had answered
judicial

whole.

of Fujimori

s

power, such as the special judicial committees

directly to the executive and constituted a grave interference with

autonomy, and issued new guidelines for the reform of the judicial system as a

2 '1

As

I

explore below, this process involved two types of efforts. The

steps taken in the

name of democratic

reinsertion

into the international

democracies and the reintroduction of international mechanisms
domestic and international law
efforts to

in Peru.

The second

set

first

includes

communin' of

to enforce the rule

of

of initiatives involved domestic

reform the institutions damaged by association with the Fujimori Montesinos

web of corruption, and

to establish

new

domestic tools intended

to

determine the legal

and moral responsibility for abuses of state power and violations of the rights of the
Peruvian citizenship. Both sets of initiatives would have profound impacts on
military relations, but

to the Interamerican

none would have as great an impact

Court of

Reconciliation Commission.

Human

As we

in this

civil-

area as did Peru

s

return

Rights and the creation of the Peruvian Truth and

of Paniagua

shall see. the transitional administration

provides compelling evidence that the

human

rights

TAN

explored above was able to

gain considerable control over questions of human rights accountability during Peru

s

transition.

2

"

On

Paniagua

s

ascension to president of Congress and then to interim president, see

all

major daily newspapers Nov 17 and 23, 2000. On Fujimori s resignation, see Perm ian
newspaper coverage for Nov 20. For useful overviews of the legal and political situation
of the country during this period, see Ames, Bernales et al Situation de la Democracia en
el Pent (2000-2001 2001 and Comision Andina de Juristas Las Tareas de la Transition
Democratica 2001. especially the chapters Lopez Jimenez Peru 2000-2001 La
:

transicion democratica y el gobierno de transicion 2004. On the
see Dargent Reforma Judicial en el Peru (1990-2005) 2006.
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Mesa

s

judicial reforms,

I.

Many members

of the

Democratic Reinsertion

human

community suddenly found themselves

rights

in

positions of power in the Paniagua administration. Having spent years in the trenches

fighting Fujimori

the accomplices

assault on

s

democracy and accountability, these individuals pursued

of Montesinos and Fujimori throughout the Peruvian power

Moreover, they immediately sought
regime

that

to institutionalize the great lesson

successfully promoting the InterAmerican Democratic Charter in the

To

the Peruvian leadership

adequately to Fujimori

engagement with

s

it

was

destruction of

democracy

knew,

In part, they

itself in the affairs

of its sovereign member

usually read to

coup of 1992 had been close

OAS member states

mean

to the

that a

OAS

new

OAS.'

had failed

to

-

by

4

respond

country throughout

its

Peru Then and

Now

assaults on

states

only

coup d

etat

democracy with Stein

OAS

s tradition

s

OAS

of involving

when democracy had been
had occurred. Though the

self-

understanding of interruption of democracy.
satisfied

by Fujimori

s

promise

to hold

new

constitution, etc. His orchestration of these events

allowed him to consolidate his pow er to a
autogolpe. but. dissuaded by Fujimori

s

this reflected the

were nevertheless easily

elections, oversee the writing of a

Legler

in the

democracy

the country in 1992 and 1995. and had only finally taken steps in the

mission of 2000.

"4

OAS

clear that the

direction of pushing back against the regime

interrupted

of the Fujimori

not necessary to overthrow a government to undermine

it is

structure.

s

much

greater degree than possible before the

overwhelming popularity

2003. The text of the

1ADC

is

at

home, the

OAS

available at

www.upd.oas.org
2'

For

OAS

critical

in Peru:

States

assessments of OAS activities

Room

for

in Peru through 2000. see McClintock The
Improvement 2001 and McClintock and Valias The United

and Peru 2004.
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failed to press for democratic reforms

Then,

in

1995, the

OAS

electoral observation mission failed to

irregularities in the electoral process

As Fujimori continued
under

his

very

own

months

to issue its report until

whenever they seemed

pursuit of a third term in office, the

to get

and

OAS

stood idly by.

away with

prerogatives.

its

acknowledge serious

to destroy the various institutions

constitution

Having managed

traditionally considered outside

after the election.

constructed

to stand in the

As Legler

way of his

suggests:

a self-coup, rewriting the Constitution, and

manipulating elections. Fujimori and Montesinos undoubtedly calculated that
their next equally daring

move,

term of office,

to run for an unconstitutional third

could successfully weather any opposition from the Inter-American system. In
fact, international resistance to

human

international

counterparts,

measures

to

descended

Fujimori

the

reelection efforts, apart

was minimal

.Thus,

when

the

OAS

finally

began

from a group of

Perm ian
to

adopt

defend democracy in Peru in 2000. the country had long since
h

into de facto authoritarian rule.'

In 2000. electoral observation missions

Union and

s

rights organizations in solidarity with their

OAS

from the NDI, the Carter Center, the European

deserved credit for decrying the electoral irregularities perpetrated by

the state and refusing to grant the election

stamp of approval.

its

NGO partner.

the international missions and their domestic

When the demands

of

Transpctrencia. for immediate

changes to the electoral system went unheeded, they did not hesitate to terminate their
monitoring missions and to declare that the elections

fell far short

of international

standards of freedom and fairness. Both internationally and domestically, this

blow

to the quickly

weakening legitimacy of the Fujimori government, one

contributed to a growing sentiment

taken.

26

2

among

all

was

that certainly

observers that genuine action needed to be

2

Ibid.

OAS

activity related to Peru through

2000

a sharp

is

174

described

in the

previous chapter.

Yet the international community

s

uncertainty over whether competitive

authoritarianism or delegative democracy, increasingly

common phenomena

Americas, warranted intervention only encouraged Fujimori to further
dismantling democracy from within, while keeping

provided by elections. The

OAS

many members of Peruvian
pushed for

OAS

reaction to the

civil society, for

in

in the

his project

place the facade of legitimacy

2000 elections was

a disappointment to

though some, notably the United

collective action under Resolution

1

of

States.

080. few other countries were

willing to stretch the provisions of the resolution to cover a non-coup scenario. Instead.

Canadian and Mexican diplomats brokered a compromise. Resolution 1753. sending the

Axworthy-Gaviria

OAS

High-Level Mission

to Peru.

considered the mission and the mesa de dialogo
country

s

it

Though Peruvians themselves

established a

weak response

to the

problems, particularly after the massive demonstrations against the regime

electoral fraud resulted in an outbreak

a Trojan horse

mission as

of violence and chaos. Legler describes

w hich was

able to

s

this

insen itself directly into a number of

highly sensitive areas within Peruvian jurisdiction

via the

mesa de

dialogo.

government disintegrated in the autumn of 2000. [the mesa ]
became increasingly prominent as a parallel congress with de facto political
decision-making power and undoubtedly helped prevent a slide tow ard further
state repression, a military coup, or even civil war. Peruvian elites, thanks to the
po
mesa, reached agreement on 16 of the 29 items on its agenda."

As

the Fujimori

.

Circumstances allowed the
transition that far

participants.

OAS

mission to assume an importance in the Peruvian

exceeded the expectations of the

Once they reached

civil society

and

positions of pow er under Paniagua

political opposition

(who himself had

served as one of the eight opposition politician participants in the mesa), key

28

Legler

Peru Then and

Now

2003.
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members of

that

mesa sought

lessons they derived from the

As De

Basomhrio

la Jara

opposed

mechanisms within

to institutionalize stronger

OAS

specifically cites a sense

system

among

limitations, the Inter-American

the

to

one

human

OAS: Diego

Cuellar. Foreign Minister.

human

the

on the

s

now

Human

for

return to

that,

whatever

He

their

OAS

Rights and the

democracy:

paid in

a state

this created a debt to

full.'"

Democratic Charter was the brainchild of three main Peruvian

Inter American

Manuel Rodriguez. Peruvian Permanent

fathers in the Paniagua administration:

shining

was converted from

community

Commission and Court

the Inter-American system Peruvian diplomats

Representative to the

that built

that fought to fortify that system.

rights

missions had contributed powerfully to Peru

The

OAS

role in the events of Peru over the previous decade.

writes, practically overnight Peru

to the Inter-American

the

It

Garcia-Savan. Minister of Justice: and Javier Perez de

would be

difficult to find another diplomatic

rights credentials. Recall that de Cuellar

UN: Garcia-Sayan would become

a

judge on the

team with such

a former Secretary General of

is

Court of Human

Inter- American

Rights during the Toledo administration. Their goals were to systematize the various
principles, norms, and procedures available to the

OAS

of guidelines for responses to threats to democracy

2"

into

one clear and consistent

in the region,

and

For Peruvian press coverage of the OAS-led mesa, see El Peruana

2000. Jan

Nov
Aug

18.

2001 Expreso
:

Aug

2.

Nov

23. 27. 2000. Jan

23. 27. 2000. Jan 18. 2001: Liberacion
2.

Nov

Marcho de

27. 2000. Jan

los

1

8.

2001

Cuatros Suyos. see

as well as Liberacion

Aug

3.

:

Aug

2.

Nov

La Republica Aug

all

1

8.

to

broaden the

Aug

2.

Nov

set

OAS

23.

2001: El Comercio

Aug

2

23. 2000. Jan 18. 2001: Gestion

2.

2000. Jan

1

8.

On
Aug 1.

2001

.

the

2000.
major daily newspapers July 28. 31.
s supporters blamed the outbreak of

2000. While Fujimori

violence on Toledo, participants in the protests argued violence and a fire had been
started

"

De

by the armed forces and police

la

Jara

chapter 2

in

order to create chaos and discredit the protest.

Basombrio Ensayos sobre justiciay derechos humanos 2003: see especially

Lecciones politicas desde

el

Peru frente

Proteccion de Derechos Humanos.
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al

Sistema Interamericano de

?

treatment of such threats from covering only

democracy. Furthermore, they sought

democracy and human

to establish a

within the inter-American system, actions such as Fujimori
Constitutional Tribunal or his attacks on Peru

to

s

over

human

now

rights accountability;

pass judgment on a regime

s

respect for

human

destruction of the

IACHR

had been one of

in fighting the

Fujimori machine

they sought to vastly expand

human

rights

right

body could have been subjected

s electoral

venues where Peruvians enjoyed the greatest success

in battles

to

as a fundamental

review by the Inter- American Court of Human Rights. The

the

of

alterations

fundamental connection between

Were democracy recognized

rights.

to include

interruptions

its

capacity

by redefining those rights

to

include rights to democracy. Such a linkage might also open up a greater role in this area
'

for the

United Nations human rights system.

A

draft

1

of the InterAmerican Democratic Charter sped

Peruvian Congress and various stages of the

OAS

its

way through

system. Like Argentina, which

successfully promoted the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias in 1985. and Chile,

played a key role in passing Resolution 1080. Peru

InterAmerican Democratic Charter served to
reinsertion

into the international

Peruvians failed to

make

it

s

facilitate the

country

small failure, the

jl

See Legler

Intervening

IADC

rights

Now

would have made

Human

special

Rights primary

all

this

other elements of the Peruvian

2003; Legler and Cooper Intervention Without

2006; and comments by Peru

El Peruano June 17, 2001. All

democratic

and democratic crises in the region. Despite

successfully institutionalized

Peru Then and

s

community. Only one provision pushed by the

to the final version. Article 13

human

which

successful promotion of the

missions by and reports of the Inter- American Commission on
tools in the monitoring of

the

s

Ambassador

IACHR jurisprudence

http://www.corteidh.or.cr/paises_ing/peru.html
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to the

OAS.

Jose Rodriguez

related to Peru can be found at

in

proposal, including a clear linkage of poverty and inequality to threats to democracy,

making

civic education a priority for the consolidation

Given the extraordinary

mechanisms

international

of democratic

civil societies, etc/'

of commitment from the Paniagua administration

level

for the protection of

democracy,

it

is

to

obvious that members of

the administration themselves considered these bodies as instrumental to responding to

the types of crises Peru itself had survived in recent years.

very weaknesses of the

IADC

indicate the inability of bodies such as the

intervene in those post-crisis areas

civil-military relations.

most

in the

wake of Fujimori

originally set for the

OAS

s

OAS

crucial to democratic consolidation,

Whatever the successes of the

challenging Fujimori, the fact that the

up shop

At the same time, however, the

mesa and

OAS

OAS

missions of 2000

to

among them
in

mission to Peru immediately closed

resignation, long before the two-year horizon

mission had passed, indicates that the problems the country

faced once the electoral crisis passed were well beyond the bailiwick of regional
organizations and ad hoc dialogue groups.

desire for the

OAS-led mesa

to

continue

responsibility for reforming the state

writes.

Though most Peruvians polled expressed

its

a

work, members of Congress argued that the

now rightfully

belong to the

While the [InterAmerican Democratic Charter]

legislature.""

As Legler

identifies strengthening [of

El Peruana, El Comercio and Expreso (April 22. 23. 2001) covered the approval of the

IADC

and the strong role of Paniagua

system. The

full text

of the

IADC

is

s

cabinet in pushing

it

through the inter- American

available online at

http://\vww. oas.org/charter/docs/resolution l_en_p4.htm

Macher agreed with this opinion. See El Peruano Nov 23. 2000:
Expreso Nov 23. 27. 2000: El Comercio Nov 23. 27. 2000: Liberacion Nov 23. 2000;
Gestion Nov 27. 2000. On the mesa s dismantlement, see all major Peruvian daily""

Surprisingly. Sofia

newspapers on Jan

17. 18.

2001

.

On

the

OAS.

newspapers April

9. 10.

Carter Center and

NDI

Peruano March 2. June 3. 2001: all major
2001: and El Comercio June 3. 2001.

the 2001 elections, see El

178

missions to observe

daily Peruvian

democracy] as

a function

of the

OAS.

it

is

in the post-crisis

phase of rebuilding

democratic institutions, pursuing national reconciliation, and consigning troops
barracks

that

we

see

severe limitations on

by-invitation-onlv

among

OAS

to their

The

the Organization s biggest remaining challenges.

activities,

including resource constraints and a tradition of

activity within countries, render

it

poorly suited to tackle the most

pressing issues facing states in the immediate post-crisis and transitional phases.

However, even
in

Peru

s

as the

IADC was

relationship with the

immediate impact on Peru

OAS

winding

its

way through

were taking place

s transitional

that

justice questions.

the

OAS.

would have

a

other changes

much more

Even before Paniagua

s

inaugural speech. Congress took a major step toward democratic reinsertion via the

On November

system.

12. the

Congressional Commission on

Human

Rights and the

Subcommission of the Dialogue Mesa on Democratization introduced
return Peru to

that

IACHR jurisdiction

OAS

without any reservations. Five days

a

measure

later, the

to

same day

Paniagua assumed the presidency of Congress, several Congressional committees

moved

to restore

Peru to the jurisdiction of the Inter American Court of Human Rights.

These committees simultaneously moved

made

relevant to Peru.

The

first

to enforce several decisions the

of these returned to their posts the Constitutional

Tribunal judges removed in 1997 for challenging Fujimori

election.

IACHR

By

reinstating the judges.

Congress restored the

decisions led to the restoration of

1992 autogolpe.

IACHR had

s

TC

right to

run for a third

to functioning order. Later

Supreme Court justices removed during

the

A second IACHR decision accepted by Congress related to the Baruch

Ivcher case. The timing of the

by the office of the

Human

IACHR decision by

Rights

Ombudsman
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Congress coincided with the release

(Defenson'a del Pueblo) of its report on

the disappeared,

which

called for an end to military impunity. After

two months of

debate, and after Prime Minister Javier Perez de Cuellar signaled the Paniagua

administration

s

intention to

of its jurisdiction, the
2001.

full

comply with

Congress voted

IACHR

all

decisions upon the reestablishment

Peru to the

to return

to return to the

IACHR was

approval from domestic and international

12.

human

urged by and then met with glowing
rights groups,

Latin America, and the press. Francisco Soberon. director of

from the International Federation

for

newspapers as pushing for return

to

IACHR

decisions.

They argued

impunity which reigned

RepubUca assured

"

on January

34

The decision

all

IACHR

its

Human

APRODEH.

Rights were quoted

IACHR jurisdiction

in

and for the

that a return to the court

after other

ambassadors throughout

and a mission

major daily
state to

comply with

would help Peru avoid the

Southern Cone states returned to democracy. La

readers that prosecution of

human

rights cases before the

IACHR

4

The Prime Minister remained purposely ambiguous about whether the president or the
were the mechanism that would implement the IACHR s decisions, but clearly the
principle of accepting its jurisdiction was embraced first by the president and only later,
and partially, by the courts (see El Pentcmo Jan 12. 2001 ). On the Defensoria s report,
see El Comercio Nov 20. 2000. This report, based on denunciations filed by human rights
groups and families of the disappeared, held the Army responsible for 60% of the
disappearances: see Defensoria del Pueblo La desapctricion forzada de personas en el
Peru (1980 a 1996) 2000. On the Congressional and Executive steps to return Peru to
IACHR jurisdiction, see El Comercio Nov 12. Dec 1. 2000. Feb 1. 2001: El Peruano Nov
12. Dec 12. 2000. Feb 1, 5. 2001 La RepubUca Nov 29. 2000. Feb 1. 2001 Expreso Dec
12. 2000. Jan 20. 2001: Gestion Dec 26. 2000. Jan 20. 2001: and all major daily
newspapers on Jan 12. 2001 All coverage in the major daily newspapers was highly
courts

:

:

.

supportive of the return to the

government

to enact the

IACHR and

measure with

pushed Congress and the Paniagua

haste, with exceptions in Expreso.

congressional committees included those on

Human

reinstatement of TC judges also

payment of reparations

required by the

IACHR

came with

IACHR decision.

a

This seemed to indicate the state

precedents for the granting of reparations.

More on

next chapter. El Peruano and Gestion April 27. 2001.

Court judges, see El Comercio

May

17.

2001.
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Key

Rights and on Justice. The

On

s

to the judges, as

willingness to follow

reparations

is

discussed in the

the reinstatement of

Supreme

"

is

not an act of vengeance.

of the violence

who

.

an act of justice on behalf of the relatives of the victims

It is

deserve to

know

the truth, as only then can

calm be restored and

forgiveness be granted. Each of these sources cited a return to the

among

several the state

the creation of a truth

must take

to re-establish the rule

commission and signing

of law

IACHR

as one step

in Peru, others

including

the statute creating the International

Criminal Court.

Once
hailed

it

the

move was approved. TC judges, human

as correcting

decision went a long

credentials in the

Congress

one of the worst mistakes of the previous regime. " That the

way toward

reestablishing Peru

s

democratic and human rights

Americas was reaffirmed by glowing praise from Cesar Gaviria,

Secretary General of the

(Peter

rights groups, and

OAS. He. along

Boehm) and Panama (Juan

with Ambassadors to the

OAS

from Canada

Castulovich). added that the decision would strengthen

and reinforce the interamerican system. Chancellor of Costa Rica Roberto Rojas told
Peruvian media that the country

s

return to the

IACHR had

brought great satisfaction to

the governments of the region.

Peru

s

return to the jurisdiction of the

on Peru. The judicial system of Peru was
confidence behind

it.

The courts were

basis of political loyalty, but

even

IACHR

in a state

filled

had a major and immediate impact

of crisis, with virtually no public

with Fujimori appointees promoted on the

in politically' neutral cases, the courts

slow, corrupt and thoroughly loathed by the public.

were

Manx members of the

inefficient,

courts.

" See La Republica Nov 29. Dec 5. 2000 and Jan 13. 2001; Expreso Dec 5. 2000;
Gestion Dec 5. 2000; El Comercio Jan 5. 2001 and El Peraano Feb
2001 On Feb
2001. El Peruano specifically stated that the return to the IACHR was significant in
signaling Peru s reintegration into the democratic community of the hemisphere.
1

~

6

El Comercio. Gestion. Expreso Feb

1

.

1

;

2001

;
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El Peruano

March

.

24, 2001

.

8.

,

including

members of the

highest courts in the country, were also implicated in the

Lima

arious plots orchestrated by Montesinos. such as protecting narcotraffickers.

superior Court President Sergio Salas estimated that

60%

of the country

s

judges and

vocales had gained their positions through irregular means. Nine of the sixteen Supreme

Court justices were accused of having direct

the court

Montesinos: four were shown

taking orders directly from him. yet no action

of the vladivideos

them by

ties to

itself.

By February

3.

2001.

at least

was taken

in

one

against

58 members of the judicial system

and 154 of the Public Ministry were being investigated as part of the criminal case
against Montesinos. Others were simply without sufficient training to

No

argument enjoyed more consensus support than

fulfill their duties.

that the judiciary required a

complete

overhaul, a reform process that would take years.

Meanwhile, the

of numerous temporary or special courts developed over

status

the previous decade and crucial to Fujimori and Montesinos manipulation of the

judiciary,

remained ambiguous. As with other

replacements for those discredited after the
often

it

institutions

fall

of the

state,

finding suitable

of Fujimori presented a serious challenge:

took two or three appointments to key positions before a candidate considered

untainted by association with the regime could be found.

More than

tw o hundred judges

dismissed by Fujimori during the 1992 autogolpe would now be reviewed and. in

mam

1

cases, reinstated/

Rather than leave highly sensitive cases to these collapsing courts, the

For a sense of the

World Bank

s

crisis in the

judiciary during the transition government, see the

report to that effect

derechos humanos 2003. ch.

1

and

FIND THIS: De
3;

Dargent

la Jara Ensayos sobre justicia v
La Reforma Judicial en el Peru (1990-

2005) 2006: Hammergren La experiencia peruana en reform judicial 2004: Justicia
Viva La reforma del sistema de justicia: ?que reforma? 2004: Gestion Jan 2. 7. 25. 3
Feb 1. 3, 2001: El Comercio Jan 5. 8. 17. 25. 29^ 31. Feb 1. 3. 14. 2001: La Republica Jan
7. 8, 12. 25. 29. Feb 1. 3. May 2, 2001 Liberation Jan 9, 12. 25. Feb 1. 3. 2001: El
1

;
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1

IACHR seemed

a credible, trustworthy alternate authority to handle the trickiest of

questions of transitional justice. In essence. Paniagua opted to adopt

and authority en masse
Peruvian courts

When

of legitimacy that characterized the

to substitute for the lack

at this time.

Fujimori and his

allies in

Congress removed Peru from the Court

jurisdiction in 1999. they had sought to avoid a series of decisions

human

rights;

now.

would shake Peru

s legal

system

the state in violation of

IACHR

that

decision,

many judges removed from

other courts in the

Fujimori

IACHR

s

IACHR jurisdiction

a deluge of

new

decisions

to the core. In the

came

against

out of the

s

Supreme Court and

or as a result of their opposition to
,s

reelection plan were restored to their former posts.

ruling had found that four Chileans, alleged

But when news that an

members of the

group, convicted of terrorism years before under Fujimori

trial,

IACHR

wake of Congress

the Constitutional Tribunal, the

wake of the 1992 autolgolpe

should be granted a new. civilian

by the

s

the previously

s

MRTA guerrilla

anti-terrorism legislation

muted opposition began

to

speak

Pentano Jan 17. 25. Feb 1. 3. 2001: Expreso Jan 2. 7. 25. 31. Feb 1. 3. 2001. As usual.
Expreso was more critical of the situation under Paniagua and Toledo than it had been
under Fujimori: if the judiciary was bankrupt, the fault belonged in large part to
Fujimori s successors, the paper suggested. See also Clifford Krauss Tapes Spy Chief
Left Behind Scandalize Peru New York Times February 3. 2001 This issue is treated in
greater detail in the next chapter. Salas statement was quoted in Expreso Jan 7. 2001: on
.

review of judges dismissed
the
->

government

in the

for dismissing

autogolpe see Expreso Jan
,

any judge w ith a connection

1

1.

2001. which criticized

to Montesinos.

o

On

return of the judges to the

TC

2001 Liberacion and Gestion Feb
:

and Supreme Court, see La Republica Jan 10.
2001 The IACHR ruled in favor of the three

9.

.

judges removed in 1997 for opposing Fujimori

s

reelection in

Feb 2001. The

12.

TC

IACHR

and material compensation for the injustices
perpetrated against them by the Fujimori government. It later became a point of debate
w hether the IACHR or the Peruvian courts should set the amount of reparations victims
found

all

of state

which

reinstituted judges deserved moral

human

rights abuses

APRODEH

w ould

receive. See. for example. Liberacion June 18. in

lawyers and the Peruvian courts dispute the matter.

183

up.

Had Peru committed

which might now force

itself to a court

cases of convicted terrorists? Did the return to the

away

sovereignty?

its

payment of S600 million
violations,

would

that

in restitution

terrorists

IACHR

Mario Urrello.

IACHR
not to

CSJM

and

trial.

This

in turn

other courts,

comply with any

was

IACHR

Peru must give

receive

new

civilian

victims of human rights

state to

now

be entitled to reparations?'

9

while they certainly would not be paying
the

IACHR

decision to

provoked the President of the Supreme Court.
of the Supreme Court, autonomous from the

the only institution

empowered

decision relevant to the

Perm ian

IACHR decision. 4 " Members

4

For example. Luiz Salgado. a congress
s

thousands of

to determine

courts.

whether or

On May

1

5.

the

declared the conviction of the four Chileans null and forwarded the case to civilian

courts in accordance with the

Peru

that

now

would indeed comply with

to state that the Sala Penal

all

that,

to retry

decisions had already called for the

convicted under the old laws

to the Chileans, they

grant them a civilian

terrorists

from the Peruvian

Administration officials announced

any reparations

IACHR mean

Would thousands of convicted

and possibly go free? Given

trials

it

return to

IACHR jurisdiction

of the administration and

member of the C90-NM

coalition,

warned

that

should carry a request that the court to exercise

Expreso Jan 14. 2001 );
Alva
was
Congresswoman Beatriz
says the decision
important, but that it would have
been better to stipulate that no terrorism cases would be subject to revision (El Penicmo
Feb 1. 2001). Even those who supported the decision to give the Chileans a new trial

precaution in

its

insisted that the

findings in cases related to terrorism

trial

be

severe

(

with the accused and that thousands of retrials presented

a genuine political problem for the state. (See Lourdes Flores
2.

2001 of those of Miguel Jugo. subdirector of Aprodeh

in

comments

in

Gestion Feb

Liberation April 28. 2001

.)

was bound by the IACHR decision, see
Expreso Feb 2. May 9. 12. 16. 2001; Gestion Feb 2. May 5. 9. 2001; El Penicmo Feb 2.
May 12. 16. 2001: La Republica April 5. May 4. 12. 16. 2001: El Comercio April 5. May

On the

case of the Chileans, and whether Peru

16.2001.
411

Gestion March 30. 2001; El Per nano Feb 1. 2. May 16. 2001: Liberation Jan 31, 2001:
Expreso March 30. Feb 2. May 16. 2001: El Comercio and La Republica March 30. May
Chile hails Peruvian decision to order retrial in major human rights case
6. 2001
1

;
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judiciary continued to strike a cautious pose, even as they praised the decision to abide by

IACHR

The

decision.

not necessarily imply

would now be
Alban

stated,

told the press the

all

IACHR

Claims

a ploy to confuse the public

on the other hand, called the
argued, would

now

IACHR

to the contrary.

Ombudsman Walter

and promote fear and insecurity. Expreso

decision a victory for Abimael

Guzman who.

,

they

be treated as a prisoner of conscience rather than a genocidal maniac.

Garcia-Sayan explicitly rejected the possibility of new
other

MRTA case did

those convicted under the anti -terrorism laws in military courts

entitled to civilian retrial.

were

decisions on the Chilean

members of Sendero Luminoso convicted

trials for

Abimael Guzman and

a decade earlier under the anti -terrorism

41

laws.

Minister of Justice Diego Garcia Sayan, under continuing pressure from

rights organizations, especially

APRODEH.

human

IDL. Amnesty International and the

Coordinadora, began anew the process of reviewing convictions under the

anti -terrorism

laws, and releasing and granting pardons to those found innocent. Families of prisoners

and

human

rights organizations staged large protests,

demanding more rapid response

to

the situation of innocent prisoners convicted as terrorists. Finally, the Justice Minister

oversaw the establishment of a new pardons commission, including as members Javier
Ciurlizza (Peru

s

representative before the

IACHR. now

the president of the

new

Comision de InduUos Derecho de Gracia y Conmutacion de Penas), Hubert Fannsiers
.

(a

Madrid EFE in Spanish May 15. 2001 (FBIS translated excerpt available through World
News Connection database). On the C'SJM decision, see La Republica. El Pernano and
Gesrion
41

May

15.

2001.

£7 Pernano April

and Expreso April

3.

3.

May

17. 21,

2001;

La Republica

April

2001

).

May

16.

2001: Gestion

2001 Marcos Ibazeta. president of the Sala Nacional Corporativa
.

para casos de Terrorismo. warned 3000 subversives would
3.

3.

This would become a major issue in 2003.

now

be

set free

(

Gesrion

May

.

respected priest), Wilfredo Pedrazo (assistant

de

la

Jara (head of the

Human

NGO Institute) de Defense

plans to review 250 cases forwarded to
prisoners over the next two months.

i

Rights

Legal).

Ombudsman), and Ernesto

The commission announced

by human rights groups and families of

it

The Ministry of Justice relaxed prison

visitation rules

and began drafting proposals for the reform of the anti-terrorism legislation. Ultimately,
granted pardons to some 163 prisoners.

Tuminoso

in prisons

4

"

Nevertheless,

throughout Peru staged hunger strikes and called upon President

Paniagua and Congress for a general amnesty

made

clear

promote national

to

had no intention of releasing dangerous

it

Paniagua administration drew

to a close, the debate

innocent, and whether terrorists

others

4

s

reconciliation, both

from prison. As the

how many

were being released along with

would be granted new

explosive issues under Toledo.

terrorists

about

beginning to grow heated, despite the administration

Guzman and

when members of Sendero

prisoners were

the innocent,

was just

best attempts to allay fears that

These very questions would become

trials.

4,

Basombrio Memoriay Bat alias en Nombre de los Inocentes: Pent 1992p. 83 -841 Expreso May 16. 2001 See La Republica Jan 3. 11. 13. 20. Teb
2. March 4. May 16. 2001: El Peruana Jan 16. 2001: El Comercio Jan 16. 2001: Gestion
May 3 1 200 Liber acion Jan 6. May 3 200 and Expreso Jan 13. 200 On pardons
of prisoners, see La Republica Jan 24. 31. Teb 2. 14. May 13. July 1 1. 2001: El Peruano
Jan 3
200 Expreso Jan 3 May 1 6. 2 2001 El Comercio Jan 24. Teb 4. June
2001: Liberacion Teb 2. 2001: Gestion May 21. 2001. When prisoners were pardoned,
sometimes after nearly a decade in prison, the press sometimes continued to follow their
difficulties in finding work and reintegrating into society. See also Comision de la
Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome III. p. 293-3 7.
"

De

Jara

la

2001 2001

1

1

.

1 .

;

.

.

1

1

:

1

:

.

1

1

1

.

1

:

1

:

.

.

1

1

'

Liberacion Teb

community,

there

15.

2001 Even among prisoners advocates

was

.

little

International said hundreds

Amnesty

agreement on the
(

Gestion and Liberacion

International argued clearly that

laws deserved

retrials;

all

in the

number of innocent

May

human

rights

Amnesty
Aprodeh and

prisoners.

31. 2001

).

those convicted under the now-challenged

Liberacion April 28. 2001: La Republica April 27. 2001. See also
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it

March of 2001.

In

judgment

that Peru s 1995

IACHR.

the

ruling on the 1991 Barrios Altos case, issued a

amnesty laws were without

legal merit.

Peruvian state responsible for the Barrios Altos killings (alleged

to

The Court found

the

be the work of the La

Colina death squad, acting under the leadership of Major Santiago Martin Rivas),

demanded

the state fully investigate the crime, and argued the case

intention of the 1995 amnesty laws to grant impunity to

human

was

indicative of the

rights violators.

The

decision called upon the Peruvian authorities to hold the perpetrators responsible and to

make

reparations to the victims in the case within the next three months.

ruling

opened the door

human

rights organizations such as

historic

:

in

essence,

legal validity as they

Human
human

to prosecution for

Rights.

it

set a

would

Amnesty

new

any crimes committed

Amnesty

may

precedent to argue that no

International argued this decision

representative before the

human

rights amnesties held

Convention on

would open

a

new

era in

4'

IACHR decision caught

somewhat unprepared. The week before

s

after 1980. International

violate the principles of the Interamerican

well be that the

The Court

International hailed the decision as

rights accountability for the Americas.

It

44

the Paniagua administration

the decision. Javier Ciurlizza. Peru s

IACHR. announced

that

Peru was studying the possibility of

voiding the 1995 amnestt law s. Minister of Justice Diego Garcia Sayan in turn assured

Retrial for Suspected Rebels

New

York Times

May

15.

2001.

We return to this topic

in

the next chapter.
44

The IACHR decision made headlines in all the major daily newspapers in Peru on
March 21. 2001. El Comercio praised the IACHR decision and joined its call for
immediate investigations of major human rights cases (April 2. 2001). See also La
Repablica and El Comercio March 26. 2001.
4"

Gestion March 27. 2001: Gestion, Liberacion, La Republica and El Comercio March

24. 2001: El

Comercio March 28. 2001.
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the press that the transitional

government would leave such an important decision

new government and Congress

to be elected in the next

few months, though on other

occasions he stated the validity of amnesties was a question that would

powers of the proposed
released, however, the

truth

commission

to the

4h

to investigate.

Once

the

fall

within the

IACHR

decision

government came under immediate pressure from human

was

rights

groups and the families of victims of state violence during the 1980s and 1990s to void
the amnesty laws, whatever the

under any legal requirement

outcome of the ongoing debate over whether Peru was

IACHR

to enforce

Macher and Francisco

decisions. Sofia

Soberon. the heads of APRODEH and the Coordinadora respectively, met with the
president of the

Supreme Court

to press for a

by the amnesty laws. Within the press,

reopening of all

at least, the

the decision against the amnesty. Dissent

majority

human

rights cases closed

was supportive of adopting

came primarily from

the pro-Fujimori

paper Expreso which repeatedly fulminated against the notion of subjecting those

pardoned by the amnesty laws to

new

trials as

a violation of the principle that an

individual could only be tried for a crime once.

4

A week after the IACHR decision, the Peruvian Supreme Court ordered that the
ruling be enacted, the Barrios Altos case be reopened, and that the amnesty laws be
IO

voided.

4h

§

t

Special prosecutor Ronald

La Repablica and Expreso March

2001
4

'

Gamarra announced

16.

the existence ot thirteen

2001: El Perucmo and Gestion March

8. 16.

.

Expreso Jan

3.

Comercio April

April

10,

2001: La Repablica April

5.

2001

.

On whether

5.

2001: El Peruano and El

Peru was obligated to adopt

IACHR

decisions, see

Liberacion and La Repablica March 28. 2001.
4X

El Peruano, Expreso, Gesiion. El Comercio March 28. 2001: Expreso April

Once more

the institutional

powers

to

determine whether to abide by the

188

6.

IACHR

2001.
decision

outstanding arrest warrants for

members of Grupo

Colina. charged with murder in the

Barrios Altos case. The former leaders of SIN. General Julio Salazar, and of the
Intelligence Service. Juan Rivero,

members of the Grupo

alleged

were arrested immediately

after the

IACHR

Army

ruling as

Colina. Rivero had. in fact, been sentenced to five years in

prison by a military court for the Barrios Altos incident, but had then been pardoned by
the 1995

amnesty laws.

had also been
found not
chief of

New revelations were made that Montesinos. Hermoza and others

tried before military courts for the Barrios Altos murders, but

guilty.

The

had been

Judicial Police also initiated an operation to capture Martin Rivas,

Grupo Colina. and

ten others charged as authors of related

human

rights

49

violations.

On

Human

June

1.

the

Ombdusman

s

office released a report, entitled.

Rights: Searching for Justice.

The report argued

violate constitutional principles and backed the

IACHR

that the

1995 amnesty laws

Barrios Altos decision, which

declared these laws incompatible with the American Convention on

only should the

state

comply with

the decision relevant to

all

human

the decision, the report stated, but

rights cases.

It

was

Amnesty vs

Human
it

less clear if this

Rights.

Not

should consider

was

the

were unclear. While The Supreme Court was ruling on the matter and petitions were
brought before the C'SJM to hear the case. Congress was considering a bill to void the
amnesty laws after President Paniagua stated that it was Congress s decision (Expreso
April 24. 2001 El Comercio March 24. 2001 El Peruano March 26. 2001
The CSJM
continued hearing the case against the Grupo Colina ( Gestion Liberation, La Republica
March 24. 2001 see next chapter on this issue) as new cases opened in civilian criminal
).

:

:

.

:

courts.
49

News Wire. Peru: ICHR - Supreme Court Orders
Amnesty Law Voided. March 28. 2001 Lexis-Nexus

Financial Times Information. Global

Enactment of ICHR Ruling.
online. Death Squad Arrests in Peru BBC Online March 25. 2001. Reported in
Expreso. La Republica. El Comercio. and El Peruano March 24. 25. 28. 2001 La
Republica April 1. 2001: Gestion April 3. 2001. On the Rivas operation, see La
.

:

Republica March 26. 2001.

189

administration

s

Sayan continued

IACHR

position; even after the

to state that the

decision. Justice Minister

government did not have the power

that a truth

commission was being established

who ought

to legitimately receive

in

amnesties for

the country as a

human

to

Diego Garcia

void the laws and

way of determining
Meanwhile, the

rights abuses.

process of preparing investigations into thousands of cases of human rights violations
began. Investigative reporters and teams of prosecutors began the arduous task of sifting

through the details of long-shelved cases. The Grupo Colina cases

damning evidence of military complicity
Peru took other steps to commit
rights accountability in this period.

announced

in

"

human

rights violations.'

itself to international

Manuel Rodriguez. Peru

0

mechanisms
s

produced

for

human

representative to the

OAS.

January that the government had signed the Interanierican Convention on

Forced Disappearances.

UN.

in

in particular

On December

Jorge Valdez, signed the

La Republica March

Rome

30. April

1.

7.

2000. Peru

s

permanent representative

to the

Statute to the International Criminal Court. Valdez

2. 5,

Liberacion March 27. March 30. April

June

2.

1.

2001. Gestion, El Comercio, Expreso and

2001; Caretas April

5.

2001.

On the

Barrios

Altos investigation and others related to the Grupo Colina. including both denials and

testimony continuing Grupo Colina
the military, see El
21.

May

12.

17.

May

s

involvement and the participation of members of

10. July 24.

2001; La Republica April

June 22. July 24. 2001; Expreso April

April 1.4. 10. 21,

Jan

Comercio April

May

2. 28.

July 24. 28. 2001;

all

2001; Liberacion
major Peruvian daily newspapers on

10. 17. 19. July 28.

22. 24. 26. June 3. 2001; Caretas July 26. 2001: El

2001; Gestion April

2, 3. 4. 10.

2001.

On

Peruano March 27.

the debate over whether civilian or military

courts should have jurisdiction in these cases, and whether previous

these cases should stand, see El

2. 3. 4. 13. 17.

Peruano March 27. April

22. 2001

:

CSJM

decisions in

El Comercio April

Expreso Jan 29. April 1. 6. 22. 24. 2001: Gestion March 24. April 3. 2001: La
Republica and Liberacion March 24. April 22. 2001. Attempts were made to link
Fujimori (in absentia) to the Grupo Colina crimes; Expreso, La Republica. and Gestion
April
1. 2001
El Peruano May 3. 2001 On the question of reparations for the families
30. 2001:

1

:

.

of the Barrios Altos victims, see El Peruano April
discussed further

in the

next chapter.
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19.

2001. This Grupo Colina cases are

argued that signing the statute not only signified a change

in

Peru

orientation to

s

questions of international law. but also represented a sign to the international

that

Peru was on the path
Journalists and

the Statute

democracy and human

to

human

rights advocates periodically urged the legislature to ratify

had signed the document, only 28 had

Peru

s

1

rights accountability.'

of the International Criminal Court. They pointed out

legislature).

ratified

myriad human rights cases, given

retroactively (and therefore the

However, the

human

that the

Rome

s

as the venue in

Rome

which

to deal

s

court; as he argued, the

over the next several years.

Members

Diego Garcia Sayan, made

Statute, appealing to Peruvians

many enjoyed by

ICC would be

sensitivity to the

1

1.

home

a powerful tool to eliminate the impunity

tleeing their countries. Peru eventually ratified the

ICC on November

Rome

Statute of the

2001. after Congress was assured the Statute did not limit the
'

state s ability to

'

engage

Gestion.

Dec

On Nov

29. 2000.

7.

in anti-subversive

2000. Jan

9.

campaigns or punish

2001: El Peruano Dec

La Republica

9.

relevant coverage, see

called for Peru to take

La Republica Dec
5.

5.

2000 and

all

May

necessary steps toward

May

29. 30. 2001. For other

29. 31. 2001; Expveso

Dec

5.

2000.

” Much of that convincing was done by people
Coordinator for the World Coalition for

terrorists/

2000.

supporting and joining the ICC. as did El Comevcio Feb 21.

2000. June 10. 2001: and Gesrion Dec

Eduardo Gonzalez. Latin America
the ICC, an international NGO. El Comevcio

191

s

might one day be subjected

question of what should happen to state criminals outside the jurisdiction of their

country

with

Statute cannot be applied

possibility that Fujimori himself

cabinet, especially Minister of Justice

statements in support of the

while 139 countries

rights violations in question fell outside the court

to trial in an international court repeatedly surfaced

of Paniagua

that

(usually requiring the approval of the

it

However, the ICC could not be considered

jurisdiction)/'

community

like

As Legler writes:
Civilian supremacy over the military in Peru, a precondition for democratic

by no means a foregone conclusion. While discredited by
abuses of human rights and the rule of law during the Fujimori presidency,
attempts by the Toledo gov-eminent at bringing the military under civilian
consolidation,

is

The

authority soured civil-military relations.
in assisting

governments

in

OAS

its

initial

has a potentially important role

Peru and elsewhere to depoliticize their militaries and

bring them under civilian control.

In truth,

however, no international organization can force the agenda of civil-military

reform within a

state; the constraints

on interference with a domestic

political matter so

intimately connected to the security and identity of the state are simply too great for the

impetus for reform
field

would have

to

to

come from

come from

to include influential

external pressure. In Peru, pressure for change in this

the state

members of human

the parameters for civil-military reform

individual implicated in

human

convictions of alleged Sendero

military

Demands
Peruvian

human

for

it

was

largely due to the

rights organizations in the

OAS

s

choice

mesa de dialogo

that

were established even before Paniagua assumed

rights violations,

for

human

rights accountability

community and

Office on Latin America.

and the use of military' courts

Luminoso members w hile simultaneously

from accountability

human

rights

Yet

no immunity from prosecution would be tolerated for any

the interim presidency:

members of the

itself.

When the

rights abuses

to ensure

protecting

must be dismantled.

had long topped the agenda of the

their international allies, like the

Washington

Vladivideos surfaced, suddenly the complaints of

these groups over the corruption and anti-democratic behavior of the Fujimori regime

w ere proven

May

correct,

and their demands for

23. 2001. Expreso

.

June

10,

disclosure of the abuses perpetrated by

on the other hand, warned

against terrorism and extend the
international sphere.

full

May

arbitrariness

24. 2001.

On Diego

2001.
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that the

ICC would

illegalize the fight

of human rights cases into the
Garcia Sayan

s

comments, see Expreso

the

regime met with overwhelming public support. Members of the congressional

opposition recognized that their newfound power over the state rested primarily on their

ability to

draw

clear ethical distinctions

Investigating his regime

s

between themselves and Fujimori

abuses was not only popular but also

s allies.

vital to his

opponents

capacity to establish themselves as legitimate political leaders.

Over

the course of 2001

vacuum

political

52 seats

its

Fujimori

created by Fujimori

held in April 2001. Fujimori

49 of

.

in the

120

s

s

s political

departure.

supporters in his

member

of the

state

1995."''"

For the

first

the

legislative elections

Change 90-New Majority

were

coalition lost

s

Peru

the largest party represented in Congress,

it

though without a majority: and Alan Garcia
8 in

When new

left to fill

Congress. Meanwhile, Alejandro Toledo

Posible went from 29 to 45 seats, making

2000 and only

opponents were

time

s

APRA took 28

in

seats

compared

to

Peruvian history, the politicians

none
in

in

charge

and the domestic human rights community enjoyed a confluence of interests

and a high degree of consensus over the necessity of re-establishing the rule of law by
holding parties guilt of corruption and
courts

human

be they politicians, bureaucrats, or

rights violations accountable before the

members of the armed

several important offices within the Paniagua administration

were

forces.

filled

Moreover,

by individuals

with deep personal commitments to such a project, including Paniagua himself. GarciaSayan. Perez de Cuellar, and Rodriguez. Let us

now

turn to the domestic institutions

established by the Peruvian state to address the question of civil-military relations and

human

M

rights.

For excellent comparative data on legislative and executive elections, including data on

Peru, see

Binghamton University

Performance. Online

at

s

Election Results Archive of the Center on Democratic

http:/Avww. binghamton.edu/cdp/era/elections/
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II.

Civil-Military Relations: Domestic Drivers of

As Conaghan

For the Paniagua government, pursuing democratic

writes.

would be

institutionalization

Change

a far-reaching challenge that included purging

remained of the Montesinos-linked Mafia from positions

in the state

re-

what

apparatus,

investigating the corruption and abuses carried out by the regime, and starting the long

process of bringing criminals to justice.

"

After Montesinos

was

finally arrested,

prosecutors estimated that between $600 million and $1.5 billion had been embezzled by
the Fujimori regime. Furthermore, millions had been spent bribing politicians, judges,

media executives, and
be eliminated from the

6

others.'

state

Public demands that Montesinos network of corruption

were powerful, and pressure on the Paniagua government

take decisive steps to eliminate that influence

for Fujimori

that

would be more

was overwhelming. The chants of

met Paniagua as he stepped onto the balcony of the

difficult to

to

Justice

presidential palace

accomplish: mat task would await the next administration.'

" Conaghan Making and Unmaking Authoritarian Peru 2001; Mensaje
La Gacera November 26, 2000.

a la

Nacion

.

Vl

'

a

For example, several opposition politicians were kept on allowances of $5.000-$20.000

month

for either switching to Fujimori s coalition in

Congress or collaborating with

in other ways. The bribery extended to members of Fujimori s cabinet.
Supreme Court justices, and members of the media. For an overview of the corruption,
see Conaghan The Immoral Economy of Fujimorismo 2006. For relevant press reports,
particularly covering the revelations of Montesinos and SIN s misdeeds, see El
Comercio Jan 11. 14. 18. 20. 2001: La Republica Jan 11. 14. 18. 20. 2001: Gestion Jan

Montesinos

11. 14. 18. April 4.

2001; Expreso Jan

Peruano Jan 18. 2001.
detailed Montesinos

Many

18. 20. April 4.

2001; Liberation Jan

18.

2001; El

of the congressional investigations discussed below

network of corruption.

Clifford Krauss Peru's New Chief Sworn In. Vowing to Revive Democracy New
York Times Nov 23. 2000. For example, an Apovo poll conducted Dec 19. 2000 found
that 38% of the public felt the president was acting decisively to eliminate Montesinos
influence, while

found that

38%

51%

felt

he had done nothing significant in this area. Similarly, the poll

of respondent

felt

Congress had acted decisively

194

in this area,

and

30%

Like Congress and the justice sector, the armed forces were severely discredited

by the

fall

of the Fujimori regime and the release of videos proving that Montesinos had

bribed and corrupted military

legitimacy

in the

commanders along with everyone

else.

armed forces was also influenced by several other

failure in the conflict

with Ecuador

in

But the loss of

factors, including

its

1995: the widespread recognition that the military

leadership had been thoroughly politicized and corrupted throughout the Fujimori

administration: the revelation that the

armed forces had become subservient

to the

national intelligence agencies of the country (an unprecedented situation in Latin

America) under Montesinos: and the continuing revelations of their past involvement

human

rights violations.'

When news
forces high

of Fujimori

s

long-distance resignation reached Peru, the armed

command immediately announced

his successor.

The next day. Fujimori

s

by the Minister of Defense and the joint

announced

that ten military generals

December

1.

interests,

their support for

whomever was chosen

command of the armed

forces: the resolution

connected to Montesinos would be retired effective

Retired General Salinas argued that

an allegation strengthened by the high

Marquez was

command

promotion was expedited was Elias Ponce of the Navy.

s

a

mere puppet

move

to

for military

speed up the

Among those w hose

APRODEH

quickly denounced

felt the armed forces had. 52% felt Congress had done nothing significant to remove
Montesinos influence from the state, and 58% felt that was true of the aimed forces.
Apoyo poll conducted in Lima, reported in El Comercio Dec 19. 2000.

armed forces at this point, see especially
Rospigliosi Las Fuerzas Armadas y La Democracia 2001 and La frustracion de la
the destruction of the reputation of the

reforma de

las fuerzas

de seguridad

as

Vice President Marquez signed a decree approved

promotions process w hile Marquez momentarily held pow er.

On

in

2006.
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.

his promotion; in 1998. the

Ponce responsible

InterAmerican Commission for

for crimes related to the disappearance

University of Callao. Meanwhile, on

three colonels

it

Nov

Human

Rights had found

of a student from the

18 Liberation printed a

list

of 25 generals and

accused of forming Montesinos circle of military allies/

Marquez immediately ceded authority

to

9

Paniagua, whose administration carried

out extensive investigations of military' wrongdoing and adopted a

more aggressive

stance toward removing wrongdoers. Further investigations by the Paniagua government

found

that

Montesinos had assured the loyalty of the armed forces by paying each of the

generals S10 million,

money

believed to have

connections to drug trafficking.

soon

to

60

The

come from

da}’ after

become President of Congress, warned

act within the next

military allies

48 hours

would

s

arms sales and

inauguration. Carlos Ferrero,

the interim administration that if

it

did not

dismantle the military high command. Montesinos

to

unite to

Paniagua

illegal

make

the country ungovernable. But the

weakness of

of the collapse of his network of corruption meant they

Montesinos

allies in the context

were

temporarily unable to respond to governmental action against them: in

at least

particular the

’

9

armed

forces, with a public approval level of only

29%

(the second lowest

armed forces high command to Fujimori s resignation, see La
Nov 20 and 21. 2000. On Marquez s dismissal of
commanders, see Oscar Zamalloa Outgoing Commanders Charged With Various
Crimes Agence France Presse Nov 20. 2000; La Republica, El Comercio. Gestion, El

On

the response of the

Republica. El Comercio, El Peruano

Peruano, and Liberation

Nov

2

1

.

2000.

On

the case of Ponce, see Liberation

Nov

2000.
0,1

La Republica and Gestion Nov
.

Depoliticize the

Armed

Forces.

24. 2000:

Politics

Inter Press Service.
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Peru: Historic

Oct

5.

2001

Chance

to

22.

levels

of public approval

governmental activism

in the

country in

to root out the corruption, politicization

characterized their institutions

at the

Within weeks of Paniagua
cabinet,

the

December 2000). would be unable

which immediately

set

s

notified the

media

inauguration, the interim president installed a

about a major shake-up

December would now be

that

and impunity which

time.

in the military.

announcement of his appointment. Defense Minister

Ledesma

to resist

(retired)

Within hours of

General Walter

twelve army generals scheduled to

retired immediately.

new

end of

retire at the

Soon more announcements of earl}’

retirements were made, including those of the president of the

CSJM

and the head of

SIN. Military commanders forced out of the sendee by Montesinos and Fujimori, like

Ledesma

himself,

were

Among those

reinstated.

who now was named Chief of the

Joint

reinstated

Command

of the

General of the Army. Rodolfo Robles, the whistleblower

was General Carlos

Armed

Forces and

who had

Tafur.

Commander

defected from the

military and been forced into exile after he went to the press with details of Grupo Colina

atrocities,

gained the restoration of his good

IACHR had

decided he deserved.

In July 2001.

continued to

fill

David Waisman became Toledo

Waisman headed

released

its

held a

s

s

second vice-president and

The congressional commission on

report in June, only

Calls for the reinstatement of military officers

of Paniagua

his military record, just as the

61

the position of Minister of Defense.

corruption which

61

name and

weeks before the

removed by Fujimori began on

ceremony

to reincorporate

their participation in the

was
El Comercio Nov

1992 counter-coup staged against Fujimori

for

(this story

major daily newspapers on May 15. 2001.) See also
23,
May 16. 2001: La Repitblica^ox 24. 2000. Jan 13. May 16. 2001 and
major Peruvian daily new spapers Dec 5. 2000. On the armed forces lack of public

covered in

all

27. 2000. Jan 13.
all

the day

many were reinstated. In one case, the state
25 members of the army w ho had lost their positions

inauguration, and ultimately

approval, see

Apoyo Opinion

data published in El

197

Comercio Dec

19.

2000.

transition to the

Toledo government and the capture of Montesinos. The commission

primary focus was on untangling the

web of corruption

s

over which Montesinos had

presided. In the course of the investigations, over 180 individuals were implicated in

corruption during the Fujimori administration. Shockingly, General Miguel Medina,
president of the joint

April 2001.

command of the armed

was accused by

the

commission

forces since his appointment by Paniagua in

as well.

Medina had been appointed

to

replace the corrupt military leadership that resigned over the Vladivideo showing them

pledging allegiance to Fujimori

Medina too was involved

in

fighter planes. Apparently,

29s were new,

when

s

coup, but the congressional commission reported that

irregularities

surrounding military purchases of Russian

Medina, then the head of the

Waisman

General Ledesma to remove Medina from his post.

illegal

had claimed the Mig-

they were not. The commission found the fraudulent deal had

enriched middlemen by roughly $80 million.

Its final

air force,

report also implicated a

called

upon Defense Minister

62

number of Fujimori

s

former ministers in cases of

enrichment, drug trafficking, covert amis deals, and other forms of corruption, and

called for charges to be brought against those

military,

named

in the report.

however, were particularly affected, as the report found

mechanism Montesinos used

to funnel

money

Members of the

that the

into offshore accounts

w as

main
military

purchases. Given the vast amounts spent on military purchases and the very low levels of
oversight required of such purchases under Fujimori. Montesinos had found

many w ays

62

For the best coverage of the Waisman Commission report and related stories of misuse
of funds in military purchases, see La Republica Dec 27. 2000. June 16. 2001. See also:
Peru
14.

lifts lid

June

on corruption.

14. 15 16,

BBC

online. June 13. 16. 2001;

2001; Gestion Dec 27. 2000. Jan

5. 12.

La Republica Jan

June

13. 14. 15, 16.

5. 7. 12.

2001;

Liberacion and Expreso Jan 12. June 13. 14. 15, 16. 2001: El Comercio Jan 12. March
19.

June

10. 14. 15, 16.

2001; El Peruano Dec 27. 2000.
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.

of using these accounts to enrich himself and fund the activities of SIN. Every

command

the military high

command, and

structure during

Hermoza

s

member of

tenure as president of the joint

were accused of crimes related

several foreign defense ministers,

to using

military contracts for illegal enrichment and violations of their Constitutional duties.

Though members of the Air Force held
purchase of Belarussian

MiG fighter jets was

warned the armed forces not

when

the military

or issuing threats.

a press conference to repeat claims that the

to stage

legitimate,

members of Congress promptly

any manifestation of their displeasure. The days

might intimidate Congress

down by

into backing

Congresswoman Tow nsend

staging tank parades

told the press, had left Peru along with

Fujimori.

In July, the

details

Morales Commission released

of the role of military purchases

most far-reaching

illegal

its

report, providing

in state corruption.

It

many

additional

the biggest and

agreed that

business activity of the past government was the massive

The Commission found

purchase of military equipment.

that

much, perhaps most, of the

$1.9 billion in military purchases under Fujimori had benefited allies of Montesinos

then contributed to funding SIN

s

various illegal activities.

Commission defended General Medina from

w as

involved in the

MiG

affair, overall the

the

Though

who

the Morales

Waisman Commission

s

claims that he

tw o commissions met the same conclusion.

Such massive and consistent manipulation of military purchases had been made possible
by collusion betw een Montesinos. the military high command, amis dealers and President
Fujimori.

Ibid.

Though

On

neither uncovered direct evidence that Fujimori

knew of individual

s defense of the MIG deal, see also El Comercio and La
2001 The armed forces continued to offer arguments in defense of the

the air force

Republica Jan

6.

.

ad hoc commission of the Peruvian Armed Forces reported to the
found no irregularities in the deal: Expreso April 30. 2001
deal: an
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CSJM

that they

abuses of military purchases,

it

was

his

removal of these purchases from public or

Congressional scrutiny on grounds of national security that allowed the corruption to
flourish. Furthermore, as

know

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,

Similarly, the

military and police

and

had managed

his partners

to

that the

reduce the fund

in the

Between November 2000 and Ap

abuse of the fund

abuse of office, and

64

illegal

On

Ibid.

2001

13.

enrichment.

66

2001: Gestion Feb

2,

April

s illegal

On

violations, see

March

6.

12. 13.

along with eight from

Hermoza.

drug trafficking,

the head of the

human

rights abuses,

Morales Commission, see also La

the

13,

trials

1

1,

May

26. 2001.

2001: La Republica March

9.

April

6.

4.

2001.

of Hermoza was extensive during this

arrest, see

Liberacion Dec 27. 2000. Jan

27. 2000. Jan 11, 12. 14. April 6. 30. 2001.

Feb

s

June

10. July 13.

Nov

May

April

9.

16.

6. 30.

La Republica Jan

14.

March

8.

May

24. 26. June 3, 2001; Gestion April 3.

26. June 3, 23. 2001

;

Liberacion

May

June

13. 26.

May

26. 28. June 3. 2001

3.

8.

22. 2001; Expreso

26, 2001: El
;

13.

2001: Gestion Dec 27.

2001; Expreso Jan 31. Feb 9. March 6. April 6. May
allegations of his involvement with Grupo Colina and other human rights

2000. Jan 31. Feb
.

On

enrichment and

2001; La Republica Dec

2004: El Comercio Jan

2001

.

the pensions issue, see also Caretas Jan

On Hermoza

6.

in

2001: Expreso

Press coverage of the charges, arrest and

period.

sixteen

Also arrested were General Jose Villanueva

El Comercio. Gestion. Liberacion June

:

-

-

of 2001, many members of Fujimori

1998 and implicated

See La RepubJica April 30. July 26. 2001

Republica Jan

66

1

arrested, including General Nicolas

to

1991

in

6'

the national police and 28 civilians.

armed forces from 1991

whereas

FTe

High ranking members

left.

from the Army, eight from the Navy, seven from the Air Force

64

pension fund for

to practical insolvency:

of every branch of the armed forces were implicated

command were

of his duty.

had been used as a slush fund under Montesinos.

had contained $124 million, by 1999 only $5 million was

military

Fujimori did not

in dereliction

Waisman commission found evidence

members of the

it

would have been

the substance of these purchases, he

if

Comercio

El Peruano June

3.

May

2001 In
.
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.

.

.

Ruesta.

joint

Hermoza

s

successor as armed forces chief: and General Walter Chacon Malaga,

commander of the armed

forces and interior minister under Fujimori, accused of

corrupting government officials, bribery, and amassing vast wealth through illegal
transactions including stealing from the military pension system and manipulating

massive military contracts for arms acquisition.

Chavez

(

Vaticano

)

indicated that

military received protection

h

Testimony from drug baron Demetrio

Hermoza. Montesinos and numerous members of the

money from drug

barons.

The men received S50.000

for each

airplane load of drugs they allowed to leave the coca-producing region of the Huallaga

Valley. Vaticano also claimed the

Navy had allowed SIN

to torture prisoners in its

hS

bases.

addition to these, his participation in undermining democratic institutions

El

Comer cio and Gestion

w as covered

in

April 24. 2001.

Also arrested or restrained from leaving the country in this period were Cesar Saucedo.
Eduardo Bellido. Edmundo Silva. Luis Salazar. Luis Delgado and Oscar Villanueva, all
generals in the armed forces under Fujimori and closely linked to Montesinos
corruption.

The

web of
command

high command removed Col. Hector Vargas from his
Montesinos flight from Peru: El Comercio January 6. 7. 2001: El
2001 Victor Malca. Minister of Defense under Fujimori, fled the country
air force

for illegally assisting

Peruano Jan
to

avoid

7.

arrest.

.

On

the arrests for and allegations of corruption

among

military

commanders, see (among literally hundreds of articles in the major Peruvian newspapers
on these topics) La Repnblica Jan 2. 3. 4. 6. 7. 8. 10. 11. 25. 29. Feb 3. 2001: El Peruano
Dec 27. 2000. Jan 3. 4. 25. 2001 El Comercio Jan 3. 4. 6. 12. 13. 25. Feb 3. April
2001: Expreso Dec 27. 2000, Jan 3. 4. 6. 1 1. 25. 2001: Gestion Dec 27. 2000. Jan 3. 4. 8.
1. 25. April
1, 2001. By Jan 22. 2001. at least six generals and two colonels of the
Army were in prison for illicit enrichment, and seven high commanders were being
prevented from leaving the country as charges against them were investigated: La
1

.

1

1

1

Repnblica Jan 22. 2001
68

Other members of the military

command

Luis Cubas Portal. Juan Delgado. Former

arrested in this period include Juan Llanque.

Army Commander

Walter Chacon. Colonel

Mario Arbulu. and Luis Delgado, charged with illegal enrichment, bribery, corruption,
money laundering and aiding Mr. Montesinos's flight. On these arrests, see Peru
Arrests Associates Of Ex-Spy Chief New York Times January 21. 2001: Peru general
faces drug charges

BBC

Online April

6,

2001:

201

New Cabinet

Installed in Peru;

It

.

Over
without

the seven

months of the Paniagua administration, not a

members of the

corruption within the military. Investigative reporting accused

not been implicated in

wrongdoing by

the congressional

for greater activism in rooting out corrupt allies of

Retired military

Hermoza
in so

day passed

one of the major Peruvian newspapers carrying a story detailing

at least

who had

single

commanders joined

for using the

armed forces

70

military.

69

blame on Montesinos and

as a tool to enhance their

doing corrupting and weakening the military.

committees and pressed

Montesinos within the

reporters in focusing

military

own power and

Hundreds of military

wealth, and

officers

were

eventually charged with corruption as part of Montesinos network as stories unfolded

about

how

he had converted military accounts into the principal cash

enrichment for himself and members of the military command.

Many

cow

for illegal

recognized that

New

York Times November 26. 2000; Peru's ex-army
chief arrested BBC Online December 30. 2000; Judicial System Prohibits Departure
From Peru of Nine Generals With Ties to Montesinos Agence France Presse Dec 27.

Quickly Ousts Top Generals

2000.

On

Vaticano

s

testimony, including his claims that Fujimori. Malca. Bellido.

other members of the military were involved in or aware of the drug money
Montesinos was making, and that the drugs were transported in army helicopters, see La
Republica Jan 5. 17. 31. Feb 3. 2001: Gestion Jan 31. 2001; Expreso Jan 17. 31. 2001:
and in all major dailies on Jan 12. 2001 Victor Malca was caught after fleeing to Mexico:

Hermoza and

.

La Republica Jan

3

1

.
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1
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This claim is based on my survey of APRODEH s new summaries, available at
www.aprodeh.org.pe See. for example. Liberacion Jan 7. 2001. A similar attitude toward
the national police was often reflected in press coverage; see. for example. La Republica

Jan
"

4.

2001.

See. for example,

comments by

retired

army generals Obando.

Parra. Soriano and

La Republica January 2. 22. 2001: those by Obando in Gestion Jan 6. 2001: and
by Salinas in Expreso Nov 23, 2000. Obando highlighted accusations that members of the
military had been forced to support certain political candidates, and to convince their
family members to do so as well; Salinas expressed hope that the armed forces could now
Pastor in

begin to regain

its lost

prestige and institutional integrity.

202

corruption extended throughout

all

ranks of the military, deeply exacerbated by the

shockingly low pay members of the armed forces received

workers

in the

country and to their counterparts

Yet more than simply responding
had encouraged

to flourish

to the

in

Peru compared to other

armed forces of the region.

in the

1

massive corruption the previous regime

within the armed forces. Paniagua faced the problem of

reconstructing the entire relationship between the civilian and military spheres of the

state.

Military complicity had enabled Fujimori to undermine

1990s. but his (and Montesinos

weakened

)

politicization

democracy

in the early

and manipulation of the armed forces had

the defense sector to the point of incapacity.

Beyond removing Montesinos

cronies from positions of power within the defense sector,

it

was

vital to build the

foundations for professional, democratic civil-military relations and to subject a reformed

military,

one with the will and capacity

to

sen e the national

interest as defined

by elected

civilian leadership, to the rule of law.

Of course,

the matter of civil-military relations

apparent consensus on accountability

within the government and

among

investigate and prosecute those

who

far less

w as

on the need

to thoroughly

s

competitive authoritarian

regime, there would

became

the time this

apparent, however, the

human

use of military' pensions for illegal enrichment by Montesinos and

military, see

La Republica Feb

Caretas Jan

1 1

fuerza armada

.

clear agreement

contributed to the network of corruption orchestrated

w ith Sendero Luminoso. By

the consensus for accountability

On

-

there

the

agreement on re-opening questions of state responsibility for human

rights violations in the conflict

1

Though

the Peruvian public

by Montesinos to perpetuate Fujimori
prove to be

at first implied.

was more complex than

2001

.

On

Ouehacer

3.

major crack

rights

community

members of the

2001: El Comercio, Gestion. Liberacion June

sources of military corruption, see
129: Marzo-Abril 2001.

203

in

12.

2001:

Obando Corrupcion y

had further embedded
Peru

s first

attempts

itself in the institutional

at transitional justice.

the judicial system had been hit

Vladivideos:

justices,

mechanisms Paniagua created

to

The problem was exacerbated by the

oversee

fact that

by the wave of discrediting revelations released with the

many members of the judicial

branch, including several

Supreme Court

were also shown being corrupted by Montesinos. Within days of the

first arrests

of military personnel, other members of the military were telling the press that soldiers

and officers would not

them

fairly,

and that

all

cases

including cases of excesses committed in the course of the

involving the military

anti subversive

trust the civ ilian courts to treat

campaign

-

ought to be heard by military courts.

Meanwhile, dozens of communal gravesites.

in

which

2

the bodies of thousands of

victims of the armed forces and Sendero Luminoso had been dumped, were being

uncovered across the country by forensic teams working with nongovernmental
organizations.

The families of the

killed

and disappeared called upon the new

government and the human rights community

to

reopen their cases, which had been

shelved by the Fujimori administration. Often the announcements were handled by local
offices of the

Human

Rights

disappeared, or the national

Ombudsman,

human

organizations of family

rights groups.

members of the

Perhaps because the majority of the

bodies discovered were found to have been killed in the 1980s and by

military,

some of them

still

members of the

in active military duty, calls for justice inevitably included

comments by retired general Jaime Salinas in Expreso Jan 22. 2001.
some measures of military reform were made under Fujimori. For
example, in January 2000. obligatory military service was eliminated as a result of
pressure from the Defensoria del Pueblo. See Ames, Bernales et al. Situation cie la
"

It

See. for example,

should be noted that

democracia en

el Peru.

2000-2001 2001.

p.

205.

204

.

demands

for investigations into the

Belaunde and Garcia governments. Anger

corruption and abuses of power under Fujimori

now mixed

with calls for justice for

first acts

during his six months

all

°

those abuses perpetrated by the state over the past twenty years.

One of Paniagua's

at the

in office

was

the creation of a

Truth Commission by executive decree. The questions Rospigliosi pondered

in

2004

are

as relevant today:

Until the beginning of the year 2000. to predict that soon there

Peru would have sounded eccentric.
its

creation open a

How then

mere eighteen months

later?

did the

would be

a

TRC

window of opportunity

in

for

How has its work impacted the
How did its Final Report modify

dispute over a hegemonic history of the conflict?
the intellectual and political agenda?

4

Plans to create a truth commission had been circulating amongst

government and

civil society for several

years prior to

this. In

members of the

the first of the nine

volumes of the Final Report of the Peruvian TRC. the commissioners wrote

that,

when

Fujimori's pursuit of further constitutional change to allow his third election provoked

international intervention to negotiate a return to normality in the country,

one of the

main bargaining points on the agenda of civil society and government opposition groups
'

was

'

the institution of such a commission.

El Comercio Jan

16. 18.

Feb

16. 23.

March

7.

23. May 5. 6. 8. 26. June 21. 2001: La Republica Jan
May 4. 6. 7. 8, 18. 26. July 3. 2001: Liberation Jan 8.

3. 15. 16. 17. 18.

March

24. April 22.

24. July 3. 2001:

reminder of "dirty war", bring

Expreso Jan 29. 2001. See also

call for

Truth Commission

EFE

Peru:
fa

Mass graves give

Spanish news agency)

17. 2001. An FBIS Translated Excerpt is available through the World News
Connection Database. Harrowing details of massacres and human rights abuses from the
1980s were now reported in the press, either for the first time or in reviews of the horrific

Jan

events: El

Comercio Feb

7.

2001

:

Liberation July 24. 2001

74

P. 75.

‘

Contision de

la

Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004.
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In

December 2000. mere weeks

government created an

Human

Rights

Paniagua

s

interim

Working Group, composed of the Ministers of

Interinstitutional

Justice, the Interior. Defense.

the

after taking office.

Advancement of Women and of Human Development, and

Ombudsman

s

Office, and. from civil society, the Peruvian Episcopal

Conference, the Peruvian National Evangelical Counsel, and the Coordinadora. This

group was charged with the design and
responsibility

which

hundreds of groups
the

many

entailed three

institution

of the truth commission, a

months of planning sessions

in civil society as

in consultation

well as national and international experts.

with

Among

important points decided upon by the Working Group was the scope of the

investigations to be conducted bv the commission: not only

examination of the crimes committed by

all

sides during

would

armed

it

undertake an

conflict with

Sendero

Luminoso. but also the crimes committed under the government of Fujimori, including
intimidation of legal opposition groups and the derogation of civil rights.

Throughout the three months of work of the

members of Congress,
the press as a

Nearly

all

the

human

way of lobbying

to

NGO community, and even the group itself used

these actors were consulted by the group

be formed and

Macher

s

was her

insistence

vision for the

how

it

Working Group,

commission.

for their preferences for the formation of the

Secretary of the Coordinadora.

ought

rights

Interinstitutional

was

itself.

Sofia Macher. Executive

particularly vocal about

should focus

its

work.

As

commission was being reported

from the beginning

that the

how

the truth

early as January

in the press.

commission
2001.

1.

Of particular

commission pave the way

interest

for

accountability in the civilian courts system, in addition to reparations for the families of

victims.

The commission should carry on

its

work over two years and must

206

fairly

.

investigate the crimes

committed by the

Sendero Luminoso and

state.

within the administration. Justice Minister Diego Garcia Sayan and

Alban echoed Macher

most

justice for the

though

position,

s

significant

cases,

the}'

were

careful to

MRTA.

emphasize reconciliation,

and a focus on developing

later the early front-runner in the first

From

Ombudsman Walter

institutional

prevent a recurrence of human rights violations. Lourdes Flores, a high-profile

of Congress and

h

reforms to

member

round of the presidential contest

in

2006. argued that the commission need only deal with a few symbolic cases and not
attempt a comprehensive treatment of all

human

rights crimes.

At the top of her

of

list

crimes to be investigated was the prison assault carried out under President Alan Garcia.

Many
back

others

to the

chimed

in to

support the position that the commission

Belaunde administration and acknowledge

peaked under Garcia. The

Human

Rights

Ombudsman

that

s

human

s

work ought

rights

to reach

abuses had

office concurred.

Less clear was whether the commission should be empowered to address the issue
of questionable convictions under Fujimori

amnestied soldiers legal

status.

Many

s

anti-terrorism laws and the question of

Peruvian scholars and journalists examined other

countries experiences with truth commissions for guidelines for Peru

Should Peru

s

commission,

crimes? The

their

point:

human

La Republicci Jan

cited in the press.

Pemano

El

Feb

14.

April

rights

2.

Jan

April 2.

May

1.

community and popular opinion w ere

who committed

2.

that included

Feb

14.

March

8.

8.

abuses. Yet even after the

who

admitted

united on this

all

Working Group

human

s

rights organizations

2001

April 4.

May

La Republica March 25.
April 2 2001: Gestion Feb 14. March 8.

Expreso Jan 22.
Comercio April 2, 2001.

30. 2001:

30. 2001: El

version.

pardons for members of the

2001. This position was backed by

See Liberation Jan

May

ow n

of South Africa, offer pardons to those

no reconciliation would be accepted

military or rebel groups

h

like that

s

207

28. 2001;

proposal was forwarded to Paniagua, these points remained contentious. Justice Minister

Diego Garcia Sayan

empowered

how
the

to

to grant

insisted that neither the

commission nor the administration was

void amnesties, and that the truth commission ought to help determine

amnesty

in a legitimate

Working Group signaled

manner

promote reconciliation. Other members of

to

their belief that the invalidity

already been established by the

IACHR decision

of the military amnesties had

and that the truth commission was

intended to assign responsibility, not grant amnesties.'

If the

most controversial question was the time period

other points of contention drew public

comment

as well.

to

be investigated,

Some emphasized

commission must coordinate the forensic work taking place

in

communal

many

that the

gravesites

throughout the country. Others discussed the appropriate makeup of the committee,
alternately suggesting that the

they be drawn from Peru

s

commissioners be appointed or popularly elected, or

human

rights

community or

civil

society broadly,

international specialists in transitional justice, representatives

mixture of these groups.

APRODEH

justice and former

among them

members of truth commissions

Hayner. Douglas Cassel. Paul
their opinions as well: Jorge

from the UN. or some

advocated the inclusion of members of the

the International Center for Transitional Justice,

Ibid.

in other countries, including Priscilla

Van Zyc and Juan Mendez.

International observers voiced

Baraybar reflected on his experience

For the Working Group

s final

in the International

Grupo de Trabajo

report see

US NGO

scholars of transitional

Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and the challenges before Peru

78

that

s

truth

Interinstitucional

Anteproyecto de de Decreto Supremo. Creacion de la Comision de la Verdad 2001. For

Commission, see Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros
6, 2001 and 438-2001 (Sept 5. 2001 ) and
065-2001
Decretos Supremos
(June 2. 2001 and 101-2001 (Aug 31. 2001): and
Ministerio de Justicia Resolucion Supremo 304-2000 Dec 9. 2000.
the legislation establishing the

Resoluciones Supremas 330-2001 (July

)

)
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commission, which he
Luis Salgado of the

sure

felt

would need more than two years

UN expressed his opinion,

transitional justice apparatus,

to

complete

work.

its

based on experience with the Guatemalan

on the Peruvian commission

s

makeup (which he thought

ought to include officials from the UN), length of operation, time period covered,
Peruvians influential
preferred to restrict

Meanwhile,
its

its

work time

including the

to

two years or

in

all

Lima, joined by

Rights

Ombusman

elected president, whatever the

parameters and nature.

human

s

Office,

79

less.

rights groups

commission and

and the mayor. Alejandro

of the major candidates for the upcoming elections. Alan Garcia

and Lourdes Flores included, pledged

When

proposed the commission

work would reach back

its

Human

citizens held demonstrations in support of the truth

prompt formation

Toledo and indeed

in the debate,

etc.

s

to continue to support the truth

commission

Working Group and administration decided
Working Group reported

the

to

Congress

in

in

if

terms of

March,

its

it

formation before the change of administration, affirmed that

to 1980.

and maintained

investigations in fifteen to eighteen months.

that

it

should conclude

its

The Working Group proposed

a composition

of seven commissioners appointed by the president.

When

the

were again held

Working Group

to press for

it

to

begin

its

its

proposals to the president, large demonstrations

immediate action. Public opinion polls showed

the public supported the truth

right for

sent

commission

s

74.3% thought

creation and

the

that

82.9% of

moment w as

work. Public comments from the Working Group upon completion

of its proposal emphasized the need to uncover the truth and reconstruct national

4

La Repablica Jan

7. 8.

Feb

14.

10.

2001: Expreso Jan 22. March

16.

2001.

March
5.

8.

June

10.

2001

2001: Caretas Feb

209

8.

:

El Comercio Feb

memory

6. 14.

June

2001: Gestion Feb 14. March

.

in

order to heal the

wounds

left

by two decades of conflict:

little

was

said about

whether

prosecutions would result. Confusing the situation mightily were conflicting statements

while some argued prosecutions would absolutely follow the findings of the

in the press:

commission, others argued

that national reconciliation implied

of abuses. Roberto Garreton. a Chilean expert on

worked with
it

the

UN.

experts and international

Human

who had
any

frequently

truth

commission as

by most Peruvian human

a claim roundly rejected

guilty

rights

members of the TAN. Mary Robinson. TNI High Commissioner

Rights, for example, promised her agency s assistance to the truth

eommission
impunity.

rights

told the press that Peruvians ought to reject

would replace prosecutions,

for

human

impunity for those

in its objectives

of identifying the victims, trying the victimizes, and ending

Members of the Working Group and

the

human

rights

community continued

to

use the media to advocate for their sometimes disparate visions for the truth commission,

and

to

propose individuals as potential commissioners. Other organisms of civil society,

such as the confederation of labor unions
_

CGTP

lobbied alongside

members of the
OA

#

t

military for representatives oi their organizations to be included in the commission.'

80

Toledo

s

newspapers

comments about
in

Peru on Jan

6.

.

the truth

commission were covered

2001 He made similar comments
.

major daily
Gestion on Jan

in all
to

1

6.

2001. though oddly his comments included the argument that the commission should also
investigate abuses perpetrated in the course of anti-narcotics operations. See also El

Peruano El Comer cio and Liber acion May 20. 2001 and El Per nano March 8. 2001. The
Working Group s unfolding plans for the truth commission and the various controversies
over its nature were reported in great detail in the press. See La Republica Jan 7, 8. Feb
14. March 16. 24. 31. May 2. 23. 27. June 17. 2001; El Comercio Feb 6. 14. March 28.
April 4. June 17. 2001: Expreso Jan 22. March 5. May 28. 29. 2001: Caretas Feb 8. 2001:
Gestion Feb 14. March 16. 31. May 3. 25. 28. 29. 2001; Liberacion March 31. 2001: El
Peruano April 4. May 3. 28. 2001. On the question of w hether the truth commission
implied impunity, see for example, contrasting comments by Garreton. Montoya. GarciaSayan. Diez Canseco, and Robinson in La Republica May 20. 30. June 10. 2001 and El
Comercio May 30. 2001
.
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Though severely weakened by
discrediting of

the shake-up in the

command

and the

structure

leadership from the previous decade, the military did not remain

its

complacent as debates about the transitional justice agenda took place. Retired military
personnel,

came forward

in particular,

to

argue

while

that,

it

was

and just

right

to hold the

military leadership under Fujimori responsible for their abuses of power and corruption,

it

was

weakened

unfair to use the

for excesses

committed

in the

state

of the armed forces as an excuse

countersubversive campaign. Peru

s

to trials in the

deeply flawed court system and

search of scapegoats to blame for the national crisis

While few rejected outright the need

in the

enemy:

to subject

context of a public

would be

for a truth

blame them

soldiers had dutifully

carried out the orders of their civilian presidents to fight a dangerous

them

to

mood

in

unjust.

commission, members and

supporters of the armed forces opposed any commission that would seek to individualize

responsibility for

commission

human

rights abuses within the military,

to include representatives

of the armed forces

protection against a witch hunt against the military,

A small

rights

community immediately

in the

pages of Expreso, that the truth commission

rejected.

and many called upon the
in its

work

to ensure

two positions members of the human

minority expressed the opinion, usually

w as

a tool of the

sought to destroy the armed forces. Such important decisions,

the}'

Leninist

left that

argued, should be in

the hands of elected leaders, not special commissioners hand-picked by the president
Q

heavily influenced by the

81

Expreso Jan

1

1

,

La Republica May
military'

22. 23.
27,

and

1

NGOs.

May

27. 30. June 21.

2001 For accusations
.

200

1

;

see also Caret as

that there

was

a

May

witch hunt

and/or supporters of the Fujimori regime, see Expreso Jan 16. 25.

Gesrion Jan 22. 2001: El Comercio Jan 15. 2001 (this

last

by the Association of Officials. Generals and Admiral

in

3

1

.

2001 and

against the

May

30. 2001:

one based on public statement

Defense of the

Armed

Forces,

.

At

this point,

consensus: to some,

community

some members of Congress began
it

to use the

now

to force

APRA.

s

legislative elections,

rights

only

just

s

corrupt

through their political agenda of spreading blame for

rights abuses to the political

Alan Garcia

human

appeared that Paniagua was allowing the

consensus over investigating and prosecuting Fujimori

regime as a battering ram

human

to reassess the accountability

and armed forces leadership of the

returned to majority party status

in the

last

twenty years.

April 2001

had reason to fear what a thorough investigation of Garcia

s

own

handling of the conflict might reveal. Garcia had returned from his self-imposed exile

Colombia, where he had

government

fled after Fujimori s autogolpe in part to

dodge the

investigations into charges he had taken millions of dollars in bribes while

s

serving as president, only weeks before the legislative elections and

attempting to restore his

country

s

own

political

largest political party

The

first

elections, put

was

busily

image and prestige as both the head of the

and as a candidate

for the presidency.

"

round of the presidential election, held the day before the legislative

Toledo and Garcia on the ballot for the second round.

When the

second

round vote was conducted in June 2001. Garcia received 47.9% of the vote compared

who blamed

in

to

forces). Members of the
Toledo often responded to these charges
via the press: La Republica, Liberation Jan 20. June 10. 2001 Gestion Jan 22. 23. July

the press for

damaging the reputation of the armed

administration, the truth commission.

NGOs and

:

16.

2001: El Peruana Jan 23. July 16. 2001. Accusations that members of the military

could not expect

(Hermoza
o->
'

"

On

fair trials in the civilian court

s sister

t

Garcia

made such an

system were much more plausible

accusation. Expreso April 17. 2001
#

s

return and the debate over whether to abide by the

).

1ACHR

...

s

decision in

Expreso Jan 9. 10, 18. 2001; Liberation Jan 9. 10. 11. 2001: La Republica
Jan 10. 11. 18. 2001; El Peruana Jan 15. 2001: El Comercio Jan 10. 18. 2001; Gestion
Jan 9. 10. 1. 15. 18; and Caretas Jan 1 1. 2001. Garcia s strong showing in the elections
and his position on the truth commission are discussed in detail in the next chapter. See
Gestion and El Comercio May 26, 2001; Expreso May 27. 2001
his case, see

1

Toledo

many

53.

s

1%

-

a remarkable showing for Garcia

who.

after all.

was considered by

the worst president in Peruvian history, had spent the last eight years avoiding

prosecution for corruption, and had been found guilty of contempt of court and

rights

abuses by the

IACHR. Now.

as the head

of the second-largest party

Garcia gave greater voice to his doubts about the truth commission and the

in

human

Congress.

IACHR.

Garcia gave the proponents of the truth commission good reason to worry that he would
hinder or limit

its

work

if

he were elected president. Though he ultimately signed a

pledge to support the truth commission

Paniagua administration

who would have
human

to establish the

the truth

Human

it.

Garcia, accusing

if

society pressed the

elections, lest Garcia,

be elected. International and domestic

Rights Watch. Amnesty International, and

and privately called upon Garcia

commission

members of civil

commission before the

great incentive to restrain

rights groups, including

others, publicly

if elected,

to respect

many

and abide by the findings of

he were elected. Others intensified their denunciations against
a variety of human rights abuses,

him of having overseen genocide and

and calling upon the Justice Minister to

initiate

criminal investigations against the ex-

president.

Though Garcia himself attempted occasionally
criticizing the

armed forces and promising

the obvious advantage in this matter.

work with him
would demand.

as

It

its

reform

if

in the press,

promising to

to the justice the truth

anticipated that Garcia might end compliance with

decisions as well, given the court

s

by

he became president. Toledo had

Toledo taunted Garcia

soon as the ex-president submitted

was

to gain political capital

commission

IACHR

findings against his administration in the cases of the

El Frontin and other prison case and forced disappearances carried out during his

'

presidency.

When

asked whether he would support the IAC'HR decision to grant

those convicted under Fujimori

trials to

s

new

antiterrorism laws. Garcia responded he

would

o

security of la patria.

opt instead to protect the

The public
of Fujimori

s

s

new

impression that the

government and not of the

months. Large numbers of respondents

'

accountability agenda implied investigation

conflict with

in

Sendero Luminoso persisted for

focus groups and polls indicated their belief

primary goal of the truth commission was to study the corruption and crimes of

that the

Working Group

the Fujimori regime, despite the fact that the

s

proposal had specifically
O

excluded corruption from the commission

s

I

investigation parameters.

In fact.

Paniagua

had unilaterally institutionalized a powerful mechanism for the human rights community
to achieve a vital step in

massive human

its

broader agenda of establishing

rights abuses peipetrated in the course

Luminoso. Leaders of the Peruvian human

rights

Sj

Liberation April 28. 2001

:

Expreso Feb

1

9.

in

role in

of the conflict with Sendero

community,

transnational activist network often spearheaded by the

Center for Transitional Justice, were influential

state security forces

in

partnership with a

New York-based

International

shaping the design and powers of the

2001.

On

the question of Garcia

s

position

commission before the elections, and demands that the commission be
established before the second round of the presidential election, lest the winner refuse

on the

truth

institute

it.

see also

26. 28. 2001: El

the

1ACF1R

May
17.

1

.

2001

2001.

La Republica April

Comercio May
Comercio May 26. June

see El
.

On

29.

4. 12. 26.

May

4. 6. 15. 21.

2001. Expreso
1.

June

May

17.

2001: Gestion

27. 2001.

2001: Liber acion

May

On

May

Garcia and

26. 2001: Expreso

General denunciations of human rights abuses under Garcia: Liberacion Jan
Garcia

s

and

APRA

s

campaigning on military reform, see La Republica

April 22. 2001.
s4

Comision de la
Verdad y Reconcilacion" 2005; see comments by Walter Alban El Comercio April 4.
Penaflor Guerra "Documento de Trabajo: Analisis del impacto de

2001

to

.

214

la

s

Peruvian

TRC. Commissioners and members of civil

experiences of other states with truth commissions
transitional justice experience.

Its

armed

1999

-

first

forces

were

own

the

plans for Peru's

to face a

its

leadership under Fujimori deeply

still

greater blow. In April 2001. only days

this

one

taken in

showing top military and police commanders and hundreds of officers signing a

government and proclaiming

1992 closure of the judicial and legislative branches of

s

their opposition to

release of the video, the military

-

in creating their

round of the elections, another videotape rocked Peru,

document supporting Fujimori

video

drew heavily upon

"

reputation severely tarnished and

discredited, the

before the

8

society

s

top

human

commanders

rights investigations. After the

many of whom appeared

in the

gave a press conference during which Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Pablo Carbone explained the commanders were forced to sign the document.

He

asked for understanding and forgiveness from Peruvians, explaining that they had no
choice but to sign.

Carbone went on

the constitution. He. along with

National Police General

November 2000
1

...

This claim

is

Santisteban.

all

of whom had been appointed

Montesinos cronies, apologized

992 autogolpe. and then offered

o

government and

Admiral Victor Ramos. General Carlos Tafur and

Armando

to replace

to pledge his loyalty to the interim

to the nation,

in

condemned

the

their resignations to President Paniagua.

...

.

substantiated by interv iew results, references in the final report of the

commission, and numerous public statements made by the Commissioners to this
example, comments by TRC President Salomon Lemer and TRC
Commissioner Carlos Tapia in El Comer cio' January 2005 special edition review ing
truth

effect. See. for

progress since the release of the final report.
86

On

the initial release of the tape and the response of the military

Peniano, La Republica, Gestion, and El Comercio April
April 13.2001.

215

commanders, see El

6. 9. 11. 12.

2001: La Republica

Although
according to the

it

was

the Peruvian Congress

to release these videos.

BBC.

President Paniagua

s

earlier [that] month expressed support for
command, arguing they were forced to sign

government [had]

the current police and military high
the

which chose

You must

endorsements

understand that for reasons of national and

internal security we can t replace all of the officers who have been blackmailed.
Prime Minister Javier Perez de Cuellar said last week. It was the same as if a nun

were put

to

•

your head and you were

told:

Sign or

While the administration kept the military commanders

87

die.

in place

through the election.

Paniagua ultimately accepted the resignations of the military commanders
address to the nation. With one stroke, the high

was
to

replaced.

The

office of the Minister of

first,

of all branches of the military

Defense prepared charges against the officers

be heard by the highest military court, the

crafted to send a double message:

command

CSJM. The response had been

who had

carefully

that the administration recognized the necessity to

maintain the institutional integrity of the armed forces by not discrediting
officers

in a historic

served under Fujimori, but

that,

second, the military

all

military

command was now

completely subservient to the civilian government and would be held accountable for
actions.

The

fear that military leaders might be tempted to lead a rebellion in order to

protect officers from prosecutions and themselves from a loss of power

five

months

later, dispelled.

they remained silent

s

88

in the

Though Caretas

face of the high

Peruvian military chiefs offer to

quit.

was now.

a

mere

reported a growing unease across the ranks.

command

BBC

88

s

self-criticism

Online. April

1

7.

and repentance."

2001. The story was

major Peruvian daily newspapers April

16. 17.

2001.

See El Comercio, El Peruano and Liberation April

12. 18.

2001 and Caretas April

covered in

2001

its

all

.
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1

1.

Of course, even

mark of Montesinos and Fujimori upon
high

command

there

command

replacing the entire military

Among

the military.

the replacements for the

were several with troubling connections

Chiabra. for example. Carlos Tafur

s

could not eliminate the

to

Montesinos. Roberto

replacement, had worked for SIN under Montesinos

and been promoted by the Fujimori administration. Moreover. El Comercio scoffed
notion that the

CSJM

might deal fairly with the commanders removed for appearing

the video and pledging their allegiance to Fujimori

justices

of the

CSJM who would

s

commanders had themselves

And how could any

structure be rescued from the military at this point,

two members of the Air Force command
they were out of the country?

Still,

approved of the president

many wondered, when

structure had not signed the pledge

were pleased

Apoyo opinion
s

legitimate

(37%

did not).

commanders who embraced
commanders would help

because

to see the president take decisive

polls indicated that

77%

of respondents

decision to accept the resignations of the military

commanders; only 10% disapproved. Of those who knew about the president
to the nation

only

84

the public and the press

action against the military.

in

abusive regime: six of the eleven

hear the case against the

signed the document, according to military sources.

command

at the

82.5% approved of it. The

press found

many

s

message

retired military

the idea that Paniagua s strictness with the military'

restore the credibility and

honor of the armed forces, but public

opinion polls indicated that a majority (66%) believed the commanders statements

84

See Liberation April 12. 2001: El Comercio April 13. 2001 and all major daily
newspapers April 19 and 20, 2001 Experts in security, such as Enrique Obando. and in
justice, such as president of the National Council of Magistrates, the body which appoints
judges, were already calling for the CSJM to be reorganized under the civilian judicial
system Expreso Jan 29. May 2. 2001 ). a matter which will be discussed in detail in the
.

(.

next chapter.
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.

rejecting the autogolpe

and pledging

The only

forced rather than sincere.

commanders should be

their

commitment

debate,

appeared,

it

tried for their support

to the

courts and rejected the idea of a

challenged the military

would become

s

traditional use

the issue that

rights accountability

under Toledo. For

decision to send the case to the civilian

The appearance of the video and

command prompted

.

armed forces

situation

now

01

to

civilian rather than

system of justice that only slowly

was

the debate

Supreme Court.

its

own

protection. This

deferred by the

human

CSJM

s

90

the subsequent replacement of the high

new democratic

was absolutely necessary.

by

civil-military relations in the area of

calls for total reorganization

to reflect the

tried

of the justice system for

of the military:

replace the faces of the military, observers agreed.

the

the

of the autogolpe and which courts ought

parceled out

would define

democratic regime was

was about whether

have control of the case. El Comercio demanded the case be
military-'

new

it

was not enough

A genuine reform

to

of the institutions of

era of the country and the altered security

This sense was reinforced greatly

publicized in the media providing evidence that the

when

a letter

commanders of the army. navy,

force and police had been planning a coup in the run-up to Fujimori

s

fraudulent

was

air

2000

9,1

Opinion data. Apovo Opinion y Mercado. Resunien de
Opinion Publica. 18 de Junio del 2001 Available online at www.apovoom.com.. For statements of support for Paniagua s action in this case, many of them from
former military commanders, see La Republica April 13: El Comercio Car etas. La
Republica. Gestion. and El Peruano April 16. 19. 2001. On the question of military trials
and punishment of the commanders, see La Republica and El Comercio April 16. 21.
200
2001 and Gestion April 2
Polling data available in

Encuests a

la

.

,

91

1

1 .

.

from Luis Iberico. Marciano Rengifo. Carlos Tapia. Alan
a big impact on later reform of me military: El
Comercio La Republica. El Peruano. Expreso. and Gestion April 17. 18. 19. 2001. See
also El Comercio April 16. 21 (calling for new laws governing military behavior); La
See comments

to this effect

Garcia and others

who would have

.

Republica Jan

13.

May

1

6.

200

1

;

Gestion June 2
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1

wake of the

election. In the

letter.

President Paniagua established a commission on

military reform: the final report of this

commission would be released

after

Toledo

s

assumption of the presidency and would serve as a guide for the military reform agenda
for the next five years.

The press and
commission as
the

the public

renewed

their calls for the formation

well, for after creating the Inter-Institutional

commission

s

creation,

little

of the truth

Working Group

to

oversee

concrete action had been taken on that front. Given

increasing evidence of the reach of Montesinos corruption into the judiciary and

especially the military courts, the truth

the

commission was seen by many,

NGO community, as the only trustworthy institution to

particularly within

investigate in a

comprehensive manner the human rights abuses of the recent

past.

As

the elections

approached. Paniagua received intense pressure from Amnesty International.
the

Andean Commission of Jurists, family members of the disappeared and

APRODEH.

killed,

and

others to install the truth commission. These groups held protests, high level meetings

with Paniagua, and a petition campaign to demand an acceleration of its installation and
an explanation for the delay.

While the public and international and domestic human
Toledo himself - pushed

for the

commission

to begin

rights groups

work before

the end of the Paniagua

administration, and despite frequent promises from the administration that

the

commission before

the end of

its

term, the commission

and even

it

would

was ultimately created and

commissioners appointed only weeks before the Toledo administration began. In a
flurry of press reports clarifying the

a

number of points were

Paniagua administration

clarified: the

s

the

final

vision for the commission,

commission would name individuals

219

install

it

deemed

.

responsible for

human

rights violations:

would

prosecution: the commissioners

it

would forward cases

to the courts for

be Peruvian; and there would not be

all

commissioners appointed from the armed forces, which some had suggested as a means
to ensure their cooperation

and

assist in their rehabilitation.

Other points were deferred to the incoming administration, such as whether the

commission

s

the commissioners appointed

rather

not. as

turned out. based on Paniagua

it

on a secret voting procedure by the president

criticism

s

s

one of

preference, but

council of ministers

provoked

from members of Congress and the human rights community for her service

under Fujimori, the possibility that Toledo might
discussed.

Though Congress made moves

commission and

truth

When

findings on institutional reforms should be legally binding.

to

were quickly shot down.

make changes

to

hold

alter the truth

its

own

commission was widely

vote on the establishment of a

to the plan decreed

by the executive, such moves

92

9

and promises of the speedy formation of the truth commission,
specifically linked in most cases to reform of the military and holding members of the
armed forces accountable for human rights abuses, see El Comercio April 4. 11. 18. 20.
'

For

calls for

May 4.
17.

1

12. 30.

8. 20. 2

1

.

2001: La Republica April

200

1

:

El Peruano

March

1

8.

1.

18. 19. 20. 22. 29.

April 11. 18.

May

9.

May
1

7.

1. 4. 5. 6. 8.

200

1 :

14. 16.

Caret as April

2001: Expreso April 20. May 5. 18.
commission would be installed before
the change of administration, but begin its work under the new administration, was
carried in all major daily newspapers on May 26 and 29. 2001 On the long-awaited
installation of the commission and the appointment of its seven commissioners, and the
controversy over Beatriz Alva s appointment and the decision to exclude non-Peruvian
commissioners, see Expreso and El Comercio June 11, 13. 14. 2001: La Republica June
13. 2001: Gestion June 14. 2001: all major dailies on July 7. 8. 9. 10. 2001; El Peruano.
Gestion. Expreso, and La Republica July 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 18. 2001: beyond this,
see next chapter, in which the Commission s work is discussed in detail. A. public
opinion poll conducted by Apoyo found that the public w as divided over whether the
commissioners appointed by Paniagua could be removed by Toledo: see Opinion data.
Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion Publica. 16 de Julio del
2001 Available online at www.apoyo-om.com. Also on this, see Caretas May 31, 2001
5. 19.

2001: Gestion March

2001. The cabinet

s

7. 8.

April 17.

announcement

May

17.

that the truth

.

.
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It

appeared that much of the machinery for reform of civil-military relations and

transitional justice established

office.

by Paniagua would be

The new administration would

controversy. While the

new

military

at

inherit a military

work long

agenda crowded with

commanders pledged upon

uphold the democratic values of the Constitution,

to restore the

their confirmations to

glory and trustworthiness

of the armed forces, and to support the work of the truth commission

Defense Minister Ledesma promised the changes
In the

weeks

in the military

after the latest military crisis,

Toledo took

after

in its investigations.

were only beginning.

Ledesma announced

that the

Defense

Ministry had trimmed $424 million dollars from the defense budget already, and that

more

cuts

lie

ahead, despite objections from within the military that more budget cuts

might jeopardize anti-narcotics and anti-subversive campaigns. The number of highranking officers had been trimmed, and the Ministry was working on proposals for the

reform of the laws overseeing the military. Finally, the

CSJM was

being reformed and

removed by Fujimori W Though

staffed with retired military personnel

retired military

personnel continued to propose alternate mechanisms for dealing with military abuses,
including a Military Truth

Commission

On whether the commission
Republica June
for the truth
4-1

12.

s

findings

separate from the one decreed by Paniagua, the

would be

legally binding, see Gestion and

2001: on whether Congress could or should make

commission, see Gestion and La Republica June

La Republica and Gestion April

its

own

La

proposals

11, 12, 13. 2001.

20. 28. 2001: Expreso April 23. 2001: El

Comercio

April 23. 28. 2001: El Pentano April 25. 28. 2001: Liberacion April 28. 2001. Caretas
(April 26. 2001

)

called for further firings of high-ranking military personnel connected to

w ere met with

from many retired military
and members of the press {El Comercio April 30.
2001). For an excellent treatment of military reform under Paniagua, see Pedraglio.
Tamayo and Castillo Fuerzas Armadas: Control civil y relaciones civiles-militares 2002.
the Fujimori regime.

Ledesma

s

reforms

personnel {El Pentano April 29. 2001

)

praise

.

military

s

acquiescence to the

including the

.

new civilian mechanisms of human

IACHR decisions

rights accountability,

and the emerging truth commission,

now seemed

1,4

assured.

Conclusions
Paniagua

s

assertion of civilian control of the

armed forces and

his establishment

of a truth commission by executive decree were bold and swift moves, the likelihood of

which had seemed remote only months before.

As Carlos Degregori

writes,

speak about the crimes and violations of human rights of our recent history
so direct

would have been unthinkable

publicize the evidence of massive

three years before.

human

in a

dare to

manner

Suddenly empowered

rights violations, the

human

rights

looked forward with great anticipation to the upcoming truth commission.

groups praised Paniagua for

improving the outlook of human rights

through the steps of restoring

IACHR jurisdiction,

4

To

to

community

Human

rights

in the nation

forming the working groups

to set

up

Chance to Depoliticize the Armed Forces. Inter Press
The publication of the coup plot letter also elicited a response from
Fujimori, who issued a statement from Japan asserting that the coup was intended to stop
investigations of human rights violations and corruption committed by Montesinos.
Politics

Peru: Historic

Service. Oct 5. 2001

.

Fujimori continued to deny involvement.

commanders and Tedesma s comments,
Republica and El Peruano April 17. 19.

On the

speeches of the

new

military

see Gestion. Expreso, El Comercio.

La

20. 2001: Car etas April 26. 2001. On retired
proposed plans for military reform, including the formation of a
separate Military Truth Commission to promote reconciliation between the armed forces
and Perm ian society, see La Republica June 1 6. 2001

General Sinesio Jaraina

s

9

Assessments of the Paniagua administration were very positive, as reported in both
domestic and international. For international expressions of support for Paniagua, see. for
example. Levitsky and Sanborn s editorial in the New York Times May 9, 2001 and
statements by US ambassador to Peru John Hamilton in Gestion April 19. 2001.
'

Degregori

Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos: reflexiones sobre

Verdad y Reconciliacion 2004.

p. 81

la

Comision de

la

the

TRC. handling

the crisis of the military high

Constitutional Tribunal. Military reform

command, and

was taking place

reestablishing the

an unexpected pace. Public

at

opinion, too. supported the creation of the truth commission, by an

86%

majority:

of respondents supported
g

When

were opposed.

with transitional justice

as either

Human

Supreme Court,

Rights

Paniagua
in

human

when

forces

were

polled in July 2001

name had become

virtually

;

only

10%

synonymous

Secretary General of the

OAS.

President of the

or president of the truth commission.

during this transitional phase was an unprecedented

empowered

rights accountability.

public

when

Peru: politicians and the public alike envisioned his future role

confluence of forces. Within Peru, the

allies,

creation

left office, his

Ombudsman.

What had occurred

powerful

its

overwhelming

to

move

human

rights

community and

the state operated as

against the military on controversial questions of

These two actors enjoyed legitimacy

in the

eyes of the

virtually no other institution of the state or society did. and while the

at least

temporarily paralyzed by the implication of the high

corruption, institutional decay and politicization, and

however, these actors were further
system and by the partners

in the

two decades. The domestic and

empow ered and

human

rights

human

armed

command

rights abuses.

Beyond

in

Peru,

influenced by the Inter- American

network painstakingly constructed over

international partners in the

Perm ian human

rights

Times Information. Global News Wire. Peru: Human Rights Amnesty
Inter- American Court Ruling on Peru. March 26. 2001. Lexis-Nexus
online. See also El Perucmo April 24. 2001 Gestion April 26. 2001
Opinion data.
Apoyo Opinion v Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion Publica. 16 de Julio del
2001 Av ailable online at www.apoyo-om.com.
Financial

Praises Historic

:

.

.

98

Gestion

Encuests a

May
la

Opinion Data Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de
Opinion Publica. 18 de Junio del 2001. Available online at www.apoyo29, 2001;

om.com
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network had found the Inter-American system a receptive and powerful venue for
campaign. As

De

when

momentum

national

la

Basombrio

Jara

writes,

the Peruvian experience demonstrates

rights

community

s

with the interests of those

campaign against impunity and for the

in

power

system, rapid change resulted.
Inter- American

that

coincides with a surge of momentum from the Inter-American

system, the possibilities for advance in the desired direction are greater.

human

its

w

in

rule

Where

the

of law coincided

Peru and the demands of the Inter-American

As we

shall see in the next chapter, the influence

system and the human rights movement

in

of the

shaping the Peruvian

experience with transitional justice would continue to play out over the next several

years.

The public was pleased with

the results of the

Paniagua administration. The

interim administration enjoyed exceptionally high approval levels, indicating that most

Peruvians were convinced Paniagua was taking the country
rooting out Montesinos

cronies and re-establishing Peru

w orld. Opinion

81%

the

transitional

considered

for

human

surveys found that

government
it

to

to

of respondents considered the Paniagua

six percent

54%

felt

1

1%

of respondents believed that respect

had improved over the course of the Paniagua

control of corruption had improved: and

by

democratic credentials before

have been a positive experience for the country: only

have been negative. Forty

rights

s

in the right direction

respect for

transition:

47%

thought

democracy had improved.

100

L,L>

De
""

la

Jara

Basombrio Ensayos sobre justicia y derechos humanos 2003.

p. 41.

Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion
Publica. 19 de Julio del 2001. Available online at www.apoyo-om.com. 39% said respect
for human rights had not changed over the Paniagua administration: 10% said it had
worsened. 33% felt control of corruption remained the same: 10% thought it had
worsened. 31 % said respect for democracy had stayed the same: 10% thought it had
1

Opinion

data.
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Paniagua had clearly opened the

whose

loyalty to

democracy and

way

own

their

for the dismissal

of members of the military

had been tarnished: over the

institutions

course of 2001. Paniagua and Toledo oversaw more than 450 retirements,

more than twenty

brigadier generals,

aimed

weeding out corruption and cutting the

at

of the bloated military. According to McC'lintock and Valias,
ranks of Peru

s

military

could not

that they

were so discredited by

resist the

new governments

convinced that the military was
2001 believed
thought

to

it

was

announce

that

it

was

likely there

unlikely). In

that

now

one

final

among them

their association

most

pail, the

a military

35%

coup

top

with the Fujimori regime

The public remained

purges.

entirely under control:

would be

for the

size

rather less

of those polled

in the next year

in

July

(54%

coup de grace, the Paniagua administration was able

Montesinos had been captured

in

Venezuela. His capture occurred less

than two weeks after a congressional committee reported on the network of corruption he

had established from

quarter of a billion dollars he had amassed as a result.

However,

efforts to investigate

of Peruvians

priorities

in this period,

human

1

"

rights abuses

and support

111

s

success

is

were not among the high

to eliminate corruption

worsened. For domestic assessments, see La Republica

and on the

1

stronger than that in favor of human rights accountability.

Paniagua

under Fujimori

his privileged position within the state

When

May

13.

asked

2001.

was much

at the

in

end of his

which

attributed in large part to his very un-caudillo style.

Plan Estrategico de Reforma del Sector Defensa.

Ministry of Defense. Peru.

www.mindef.gov.pe According to McClintock and Valias The United Stales
the number of purged officers was 486. p. 164. On the capture of
Montesinos. see all major daily newspapers in Peru, but especially La Republica. on June
25. 2001. Opinion data. Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion
Available

at

and Pent 2003.

Publica.

1

8 de Junio del 2001

.

Available online

at

www.apoyo-om.com

presidency what the Paniagua administration

s

greatest achievements had been. Peruvians

ranked them as follows:

4.

The capture of Montesinos
The cleanness of the elections
The return to democracy
The fight against corruption

5.

Assistance to areas affected by earthquake

6.

The creation of the Truth Commission

1

.

2.
3.

At the beginning of the transitional administration, polling respondents said they thought
the highest priorities of the transitional government ought to be the

economy (39%).

corruption (32%). and the next elections (26%): as the administration ended, the concerns

of the population reflected the same
heading the

list.

Human rights

those polled considered

country faced: only
tackled); the

the

set

of priorities, with unemployment and poverty

violations

human

2% thought

now were

rights violations as

it

should be the

a rare

phenomenon

(only

one of the three largest problems the

first

issue the

new administration

much more immediate dangers of poverty and joblessness were foremost

minds of the public. While Peruvians were supportive of the president

create accountability as a whole, there already

over

human

wanted

12% of

seemed

rights accountability in the public than the

to admit.

much

Corruption remained a

to

in

s efforts to

be more doubt and disinterest

nongovernmental organizations

greater danger in the public mind.

Furthermore, the high level of public support enjoyed by Paniagua and his cabinet

were not available

38%

and

28%

in

to

Congress or the Judiciary, whose approval ratings remained low

March 2001 (compared

to

Paniagua

s

68%).

102

at

Congress would, over

102

Apoyo poll conducted in Lima, reported in El Comer c\o Dec 19. 2000: also Opinion
Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion Publica. April
2001. Available online at www.apoyo-om.com. On approval ratings for Paniagua,
data.

typically ranging

from

65%

to

80%, see

this

same
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poll, as well as

one by the National

the course of 2001 and 2002. assert greater control of the transitional justice agenda, but

much lower

with

public support than

members of Congress was

it

had under Paniagua. Cooperation

difficult to broker, as

was already becoming

of the Paniagua administration. Paniagua attempted to construct a

modeled
all

after the

parties

OAS-led mesa of 2000 but now

and institutions

incoming administration.
Similarly. Toledo

Paniagua.

What

in

It

to

clear by the

Mesa

c/e

end

Dialogo.

be composed of political leaders of

an attempt to develop the democratization agenda for the

quickly

fell

due

apart

would never enjoy

1

"'

to partisan bickering.

the high level of public approval of

the incoming Toledo administration

the transitional justice

among

and new Congress would make of

agenda they inherited and of the sticky business of civil-military

reform remained to be seen.

Engineering University in Lima reported the same day

in

La Republica (the source of the
Apoyo data, go to

Congressional approval ratings cited here). For comparative

wvwv.apoyo-om.com On public
2001
1

priorities, see

Apovo

polling data report for June 18.

.

See El Comercio April 20.

May

3.

2001: La Republica and Gestion April 20. 2001.

227

CHAPTER V
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER TOLEDO
When
among

Alejandro Toledo entered the presidency, a high level of consensus existed

the public and the political elite in favor of far-reaching changes to the political

system of the country. In August 2001 polling data indicated
.

that the public

found even

the Constitution of 1993 to be illegitimate, a sign of the debilitated status of state
1

legitimacy

at the time.

Consensus existed too

for

thorough investigation of the

wrongdoings of the previous regime, including those committed by the

military, as a

necessary step toward rebuilding the institutions of the state and earning back public
respect and trust for them.

However,

as the institutions established to ascertain the truth about

wrongdoing

within the state gradually released their reports and set about punishing those deemed
responsible, that initial consensus began to fracture.

Toledo

s

control of the transitional justice agenda

It

was

quickly became apparent that
quite weak, as he

was

largely

reduced to reacting to the controversial decisions of a series of commissions and from
various parts of the court system: generally, his reaction

was avoidance. Whereas

Paniagua was able to control the transitional justice agenda himself (creating the truth

commission and purging the military high command). Toledo had

less direct control of

the unfolding process. Paniagua had taken advantage of the release of the video

command committing

the military high

project to exercise an unprecedented

1

Poll

.

power over

As of this

Fujimori

in

Aspectos constitucionales de

writing. Peru has not drafted a
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s

authoritarian

the military institutions, but over the

conducted by Universidad de Lima and published

cited in Bernales Ballesteros

2001

itself to protecting

showing

new

El Comercio
la

Aug

16.

2001:

transition democratica

constitution.

course of the Toledo administration, these institutions would recover

much of their

power, credibility and authority. Meanwhile, the center of action shifted from the
President to Congress and then to the Courts.

As we

shall see.

each of these institutions

struggled with a crisis of legitimacy, with public approval of these institutions reaching

all-time lows.

The window of opportunity

relations in the area of

human

for changing the nature of civil -military

rights accountability

would begin closing

quickly.

Certainly, there were early signs that the country faced troubling times. Toledo

inherited a less corrupt and unstable system than had Paniagua, but the 2001 elections

gave the

new

reentered the

president a

county

weak mandate.

shortly after Fujimori s

the presidential elections, receiving only

Posible party controlled a mere

historic

Surprisingly, ex-president Alan Garcia,

26%

5%

fall,

who

narrowly missed defeating Toledo

fewer votes. Furthermore. Toledo

of congressional

seats, perpetuating the

problem of executive-legislative tension. Toledo also came

into the

s

in

Peru

country

s

presidency

with a public in a deeply cynical and suspicious mood. The continuing release of

Montesinos thousands of videos embittered the public and turned rumor- mongering into
the

new

national pastime. Peruvians interviewed by the domestic and international press

regularly complained that These tapes

Allegations

w ere

the country s

key

constantly been

show you

made and

politicians, including

were usually proven

can't trust a single politician.

then rescinded,

many of them touching upon

Paniagua and Toledo. Though such allegations

false within days, the stink

229

of the Fujimori regime

s

corruption

continued to taint the entire political class, driving a deeper and deeper wedge between

Peru

s elites

and the public. The steady flow of shocking information revealed by

Montesinos from prison exacerbated the problem.'
Part of Toledo

s

of a highly impressive technocratic team of advisors. Paniagua
individuals

known

was

strategy for building public trust in the state

best for their stance

s

the appointment

cabinet had included

on human rights and their commitment

to the

inter-American and international system (Javier Perez de Cuellar, former Secretary

General of the
in

UN is the most obvious example

positions within the

human

rights

TAN.

),

many of them now

and

Paniagua

s

turned to work

controversial Minister of Justice.

Diego Garcia Sayan, became a judge on the Inter-Amercian Court of Human Rights, and
Susana Villaran joined the
other hand,

drew

his

Commission on Human

Inter- American

Rights. Toledo, on the

team from the world of business/

Despite the weak electoral mandate, most analysts
position to tackle the country

s

felt

Toledo was

major challenges, including the poverty

in

in a

strong

which the

majority of the population lived and. of course, the necessity of military reform.

'

See. for example. Clifford Krauss

York Times Feb

3,

President can Save

On

Tapes Spy Chief Left Behind Scandalize Peru

2001 or Carlos Tapia

Them from

2001. Lexus-Nexus online.

As one

Jaded Peruvians

Culture of Cynicism

More Videos

the allegations against Paniagua, see

Set

all

Wonder

Pacific

To Shock Peru

News

if

A’eir

New Indian

Service. June 25.

BBC

Online Feb

12.

2001.

major Peruvian daily newspapers on Jan 29.
3. 2001. Each of these last three

2001 and La Republica Gestion and El Comercio Feb
.

cite a

.

National University of Engineering poll which indicated that though nearly

respondents had heard about the allegation implicating Paniagua

of corruption, a mere

1

0% believed the

report to be true, and that

all

Montesinos network
Paniagua s approval

in

76%. Politicians and other public figures
Paniagua in the face of these accusations; see all major
daily newspapers Jan 29. 2001 On Diego Garcia Sayan s joining the IACHR. see El
Comercio Expreso and El Perucmo April 28. 2001 and Expreso Nov 9. 2004. which
ratings remained exceptionally high, around

rushed

to state their support for
.

,

accuses Garcia-Savan of being too soft on terrorists during the Paniagua administration.
'

See La Republica

s

profile of

Toledo

s advisors.
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June

8.

2001.

reporter noted.

Mr. Toledo must also reform the military, which

overstocked with generals. The armed forces are so discredited
repressive and corrupt behavior that Mr. Toledo
4

budget.

Toledo and his main opponent

campaigned

in part

military reform.

on promises

And

to

for the first

in the

may

bloated and

is

in

Peruvian eyes by their

be able to reduce their size and

2001 elections. Alan Garcia, had

reduce military size and budget and

to

oversee

two years of his administration. Toledo did take

concrete steps to continue Paniagua

steps towards reform of the military, budget

s first

reductions, and reassertion of civ ilian and democratic controls over the institution.

the course of 2001. 451

members of the

2002. the defense minister conducted
forcing 420 officers of the

w hat

armed forces

military officers for the year to 460.

military

w ere

relieved of duty. In

military critics labeled a

Over

December
vendetta,

sadistic

into retirement, bringing the total reduction

more than half of them

in the

Army/ While

number was higher than normal, proponents of the move pointed out

that

it

of

this

was needed

(and will be each year until 2006) to give a top-heavy force a conventional pyramid

profile.

14%

4

Meanw hile,

was reduced under Paniagua

of PBI

Mr. Toledo

s

w hich

the budget of the defense sector

Peru Posible

New

s

until

Minister of Defense Walter Ledesma to

York Times June

5.

2001

.

On

Garcia

success in the elections, see Steven Levitsky and Cynthia Sanborn
editorial.

A

Hard Choice

in

weak

Peru

May

9.

2000 represented

s

s

New

surprising

York Times

2001. The authors explain Garcia

s

resurgence

and parties, as well as Garcia s superior
campaign skills (contrasted with Toledo s tendency to stumble into scandal). The authors
also argue that the greatest danger of another Garcia presidency w ould not be a repeat of
his failed economic policies, but rather the main problem w ith Mr. Garcia is that he still
faces credible charges of corruption and responsibility for gross human rights abuses
during his first administration. If a vote for Mr. Toledo is a shot in the dark, a vote for
Mr. Garcia is a vote for impunity.
as the result of Peru

'

s

Ministerio de Defensa

institutions

Plan Estrategica

:

Castro Contreras

defensa nacional y reforma del sector defensa

2005,

p. 14.

Politica de seguridad.

9.6%. then
finally to

6.86% under Toledo

to

s first

Minister of Defense David Waisman. and

6.06% under Aurelio Loret de Mola. According

of the year, soldiers were being sent

maintenance had run

out.

home

at

weekends

to

The Economist. By

for lack

of rations, and

The government responded with one-off payments

the end

money

for

to plug the

gap. and authorized the selling of redundant defense-ministry properties.

Yet

it

was

crucial tests for

the impact of two processes already

Toledo

s

underway

that

would provide

the

control of civil-military relations during his administration, in

particular the release of the final report of the truth

commission and

the unfolding

drama

in the courts.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The commitment
in the

months

to rooting out corruption

after the transition

presidency. Toledo and

from Paniagua

many members of his

to support transitional justice efforts, to

make

to

make such

Military mutters

interim presidency to Toledo

party had campaigned heavily

reparations to victims of state

violations (including proposals to use recovered

Montesinos

s

and authoritarian tendencies continued

money

pilfered

reparations), and to aggressively take

The Economist Jan

1

1.

from the

s

on promises

human

rights

state coffers

by

on military reform and

2003: Castro Contreras

a

Politica de

seguridad. defensa nacional y reforma del sector defensa 2005: Clifford Krauss
Candidates in Peru’s Presidential Race Peck at Fading Military New York Times

May

On the matter of reform of the military budget process,
Los procesos de asignacion de recursos para la defensa 2005: Robles
Montoya Transparency y Control en la asignacion de recursos para la defensa: discurso
y realidad 2005: Palomino Milla Economic c/e la defensa nacional 2004: IDL
Trcmspavenciay eficiertcia en gastos para la defensa 2003.
25. 2001: Gestion April 21. 2001.
see Sibil la

i

Throughout this text. I alternately refer to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as
commission or TRC and by its Spanish-language initials. CVR.

the truth

.

Congressmen continued

reduction of military powers and impunity.

and hold hearings on the corruption and abuses of the
the

CVR was

the next

1

two

ratified

1

Commission held public and

to

form committees

990s. Meanwhile, the creation of

by Toledo and expanded from seven

years, the

.

to

twelve commissioners. For

televised hearings

and collected over

7.000 testimonies throughout the country, supervised the collection of forensic evidence

at

over 2.000 mass grave

sites,

assembled extensive documentation

the Attorney General's office to assist in future prosecutions,

list

of recommendations

to address the

which allowed these events
to clarify the nature

in

doing

of the

to occur.

According

of the violence of Peru

so. help establish the

new

weaknesses and

s

to the

later

turned over to

and developed a detailed

failures

of the

Commission

state

and system

itself, its

purpose was

recent past and determine those responsible:

transparency and accountability essential to the legitimacy

democratic regime: and begin to heal the breach that decades of violence and

state failure

had created between

and between individual

and society, between

state

citizens. In the

political

and

social factions,

opinion of the commissioners, establishing the

foundations for a consolidated democracy based on a stronger sense of civil society and
the rule of

law was the ultimate aim of transitional justice. To these ends, they called

upon those implicated

in the report to

countrymen, and submit

admit

their guilt,

ask for the forgiveness of their
4

to legal

proceedings against them.

The Commission benefited from

the assistance and participation of a

wide array

of human rights groups, both domestic and international. For example, the International

s

See El Comercio May 12, 20. 2001; Gestiou Jan 16. 22. April 21. May 29. 2001: El
Peruano May 8. 20. 2001: Liberacion May 20. 2001: La Republica April 22. May 21.
2001; and all major daily newspapers in Peru on Jan 6. 2001
4
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1

Center for Transitional Justice based

commission throughout

its

Peruvian Association for

developments

in

weekly

in

New York

tenure: hired a

Human

Rights

City sent consultants to work with the

Lima-based consultant

(APRODEH)

to report

to

work with

the

on post-CVR

nongovernmental organizations and

bulletins: provided

techniques and strategies of massive crime

prosecutors with information about

sent another consultant to Peru in June

2004

conduct a six-week

investigation

:

program with

APRODEH

continues to

provide technical assistance on post-Commission criminal justice issues

aid and assess

to

its

to

work on prosecutions

:

and today (2006)

and implementation of reparations, while tracking the post-CVR process and analyzing
lessons to be learned.

de Derechos

Domestically, the umbrella organization Coordinadora National

Humanos and

its

many participant NGOs

played a

information and testimonies these groups had collected over the

primary data for the analyses of the

CVR.

thanks the Coordinadora groups, saying

their assistance

truth

In

its

its

final report, the

vital role.

The

two decades became

last

Commission

specifically

work would have been impossible without

and information. Man) members of the Coordinadora worked for the

commission

7

in varying capacities, both in

Lima and throughout

the country,

and the

organization itself played a central role in publicizing the activities of the truth

commission and convening numerous meetings and conferences on

The example of other
rights

and recent developments in international human

states

law had a powerful impact on the truth commission. The legal question of the

applicability of international

111

1(1

related topics.

human

rights

law to non-state actors had always presented a

www.ictj.org/americas/peru.asp Retrieved February 4. 2006: Comision de

Reconcilacion Informe Final
justicia y derechos

Tome

humanos 2003.

1.

p.

Tome

IX:

211-3.
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De

la Jara

la

Verdad v

Basombrio Ensayos sobre

.

1

challenge to the Peruvian

human

regime. Peru had signed the

rights

Rome

Commission

transitional

Statute establishing the International Court of Justice,

which individuals can be prosecuted

in

community. During the Paniagua

Moreover, the

for violations of international law.

examples of the International Criminal Tribunals

explicitly cited the

Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda established by

for the

the United Nations. Together, they wrote,

the events of the 1990s demonstrated a growing international will and legal basis on

which

to create

vigorous mechanisms of universal jurisdiction to pursue those

responsible for crimes against humanity regardless of the place they were committed.

These developments allow us

to establish

with clarity the international legal

responsibilities of particular individuals that

Though

form part of non-state organizations.

the debate over the nature of legal applicability of international law to non-state

actors continued, they wrote, the principle of the extension of moral culpability for

human

rights violations to such

states to prosecute

them on

groups was perfectly clear and the

this basis unquestionable."

They

ability

of individual

also conducted a detailed

study of other countries experiences with transitional justice, including Sierra Leone.
Argentina, and Chile. But above

2001 ruling by the

Inter- American

decision, discussed in Chapter

No

state

all

the

Commission

Court of

IV of this

Human

cited the role of the groundbreaking

Rights in the Barrios Altos case. This

text, established the inv alidity

has the pow er to create exemptions from international

human

of amnesty laws.

rights law

according to this ruling. The Commission agreed, calling for immediate steps to end

impunity in Peru and reassert civilian judicial authority over

1

Comision de

12

Ibid,

la

human

Verdad v Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome

p 72-76. 294-301.
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I.

p.

12

rights.

45-47. ch.

4.

.

One of the most shocking

findings of the

estimates had grossly underestimated the actual

organizations had accepted death

Commission

itself

Commission,

toll

CVR was that all

toll

previous death

of the conflict Even

figures of approximately 25.000.

human

toll

rights

and the

received 23.969 reports of deaths and disappearances. Yet the

in part relying

on

statistical projections

under the guidance of the

Human

Rights Data Analysis Group of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, found that the actual

to accept

closer to 70.000. a

number some

find difficult

and others see as evidence of the enormity of the gap between Lima and the

marked by

a lack of information or interest in events outside of

lost

rest

only in a country so divided between urban and rural cultures and deeply

of the country

people be

number was

Lima could

so

many

without public outcry or knowledge. Thousands more suffered torture,

and other

illegal detention,

violations.

The

CVR found that the vast majority of the

victims of human rights abuses were poor, indigenous.

educated individuals living in the Peruvian countryside

Quechua

speakers, poorly

in essence, the

most

marginalized and forgotten sector of the population. The peaks of violence during the

conflict

had occurred in 1984. 1989 and 1990. thereby implicating

all

three of the

administrations responsible for governance during this period for failing to minimize

violence in response to surges in terrorist threats.

*"

lj

I include the Human Rights Data Analysis group as part of the transnational activist
network and/or epistemic community that influenced the Peruvian CVR. Lor earlier
estimates, see all major Peruvian daily newspapers on July 26. 2001 when the Census
for Peace was released by the Ministry for Women under Susana Villaran. as well as La
.

Republica April

1

8.

2001
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While the Commission
violence

lie

clearly stated that the greatest responsibility for this

with Sendero Luminoso.

it

did attribute

during the conflict to security forces of the

police.

The Army was implicated

rights abuses

in

by

was

attributed to the

blaming the two armed parties

to intervene in the

great sacrifice

scale,

human

made by

55%

of all forced disappearances

however,

to

condemn

Lerner). "a double scandal

armed forces

who

did not.”

the killings, disappearances

soldiers.

It

violations, nor the political leaders

did not hesitate, however, to

strategies

of the three presidents
the media, the

rights

their inaction or

CVR stated

reports include specific sections detailing the responsibilities

s

w ho

Church and

held office between 1980 and 2000. the judiciary. Congress,

civil society.

And

unlike

many

commissions, the

truth

unequivocally that prosecution of the crimes documented in their

was an absolute

the last of the nine

requisite of progress toward national reconciliation and justice. In

volumes of the

final report, the

Commission

for institutional reforms to redress the structural sources of the

14

by

human

14

The Commission

report

who endorsed such

the

from subversion, including

roundly condemn members of the military for perpetrating massive

Peruvian

words of the

The Commission recognized

to defend the nation

wounded

1.100 fatalities and 1.600 seriously

cooperation.

(in the

and the indolence, ineptitude and indifference by those able

catastrophe and

the

number of deaths and human

Army. The Commission went beyond

in the conflict,

Commission President Salomon
and torture on a huge

state:

of all deaths and disappearances

including both the military and national

far the greatest

committed by agents of the

perpetrated by the state

state,

38%

Informe Final de la CVR, Tome

I.
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details

recommendations

problems detailed in

their

report.

Among the

reforms recommended that relate directly

to the

armed forces were:

strengthening the Ministries of Defense and Interior as civilian checks on military

autonomy, reforming military training
changing legislation relating
rights

to

state

emphasize human rights and democratic

to

of emergency

and narrow the military mandate

in

status in order to protect citizen s

such cases, establishing stronger controls over

national intelligence, and overhauling the military justice system.

The

commission presented

truth

and the country

s

judges

in

ideals,

its

1

'

final report to President

August 2003. With

Toledo. Congress,

the release of the report, the

commission

also forwarded 44 cases to the Public Prosecutor s Office and the judicial branch for

investigation and.

where appropriate,

trial.

Finally, they

recommended

the

government

put in place a program to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the violence

described in the report. The International Center for Transitional Justice, which provided

technical assistance to the truth

assisting in the

commission

s

commission throughout

development of a reparations plan over the

work.

investigations, focused on

its

last

few months of the

16

Analysts attempted to assess military and politicians reactions to the TRC. and
often their interpretations were contradictory.

Unusually,

members

[of the

On the

commission] had the

one hand. The Economist reported.
cooperation of the army

official

See Tome LT del In for me Final de la Ci'R 2003: Ciurlizza Contreras Las reformas
institucionales propuestas por la CVR 2005: Hurtado Meza Una reflexion sobre la
fuerza armada peruana a partir del informe final de

Reconciliacion
16

la

Comision de

Verdad y

2005.

Information about the ICTJ role

in the

work of the Peruvian

www.ictj.org/amercias/peru.asp. as can a link to the ICTJ
for

la

Designing a Reparations Program

in Peru.
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s

CVR can be

found

Sept 2002 report.

at

Parameters

(though not of the navy, whose marines were also called on to defeat the insurgency).

On

the other hand:

men have

Politicians and military

commission
with

leftist

s

The

scuttled to defend themselves.

members, mostly respected academics and human-rights activists

sympathies, have been called reds and communists. Critics accuse

them of being tougher on

the Peruvian

armed

forces, obliged to defend a

who sought to take
undermine Peru s heroic armed

threatened democracy, than on the bloodthirsty insurgents

over the
forces,

state.

The report was a Marxist ploy

said one congressman.

to

1

Roberto Chiabra Leon had upheld his repeated pledge

commission, but no-one

in the

to support the

truth

military endorsed the idea of holding individuals

responsible for the crimes discussed within the commission

now

work of the

s

findings.

'

The question

before the state was whether to immediately open criminal investigation on the 120

groups and individuals the commission cited as responsible for human rights violations.

Immediately upon the publication of the commission

human

rights groups

recommendations.

demanded

Among their

the

s final report,

government take immediate steps

immediate

priorities

to

19

domestic

implement

its

were establishing the identity of the

victims of the violence in order to establish a reparations program, dissemination of the

commission

report to the public and

country, and advancement to

trial

its

inclusion in the educational curriculum of the

of cases of human rights abuses. They had reason

to

worry. The attention to and interest of politicians in reforming the state and investigating

human

1

rights abuses

was quickly w aning. As Degregori wrote:

Dealing with the past

(3):

The Shining Path Revisited.

18

The Economist. Sept

6.

2003.

Members of the truth commission hailed these statements, made as Chiabra Leon took
commander general s position in the army, and saw it as a major change from
earlier army leaders attitudes. See En La Mira. Feb 2003.
over the

19

Ibid.
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Sixteen months after

had opened for the work of
The economic difficulties the fragility of
the regime sharpened the tension between truth and justice on one side, and
democratic governabilitv on the other. Skepticism undermined the credibility of
institutions. The spaces for a reelaboration of the past narrowed and the
temptation to forget returned
The principal risk the CVR ran was that its final
report would be received with total indifference.'
its

CVR seemed to be

the

The human

rights

formation

disappearing.

community did

the public spotlight.

the spaces that

The Permian

its

best to keep the findings of the truth

how

best to

implement the

new commission

CVR recommendations

designed to

but also demanding that

the

commission not simply study the matter but take concrete measures

the

new

agenda.

to

International, the Instituto de

Commission on Human

Rights, and various

Defensa Tegal. the Inter-American

human

rights organizations continued to

monitor the implementation of reforms demanded by the truth commission
surveys, reports and articles in the years after

its

release.

22

human

frequent newspaper editorials contributed by

Commissioners of the

CVR attempted to keep the

rights practitioners

commission

and

and the

report. Still, as

11

Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos: reflexiones sobre

Amnistia Internacional

in this area,

question before the public eye and

pressure the Toledo administration to rapid!}' act on the

Verdad y Reconciliation 2004.

in regular

Similarly, major newspapers

such as El Comercio periodically issued special reports to judge progress

21

implement

21

Amnesty

Degregori

in

office of Amnesty International issued a public

declaration pushing Congress to approve plans for a

determine

commission

la

Comision de

la

p. 80.

Declaracion Publica.

Oct

13.

2003. Available

at

http:Aveb.amnesty.org/library/
22

See for example. Amnistia Internacional

un primer paso hacia un pais

sin injusticias

http:/web. amnesty.org/library/

Pern21 Feb

La Comision de

la

2004. Available

at

26. 2005.
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Degregori acknowledged.

Before the reticence of the majority of parties, of the public

ministry and of the very government, nothing guarantees that

its

recommendations

will

be assumed by the government and supported by important sectors ot public opinion.
If

one of the purposes of the

for the creation of the

forces,

political leaders

Commission was

and other responsible

many of them

power or

s

s

Commission

s

and

political

movement

).

armed
directly

leading politicians and military

in active duty, as

groups that had held political power since the return

and Fujimori

responsible

went largely unrealized. The report

parties, this goal

still in

civil society sectors

to discredit implicated politicians, the

challenged the reputations of many of the country

officials,

and

to

well as

all

democracy

three political

1980 (AP.

in

APRA

Given the systematic patterns of abuse revealed by the

investigation, they argued responsibility could be attributed to the military

commanders who oversaw these

policies.

Many

continued to deny responsibility for the events covered by the

of these individuals

CVR.

including most

importantly elements of the armed forces and Alan Garcia.

Garcia continued as head of his party and was universally acknowledged as the
face of the political opposition in the country during the Toledo administration, and

does not appear that his
of the

CVR.

political reputation has

been affected

any way by the findings

Garcia came in a close second to Toledo in 2001 and then

presidential elections. Unbelievably,

one of the

presidents in recent history has been returned to

least successful Latin

pow er

In the estimation of the truth commission. Garcia

w as

in

won

in the

2006

American

Peru for another five year term.

not only responsible for ordering

military operations without regard for the inevitable loss of

2

in

it

life

among unarmed

civilians.

'

Degregori

Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos: reflexiones sobre

Verdad y Reconciliacion 2004.

p. 85.
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but also contributed to the evisceration of democratic

norms by embracing

attitude other political leaders during this period adopted: while

an idealized goal for the

demanded

state, the reality

the cases

to

advance

same

democracy represented

of the conflict with Sendero Luminoso

the suspension of normal democratic guarantees. Attempts

Coordinadora and others

the

legal proceedings against Garcia

by the

were blocked when

were shelved by public prosecutors, though cases were advanced against

members of the

As

military

who

participated in the El Frontin killings.'

for the military, the

Commission had gone

4

to great pains to clarify that the

abuses they had documented were not the acts of a few perverse individuals, but rather

massive and systematic, resulting directly from military strategy.
places,

they wrote,

the

Armed Forces engaged

of human rights violations

The commission

in a

In certain periods

systematic or generalized practice

finds reason to believe these constitute

crimes against humanity, as well as infractions of international humanitarian law.
final report

and

The

included detailed information about the use of extrajudicial killing,

disappearances, torture, massacres, and sexual violence during the counter-insurgency

campaign.

Of all

the deaths caused

by agents of the

between 1982 and 1994.

state

roughly half were victims of forced disappearance."'
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For detailed weekly and monthly polling data in the run-up to the elections see
www'. apoyo-om.com: on Garcia s win see Forero Failure in 90. Ex-President In Peru in
a Comeback New York Times June 5. 2006 and all major Peruvian daily papers June 5.
2006. The 2006 elections are further discussed

at

the end of this chapter.

On

failed

attempts to prosecute Garcia for the El Frontin prison deaths, see El Comercio

2004. Feb
2'

7,

2006; El Correa Dec

Comision de

section on the

la

2.

2004; Peru21 Dec

3.

Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome

Armed

.

Forces.

->42

Dec

1.

2004.

I,

see especially

Tome

II.

According

to

Amnesty

International:

many members of the Armed Forces and

Police expressed their displeasure with

its conclusions, and attempts were made to discredit the
Commissioners by accusing them of being hostile to the security forces. Serving
and retired members of the security forces and their relatives, while recognizing
that excesses were committed by State officials during the internal armed confl ict.
6
also denied that human rights were systematically violated.'

the report and rejected

Though an August 2003
Commission
the

treated the

Commission found

see. the

for the

Armed

15% of respondents

and military were responsible for more than

between 1980 and 2000. and

that the

armed forces have successfully recovered
s

40%

of

Arm}' alone was

28.73% of all deaths and disappearances during

recovery was the public

believed that the

Forces in a prejudicial manner, and despite the fact that

that the police

the violations occurring

responsible for

poll found that only

this period, as

we

shall

their reputation. Part of the explanation

perception that the reforms demanded by the

government and the elimination of the corrupt military leadership were
accomplished. The year the truth commission

s final

report

was

in fact being

released (2003). a poll

conducted by Imasen found that 52.8% of respondents were pleased with the process of
reform the armed forces had undertaken to date.

The image of the armed

2

forces remained contentious, with the

themselves alternately accepting responsibility for
conflict

and glorifying the

protecting the nation. In

Pacification,

meant

to

historic role

Published in

available at

the

document and honor

La Comision de

hacia un pais sin injusticias
2

of their institutions

December 2003.

Amnistia Internacional

excesses

army opened

their role in the

la

committed during the

in fighting

the

armed forces

subversion and

Museum

war against

Verdad y Reconciliacion

of National
rebels, including

-

un primer paso

2004.

La Republica Feb

16.

2003. See

wvwv.apoyo-om.com
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En La Mira Feb
.

2003. Polling data also

Shining Path and the Tupac

museum

housed

is

is

Amaru

Revolutionary Movement. The building

ambassador

a replica of the Japanese

s

residence

in

which

this

built so the

soldiers could practice storming the building before the rescue operation in April 1997.

The museum

s

opening ceremony included a reenactment of the storming of the

residence (in which one hostage,

two

soldiers and

all

14 guerrillas were killed) and

was

presided over by the army chief. General Roberto Chiabra. and top naval officers. Neither

Defense Minister Aurelio Loret de Mola nor any other civilian from the Toledo

government was

attendance. (As discussed below. Chiabra eventually replaced Loret

in

de Mola as Minister of Defense,
relations

w hat many

in

interpreted as an attempt to shore up

between the armed forces and Toledo.)

Relations between Toledo and the military were

during

this period.

The museum

s

provocation to the government, as

it

was held on

demand

that

Toledo

Marlene Roman,

December

set into

as the

motion

a coordinator of a

ceremony proceeded, a crowd of roughly

trials

Human

Rights

youth group for human

rights, told reporters.

justice nor truth. For reconciliation there has to be justice and the military

-)

'

is

human

rights abuse.

neither

must assume

Protestors reenacted a military massacre of farmers and

reparations for victims of

Day and

of military personnel accused of atrocities.

10 should not be a day of reconciliation because in Peru there

their responsibility.

frosty

the very day Toledo had designated the

1.000 protestors gathered outside the Justice Palace to celebrate

to

considered to be

opening ceremony was interpreted by many as a

Even

-

da} of national reconciliation.

w idely

demanded

28

Q

Peruvian army opens anti-terrorism

museum Agence

Lexis-Nexus online.
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France Presse. Dec 11.2003.

Fujimori

s

reputation

was

not entirely destroyed either. Throughout 2003 and

among

2004. polls continued to indicate that Fujimori would enjoy the most support
possible candidates expected to run for the presidency in 2006. at the

polls indicated that large majorities considered his

government

same time

that other

have been the most

to

1

corrupt in recent years.'

'

Several scholars and commentators have attributed the ongoing

popularity of Fujimori and the lack of public outrage over military and police atrocities

during the war on terrorism to the
create order

commonly

and defeat Sendero by resorting

vocal minority of the public

felt

held belief that

to drastic

it

was only possible

to

and authoritarian measures.

A

imposed by the

a clear nostalgia for the sense of order

Fujimori regime.

In fact, the truth

commission

s efforts

increasingly entrenched notion that order and

of the two. order

is

far

did

little

democracy

more important. (Barometro

are incompatible states

polls indicate a

mere

respondents selected democracy as their preferred form of government,
selecting weaker,

himself on

many

of the

to dissuade the public

57%

w ith

and

that,

of

the majority

mixed forms of democracy.) This idea w as advanced by Fujimori
occasions. So too

was

the idea that the political Left in Peru

w as

thoroughly corrupt and only interested in protecting the rights of terrorists, an argument
also

invoked

to discredit the truth

commission and human

Fujimori or others accused of w rongdoing. Even
large minority

w eeks

rights

after

of Peruvians approved of his presidency (only

asked in 2002 to reflect on Fujimori

29

El Coireo Nov
Apovo.

9.

s

2004; El Peruano

autogolpe a decade

Nov 4.

groups by supporters of

Fujimori tied the country, a

53%

earlier.

disapproved).

34%

answered

When
that

2004. Both polls were conducted by

it

had been a positive thing for Peru, while

Though

these attitudes

democracy

as

it

would gradually

considered

it

to

have been negative.

decline, the public retained serious doubts about

actually functioned in the country/

Reception of the
positive,

52%

final report

and opinion polls

in

Lima

of the Peruvian truth commission was largely

indicated that the public accepted as true the version

of history the Commission offered. Unfortunately, knowledge of the actual findings of
the

it

Commission was weak and highly

received before, during and after

its

variable, in part

Noticias. and 24 Horas)

3.7%. and

(RPP) and

media coverage

television

CVR by the

most p oular newspaper

programs (90 Segundos. America

was incredibly low. These sources dedicated 1%. .9%. 2.5%,

2% of their coverage

CVR. between

to the scarce

work. One study by the media analysis group

Calandria found that coverage of the work of the
(El Comercio). radio station

due

to the process

February and July 2003

and

of national reconciliation, including the

that tells us

nothing about the content of

'

that coverage,

which could be positive or negative.

1

This lack of attention contributed to the ephemerality of the public's response to
the final report and their rapid disillusionment as concrete changes

Commission (such

as the reparations) failed to materialize. Indeed, as

the failure of concrete resolutions of the cases the truth

courts

may

actually reinforce the public

The CVR's legitimacy

~

(!

Apoyo

polls

demanded by

shall see below,

commission forwarded

to the

sense of inefficacy and distrust of government.

also suffered as a result of the devastating lack of popularity

conducted

The second, conducted

s

we

the

in

first was reported in El Comercio Dec 19. 2000.
2002 is available online at www.apoyo-om.com. On
example R. Letts article in Expreso Nov 3. 2004.

Lima. The

in April

nostalgia for Fujimori, see for
jJ

Penaflor Guerra "Documento de Lrabajo: Analisis del impact de
Verdad y Reconcilacion" 2005.
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enjoyed by President Toledo, possibly the least popular Latin American head of state
history. (Since

10%P 2 )

February 2004. Toledo's approval ratings have hovered between 8 and

Furthermore, according to Javier Torres Seoane/' nearly every group

society and in

Commission

in

government

also threw

its

that

in civil

supported the work of the Truth and Reconciliation

support behind Toledo's campaign for the 2000 elections.

Hence, as Toledo's government became discredited, the brief period of expanded respect
enjoyed by these groups was also diminished substantially, which
reputation of the

CVR.

That nearly every branch of government continued to suffer from

shockingly low approval ratings over the five years of Toledo
the

work of any such body more
Guerra goes so

'

heard of the

s

term made legitimizing

4

difficult.

far as to identify

-

an active campaign to discredit the

finds that these orchestrated attacks against the

who had

in turn hurt the

CVR had

relatively

little

CVR continued to hold favorable opinions of

it.

CVR.

effect

yet

those

despite having

heard criticisms that the Commission had been a waste of money, was partial towards

Sendero and against the Aimed Forces, and staffed by the

Leftists.

According

to

Human

Rights Watch, footdragging on the pail of government and open attacks against the

commission from several directions were obvious obstacles impacting

the effectiveness

of the commission. For example. "The impartiality of the commission was repeatedly
questioned by politicians belonging to

'

2

APRA

Although the government supported the

Barometro: Estudio 255: Lima Metropolitana y Callao. Feb 2005. Online

at

http://www.elcomerciopem.com.pe/ediciononline/html/BAROMETROFEBRERO2005_

GOP_ULIMA.xls
Torres Seoane "Documento de Trabajo: Balance a Nivel Regional y Local de los
las Recomendaciones de la CVR" 2005.

Procesos en Relacion a
'

4

Expreso

May 4.

2005. This

is

explored further in this and the concluding chapter.
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commission,

it

was slow

to

make up

its

60 percent share of the commission's budget

Cabinet minister and prominent members of C ongress tried to prevent prosecutions"

demanded by

the commission.

The biggest challenge
seems

to lie elsewhere,

by the

fall

of Fujimori,

°

to the legitimacy

and acceptance of the work of the

however. Because the CVR's institutionalization was expedited
it

emerged more

as a political project of certain sectors of civil

society and the political opposition than as a result of public demands.

community enjoyed unprecedented influence and
it

constituted a relatively

in the

Though

this

prestige during the Paniagua transition,

weak base of public support

for the

work of the commission,

several reasons. First, the very concept of national reconciliation

problematic

CVR

was and

is

for

deeply

context of Peruvian politics and national identity. Fujimori employed

the concept of national reconciliation to justify the 1995 amnesty laws, and given the

continued support for the armed forces in Peru (they continue to receive the highest levels

of public support of all branches of government), one suspects that
this line

many

people accepted

of argument. Peruvians wholeheartedly reject the idea of reconciliation with

those implicated in subversion, leaving the nature of reconciliation itself somewhat
unclear. This rejection of or at least lack of consensus over the

has been reinforced by President Toledo,

impossible and not a goal of the

Moreover, there
truth in Peru.

commission was not only

"

Human

has openly stated that reconciliation

is

state.

is little faith

As Giovanna

who

meaning of reconciliation

among

the public that

it

is

possible to uncover the

Penaflor Guerra has written, the challenge before the

to bring to light the horrors

of the

Rights Watch World Report 2003 Available
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at

last

two decades

www.hrw.org

in Peru, but

also to prove to the public that

indeed possible to hold an effective, impartial

it is

The current

investigation into the past and obtain the truth.

marked by

a type

of exhaustion amongst the public. With

dissatisfaction with the

performance of democracy

somewhat

interested. Distrust

of the various branches of government

62%

64%

of poll respondents claiming

to

have

little

49%

only

interested in politics today, while another

is

Peru

is

of the public citing grave

in their country,

public claims to be

media, with

political culture in

35%

is

not at

all

distrust of

news

media. Fully

86%

matched by

trust in the

of the

believe that the media manipulates information about political issues. This contributes to

an overwhelming sense of inefficacy

empowered

to exert

among

the public, both in the sense that

any control over government or demand

its

it is

not

improvement, and

in the

sense that the average person cannot ascertain the truth about the political reality in their

own

7

country

.

As one

final indicator

in general, the right to

be informed

of this trend.
in

66%

of individuals polled respond that

not respected in Peru.'

contribute to the debate surrounding those

human

rights cases

These factors would

which were soon

to

go to

trial.

The lack of consensus over the concept of reconciliation indicates
cause for the fragile public support for the

CVR is the massive gap

in state-society

relations plaguing Peru. In their conclusion to The Peruvian Labyrinth.

Cameron

note that, while civ

il

the 1980s and 1990s. this had

society

little

became

effect

on the "top-down, centralized and authoritarian

Pehaflor Guerra "Documento de Trabajo: Analisis
Verdad v Reconcilacion" 2005.

la

Mauceri and

stronger and better organized throughout

h

Grupo de Opinion Publica de

that another

del impact de la

Comision de

la

Universidad de Lima. Consejo de Prensa Peruana.

Estudio 245. Enero 2005. Available online.
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structures in society."

Cameron argue

is

The chasm between

severe even

in

state

comparison

and society

to other Latin

in Peru,

which Mauceri and

American

mitigated by the greater development and organization of civil society

the historical

and continued

Divided as ever by
in

organized

in

Peru because of

race, class,

and geography, the Peruvian public has not found

an accurate reflection of their

own

identity

nor an adequate means of channeling their energy to effectively impact the
like the

has not been

of national integration.

failure

civil society either

states,

and

interests

state.

Hence,

democratic transition of 1980 (which, as Mauceri and Cameron write, "did not

occur as a result of a mass movement favoring a return to democracy" and which did not
reflect a

consensus about the desirability or meaning of democracy), the

CVR can

be seen

as a project of organized civil society without deep reserves of public energy or a

consensus about the desirability or meaning of truth and reconciliation behind

1980 transition to democracy was the

from

direct

power

rather than public

transition the result of the political

result primarily

demands

vacuum

for

If the

it.'

of the withdrawal of the military

democracy, so too was the 2000

created by Fujimori

organized civil society and political opposition was able to

fill

s

removal: that an

this

vacuum does not

indicate any wellspring of public support for those groups, and does help explain

why

popularity and sustainability softened quickly.

s

Cameron and Mauceri The Peruvian Labyrinth 1997.
For a critique of the Sierra Leone

CVR which relies on related arguments about the

social basis (or lack thereof) for such a process, see

Reconciliation Commissions

2005.
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Shaw

"Rethinking Truth and

its

The same
1980 Peru began

basic

its

argument can be applied

to

Peru

transition to

s

transition with cessation of military Rile

elections. Yet. surprisingly,

Luminoso began

to

was

it

at this

grow, demonstrating

moment
to

that the

much of the

democracy.

and a return

In

to regular

armed insurgency of Sendero

population the utter incapacity of

the state to provide even basic protection to the public, thereby

undermining the

legitimacy of democracy in their eyes and laying the foundations for public support of

authoritarian

moves by Fujimori

a failure to consolidate

in the 1990s. Clearly, the last

democracy

in

Peru and periodic slides away from democracy. The

Toledo government, much loathed by the public, did nothing
for

democracy, and the great likelihood

falsifying thousands

turn.

Hence,

if

that

any transition

in

is

to strengthen public support

Toledo entered the 2000 elections by

of signatures has reinforced the sense

country continues to be mired

two decades has witnessed

that the political reality

such corruption as to provoke public disgust

at

remains unclear

to

taking place

in the

country,

it

of the

every

Peruvians and observers alike in which direction that transition might take the country, or

even

which direction the public wants

in

It is

public

s

It

to

be taken.

perhaps too early to pass judgment on the effects of the

psyche and on the future of the

country.

it

does seem

fair,

however,

state

CVR on the Peruvian

of human rights and democracy in the

to argue that the general lack

of consensus and

cooperation amongst the various groups holding power in Peru also marked the birth of
the

Commission. Even

who. due
to

as the

to the political

compromise

CVR emerged largely as a project of a

opening created by Fujimori

s

specific set of actors

hasty departure,

w ere

not forced

or engage in extensive bargaining with their opposition, so too the

Peruvian public remains fragmented and interpretations of the country
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s

recent history

remain up for grabs. The few old fujimorista stalwarts

who

had managed

posts had. of course, never ceased to defend Fujimori and the

armed

to cling to their

forces.

Martha

Chavez, the best-known of these, stated clearly that she would support any opportunity

new amnesty law

pass a

for the military.

confessions of several former

Chavez

also told reporters that, despite the

members of the La CoJina group, she would never

recognize the existence of such a group or accept that the Fujimori regime
in the

abuses allegedly perpetrated by La Colina

system,

it

to

only intensified. The outcome of Peru

40

s

As

the debate

moved

was implicated

to the court

transitional justice experience

would

be determined in large measure by the drama unfolding there.

II.

In 2001.

The Courts

Congress approved charges against Montesinos and Fujimori as co-

authors of numerous murders and disappearances conducted by death squads such as

Grupo Colina.
seats, there

needed
elite

to

41

Except for a few hardliner Fujimoristas

was consensus within Congress

who

held onto congressional

that the ex-president

and his right-hand

man

be held accountable. Publicly exposed as Montesinos had been, the political

no doubt saw his reckoning with the law as not only serving the cause of justice, but

also creating the opportunity to prove that Fujimori shared responsibility with

4

"

La Republica Dec

41

19.

2005.

McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru 2003. p. 163. Montesinos was
Venezuela in June 2001 and returned to Peru. He promptly offered to
hand over tens of thousands of videotapes implicating hundreds of individuals. Clifford
Krauss, Peru s Spy Chief Captured AVir York Times July 1, 2001.
finally captured in

Montesinos

for the crimes being

uncovered daily

in the press.

all

on Montesinos. and indeed no

responsibility, laying sole responsibility for the corruption

known documentation

Fujimori denied

or video has linked the president to these abuses.

Politicians clearly worried that Fujimori

public sphere and that he might even eventually

was

retaining a core of support in the

made good on

his

promises to return to

Peru to run for the presidency again. President Toledo and special prosecutors
strenuously lobbied Japan to return Fujimori to face

trial in

Peru or The Hague, but to no

The public blamed government incompetence and inefficiency

avail.

bring Fujimori to Peru to face

and prosecutors
inadequate.

48%

trial:

in the extradition

In

2005,

80%

for the failure to

considered the work of the government

case to have been inefficient and

60%

believed the main reason Fujimori had not returned for

considered

trial

was

it

the

incompetence of the government: others blamed the protection of the Japanese

government or a lack of sufficient evidence.

As would soon become

'

apparent, the consensus in Congress for pursuing

Montesinos and Fujimori did not extend to the idea of a relentless pursuit of justice for
violators of human rights within the military. In

May

party blocs, the National Unity coalition and the

APRA party, each

legislation granting

amnesty

Japanese ambassador

4

”

As

residence, during

which

that

introduced draft

involved in the 1997 siege of the

all

early as 2002. the Peruvian and international

hinted
until

s

to military officers

of 2002. the two main opposition

he might try to replicate Alan Garcia

fourteen of the insurgents were killed.

media conjectured
s tactic

and Fujimori

of staying outside the country

charges against him were dropped and then return to run again. James Brooke

Former President Plots His Return to Power New York Times Dec 22. 2002. The
Nov or Dec 2005 is available online at www.apoyo-om.edu. On
the failed campaign to have him extradited from Japan, see Expreso Dec 28. 2004: El
Peruano Nov 29. 2004. Dec 27. 2004: El Comercio Oct 29. Dec 21. 2004.
Peru's

Apoyo

polling data from

Autopsies of eight of the insurgents indicated that they had been shot
in the

back of the head, implying they had been summarily executed

When, on May

among them
warrants.

1

1.

three generals, accused of the killings, the

after surrendering.

army refused

to act

on the

Olivera. striking a conciliator}* tone,

would be replaced with summons,

announced

that the arrest warrants

legislation,

which would have ended the investigations

way to

point-blank range

2002. Judge Cecilia Polak issued arrest warrants for twelve officers,

Though Minister of Justice Fernando

offered as a

at

into the case,

the proposed

was

explicitly

prevent a direct confrontation between the armed forces and civilian

authorities.

Aprista Congressman Jose Barba Caballero argued that

the arrest warrants are

unjust and dangerous. Unjust because they seek the arrest of the suspects before carrying

out an investigation, and dangerous because they place the

disobedience, which could give rise to something

more

army

serious.

in a position

He

of

also accused Justice

Minister of Fernando Olivera of pursuing the case for politically motivated reasons; the
administration clearly wanted a

human

ordering abuses.

From

the international

community and

amnesties aimed

at

the Left,

4

'

at least

Abraham Lama

Press Service.

May

Congressman

would implicate Fujimori

Javier Diez

Canseco countered

courts nor the Peruvian Congress

granting impunity for

of military subordination
appeared, and

rights case that

human

to civilian control

w ould

4

rights violations.

*

17.

Raid ATir York Times

2002;

May

that neither

accept

Clearly the questions

and of amnesties were not as settled as they

some members of Congress, including members of its

Peru: Opposition Seeks

in

Amnesty

to

first

Prevent Military L nrest.
T

and

Inter-

Peru Rethinks Order For Arrest of Officers In '97 Rescue

21, 2002. Lexis-Nexus online.

254

third largest political parties, continued to

worry about military unrest and

heroism of members of the military implicated

human

in

to

uphold the

rights abuses.

Evidence of deep and systematic corruption within the judiciary has destroyed the

The Vladivideos had

credibility of the entire legal system that functioned under Fujimori.

directly linked

members of even

Montesinos and

the highest courts in the country to

implicated them in abuse of the legal system and corruption. Moreover. Fujimori
dismissal of a large percentage of the judges in the system

their

at the

s

time of his coup and

replacement with provisional judges dependent on his administration for office

few courts with

credentials of autonomy, professionalism or even-handedness.

problem of how

to address the

previous decade occupied

non-existence of a

much of the

presidencies. In January 2003. just

had provoked a

report, the issue

overturned. Peru

s

fair

legal

The

system over the

time and attention of the Paniagua and Toledo

months before

new

and just

left

crisis

when

the release of the truth

commission

the conviction of Abimael

s

Guzman was

Constitutional Tribunal (TC) ruled the bulk of the Fujimori-era

antiterrorism legislation unconstitutional, in keeping with the 2001 Inter- American Court

of Human Rights decision, and found those convicted under the legislation entitled
retrials in civilian courts.

At once,

44

the unimaginable began: the courts

began preparing to retry imitates

imprisoned on charges of treason against the nation or serving
Fujimori anti-terrorism legislation.

When the TC made

its

life

sentences under the

ruling. 1.935 imitates fell into

these categories. Within days of the ruling, one hundred of them had filed for

By October

44

On

the

to

new trials.

2004. The Economist reported that 212 inmates convicted under Fujimori

TC

Peruano Jan

decision to overturn the cases, see
10.

2003.

La Repuhlica Jan

9. 10.

2003; El

s

anti-terrorism laws

had already been released

of evidence or because they had

for lack

completed their sentences. The public reacted with shock and anger. Polling results
indicated that, of the

64%

of respondents

19%

disagreed with the decision and only

mean
71

that

some

terrorists

who had heard of the TC

would now go

60%

agreed.

interpreted the court

35%

free (only

decision.

(23%

disagreed).

Though 52% believed

the ruling reflected a desire to bring Peru

weakness of the courts before the

terrorists.

President Toledo

statements about the ruling, both supporting the court

toward re-establishing democracy and the rule of law
promising to declare a national

when

nerve, particularly

members. Guzman
administration.

46

it

state

came

s retrial

of emergency

who had

Efforts to retry those

to

began

32%

4,1

decision as a necessary step

10. 20.

and simultaneously

in Peru,

an} terrorists went free.

in

2004.

at a difficult

to exhibit

comparison

to

moment

4'

for the

Toledo

weakness and was constantly under

Toledo

criticized the

s

own

dismal approval ratings.

slow progress made on high profile

polling data from Jan 2003. Available online at

Republica Jan

www.apoyo-om.com: La

2003.

At the time of writing, the case against Guzman remained unresolved, in part due
of the first trial convened, and numerous resignations and scandals over the

to the

failure

conduct of the

Nov

3.

2003,

trial.

Nov

to

contradictory

-

if

it

Abimael Guzman and other leading Shining Path

Though President Toledo had publicly

Apoyo

s

made

attributed

s

been convicted of terrorism touched a very raw

The judiciary continued

attack, but this obstacle paled in

"

decision to

disagreed with this statement);

standards of justice in line with those of the international community.

4

s

% understood that the ruling meant some terrorists could now be retried in civilian

courts

a

77%

On torturous

7. 8. 9, 10.

1

7.

path of Guzman

s retrial,

2004; El Comercio

Peruano Nov 3. 8. 15. 16, 18. 2004: El Correo Nov
Peru21 Nov 30, 2004. March 14. 2005.
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Nov
10.

see
10,

1

La Republica March
1.

16. 30.

2004; Expreso

2004: El

Nov

3.

2004;

28.

cases, he had also

warned

would encourage new growth among

after the defendants

The

level

largely defeated a decade before

the polling firm

probable

that

The public

Apovo found

surprising.

45%

courtroom packed with

A

terrorist

new wave

of terrorism

it

probable or very

in the

next ten years.

clearly linked the Constitutional Tribunal decision to both the

as. indeed,

did

movement

September 2004 survey conducted by

of Lima residents thought

Peru would suffer from a

movement of the country and
Rights

that

in a

of continuing uneasiness over a

was

human

the earlier rulings of the Inter-American Court of

retrials particularly

The

retired admiral is seething:

angered the military.

I

don

t

rights

Human

NGO community. 49

members of the Peruvian

The

new

the remnants of the Shining Path, particularly

began chanting Sendero slogans

reporters and cameras.

runs the risk of having the

Others feared that public coverage of the

doors opened for terrorists to be freed.

trials

interview that Peru

in a television

A January 2003

article reported:

know when we went from

being

in the dock. Peru s armed forces were once
The downfall of Alberto Fujimori laid bare
their involvement in hug kickbacks on arms purchases, in human-rights abuses
and even electoral fraud. But now the army reckons the pendulum has swung too

acclaimed as national heroes

to

being

hailed for having crushed terrorism.

far.

A

dozen generals are in jail, facing corruption charges. Alejandro
wants to bring the armed forces under tight civilian control. His

Toledo

government aims

to slim the officer corps,

and make

is

more professional and

accountable (the auditor-general would check the military books). But reform
stirring

4

48

Nov

9.

2004: El Peruana

Nov

8.

2004: La Republica

Nov

4.

2004.

Peru

s

Terrorism Trials:

Still

shining after

all

these years

Economist Oct 30. 2004.

l
'

is

unrest.

See especially El Correo

8.

'

up

De

la

Jara Ensayos sobre justiciay derechos
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Immanos 2003.

ch. 2.

The

article also

warned

that

ordinal'}'

terrorism as a triumph, and do no

Peruvians

still

see Mr. Fujimori

Military courts proved relatively cooperative with

demands

crushing of

'°

methods used.

juibble about the

s

that civilians

convicted under anti-terrorism legislation within the military courts be granted

The

civilian courts.

initiation

of civilian court cases against members of the military

provoked much greater resistance, on the other hand. The military
criminal procedures against current and former officers at

Numerous members of the

retrials in

7

military

were ultimately

capacity to block

did not

seem

and convicted

tried

sentence for illegal enrichment and general corruption,

first

s

to

great.

lengthy prison

among them both Vladimiro

Montesinos and General Cesar Saucedo Sanchez. Interior and Defense Minister from
51

1997 to 2000.

Yet progress on human rights cases represented a mixed experience. The truth

commission forwarded 47

to the Public Ministry for investigation

2005, 22 investigations had been opened.
the opening of these cases

was

On one

(representing

Of these

a genuine step forward for those advocating

383. 277 were current or former

72.3% of all those charged): 64 were from

277 members of the Army charged,

active duty, and

more than

Military mutters
?l

human

rights

been charged and legally processed

members of the Arm}
the national police force; and

were Marines. The accused included both active duty and
forces: of the

By

hand, the advancement symbolized by

accountability; in 2005. at least 383 individuals had

in these cases.

and prosecution.

retired

1

members of these

for example, at least 58

were

still

on

half the accused national police officers were. In addition to

Economist Jan

1

1

,

2003.

Gestion Dec 28, 2005. La Republica Dec 21. 2005
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5

the cases forwarded by the truth commission, four other

by 2005

at the

human

rights cases

were opened

behest of the Defensor la del Pueblo. Together, of these 26 cases,

1

involved charges of qualified homicide: 10 of forced disappearances: 8 of kidnapping: 3

of torture: 2 of simple homicide:
aggravated terrorism:

1

1

of aggravated kidnapping:

of sexual violation: and

By February of 2005. journalists were
current and former

Justice

May Be

members of the

Delayed

for

getting progressively longer for

One hundred and

been dying.

come

in the

to living

of

of genocide/'

End

some members of the

some have accustomed themselves

1

dramatizing the fear of prosecution which

military had

Decades. But

1

of qualified torture;

1

to

it

known. As one

article entitled

Comes

the nights are

military

put

The

it.

fear has

grown and

day by day. The impunity of yesteryear has

eighty officers were implicated in a series of

human

rights

violations and connected to the kidnapping, torture and executions of more than 520

individuals between 1983 and 1997; their cases

commission had forw arded
the capture

to the

fell

within 16 of the 44 the truth

Ombudsman and judiciary

for investigation. In

of many of these 180 accused was ordered. Though

Noel, the chief of the military-political

continued to

move

about in

total

command

of Ayachuco

others, like

2005.

Clemente

in the early 1980s.

freedom in public w ithout being apprehended, some

took precaution and tied the country. Numerous implicated individuals continued in
positions of power in both the military and

government under Toledo

/"'

Defensoria del Pueblo A dos cmos de la Comision de la Verdady Reconcilacion 2005.
ch. 2; for

x

coverage of human rights cases, see La Republica Dec 21. 2004.

Oscar Castilla C.
Feb 13.2005.
'

La

Justicia

Puede Tardar Decadas. Pero A1 Fin Llega. El Comercio
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Some

bold prosecutions did go forward. In March 2004. the Fourth Criminal

Court of Huancayo charged retired General Luis Perez Documet with kidnapping.

Documet was

military chief of Junin province in the early 1990s. a period in which

least nine university students

were forcibly disappeared

Huancayo. Luis Alberto Ramirez, a key witness

in

the Truth and Reconciliation

Commission about

survived a third attempt on his

at the base,

life in

Human

Rights request that

the)'

demands by Human Rights Watch

do

so. the

the bold

in the trial

at a military’

base

also testified before

and witnessed

June 2005. Though the Peruvian
after the

Inter-American Commission

s life

lead to repeated

government improve

that the Peruvian

moves taken by

who

attempts on Ramirez

protection services and investigate the attempt.

Among

being held

brutal torture he suffered

government supplied Ramirez with a police guard
on

after

at

its

witness

4

the courts to bring those responsible to justice

were the opening of procedures against those implicated

in

cases of large-scale military

abuses alleged to have occurred in Accomarca and Cava, two
region. In June 2005. twenty nine arrest warrants

were issued

v

illages in the

Ayacucho

for military officials

accused of involvement of the 1985 massacre of 72 villagers in Accomarca. Though the
military courts had found a handful of officers guilty of the massacre in 1993. these

officers too

had been granted amnesty under Fujimori, and few outside the

believed the case had been fully investigated in the

''

1

first

place.

Special

military'

Human

Rights

Prosecutor Cristina Olazabal went so far as to accuse ex-president Alan Garcia, a former

4

Human

Rights Watch.

Peru: Third Attempt on Life of Key Torture Witness.

2005. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/03/perul

" Rich Vecchio Peru

Manos

de Juez.

3.

074_txt.htm

military resists civilian trials of human rights violations.

2005 Lexis-Nexus online.
El Comercio Feb 4. 2005.

Associated Press. July

1

June

7.
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Caso Que Hizo Aflorar

la

CVR en

president of the Joint

command

in
h

massacre/
detain

1

Command

of the

Armed

Ayacucho. and other high

Forces, a former chief of military

officials

Then, within the space of one week

of criminal complicity
in

in the

Accomarca

July 2005. orders were ordered to

18 individuals implicated in events that transpired in the village of Cayara in

1988.

More

many

others were tortured. Reportedly,

attack

on an army convoy a day

May

than two dozen villagers were killed as a result of military' actions there, and

earlier.

the massacre

Wilson wrote

If the release

in

of the

in retaliation for a guerilla

'

Bold action within the judiciary was met with
and Congress.

was

CVR final report

political

avoidance from Toledo

had presented Toledo, who, as

August 2003. "has never been popular with the Perm

the politically delicate task of weighing the

growing public

ian military

w ith

cries for justice against

allowing the report to stand as the final word on the war." his actions on this front were
often contradictory.

At times Toledo opted

of implicated individuals

for avoidance of the question of prosecution

in the security forces, despite a succession

courts to speed the justice process.

of moves by the

The capacity of the Toledo administration

to seriously

challenge the armed forces and force wide-reaching changes on the institution rapidly

diminished ox er the course of his presidency. During
state

'

6

w ould

continue to suffer from extremely low

Caso Que Hizo Atlorar

FB1S-LAT February
Vecchio

5.

lex els

CVR en Manos de .Tuez.

of the

of public confidence. President

El Coniercio Feb 4. 2005 and

2005.

Peru military

Press. July 7.

la

this period, all institutions

resists cixilian trials

2005 Lexis-Nexus online.
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of human rights

x

iolations.

Associated

Toledo, by 2003 the single least popular head of state in the history of polling on such
matters in Latin America,

was hardly

in a position to

challenge the military, which,

conversely, enjoyed the highest levels of popular respect and trust as early as 2003.

One of the

biggest obstacles to prosecution proved to be the assertiveness of the

military courts in continuing to claim jurisdiction over

in

Chapter

I.

the tradition of military fueros, under

special, separate legal procedures

human

which

the

rights cases.

As

discussed

armed forces enjoyed

overseen by members of the defense sector themselves,

has long served as one of the pillars of special privilege enjoyed by Latin American

militaries.

The Peruvian

Justice (Consejo

members of the
courts.

As

political

military justice system, led by the

Supremo de

services from the careful scrutiny they

machinery

to guarantee

emergency were

alleged crime

in action

it.

would have received

in

all

protecting

in criminal

the military justice system served as the

impunity to human rights violators within the

In the 1990s. Fujimori passed a decree that

member of the

CSJM). has been instrumental

Justicia Militar.

the Insituto de Defensa Legal puts

Supreme Council of Military

military."

military personnel operating in zones of

24 hours a day: therefore, any charge brought against a

military in such a zone could only be tried in military courts, even

would normally

fall

under the jurisdiction of tradition

civil courts.

if

the

This was

one of several expansions of military court jurisdiction ox er the Fujimori regime.

Though
Congress

"

8

CVR has specifically called

to institute

civilian court

human

the

upon the Toledo government and

reforms to subject the military courts to the supremacy of the

system and to define clearly via law the jurisdiction of civilian courts

rights cases, in

IDL Los nudos de

la

2005 and 2006

this issue

defensa 2005.
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remained unresolved.

In

2001 the

in all

CSJM

and the Council of Magistrates (the
developed a proposal

institution

had hardened against the reform.

those

the

human

all

By

CSJM.

like

judges) had

54

The

truth

CSJM now insisted

under investigation

commission, and despite the

members of all high

on asserting

members of the

in

fact that

CSJM

CSJM

claims to

military,

even

in

accordance with

many members of the

courts in the country, had been found guilty of
60

2004. a watershed ruling was issued by the Constitutional Tribunal,

The

declaring the military courts out of bounds.

by the

its

in civilian courts in

corruption and abuses of the courts to further impunity under Fujimori.

But

to consider the

this point, the attitude within the

cases involving current and former

rights cases already

demands of the

to appoint

implement such reforms, yet Congress refused

to

issue over the course of the next four years.

jurisdiction over

empowered

to acquit

ruling had been provoked by the decision

Vladimiro Montesinos. Fujimori

s

armed forces commander

Nicolas de Bari Hermoza. and his military operations chief Luis Perez Documet. of
charges that they were the intellectual authors of the 1992 La Cantuta massacre. The
highest civilian court fought back with a ruling that challenged the military courts

4

Ciurlizza Contreras
00

Fuero Castrense

No

Las reformas institucionales propuestas por
Tiene Competencia.

civil/military jurisdiction debate during the

38 and Salazar Villalobos

Redefiicion de

El Comercio

Aug

la

CVR

28. 2005.

On

2005.
the

Paniagua administration, see Chapter

la .Tusticia

Militar

4.

note

2005: San Martin Castro

militar y los delitos de funcion (A proposito de la sentencia del Tribunal
Constitucional del 16.3.2004) 2005: Asencio Mellado Reflexiones en tumo a! proceso

La jurisdiccion

penal militar peruano 2002: Donayre Montesinos La reforma cle lajusticia militar 2004:
Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Para Hacer Justicia 2004: Comision para
la

Reestructuracion Integral de las Fuerzas

Especial para

la

Reforma

Armadas Informe

Integral de la Administracion

Final

2002: Comision

de Justicia Plan Nacional de

Reforma Integral de la Administracion de Justicia 2004: and Human Rights Watch
Annual Report 2005. On allegations of corruption and other abuses in the CSJM see El
Comercio La Republica, Liberation. Expreso Feb 2. 2001 La Republica Jan 15. 2001:
,

Expreso April 1.2001.

:

traditional

wide conception of their jurisdiction, arguing

TC

must

it

in future

offences in furtherance of military duties.

to hearing cases related to

the

that

be limited

Military courts,

argued, did not meet the requirements of impartiality and independence required

to guarantee

due process. This ruling was immediately followed by public demands from

Prime Minister Carlos Ferrero for the military courts
civilian courts

to respect their subordination to

and accept the annulment of their past rulings

in

cases

now deemed

inappropriate for their review. Supporting the judges arguments that the military justice

system was acting

in violation

rulings that breach

human

pretext

for

of the constitution. Ferrero called for the annulment of

rights, so that there

dodging prosecution.

can be

in the future

61

Nevertheless, military courts continued to conduct their

human

6-

rights cases.

no further excuses or

In the majority

own

investigations into

of these cases, the victims were without

counsel. In the cases forwarded by the

CVR to

the courts.

75.9% of the victims were

without legal counsel: 23.5% enjoyed legal counsel provided by

NGOs: and

The accused enjoyed somewhat

better legal

employed private

legal counsel.

representation, with

12.8% enjoying

represented by private counsel, and

legal counsel provided

42.6% w ithout

legal

counsel.

by the

state.

only .6%

44.6%

The police forces of the

country continued to do their part to contribute to the avoidance of prosecution of the

61

For coverage of the

military justice

TC

case and

Latin American

Lexis-Nexus online: La Republic
'

2

p.

Defensoria del Pueblo

A

its

implications, see

Weekly

Nov

Peru:

Move

to

Report. Intelligence Research.

2. 3.

curb reach of

Aug

31. 2004,

2003:

dos alios de la Comision de la Verdady Reconcilacion 2005.

129-149.
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armed forces (and members of the national police implicated

Only

1

7.1% of those charged with human

in

rights violations for

human

whom

been issued had actually been detained by 2005; 82.9% remained

III.

had

6j

at liberty.

the legislature to the powerful step the

challenging the military' courts

legislature to

arrest warrants

Public Opinion and Multiple Crises of Legitimacy

The response of Toledo and
in finally

rights cases).

is telling.

The responsibility now

TC

had taken

fell to

the

assemble a delegation charged with the responsibility of overseeing a

rewriting of the rules of military justice. Congress immediately attempted to pass

responsibility back to the executive by arguing the}'

were not capable of engaging

a project, citing the highly technical nature of the matter as

authority. Experts

on civil-military relations condemned

legislature to develop

new

under the control of the

grounds for abdicating

this refusal

in

such

their

on the part of the

rules for military justice and relocation of the military courts

civil legal

system as clear signals

that the legislature

was

unwilling to challenge the military courts as an autonomous legal entity. They concluded

that,

moreover, military reform as a whole was more window-dressing than genuine

commitment

to

democratic reform of civil-military relations. Meanwhile, the confusion

over jurisdictions further delayed ongoing

Grupo Colina cases had held

trials.

the alleged death squad

without sentencing them when, in January 2006.
detention for another 36 months.

63

Ibid, chapters 2

and

3.

The

Though

it

special criminal court re-hearing the

members

in prison for

36 months

decided to extend the prisoners

the law states that prisoners held 36

months

without sentence must be released, the court justified the extension on the grounds that

work had been severely hampered by

legal uncertainties

over the rules of military justice,

amnesties, and the multiple competing judicial jurisdictions that had been invoked/

Clearly,

many

political

maintain the status quo ante
Military

result

to

Reform

div ision

decision-makers

in the field

of the

Institute)

members of Congress

been held by the

to

it

6

The Defense and

'

de Defense Legal argued the
i

drop the

CSJM and armed forces to

CSJM

issue.

4

as in their best interest to

of military prerogatives.

of intense lobbying by representatives of the

persuade

saw

still

its

move was

and the armed forces

the

in general

Multiple seminars and meetings had

members of Congress,

discuss the issue with

and numerous public statements on the matter had been issued by the president of the

CSJM.

66

Though

of responsibility
little

this

was

a particularly egregious

in military reform,

was not

it

example of Congressional abdication

effort to exert itself in this area since the transition.

Commission on Defense and

Congress had made

entirely surprising:

Though

a congressional

Order had been active since 2003.

Internal

approved a handful of the hundreds of pieces of legislation under
majority of the energy and time of the

promotion and retirement.

64

La Repnblica Jan

its

Commission was dedicated

it

had only

review.

The

vast

to settling questions

6

24. 2006. Arrests of

Grupo Colina members began under Paniagua:

see supra note 38.
63

Ana Maria Tamayo and

66

Ed La Mira Dec 2005.
Montoya. Jose Robles.

of

Jose Robles

Prioridad: Fortalecimiento

Ideele.

El Congreso y la politica de seguridad y defensa:

^Fiscalizacion o abdicacion?

Ideele.

No. 166. Oct 2004.
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Dec 2005.

CSJM

If anything, the

official requests to the

the truth

and

commission

to the judicial

Human

s

s

actions

grew

Ombudsman

Rights

collected by the truth

commission and

The Ombudsman refused

illegal as the

was worrying:

office for information contained in

branch for investigation. This signaled not only the

CSJM

the military

s trials.

wished

couns

civilian

to

had ruled beyond

CSJM

in

s

intention

their jurisdiction,

DNA samples, autopsy repons,

but also their intention to use data, such as

were as

s

sent dozens of

records relating to criminal cases the commission had sent there

to continue trying cases the Constitutional Tribunal

institutions!

CSJM

bolder. In 2005. the

and testimony,

order to undermine those same

hand over the information, arguing the requests

Assistant

ombudsman Rocio Villanueva

to settle these cases in their

own

s

analysis

courts before civilian

courts could try them fairly so as to give any convictions an uncertain legal status and to
zo

invalidate the civilian court procedures for essentially retrying already-settled cases.

Then,

left

in the final

the passage of a

law. finally passed

two hours of the

new law governing

Law 28665

-

the

legislative session

military justice to the last

Law on

congressional

w ith

68

69

Fuero Castrense

Laws

The contents of the new law

De centralista.

Concertcicion

reported that the law passed

unanimous support of UN, APRA. F1M and Peru Ahora

the

No

Tiene Competencia

are published in El

database

at

Perucmo and

El

Comer cio. Aug

their full text

http:/A\w'w.elperuano.com.pe/ under

minute decision, see El Perucmo Dec

Competence

Susana Villaran. presidential candidate and

political firestorm.

member of the

moment allowed by

the Organization. Functions and

of the Specialized Jurisdiction over Military Penal Matters.

provoked an immediate

of 2005. Congress, having

14. 15.

in

w hat

she described as

28. 2005.

can be found on the paper

Normas

Legales.

On

s

Congress

s last

2005: Peru21 and Gestiou Dec 15. 2005.
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an attempt to protect the military

s

intervention into the legal system.

continued to reject pleas from a congressional minority pushing
these officers amnesty, he did

Supreme Court
argument

that

legal status in

to

review cases against

members of the

human

military'

rights cases.

Suprema Judicial Militar ).
to be

now back

composed of three

0

Though Toledo

to offer at least

some of

the formation of the special court within the

military' suspects,

which accorded with

his

deserved a more expedited settlement of their

The new Supreme Court of Military

officially created

by Congress

military magistrates and

two

s

Justice (Sola

approval of Law 28665. was

civilian judges.

By

a simple

majority vote, the court would determine which military abuse cases should be forwarded

to civilian courts

and which ought

This was interpreted by the
reversing

much of the

to

be heard

human

1

in

rights

closed military tribunals.

community

significance of the previous year

s

as a

major setback,

decision by the Constitutional

Tribunal declaring the military justice system unconstitutional and calling upon Congress

to create

new

legislation asserting civilian jurisdiction over military courts.

avenue was being created

to

circumvent civilian courts and route sensitive cases back

military jurisdiction, and the president

system for the

persecution

Now a new

was

blasting the

of military personnel.

'

discredited

civilian court

The Attorney General Fiscal de
(

Nacion) Adelaida Bolivar appealed to the Constitutional Tribunal (TC). arguing

"

to

that

la

Law

Villaran denuncia aprobacion de ley que permit ira intromision militar en justicia

comun.

El

Comer cio Feb

7.

2006: on the significance of the law. see La Republica Jan

27. 2006: Defensoria del Pueblo

s

comments

in El

Comercio Feb

28. 2006.

Approval of the law w as announced in the government newspaper. El Peruano on Dec
16. 2005. under the headline Congreso crea Sala Suprema Judicial Militar. For
Toledo s demands for more celerity in the military justice process, see El Peruano Dec
28.2005.
1

72

Ibid.
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28665, which had originally legalized the CS.TM

s

wider jurisdiction, violated the

Constitution and international law and jeopardized the

TC

system. The

agreed to hear the case.

including one staged outside
February' 2006. That

civilian

CSJM

same day.

the country

s

Supreme Court was scheduled

new Sala Suprema Judicial Militcir.

by many as indicative of the Supreme Court

the justices refused to

question of

announced

The new law met with immediate

its

make

that a

was

commission of judges was

militarize

of the civilian court

sy

in the

7.

realiza planton

and

TC

2006. Bolivar

Mn a response

convene

until the

Vasquez Vejarano

would any law. including Law 28665. be

new

of the generals being considered as

Sala Suprema Judicial Militar had strong

Two

ties to

of the three had participated in

en rechazo de ley que permite a justicia militar juzgar otros

acoge demanda contra reforma de
s

the

process of reviewing the laws of

that three

Montesinos during the Fujimori administration.

delitos

name

stem.

possible appointees to the

CAL

to

in

the justice system nor institutionalize interference with the duties

Meanwhile, La Republica reported

'

protests,

rejection of the idea of the Sala .

established. Chief Justice Walter

military justice, but that under no circumstances

allowed to

s

the appointments or allow the panel to

constitutionality

legal

by members of the Colegio de Abogcidos de Lima

judges to be appointed to the

interpreted

autonomy of the Peruvian

la

justicia militar

El Comercio. Feb

appeal was reported in nearly every Peruvian newspaper, including

La

Republica El Peruano. Gestion. Expreso, and El Comercio on Jan 26. 2006: see also
Gestion and Peru21 Feb
16. 20.

4

2006: El Peruano Feb

15. 16. 20:

La Republica Feb

13.

2006.

CAL

delitos

13. 20.

realiza planton en rechazo de ley

El Comercio Feb

7.

que permite

a justicia militar juzgar otros

2006.

Poder Judicial no pondra en funcionamiento sala militar El Comercio Feb 9. 2006.
The Inter-American Comision on Human Rights expressed its concerni over the new law
and requested reports from the government and human rights organizations on the matter:
Peru21 Feb 21. 2006.
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signing the oath of loyalty to Fujimori videotaped
the Paniagua administration.

investigation into

its

human

At

its

commitment

of the judges considered for the

1999 and released publicly during

that time, the military leadership

rights abuses alleged to

agents and reaffirmed

in

slots

to

pledged to obstruct any

have been committed by the

amnesty for members of the

had defended Montesinos

state

military.

in military court,

and

Three
while

another was undergoing investigation for malfeasance of office. In light of these and
other objections. Susana Villaran and others organized protests, including the symbolic

washing of the flag outside government

The government
military reform. In

human

s

h

offices.

next steps further enflamed those

pressed for genuine

December 2005. Rick Vecchio of the Associated Press reported

rights groups

complain [Toledo] has done an about-face, bowing

pressure to sidestep the prosecution of abuses.

statements

who

made by

the president

and

Among the

that

to military

evidence were public

many members of Congress

that military suspects

had not received due process in civilian courts. This was clearly a position gaining
popularity in Congress. In

the Defense

December 2005 and January 2006. Luis

Iberico. president of

Committee of Congress, accused members of the Public Ministry of bringing

charges against

members of the

commission and of violating

military based solely

officers

on charges made by the

truth

fundamental rights in the course of legal

procedures. Provincial magistrates were charged with borrowing whole paragraphs from

b

77

Reported

in Gestion.

El Perucmo, El Comercio and La Republicci Feb

Vecchio Dec 2005.
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3.

2006.

the

CVR report as justification

of Congress
truth

now pointedly reminded members

commission was not

NGOs

why

human

rights cases.

s

Jose Barba

itself

accusing Peruvian and

of unjustly pressuring judges and

According

and arbitrariness

committed by the Public Ministry.

own

90%

estimate that

in

to

Barba, this helped explain

of the cases against members of the military involved

a large percentage

members

of the legal system that the word of the

UN

and the truth commission

attorneys into prosecuting

military;

sacred.

Furthermore, Iberico was joined by
international

members of the

for accusations against

PAP

s

Judith de

la

excesses

Matta added her

of the cases against members of the military were based on the

opinion of the truth commission.

Members of the

military

were being blamed and

tried

collectively, she argued, in violation of the military justice principle that all military

crimes are individual rather than corporate or collective.'
say that the unjust persecution of those

of the Peruvian

wound

state

was

in the nation that

would never be

which would grant amnesty

78

went so

human

had opened a

°

fully healed.

new amnesty law

to the

far as to

fought heroically against terrorism on behalf

the fault of the truth commission, which, he said,

Iberico put forward a

civilian courts for

who

Julio Favre

7

for Congressional consideration,

more than 600 members of the

rights violations at that

one

military being tried in

time.™ Once more the question of

A series of articles on these matters appeared in Correct Jan 3.

2006. See also Expreso

Jan 10. 2006.
q

x

"

Correo Jan

12.

2006.

Gestion Dec 26. 2005. La Republica Jan

Interestingly. Luis Iberico

the

Vladivideos.

As

12.

2006: El Comercio Jan

3.

2006.

was one of the members of Congress who revealed the first of
New York Times on Dec 3, 2000.

Clifford Krauss reported in the
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amnesty provoked a firestorm.

Ombudswoman

Beatriz Merino countered the proposal by

reminding the public that the Inter American Court of Human rights had specifically
ruled amnesties inapplicable to cases of

members of Congress

to military

FIM

and not

had the authority to judge defendants innocent or guilty

Others accused Iberico.

candidate on the

rights violations such as torture,

and forced disappearances. Furthermore, only judges

extrajudicial killings

cases."

human

ticket,

who was

in

such

time campaigning as the vice-presidential

at the

of simply playing politics: the restoration of the right to vote

and police personnel meant there were

now

134.000 military and police votes

o-»

to court in the

military

upcoming

and police and

elections.

"

not to mention those of former

their families, a

group potentially encompassing millions.

That these arguments reflected military opinion was

became obvious just how closely they

members of the

clear, but in

reflected military opinion

when

January 2006

it

a report prepared

by the military was circulated among members of Congress. The report forcefully argued
that legal

human

proceedings against members of the military were the result of pressure from

rights

NGOs

on judges and attorneys

to

apply the recommendations of the truth

commission. The military report claimed that the human rights organizations (including,
specifically

CAPA.

named

Ceapaz.

in the report.

CAAAP.

IDL. Amnesty International. Aprodeh. Anfasep. Cedal.

and Ipedehp) were able to employ three times as many legal

experts as could the defendants in such cases and that they unjustly threatened judges

with legal complaints

military

82

Dec

they failed to prosecute.

was contacted by

Iberico

81

if

7

and intelligence

Even members of the National Counsel

who said the videos came from members
community who wanted to embarrass Montesinos.
a

friend

29. 2005.

El Correo Dec 27. 2005.

°72

of the

of Magistrates

(CNM. Cornejo National c/e

la

Magistratura) argued that the

NGOs

had

broken their moral pact with the country by politicizing the legal process with attacks
against the military and

its

political allies.

Most accusations of this kind were published
the

NGOs

allies,

of trumping up charges

in

in

order to garner more resources from international

but they could be found in other papers as well.

example. El Comercio reported
seventy Peruvian

NGOs

On November

APRA Congressman Jorge del

12,

2004. for

Castillo s charge that

were directly controlled by Sendero Luminoso. Congressmen

and presidential candidates rushed

to

outdo one another

several called for a congressional investigation of these

they were accused of serving.

NGOs to

Expveso. whose editors accused

be investigated and

in

raging against the

NGOs

and the foreign

The Defense Minister immediately backed
tried,

and he acknowledged

NGOs. and

that the links

interests

calls for the

between these

groups and subversive groups remained a constant preoccupation of the armed forces.

Human

Retired generals told the media that the

Pueblo),

human

disappear

rights groups

the Peruvian

Rights

Ombudsman

(Defensoria del

and the truth commission had long conspired together to

armed

with this assessment of Peruvian

forces.

Even

human

a

member of the Supreme Court concurred

rights groups, suggesting that their

members

were simply angling for large international donations and positions on the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. The Defense Minister joined Iberico and his
their calls for

hunt

v

amnesty

of human rights

for

members of the

trial,

allies in

military unjustly persecuted in the

Congress

in

witch

portraying such an amnesty as a "legitimate proposal to

Expreso Jan 10, 16. 17. 18. 23. 26. 2006. On the campaign to discredit NGOs see De la
Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobre justice y derechos humanos 2003. p. 86-89: La Republica
'

Jan 23. 2006.

reconcile Peruvians."

They added

that in cases

when abuses were indeed

weight of responsibility rested upon the civilian government

who had

perpetrated, the

failed to give clear

guidance to the military and police charged with carrying out the anti-subversive

campaign.

84

The debate over
security, rising

a

once more

new amnesty was
in light

fueled in part by concerns about national

of renewed, but isolated, attacks by members of

Sendero Luminoso. In December 2005. President Toledo declared a
six

provinces of the Huanuco region after
85

eight.

Some

elections.

ambush

SL

fighters

ambushed

state

of emergency

police officers, killing

suspected ST might be gearing up to interrupt the upcoming 2006

The Council of Ministers

President. Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. pointed to the

as proof that his repeated warnings over the past year that

regaining strength had been prescient.

"most of the 10.000

terrorists liberated

He

ST was rearming and

told the press that the attack also indicated that

under Valentin Paniagua's interim government

had rejoined the ranks of Shining Path." Fernando Rospigliosi.

Interior Minister

under

Paniagua, issued an immediate reply to this charge, pointing out that the Paniagua

government had released only 540 alleged

terrorists, all

of whom had been cleared of

suspicion by the ad hoc commission granted this responsibility. Furthermore.

84

Quote is from Expreso Dec 28. 2005. See also Expreso Jan
Peru2J Jan 19. 2006.
s
~

Periodic attacks by

SL continued

16. 17

and

19.

sporadically throughout the years after

SL had

2006;

Guzman

s

though the groups numbers never reached more than a few hundred members.
For example, on March 21. 2002 terrorists set off a car bomb in Lima the night before a
visit by US President Bush. Eight people were killed and 40 injured by the bomb blast
outside the LJS embassy. A similar car bomb explosion was set off in Lima in 1991. See
A cor York Times March 21 and 22. 2002. The 2005 incidents were reported on Lima TV
capture,

Dec

in

23, 2005.
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never had more than 4.500 militants

was merely being
Kuczynski

s

at

any one time.

alarmist and dishonest.

The Ombudsman

claims, citing the fact that the

charges had peaked

at

3.878

in

so. Rospigliosi

s

argued. Kuczynski

Office too rejected

number of Peruvians imprisoned on

terrorism

1997: to claim that Paniagua himself could have released
o/

10.000 such individuals was a gross exaggeration.

However, these

figures did

sources continued to warn that

little

to reassure the public, as unidentified military

SL was planning numerous new

attacks across the

countryside to sabotage the elections. The Council of Ministers responded by allocating

$14.5 million to restore military and police counter-insurgency bases

in the

region and

another $7.5 million to the armed forces to step up antisubversive operations. Defense

Minister Marciano Rengifoalso announced that 46.000 troops would be deployed to
0*7

provide security during the 2006 elections.
Several political appointments provoked the

criticism

from military

new commander of the

experts.

Toledo appointed

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Williams, as Vecchio explained:
in the retaking

of the Japanese embassy

officials issued arrest warrants

Indian

86

w omen,

Many

ire

of human rights advocates and

Army

Opinion

is

General Jose Williams as the
deeply divided over Gen.

Peruvians consider Williams a hero
in 1997.

But he was also one of the 29 military

over the Accomarca case, in which

children and village elders.

According

to

the victims

Vecchio.

El Correo and La Republica Dec 26. 2005. El Peruano Feb 8 and 23, 2006.

87

Ibid.
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for his role

were

The women were raped before being
leader in the

under his

command

rights charges facing

commander of the

Peru

pacify the country are

it

initial

s

now

a

rogue army patrol

in the

joint chiefs

He used his
human
comrades who fought to

of

military, telling troops their

staff] to blast the

being persecuted, slandered and mistreated.

order for Williams arrest

and allow him to remain

decision to appoint

Williams, then a major and company

carried out the massacre without his knowledge.

induction ceremony [as

Shortly after the

killed.

Andean zone, denies any wrongdoing, saying

army

s

was

issued, the courts agreed to suspend

custody, essentially in a legal limbo. Toledo

him commander of the

Joint Chiefs

s

of Staff in the midst of such

charges seemed to send the message that the tide had turned once more in favor of the
military and against

new efforts

to drag officers before the courts.

Though

the

2002 laws

governing career advancement within the military specifically stipulated that no officer
under investigation for criminal activity could advance to the next rung
hierarchy, such promotions did continue to occur.

Aprodeh
took

cited

human

Human

rights accountability seriously.

Toledo turned the office over

two

to retired

civilian defense ministers in

military relations, argued that under this

military has returned to

what

it

s

best

new appointment,

was before and

known

En La Mira Oct 2005. On Williams appointment,

89

Peru21 Dec

19.

2004: Expreso Dec 16.

17.

2005.
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in

expert on civil-

by the Toledo

Ana Maria Tamayo

agreed that

Comercio Dec 19. 2005: on
Dec 27. 28. 2004:
2004.: El Comercio Dec 16. 2005.
see El

accusations of irregular promotions under Toledo, see also El Correa
17.

s

the relationship with the

that early efforts

administration to rein in the military had been short-lived.

La Republica Dec

Peru

army General Roberto Chiabra

December of 2003. Fernando Rospiglioso. perhaps Peru

88

rights groups such as

Williams promotion as an ominous sign that the administration no longer

In addition, after appointing the first

history,

11

in the military

the

window opened by

with military people

stated,

the transition [of 2000]

who have

t

Rospigliosi

is

They

afraid to confront the military.

is

The Ministry of Defense,

it

should be noted, was created to serve as a check on

limiting the influence

of the three individual heads of the military

branches and subjecting them to civilian leadership.
legislation governing the Ministry

of Defense,

in

Tamayo

2005

it

writes that despite the

had yet

C'hiabra

s

power and funding

as well as

its

the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of

-

did

much to

Human

momentum

with Chiabra

ascension to Minister of Defense.

human

the idea of

1

armed forces ended

abandoning the court seemed to have gained popularity as
1

Rospigliosi qtd in Vecchio

Peru military'

La Republica Nov

1

1.

la

in the

IACHR.

that court s ruling

'

resists civilian trials

of human rights

2005 Lexis-Nexus online and Dec 2005: Tamayo
conduccion democratica de la defensa en el Peru 2005.

Associated Press. July

Avances y retrocesos en
11

a suggestion he brought

(While Peru remained

on the controversial Lori Berenson case approached.)

violations.

Rights

rights accountability over the
'

s

new removal of Peru from

confirm the suspicion of human rights

groups that the

for

its

return to military (albeit retired) leadership.

suggestion that the armed forces would support a

before the Counsel of Ministers

new

to transform the

Ministry of Defense into a source of civilian control of the military both because of

insufficient

now

happening

90

have sufficient authority.

power by

s

The president

occurring with the approval of the defense minister

is

military

What

shut.

detention orders and are not being detained.

primarily responsible. The civilian government

don

was now

7.

2004: El Correct

Nov

10.

Ministry of Defense to civilian control, see Serna

2004.

On the

importante of the

El Estado: Papel de la Fuerza

Armada

la Seguridad. Notas sobre su control democratico 2003: Otarola Peiiaranda La
nueva Ley del Ministerio de Defensa y la reforma constitucional de las Fuerzas

y de
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Alejandro Silva, the
criticized these

Peru

new head of the

moves, and complained

national criminal court

s

arrest warrants for active

abuses.

The human

and

rights

-

Peruvian
against

NGOs.

g'

in a false espirit

against the

in

de corps,

Armed

that an

ongoing

Forces.

campaign of intimidation,

organizations and witnesses

was being

interpret the report [of the truth

commission with protection

individuals

after they received similar

made

institutions that,

commission] as an offense

International organizations such as

many of the

threats

carried out against

2005 by supposed defenders of the military

provide the truth commissioners and

rights

that the military s influence over

Human

the International Center for Transitional Justice lobbied the Peruvian

the

human

El Comercio regularly featured stories about death threats

Salomon Lerner

Rights,

on court-ordered

retired military personnel implicated in

community of Peru argued

at their

Human

as did Judge Pablo Talavera. president of

that police continually failed to act

government remained powerful, and
and violence directed

National Coordinator for

who

Rights Watch and

government

to

gave testimony before

death threats.

94

Armadas 2002 and El proceso de la reforma del Ministerio de Defensa y
Fuerzas Armadas para la consolidacion democratica 2004.

el rol

de

las

4

Congressman Rafael Rev continued to insist the IACHR was full of leftists and
therefore partial. The IACHR found in favor of the Peruvian state in the Berenson case.
El Peruano Nov 26. 29. 30. Dec 3. 2004; Expreso Nov 14, 17, 22. 2004: El Correo Nov
25. 2004: El Comercio Nov 24. 2004. The Berenson decision, and all IACHR
'

jurisprudente related to Peru, can be found at wvvw.corteidh.or.cr/paises_ing/peru.html
93

Ibid.
44

Oct

Guerra sue
8.

i

a.

El Comercio Oct

2005: Vivanco

10.

2005: Guerra

El rincon del autor.

Organizacion intemacional pide proteccion.

2005.
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El Comercio

El Comercio Oct

7.

Meanwhile. Lerner
governing Peru from

1

980

s

public statement that the politicians

2000 apologize publicly

to

outrages described in the truth commission
the leadership of the

APRA and Accion

del Castillo contented himself with

politician apologizing. Victor

s

reports

participated in

for their failures to prevent the

provoked immediate responses from

Popular parties. While

waving away

who

APRA

s

secretary Jorge

the possibility of any individual

Andres Garcia Belaunde. president of Accion Popular, shot

back that Lerner himself should apologize to the Peruvian people for hiding behind a
desk for twenty years while politicians had made the hard choices.
did. in fact, apologize to the victims

families,

on behalf of the

But by

this point.

of the violence detailed

4

President Toledo

in the report,

and

to their

nation.

Toledo

s

presidency was plagued by corruption scandals,

investigated by several congressional committees. Minister of Defense Chiabra himself

came under
06

career.

investigation for allegedly accepting bribes from Montesinos earlier in his

The most damaging

According

to the

New

scandals, however, touched

York Times

.

Today more than

upon

the president himself.

a dozen of Mr. Toledo's relatives,

including his wife and brothers, are accused of using their influence for personal gain.

Opinion polls give him among the lowest ratings of any Latin American leader, and his

government has been bled by nearly constant media sniping over the scandals.
part

^
46

This

is

of a wider trend of second-generation leadership of Latin American democracies

Exhortacion que no se escucha.
El Perucmo

Dec

1

0.

El Comercio

2004: El Correct

Nov

4.

279

1

Aug

7.

29. 2005.

2004: La Republica

Nov

1

5.

2004.

disappointing the public and failing to
Brazil under Lula da Silva.

and others.

fulfill

promises to end corruption, a trend touching

Ecuador under Lucio Gutierrez, Mexico under Vicente Fox.

97

Unfortunately, corruption in the Toledo administration went beyond placing

family

that

members and

Toledo

the Toledo

s sister

political allies in

campaign produced

A

as pail of the requirement to get his

denied the event ever took place.

word. I'm telling the

g

s

truth.

petition signatures

name on

the

congressional commission convened to further investigate

and questioned Toledo over

over Toledo

jobs. Investigators have uncovered evidence

oversaw the forgery of many (perhaps most) of the

presidential ballot in 2000.

the matter

plum

This

his

is

involvement

a factory of

in the forgery

scheme, but he

he claimed. Take

lies,

me

at

my

Despite substantial improvements in the Peruvian economy

tenure in office, he

Larry Rohter and Juan Forero.

was deeply

disliked by the public.

Unending Graft

is

Threatening Latin America.

New

York Times. July 30. 2005.
Ibid.

For a

critical

assessment of the Toledo administration, see Adelman

Impasses 2002: for a much more positive one. see Taylor

On economic

Andean
From Fujimori to Toledo
2006 and La Republica Dec

improvements, see El Peruano Jan 27.
which notes that the Peru s national statistics institute reported GDP growth of
21.2% from 2002 to 2005. a rate higher than that of Chile, and attributing this growth in
large part to sound fiscal and monetary policies and to the Andean Trade Promotion and
Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). On export growth, see Expreso Dec 23. 2005: on lowlevels of inflation see El Comercio Feb 7, 2006. However, polling results indicate that the
improved macroeconomic situation was not perceived by much of the population. When
asked in August 2004 to compare their family s economic situation with how it had been
twelve months earlier, only 1% said their family s economic situation was much better:
12% said it was a little better: 28% said it was the same. 3
said it was a little worse:
and 28% said it was much worse. Their economic outlook was fairly pessimistic, as well:
when asked how their household economic situation would be in another twelve months.
2005.

22. 2005.

1

%

3% said much better: 17% a little better: 31% the same: 19%
much worse. Similarly, when asked to evaluate the president
poor people in the country had decreased by 420.000.
that the

number of poor people had

increased;

280

15%

80%

said

it

worse; and

24%

a

little

s

claim that the number of

believed this

w as

was

partially true:

false

and

and only

3%

The most

serious scandal related to charges that his party. Peru Posible. falsified

signatures to get Toledo on the ballot in 2000.

Whatever the

facts of these cases, opinion

data indicates that the majority of the public believed the charges to be true. In the case of

74% of the

the falsification of signatures,

believed the charges against Toledo

s

public believed the charges to be true:

83%

wife were accurate. This refected both the

unpopularity of the Toledo administration and the wider perception of Peruvians that

most

politicians

perception

and public figures are corrupt. According

was so

to

Apoyo

analyses, this

strongly reinforced by the Vladivideos scandal that

it

has

become

a

w

permanent feature of the Peruvian public psyche.'
Charges

that

military

came from

but also

made

Toledo was interfering with the normal process of promotion
all

sides. Allegedly.

sights

said

coalition claimed

it

1011

in protest.

on the presidency, grew highly

and often decried Toledo

PAP

was

Toledo not only violated the norms of promotion,

the promotions without consulting the

Army. Both commanders resigned

true.

Toledo

s

commanders of the Air Force and

Alan Garcia, who once more

Garcia and other members of the

military promotions of the high

Opinion Data: Resumen de Encuestas a

Opinion y Mercado. Sept 2004. Available

at

set his

of Toledo as the 2006 elections approached

critical

abuses of the military.

s

in the

la

command,

especially the

Opinion Publica.

Apoyo

www.apoyo-om.com

Opinion Data: Resumen de Encuestas a la Opinion Publica. Apoyo Opinion y
Mercado. July 2004. Available at www.apoyo-om.com. On the forgery scandal, see El

Dec 28. 2004: El Perucmo Nov 1 1. Dec 30. 2004: Expreso Dec 15. 30. 2004: El
Comercio Dec 27. 2004: La Republica Dec 1, 2004. On corruption and other scandals
involving the president and his family, see. for example. La Republica Dec 22. 2004.
Correct

May

4.

2005: El Comercio

Nov

11111

See Fernando Rospigliosi

s

8.

2004.

May 4.

comments

in

2005.

El Comercio

Dec

16.

2005. See also El

Correo Dec 27. 2004. which details the normal process of promotion and accusations
Toledo abused the system in order to advance his personal pilot among others.
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that

promotion of General Cesar Reinoso as general commandant of the army, were based
strictly

on personal loyalty

and constituted

seniority,

to

Toledo, violated institutional norms of advancement and

political

manipulation of the armed forces. Retired generals and

other political candidates agreed, and retired General

politicization of the military

command would

armed forces was reinforced when sources
Comercio

in the

s

warning

that such

Ministry of Defense told reporters

had threatened

to resign if

at

El

Reinoso

s

""

Assessing Civil-Military Relations

The

Parra

inevitably provoke dissension within the

that several generals, including Williams,

promotion went forward.

German

Under Toledo

original plan to radically recraft civil-military relations had

become

increasingly difficult to realize over the course of 2002 and 2003. During the Toledo

administration,

all

institutions

of the state would continue to suffer from extremely low

levels of public confidence. President

Toledo was soon polling as the single

least

popular

head of state in the history of polling on such matters in Latin America, with approval
ratings often as

slipping.

When

low

as

7%. As early as November 2002. Toledo

control

seemed

to be

elections were held to create 25 regional governing bodies to decentralize

political control in the country.

divided

s

among many

Alan Garcia

small parties.

The

APRA was awarded

results

1 1

.

with the rest

were widely interpreted as a vote of no

1111

See El Comercio La Republica, Correo. Perull Dec 10. 20. 2005; Ojo Dec
and El Comercio Dec 16. 2005.. Lourdes Flores (UN), who led the polls for the
,

19.

2005

presidency for several months before the 2006 election, joined other candidates including
Susana Villaran (CD) in responding to Williams and Reinoso s promotions by

demanding respect

for the military

and

its

rules
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of promotion.

confidence

by a public angered by Toledo

s

mishandling of several personal scandals."

~

policies of privatizations and.

Toledo was hardly

in

above

all.

his

a position to challenge

the military, which, conversely, enjoyed the highest levels of popular respect of any state

institution after 2003.

the public. (See

The

Graph 4

courts. Congress,

in

and the executive were widely distrusted by

Appendix.)

Particularly disappointing to the victims of the violence of the 1980s and 1990s

was

the failure of the Toledo administration and Congress to institutionalize the long-

promised reparations program. Though legislation passed
parameters for such a program, no national program was
administration.

10

Moreover, even

'

this legislation

in

in

2005 established the

place at the end of Toledo

refected the reality of tensions within

the concept of reconciliation. For example, the legislation prohibited

from being awarded

Though

the truth

to individuals

commission

itself

paid to those injured or killed in

the

2005

legislation

who had

would also

any reparations

belonged to subversive organizations.

had proscribed the possibility of reparations being

armed

members),

conflict with the state (or their family

rule out

any individual

in

any way

with a

affiliated

subversive organization from being considered a victim and receiving reparations, even

in cases

l0

‘

where the

state

was found responsible

for acts

Ilb

11,4

p.

1

14

For example, after Toledo refused to recognize his illegitimate daughter for

months, he then reversed course. Juan Forrero.
in

such as rape, torture.

Peru Election

On

New

York Times

Nov

1

8.

A

Pem21 Dec

25. 2004.

March

7. 9.

2005;

Comision de la Verdady Reconcilacion 2005,
offers the best and most up-to-date assessment of the

dos an os de

276. Chapter 7 of this text

Opposition Party Makes Strong Showing

2002.

the absence of a reparations program, see

Defensoria del Pueblo

many

reparations situation in Peru available.

la

)

Certainly, military reform progressed on

many

levels, particularly in the sense

Ministry of Defense consistently articulated messages reflecting the primary

that the

lessons of civil-military relations to emerge from the Fujimori debacle: measures were

necessary to assure that the members of the armed forces respected the subservience of
the institution to the civilian control of elected

political manipulation.

Book (developed

in

it

be protected from

like the

White

conjunction with groups like the Instituto de Defense Legal), and
i

to incorporate

ethical guidelines.

that

Documentation from the Ministry of Defense,

public statements reflect a sensitivity to

forward

governments but

human

human

rights issues as well.

rights training into military education

The Ministry repeatedly elaborated on

New efforts went
and

to

develop clear

the need to define the

and goals of defense reform along the lines established by the truth commission
report, the

Commission on

the Integral Restructuring of the

Constitution, and the National Accord. In 2003, the

Human

Armed

Armed

methods
s final

Forces, the

Forces Center of International

Rights was created, and the Ministry of Defense signed an agreement to work
7

with the International Red Cross and the Andean Commission of Jurists to strengthen

mutual cooperation

in areas

of human rights. Dozens of public meetings were organized

by civil society and by the various national branches of the Defensoria del Pueblo to

promote

better relationships

1

between the armed forces and the communities

in

which

they

'

are based."

"

'

For a sense of the Defensoria del Pueblo

armed forces and society and promoting

s

role in reconstructing relations

military reform, see

its

reports

betw een the

Democraciay

un estado de derecho 2003 and Relaciones
2003. See also
IDL publications such as Pedraglio. Tamayo and Castillo Fuerzas Armadas: Control civil
relctciones civiles-militares: construyendo
civiles militares: el catnino esta abierto

( conclusiones-recomendaciones

v relaciones civiles-militares 2004.
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But Ministry of Defense reform plans and public discussions are a rather weak

measure of actual change

in civil-military relations in the

of the armed forces were not reflected

transition. Efforts to alter the political culture

spending

priorities; a

cultural activities

wake of the 2000-2001 regime

mere 1.2% of the defense

sector budget covered

all

educational and

of the armed forces. More worryingly, Peruvian experts on

warned

military relations consistently

various branches of the armed forces

weak and

in fact quite

about changing the culture and orientation toward the state

armed forces was not

reflected in true change.

Rut Diamint warned

that,

that the strong language

among

the

The Ministry received

percent of the budget dedicated to the Defense Sector.

civil-

of Defense over the

that the control of the Ministry

was

in

members of the

less than

one

1

throughout Latin America. Defense Ministries

incapable of exercising professional control of defense sector policies, and continuing

military resistance to civilian control,

were threatening democratic consolidation.

Felipe Agiiero agreed: the key to successful military reform

"

was the construction of

strong central organism of civilian control over the military. Only if the Ministry of

Defense was strengthened

to the point

where

it

was accepted

as the authoritative source

of policy control over the armed forces would the fundamental steps toward reform be

made, and

this required

above

all

restructuring institutional

mechanisms

to establish this

control and the placement of indiv iduals who. by their stability in positions of pow er, by

their quality

106

management, could command

Tamayo and Robles

Prioridad: Fortalecimiento

1(1

Interview.

the respect of those under their jurisdiction.

Claves para

la

Ideele.

conduccion democratica de

Dec 2004.

285

la

Dec 2005.
Defensa.

Ideele.

No.

167.

By 2004

a

number of political moves by Toledo

indicated a

new willingness

to

concede

control of defense sector reform to the military and to seek military support for his

and deeply unpopular government. The Minister of Defense position,
civ ilian

David Waisman

filled first

7

Army. Chiabra
relations, the

of the Toledo presidency

s rise

by

(particularly unpopular with the military and considered

completely ignorant of military affairs) and then civilian Aurelio Loret de
for the remainder

weak

marked,

in the

filled

new

The Ministry of Defense

s

Mola. was

by General Roberto Chiabra of the

eyes of many Peruvian experts on civil-military

end of the constructive period of reform

below. Toledo also introduced

la

initiated

by Paniagua. As discussed

sources of funding for the armed forces.

own

articulation

of the plan

for reform

Iw

of the armed

forces indicated, too. that the tide had changed in favor of supporting the military rather

than appearing to aggressively intervene in

made

public

its

Strategic Plan for

clearly indicated that, though

l

"'s

from 2001

to

|(

g

2004

it

had been necessary

unilaterally disarm

was now behind them. From 2004

Tamayo and Robles

publico es clave.

In 2004. the Ministry

Icleele.

of Defense

Reform of the Defense Sector 2004-2010 which

forces to accept budget and personnel cuts,

political control, all that

its affairs.

to

.

for the

armed

and submit to

new

2006 the plan envisions the

Entre vista con Felipe Aguero. Reforma Militar: El debate

No.

1

64. July 2004.

Una reflexion sobre la fuerza armada peruana a partir del informe
Comision de la Verdad v Reconciliacion 2005: see also Pedraglio. Tamayo
and Castillo Fuerzas Armadas: Control Civil y relaciones civiles-militares 2002.
’

Hurtado Meza

final

de

la

286

armed forces consolidating the process of reform, but
capacity

,

modernizing

its

forces,

and engaging

the highest priority for defense sector reform

recuperating

also

in strategic planning.

its

operative

From 2006

2010

to

1

would be modernization and planning.

10

Clearly the nature of reform had begun to slow even before 2004. For example,

from over 460 retirements from the armed forces

in

2002. the number dropped to 264

2003. In 2004. members of the armed forces received pay increases, followed by

in

new

increases in 2005 and 2006. In 2006. military expenditures rose as a share of the budget.

Purchases of large ticket military equipment were re-initiated, including that of several
frigates.

shown

Where

Defense and the high

the Ministry of

command of the armed

great hesitance to complain about budget matters and

for the first

few years

after Fujimori s departure, in the last

presidency they demonstrated a

new

forces had

demand new expenditures

two years of Toledo

s

assertiveness on such matters, arguing that low

7

military budgets were negatively impacting the capacity and training of the military.

During Minister of Defense Chiabra

s

tenure, the stipend paid to soldiers doubled.

111

The mission statement of the Ministry of Defense and those of the armed forces
reflected several important

changes

in the conceptualization

of the role of the military

serving the national interest. The Ministry of Defense identified five special roles the

defense sector should play in national

1111

Ministry of Defense. Peru.

Available
111

at

life:

Plan Estrategico de Reforma del Sector Defensa.

www.mindef.gov.pe

La Republica Nov

1

5,

2004: El Comercio Oct 29.
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Nov 25.

2004.

in

J

To guarantee

the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in

safeguarding the national interests.

To assume control of internal order during states of emergency.
To participate in civil defense.
To contribute to the scientific, technological, economic, and social development
of the country.

To

participate in projecting the state in the international context of a regional

defense system and hemispheric security.
Participation in humanitarian civic action

w as one of the ways

actively participate in state policies related to

norm during

This had been the

the 1990s.

11_

in

which the armed forces

development and national

when military command

integration.

with control over

zones in emergency status engaged in highway repair, urban development, health care,

and even literacy and civic education

was frequently employed

in the delivery

The military rapidly replaced
local

initiatives,

and even outside the zones the military

of social sendees and humanitarian assistance.

civilian social service delivery institutions

governments, whose budgets were being slashed under Fujimori

austerity

programs

while military budgets grew.

11

’

In 2004. the

s

of the

state

and

economic

armed forces of Peru

participated alongside U.S. military counterparts to bring medical assistance to 22.000

poor

citizens,

1

countryside.

the

and engaged
14

in a

In 2005. Toledo

war on poverty, noting

national territory,

12

wide array of humanitarian services throughout the

announced

that military

making them an

specific plans to reinsert the

anned services

and police forces were disseminated across the

ideal tool to

implement low-cost

efforts to

improve the

Decree No. 749. published in El Perucmo
Nov 12. 1991. placed all local and regional government powers and resources in the
hands of Military Political Commands organized by the aimed forces.
1

Ibid.

11

The reader

Rospigliosi

Republica Oct
1

14

El Correo

will recall that Legislative

Monte sines y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch.
14. 1991.

May

4.

in

2005 and website of the Peruvian army.
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1.

See. for example.

La

1

economy of the

countryside.

'

"

Now,

as then, the

armed forces are considered

a viable

alternative to civilian institutions of the state given their infrastructure, national presence,

and public respect.
Especially worrisome

was

the

growing

role

of the armed forces

in fighting the

vaguely-defined war on terrorism, which included the multiple goals of stymieing the
activities

of anus smugglers, drug traders, and insurgents, along with a broad

defense

agenda, which included addressing the socio-economic causes of violence. In part a
reflection of

and

defense

US

security policy. Peruvian military policy includes a mixture of

security

concepts, reflecting the growing sense that the greatest threats to security

in the twenty-first

century

come from groups

operating inside state borders but linked to

criminal or terrorist groups that crossed borders, as well as from socio-economic

challenges.

Security

a concept broad

is

from a wide array of risks
insecurity,

s

to include the protection

to their well-being, including poverty,

unemployment, and poor

harnessing the state

enough

health.

Defense

is

of individuals

environmental

understood to relate directly to

from military

violent or coercive capacity to protect the public

116

threats.

As w ith military'

participation in humanitarian civil sendee, the expansive role for

the military in domestic security worried those

who

argued

that, in fact, the

only safe and

democratic role for the military in Latin America was to combat external threats to
security. Police

11
'

and domestic intelligence agencies ought to be strengthened in their

El Peruano Feb 25. 2005.

116

Gaston Chillier Defensa y Seguridad: ?De Nuevo Mezclados? Ideele. No. 167. Dec
2004; Pedraglio. Tamayo and Castillo Fuerias Armadas: Control Civil y Relaciones
Cixil-Militares 2004. ch. 2.

On this phenomenon across

Guerrillas. Narcotics, and Terrorism:

Old Menaces

289

Manwaring

the region, see

in a

New World

1

996.

7

1

capacity to fight these dangers, just as the national bureaucracy and social service needed

to he strengthened to deliver

into national structures.

provided

It

To delegate

eyes, a dangerous step

these critics

military.

medical care, build roads and integrate isolated border towns

new openings

these responsibilities to the

backward

in

armed forces was,

in

establishing democratic controls on the

for the corruption that

had plagued the military under

Fujimori, and slowed the pace of consolidating efficient state institutions to deliver public

services. Peruvian military control over counternarcotics operations, established during

Fujimori

s

presidency and

from the United

army

officers

States,

who

still

in place, in particular reflected the vision

of and pressure

which ultimately won out over the concerns of many Peruvian

felt that their

main focus ought

protection rather than counternarcotics, with

all its

to

be counterinsurgency and border

potential to negatively impact the poor

indigenous communities that grew the coca and to provide dangerous temptations for
corruption and

over

FARC

military

illicit

dealing

among members of the

activities in northern

was increasingly

called

Peru

upon

built

military. Furthermore, as concern

over the course of 2005 and 2006. the

to respond to the potential spread

of Colombia

s

11

conflict.

FARC

movement engaged in combat in Colombia. McClintock and
Valias The United States and Pent 2003. Ch. 6: Musso Marcovich La participacion de
las Fuerzas Armadas en la lucha por la seguridad nacional 2002; Rospigliosi Las
Fuerzas Armadas y La Democracia 2001. The Paniagua administration adopted a more
1

is

a guerrilla

cooperative attitude toward

US

and Colombian antinarcotics operations, and ordered the
the border in 2001 for coordinated action with the

deployment of troops to
Colombian military; Peruvian Defense Minister Views Deployment of Troops to
Colombian Border. Plan Colombia Agence France Presse May 8. 2001 (FBIS
Translated Text available through World News Connection database). The Toledo
first

1

administration continued these policies.
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Interestingly, the reform plan specified the goal of finding alternate sources of

funding for defense

priorities. President

Toledo announced the creation of a

defense fund in 2004. The defense sector

new

national

exemption from regular national

s traditional

budgetary proceedings under the control of the Congress was widely considered a

power of the

contributing factor to the overspending, corruption, and menacing

as an institution over the entire history

last

of Peru. Just as

seemed possible they would

it

at

be subjected to the same demands to legitimize their expenditures as did every other

institution

of the

state in the

course of hammering out a budget in Congress (something

reformed militaries throughout the region had come
exception of Chile). Toledo

now

to accept in recent years,

exactly the opposite of the

military. This

forces.

'

capacity to exercise the vital

s

The president

was

recommendation of the Truth Commission. As Rut Diamint

and others argued, the action represented a deficiency of democracy,
diminished Congress

with the

introduced a protected fund for the security forces,

encompassing both the national police and the three branches of the

1

14

in the

sense that

power of the purse over

upon whoever was elected

called

dedicated to this special fund.

first

military

in

2006

the

to increase the

is

armed

money

Simultaneously, in 2004 the armed forces received their

increase in military budget since the transition: these would be followed by

more

increases in 2005 and 2006.

118

.

*

Interview.

Claves para

Dec 2004: Rospigliosi
in fact,

s

la

conduccion democratica de

comments

in

El Comercio

based on the Chilean model, particularly

income from natural gas production would

119

Iaeele.No. 167.

2004. The defense fund was.

percentage of the

legally be dedicated to the fund, just as Chile

Republica Oct 29. Dec 20. 2004: El Perucmo Dec

Nov

1.

Defensa.

in the sense that a

guaranteed the armed forces a percentage of copper

Peru21

Nov

la

25. 2004.

En La Mira Oct 2005.
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sales.

On

10. 16. 17.

the defense fund, see

2004: Degregori

La

s article in

Still,

is

it

undeniable that

many

positive changes in civil-military relations

moving forward. Like many of its neighboring
back to democracy and

civ

il

peace

left

it

states.

Peru found that when

many needs

the

transition

with a massive military and few immediate

threats, giving the military a greater role in multinational

serve

its

were

peacekeeping efforts could

once. Contributing to such operations provided critical funding for

at

armed forces without diverting

state resources

needed elsewhere:

of the armed forces for missions and a positive public image: and

it

it

satisfied the

need

afforded the state a

greater presence in international organizations and operations than normally achieved by

minor powers.

1

"0

In

2003 and 2004. the Peruvian armed forces actively participated

UN peacekeeping efforts
Haiti and Burundi.

1

'

in the

Congo.

in

Liberia. Eritrea/Ethiopia border areas. Cyprus,

1

Reforms also involved opening

the

armed forces

to greater interaction

society and creating greater transparency within the defense sector.

Over

with

civil

the course of

2004. members of the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces participated in meetings

and workshops with the

Institute

of Legal Defense, the International Red Cross, the

Andean Commission of Jurists, and
1-2

rights.

120

On

third

No

doubt a more

the Catholic University

difficult goal

peacekeeping operations as a major

wave democracies,

see Hunter

Peacekeeping. Confidence Building
121

El

of the plan

Comerc\o Nov

10.

new

as the plan states,

1996.

2003

www.idl.org.pe
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to

to

human

change the

area of activity for the aimed forces of

State and Soldier in Latin

jT)

"

is.

on topics related

America

1996: Child

mentality of the

members of the armed

indoctrinate and consolidate respect

forces to

for constitutional precepts, democratic principles, the legal

rights

I2j

and international humanitarian law.

The majority of these reforms were popular with
particular, the biggest reform

the

first

time,

denying these individuals
separate worlds

forces and national police

of the security forces,

their right to participate in

of civilian and military

primarily as

armed forces

members of an

into

it

In

would be allowed

to vote

was widely recognized

way

that

democratic elections only reinforced

life that

Maria Tamayo and Jose Robles argued, restoring the
integration of the

armed forces themselves.

the prohibition of their votes had long ago been formulated as a

to assure the nonpoliticization

the

the

of 2005. was one deeply desired by the defense sector: for

members of the armed

Though

in elections.

and normative system, human

had prevailed

in the past.

As Ana

rights to vote contributed to the

normal roles as citizens and individuals rather than
1

'4

institution.

Conclusions
After

initiated

initial

indications that Toledo

would continue

the massive reform efforts

by the Paniagua administration, his presidency w as

supporters of reform in the judiciary and

human

a

disappointment

rights trials for

to

members of the

military.

In the assessments of Eduardo Dargent and Ronald Gamarra. the failure to press for

judicial reform reflected a lack of political will and the

weakness of Toledo

s

presidency.

Others were far harsher, attributing to Toledo more malicious designs. Fernando

12

~

12.

Tamayo and Robles
2004: Expreso Nov

Prioridad: Fortalecimiento
16. 2004: Gestiou.

Ideele.

Dec 2005: El Comercio Nov

Peru21 and La Republica Feb
,

124

Ibid.
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9.

2006.

Rospigliosi.

w ho,

it

should be noted, served as Minister of the Interior tw ice and briefly

as head of the National Counsel on Intelligence

(CNI) under Toledo and ultimately

resigned from office after a motion of censure by the Congress, attributes the failure of
military reform not to

mere weakness or

buttress military support for his

area of

human

military itself

w rites. Toledo

turpitude. Rather, he

weak presidency by making

sought to

concessions

tactical

in the

rights accountability. Fears that political opponents. Fujimori, or the

might threaten his administration continued

policy-making more than a decade after Fujimori

to influence presidential

1

s

'"

autogolpe.

February 2005 Barometro polling data continued to show Fujimori receiving the

second highest approval ratings among the public, despite his self-imposed exile

(It

in Japan.

should be noted, however, that he also receives the second largest response to the

question "With which political figure do you have the least sympathy?”)
the end of 2005. Fujimori once

more shocked Peruvians by showing up

he was arrested before he could re-enter Peru.

'

Fujimori

1-6

in

Then, near
Chile,

may have been hoping

where
to take

La frustracion de la reforma de las fuerzas de seguridad 2006: Gamarra
Derechos humanos. justicia y transition democratica 2006: Dargent Reforma Judicial
990-2005 2006.
en el Peru
Rospigliosi

(

126

1-7

1

)

Barometro. Estudio 255 Feb 2005.

For detailed press coverage of Fujimori

him extradited
matters.

to Peru to stand trial, see El

Fujimori Detenido.

s

stay in Chile

Comercio

and Peru

s

attempts to have

s special link to stories

on these

Fujimori had long been promising to return to Peru to run

again. See. for example. Larry Rohter

Surprise! Before He's

Be Planning His Comeback New York Times Sept 2

294

1 .

2000.

Even Gone. Fujimori May

advantage of ongoing tensions between Chile and Peru, due

to

maritime boundary

disputes and evidence that Chile had supplied Ecuador with arms during the Peru-

Ecuador

conflict, in order to

Ollanta

Humala

s

avoid arrest or extradition.

campaign

demonstrated the political capital

Humala.
Ollanta

a former

Humala

s

army

to

2006

for the

"

presidential elections clearly

be gained from associating with the military.

lieutenant colonel, participated in the military rebellion (led

brother. Ann}'

Major Antauro Humala) staged

in the final

human

by

months of

s

presidency.

Though suspected of involvement

in

committed

in the early

1990s, he routinely campaigned

a green military-style jacket

Fujimori

in

rights violations

and praised the 1968-1975 military government of General Velasco. As Humala raced
into

second place

Peruvians

see

in polls

Humala

on the presidential campaign, journalists explained that

as the tough military

man

the country needs to punish the corrupt

and impose order. Humala views himself in the same
experience

1

believe

we need

light.

Due

to

my military

discipline in the country, discipline and order.

Five civilians filed criminal complaints against
election, accusing

him of ordering

many

Humala

1-4

in the run-up to the

or participating in disappearances, torture, and

extrajudicial killings while in charge of a military base in the Huallaga Valley 1992.

Human
result

rights organizations report that

On

these tensions see

Peruano Dec
I_g

year as a

in the valley that

of conflict between Sendero Luminoso. the army and narcotraffickers. Humala

defense was that the accusers

1-8

300 people disappeared

23, 2004.

Associated Press Jan

want

to destroy a soldier but

La Republica Nov

May 4.
14.

1.

2005;

I

will not permit

FBIS-LAT

it.

On

April 30. 2005; El

2005.

2006. For an overview of the (few) proposals put forward by

the parties relating to civil-military relations during the campaign, see Florez and

Castaneda Orden

Cerrado

s

2006.
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another occasion he shouted that he was being attacked simply for belonging "to that
generation of Peruvians

in the

whose

turn

it

was

to fight insurgency, to

Condor Mountains." He then promised
would "vindicate

president he

defend our sovereignty

the military and police forces that as
1

""’

their institutional values."

0

The Coordinadora and IDL

provided legal defense for the accusers. Polling data indicated that
believed he

first

was

guilty of the alleged

human

rights violations.

place in the polls in the weeks before the

nationalist

campaign

first

41%

Meanwhile. Humala shot

mare through the

Armas, shouting slogans and promising
votes in the

first

streets

4.

2006.

a thrilling

of Lima, into the Plaza de

to revolutionize Peru.

round of the elections, but ultimately

Alan Garcia on June

to

round of voting. To drive home his

message and further embrace the caudillo image, he staged
stunt, riding a chestnut

of respondents

Humala won

the

most

lost the presidential elections to

131

lj0

Quotes from Associated Press Feb 25. 2006 and El Comercio March 10. 2006. On
Humala and human rights, see El Correct Feb 3. 27. 2006. La Republica Feb 8. 14. 2006
(the latter includes an interview with him). Many compared Humala to Venezuela s Hugo

Chavez (who quickly endorsed Humala) or

to

2006. La Republica reported that

military records

excellent

including

marks

Humala

s

Ecuador

s

Lucio Gutierrez.

showed

for his participation in operations that involved

Operation Spoon

.

an operation of which the

CVR

On March

22.

that he received

human

rights violations,

had been highly

critical.

is from Opinion data.
Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a
Opinion Publica. Feb 2006. Available online at www.apoyo-om.com.

Polling data
la

bl

El Comercio Feb

major Peruvian daily papers Feb 2. 2006; Juan Forero
Nationalism and Populism Propel Front-Runner in Peru New' York Times April 2. 2006.
See also At the double. Ollanta the Outsider Economist March 25. 2006; AP LeftLeaning Candidate Surges in Peru New York Times Jan 14. 2006; AP Criminal
Complaints Filed Against Humala New York Times Feb 25. 2006. For coverage of the
results

June

7,

3. 6.

2006;

all

of the two rounds of election, see

all

major Peruvian daily newspapers April

2006.
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Humala was

not the only one

capital in the presidential race.

who

tried to

use the military card to gain political

The ultimate winner was Alan Garcia, whose running

mate, retired admiral Luis Giampetri. worried Salomon Lemer.

who

told El

Giampetri had strongly opposed the work of the truth commission.

that

Garcia
enact

s

new

military amnesties if elected president and

his support for a

new amnesty

tried before a military court for

1986, in which

1

1
1

people were

Though

against Giampetri and others in the case,

Though human

now

on human

be retried, the court

rights organizations did not let

2006. he accused IDL. law faculty

terrorists to

truth

go free as a

commission

IACHR

6.

aversion to the truth

history: he himself

had

Frontin prison incident of

the military courts dismissed the charges

legal procedures in civ

rights cases tried

s

il

ian courts

were

result

by military courts were

apparent decision to shelve the case in early

s

criticisms of the truth

commission and

up during the presidential campaign. In January

at the

Universidad Catolica. and others of allowing

of their campaign against military judges, and of giving the

false or circumstantial information

El Comercio Feb

s

as running mate.

2006 outraged these same groups. Giampetri

human

in the El

military favor by

rights groups claimed the trial itself was a victory for advancing

the principle that court decisions

invalid and could

new

own

reflected his

involvement

killed.

when Garcia chose him

would court

an open possibility. Giampetri

authoritarian option

commission and

going on

considered

choice of running-mate as an indication that Garcia was signaling that he would

keeping the

been

He

Comercio

which

the

CVR treated as fact.

2006: La Republica Jan 4 and 12. 2006: La Primera Feb

1

'"

10. 206.

August 2000. condemned the Peruvian state
under Alan Garcia and members of the armed forces for human rights violations. See El
Comercio May 3. 2001

The

itself

heard this case, and

in

297

Giampetri joined those
also opined that the military

who

supported the

new

mil

i

amnesty granted by Fujimori was

opinion shared by fujimorista Martha Chavez. Arturo

amnesty proposals. He

tar}’

still

Woodman,

valid and legal, an

vice-presidential
1

candidate for

UN, urged Congress

of the military. Sebastian Brett of

would

was

violate Peru

to

reopen the question of legal amnesty for members

Human

Rights Watch shot back that any

international treaty obligations

s

and

that discussion

Alan Garcia

s

of such measures

upcoming

clearly conducted in attempt to gain military backing for the

new amnesty

'

elections.

5 ''’

actions tended to confirm the sense that pail of his electoral

strategy was. if nothing else, to portray himself as closely supportive of the military. In

February 2006. Garcia promised
salaries within his first six

that, if elected,

months

in office.

he would raise military budgets and

Garcia was particularly

critical

of low

military budgets, and promised to seek international credits to finance higher

spending. Retired General Carlos Tafur Ganoza. the former army
also ran

on the

APRA ticket,

mi li tan-

commander

general,

but for Congress. Throughout his campaign, he advocated

increases in military spending to bring the Peruvian military to parity with the Chilean

forces, as well as increases in the

impressive

new

many of Peru

s

numbers and

salaries

of troops, and the purchase of

equipment. Tafur envisioned restored military power as key to solving
problems: "This will have immediate consequences.

We will

give

occupation to 50.000 unemployed persons, improve the training conditions of personnel,
and. above

1

'

draw youths away from gangs and delinquency."

La Primer a Jan

Peru 21 Jan
14

all.

9.

6.

2006; La Republica Jan

6.

27. 2006; El

Peruano Feb

298

'

4

2006; La Republica. El Peruano. and

2006.

La Republica Feb

1

2.

2006.

The impact of Garcia

sincere:

political calculation than a

have

will

it

become

s

presidency

is

leadership

was

However, with Garcia
majority of seats in Congress,

all

was more

s

in the presidency

little

rights groups

can

at least

breathe a sigh

discontent with their government and

and Humala

s

coalition holding a

interest in pressing the question

to be found in the ruling political class.

Human

we

fronts,

too clear.

w ithin Peru and

and the InterAmerican Commission on

Human

the

Guzman

TAN.

s

of human rights
case remains

as well as

many journalists

Rights, decry the slow progress towards

implementing the reforms the truth commission had called

lj

this too

over, for despite the stability and relative prosperity

Peru enjoyed from 2001 to 2006. the public

unresolved.

whether

clear

rights

and respect for the Peruvian government. Given the

of relief that Toledo

is

human

fighting internal subversion can finally be eliminated. Garcia will

Toledo administration on these

accountability

terms of economic

forces accountable before civilian courts, or

overall failure of the

its

in

genuine resistance to reform. Regardless, before further action

to restore the public s trust in

particularly

reformed

harder to be optimistic on the

members of the armed

can be taken to hold

in

is

Only with time

accountability front.

before their role

it

on questions of human

attempts to consolidate democracy, remain unclear.

s

his attempts to portray himself as

were

strategy at least

return to the presidency, both

and on Peru

rights accountability

One can only hope

s

'

for.

De la Jara Basombrio is pessimistic as to what a new Garcia administration would
mean for human rights prosecutions: see Ensayos sobre justiciay derechos himicmos
‘

2003.
1

'

h

p.

88-89.

Peru21 Nov

1

1.

25. 2004. Jan 13.

y transicion democratica

Feb 28. 2005: Gamarra Derechos humanos.

2006.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The Peruvian case study offered here supports
Keck, and Sikkink place on transnational

activist

the emphasis scholars like Risse.

networks. The pressure of a well-

organized network of domestic and international activists was brought to bear upon the
state, in

most

pan because

netw ork successfully

shopped

likely to influence the Peruvian state s behavior (the

and Court for

Human
a

that

new

Human

Rights

OAS

Rights and the

Ombudsman

s

office

(.

mesa de

catalysts for

InterAmerican Commission

dialogo). After the creation of the

Defensoria del Pueblo ) in 1996 and the selection of

Constitutional Tribunal (TC) after the

became primary

fall

of the Fujimori regime, these institutions

change from within the

network w as arguably the most important factor

The pressure from

state.

in shaping

Peru

s

Tuminoso

network of activists, cleverly
international organizations,

threat,

this

rapid transition

towards the rule of law and military accountability for crimes committed
defeating the Sendero

venues

for the international

course of

in the

outcomes unimaginable only months before. This

utilizing international connections in civil society,

and foreign governments, pushed the

state to

overcome

the

antidemocratic balance of civil-military relations which continued to characterize

Argentina and Chile years after their transitions.

Peru

Appendix

fits

the

model Risse and Sikkink

for the Risse

and Sikkink

repressive behavior on the

pan of the

information, invoke international

Spiral

offer in

many ways.

Model of Human Rights Change.

state spurred the

human

(See Figure

TAN to

collect

and

rights norms, pressurize the state,

international organizations (though rarely liberal states) in

300

its

1

)

in

Certainly,

utilize

and mobilize

campaign. Presidents

Belaunde Terry and Fujimori,
validity of

human

security and

human

TAN

decision, the

by continuing

Fujimori

Human

to carry its

s

is

the

did sustain

its

NGOs. and

employ information and symbolic

politics as

In 2000. there

human

rights

norms

was indeed
in Peru.

Fujimori

s

Name

to the

it

denial. In the

network pressure on the

of American States, to the

Peruvian people.

It

of the Innocents

and

was

the result

of Fujimori

term as president. Public opinion was

The mobilization and strengthening of the human

s

at last

rights

community

Europe created an opening

the

fall

pan of a

remake human

TAN

decision

with

s

TAN campaign for human rights accountability,

for the pursuit

of the Fujimori regime created the

exploit to

s

actions.

but

it

s arrest

of human rights accountability within Chile,

political space the

Peruvian-based

rights policy. But while Pinochet s arrest

campaign. Fujimori

built

in this case is

cannot be linked causally as the Risse-Sikkink model suggests. Just as Pinochet

in

US

campaign.

opposition and those making principled arguments against Fujimori

certainly linked to the sustained

state,

continued to

criticized the Fujimori regime,

this mobilization

to run for a third (unconstitutional)

dealt with matters of internal

mobilization and strengthening of groups engaging

a

But

multilateral

to the Organization

In the

and claimed Peru

most obvious instance of this

State Department, to international

its

it

denial of the

removal of Peru from the jurisdiction of the

Rights

campaign

public confidence through

campaign with

as subject to international jurisdiction

the intervention of other states as

rights.

InterAmerican Court of

wake of this

norms

rights

immune from

should be

in particular, reacted to this

self-destruction cannot. There

might be considered

was nothing

inevitable about the dramatic collapse of the regime, and the successes of the

301

TAN w ould

TAN

in this

case

came about because network members were positioned

political

to take

advantage of the

opening created by changes beyond their control.

That the tactical concessions granted by Fujimori

in

response to the network

s

pressure strengthened the position of that network does seem accurate: for example, the
creation of the

maneuver

re

Fluman Rights Ombudsman

human

rights.

s

Office did reduce the regime

But regime change came

to

Peru

in

s

margin of

2000 and 2001 as

a result

of an internal collapse of legitimacy provoked by the release of the Vladivideos and the

crumbling of the internal power structure Montesinos had held in place. Regime change

was not primarily
space

;

a result of the expansion of

rather, the increase in influence

collapse of the regime.

The human

in the areas

movements pushed

around which

it

rights

efforts

TAN at work
its

in

transition

Pern did play a unique role

in

and effectively achieved policy

consistently for the development of legislation to institute the truth

to gain public support for

on prosecution of human rights

The speed with which the
its

new political

had so long campaigned. The human rights

commission and conducted a campaign
its

rights groups in a

of those groups was made possible by the

the tumultuous politics of the country during

change

human

truth

position.

The Paniagua

organize

new

little

and then refocused

violators.

commission was established makes the process of

creation by the transitional administration

Basombrio points out there was

it.

seem almost

inevitable, but

De

la Jara

political incentive for the administration to take this

transitional administration s

main

functions, after

all.

were

to

elections and maintain governmental continuity and stability, not to issue

groundbreaking

human

rights policies. Furthermore.

Paniagua

s

decision cannot be

explained by electoral dynamics, as he was not running for office and already enjoyed the
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overwhelming support of the public and the

demanding human

institutions

of the

state.

rights accountability represented the interests

Given

groups

that the

of the poor,

marginalized indigenous families of victims, and that the public as a whole was far more
interested in questions of corruption and the

was no society-wide demand
assumed centerstage
carried with

all

it

economy than

for the creation of the truth

in societal

discourse

in

Peru

in

human

commission.

at this time,

the ambiguity and ambivalence that

rights cases, there

was soon

it

lj

If

did so

human

in a

rights

way which

to reveal itself.

The

public and the political class were united in their desire to purge the state of the

corruption which had flourished under Fujimori s power, but this surface consensus hid a

deep ambivalence about the desirability of aggressively prosecuting alleged human rights
violators within the ranks of the

under Fujimori

armed forces and

retrying those convicted as terrorists

s antiterrorist legislation.

The capacity of transnational networks

to affect civil-military relations is at

peak when prevailing power relationships within the
the

window of opportunity open

rights and democratization

state are

to these groups to enact

agendas

is

its

fundamentally upset, but

key elements of their human

narrow and closes quickly. Though international
7

intervention or the collapse of institutions of the state grant transnational networks,

previously marginalized, the ability to assume extraordinary powers to shape the national

dialogue on matters key to civil-military relations, the mechanisms they are able to craft
to exercise this influence are either

pressure for

to

L

'

human

temporary or

indirect. In Peru, transnationalized

rights accountability, the civil-military matter usually

fundamental change, was able to achieve powerful successes in the

De

la

Jara

most

first

Basombrio E ns ay os sobre justiciar derechos humanos 2003.

resistant

three years

p. 124.

from power. In

after Fujimori s fall

particular, the

TAN was able to

influence the creation

and reach of a truth and reconciliation commission, an item high on the Peruvian human
rights

community

InterAmerican

Toledo

agenda

Human

to overturn

paradigmatic

s

for

many

They

Rights Courts to push the

amnesty laws,

human

years.

rights cases

to

effectively used cases before the

new

administrations of Paniagua and

reopen domestic civilian court proceedings on

from the

past,

and

to adopt a discourse

of human rights

accountability.

However, the

field

of civil-military relations

is,

matter of democratic reform, a difficult one for actors

perhaps more than any other

in civil society to

the literature on civil-military relations traced in Chapter

institutionalist, rationalist

the capacity of

and

II

culturalist factors influence,

navigate. Here

bears relevance, as

and

in this

TAN campaigns to transform civil-military relations.

case clearly limit

The armed forces

continue to enjoy a special privileged status which makes them exceptionally difficult to

affect

from outside the

traditional

avenues of power. International organizations,

transnationalized institutions, and even other countries have a strictly limited capacity to

alter the nature

decreed into
trespassing

of civil-military relations within a

reality,

state, for

no such change can be

and strong pressure from outside will surely be interpreted as

on the most sacred reserve of national

component of sovereignty. The intense pressures
from the OAS. transnational

civil society

security policy, a fundamental

the Fujimori regime

was subjected

to

partners such as Transparencia in Peru and

WOLA in the US. international financial institutions, the countries of the Americas and
Europe,

etc.

were not sustained within the country
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after the

immediate threats to

democracy had been removed.

No

international force could press for reform of civil-

had

military relations in Peru; the pressure

By 2003 power

to

profoundly altered. In the

among

final

s

political

days of Fujimori

s

congressional majority of today,

regime,

it

by the wayside. The

new

patterns,

and the

civil society

had been only too easy

among

the opposition of yesterday

many of the

state.

opponents and

his political opposition, particularly

OAS-led mesa de dialogo. But once

the transition fell

within the

relations within the country had settled into

powerful but brief alliance between Fujimori

find consensus

come from

the participants in the

became

the

great principles articulated in the course of

political opportunity structure that

had enabled

way

principled arguments about accountability and justice to carry the day in 2001 gave

to

renewed public discontent with

seemed

to a majority

The biggest obstacle
accountable for

human

to efforts to hold

final report

system proves

everyday administration of

the military

wielder of power.

members of the armed

forces legally

weakness and public

itself

distrust

of the truth commission w rote, the weakness of the
that, so

incapable of resolving the problems of impunity and

justice, respect for the state

far as to argue that at times the

and the rule of law will continue

massive violation of the
t

rendered the legal system of Peru

itself

right to

due process

e

an agent of violence against the people.

I

-so
'

•'O
'

long

erode and the option of violence w ill remain a pow erful alternative. The Commission

went so

I

Once more

law remains the Achilles heal of Peruvian democracy. They warned

as the public

to

least offensive

rights violations is the institutional

of the legal system. As the
rule of

the institutions of power.

of Peruvians the

to

Comision de

system,

p.

la

Verdad Informe Final Tome

247-280.

III. p.

247-8. See section on justice

Public opinion in both Peru and in Latin America as a whole considers corruption
to be high in the state

perception

in

and

in society.

Peru that the

any possible gains

state is

transitional justice efforts
140

2.

might have offered

In Peru, across Latin

)

In Peru, public trust

is

is

1

'

9
)

Furthermore, the

rather than less corrupt severely limits

across the globe, public distrust of state institutions

legal system: this trend

Appendix.

in

1

becoming more

of law. (See Graph

faith in the rule

(See Graph

is

in establishing public

America, and indeed

highest for the legislature and the

noticeably worse in Peru than

it

is

globally or in Latin America.

worst for Congress and the Judiciary, the two institutions that

ultimately exert long-term control of the transitional justice agenda within the state, while

the

armed forces

are considered significantly

more trustworthy. (See Graph

141

3.

)

Since the regime transition of 2000. this trend has worsened, with the legislature

and judiciary losing public

Graph

4.) In fact, a

armed forces
supporting

14

'

even as the armed forces recover public

December 2005

to be the

it.

trust,

most trusted

This trend

is

poll

institution of the state, with

especially dramatic

19

The data

in this

the Fujimori

graph

is

Perception Index. Available

(See

conducted by the University of Lima found the

when

with the armed forces during the Toledo administration

December 2000 (when

trust.

government had

54.6% of respondents

the level of public satisfaction

is

compared

to its level in

just fallen apart and the

drawn from Transparency

International

s

armed

Corruption

at

www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
140

Ibid.

141

The data

in this

graph

is

drawn from

Corruption Barometer. Available

the Transparency International

at

www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb
l4

'

Reported

in

Gestion Dec

13,

2005.
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s

Global

complicity

forces

in

corruption

was gradually being

respondents approved of the management of the

by 2002 and
14

state.

'

On

trustworthy

48%

in early 2005. placing

it

the other hand. Peruvians are

Armed

among

more

less corrupt than

Congress or the

Peru, the public believes the

At

that time, only

presidency. (See Graph

legal system, both in Peru

Fujimori for

human

rights violations

become

a

much

less likely to

state.

public approval, particularly

Paniagua,

who

when he was seen

military leadership accountable,

was able

)

This

to be far

better job dealing with

As time

In

its

has

blame the armed forces or

from the 1980s and 1990s. (See Graph

The weakness of institutions undercuts
of other institutions of the

144

at all

and the region as a whole.

corruption than the Congress and judicial system have done with theirs.
passed, the Peruvian public has also

Not

5.

The public perceives the military

armed forces have done

38%

institutions of the

likely to consider the judiciary

s

29% of

Forces: this figure rose to

most trusted

the

today than they were during Fujimori

too seems related to the issue of corruption.

revealed).

14

b.

^)

their capacity to challenge the prerogatives

enjoyed exceptionally high levels of
to be taking strong steps to hold the

to channel his popular legitimacy into

institutional strength sufficient to assert control over the transitional justice agenda. (See

Graph

7.)

Toledo, throughout this five years in office, suffered from a devastating

collapse of popular support

institutions. (See

Graph

8.)

which made

the executive

Though Toledo entered

weaker

office

relative to other

committed

to

human

rights

l4j

The 2002-2005 data in this graph is drawn from Apoyo Opinion Polling Data.
Available at www.apoyo-om.com. See also Apoyo polling data in El Comer cio Dec
2000
.

144

Ibid.

145

Ibid.
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19.

trials for

members of the

military, his inability

and lack of incentive

Congress or supporting the judiciary contributed

armed forces

resulted in the

accountability for

Though
formation was

commission

s

its

to a gradual backsliding that ultimately

human

reasserting institutional control over

rights

was highly supportive of the Truth Commission when

decreed under Toledo, support for

work and

components of the

w ith

own members.

the public

first

for cooperating

legal

after

its

system

conclusion. (See

s

its

Graph

work declined during
I4fl

9.

Similarly, the

)

attempts to restore the rule of law via

retrials

of individuals convicted under Fujimori

courts,

and prosecution of members of the military implicated

have provoked deep uncertainty. While

little

s

trials

its

the

two
civilian

antiterrorism legislation in military

in

human

rights abuses

generalized polling data exists on this

question, the fact that large majorities disapproved of the Constitutional Tribunal

s

decision to retry civilians convicted in military courts under antiterrorism legislation, and

believed that terrorists would go free as a result of this decision,

is

indicative of

dissatisfaction with that measure. Polls relevant to public perceptions of trials of those

members of the

military accused of

human

rights violations are

few and problematic as a

basis for generalization, but are nevertheless suggestive. For example, a poll

was

conducted on attitudes toward the order for the arrest of officials involved in the military
operation Chavin de Huantar. which rescued hostages held in the Japanese

residence from

members of the

majorities believed that

MRTA in

members of the

Ambassador

1997. Polls indicate that though slight

MRTA had

been executed

after surrendering

(56%). that the executions had not been necessary (55%), and that the case ought to be

l4(
’

Supra note 4 for Graphs

7-9.
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s

.

investigated (53%),

44%

therefore including

some of those who agreed with

a proposed

law

Few
to see

amnesty

Peruvians believe a

fair trial is likely in Peru.

much

23%

broader

believe he

trials for

would receive

,4S

Though most Peruvians want

human

trial in

Peru.

Fhis

is

writes,

rights

only one part of

in

the distrust in the justice

in the

democratic institutions of

Indeed, the Peruvian transitional justice experience faced a unique challenge

relative to other

human

Chavin de Huantar.

charges of corruption and

forms parts of a deep distrust of the citizens

Peru.

(and

of legitimacy within the judicial system of Peru, and indeed

crisis

much of Latin America. Eduardo Dargent
system

a fair

60%

the first three statements) approved of

to the participants in Operation

Fujimori returned to Peru to face

abuses, only

a

to grant

wanted the case closed without investigation and

such exercises

in

Latin America: because the overwhelming majority of

rights abuses investigated in the Peruvian case

had been perpetrated under the

leadership of civilian, democratically elected governments, the danger that transitional

justice initiatives might actually

the country

14

l4s

Nov

or

was very

weaken

rather than strengthen support for

democracy

in

144

real.

Dec 2005; www.apoyo-om.com

2006: Justicia Viva La re forma
Hammergren La experiencia peruana en
reforma judicial 2004. On the Latin America-wide trend, see especially Hammergren
The Politics ofJustice and Justice Reform in Latin America 2004 and Domingo and

Dargent

La reforma judicial en

el

Peru

(

1990-2005)

del sistema de justicia: ?que reforma? 2004:

Sieder Rule of Law in Latin America: The International Promotion of Judicial Reform

2001.
I4 "

Comments

suggesting this often appeared in the media: often, while demanding

thorough investigations of the abuses committed
lament the reality that Peru
Gestion

May

s

electoral

in the

1980s and 90s. individuals would

democracy had not prevented such abuses. See

28. 2001
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Civil-military relations in Peru have indeed undergone profound transformations

since the

fall

of the Fujimori government, but

the military maintains

much of its

in the

area of human rights accountability,

capacity to block prosecutions of

evolution of accountability efforts over the

last five

officers.

its

years demonstrates

The

many of the

continuing challenges to consolidating democracy in Peru. Clearly, institutional factors

played a role

in

determining the means and capacity of the

military relations.

Fujimori

human

s

At

first,

the institutional

assertion of subjective control

rights accountability

damage

seem

to the

state to affect

armed forces

change

in civil-

resulting from

to explain their initial inability to block

measures threatening

their

members. Above

all.

the total co-

dependency of the military leadership with Montesinos and Fujimori rendered the aimed
forces highly vulnerable to aggressive action

by the

state.

Submission

to

Montesinos and

Fujimori, the corruption of traditional military protocols and systems of meritocracy, and

outrage from

and their

some

own

factions within the military over abusive behavior

by death squads

leadership, had already substantially fractured the unity of the

armed forces

long before Fujimori tied the country.

Yet the

political reality

of Peru painfully demonstrates the

fact that corruption

and

individual self-interest often trump institutions ability to act as unitary bodies working to

maintain traditional institutional powers and prerogatives. In such cases, institutionalist
explanations are weak. While the armed forces enjoyed significant political protection

from the Fujimori regime and Congress in
especially

violations

immunity from
in

their continuation

legal action against

of traditional practices

members of the

exchange individual members of the armed

military for

forces,

and his circle of associates, traded other key military prerogatives,

310

human

-

rights

most notably Heimoza
like

autonomous

control of internal professional matters such as

personnel.

The

interests

advancement and retirements of military

of this small group did include important institutional concerns

(maintenance of sizeable budget, greater defense of the armed forces by the regime

in the

face of international and civil society criticism, capacity to conduct counter-insurgency

campaigns without

restrictions

individualistic (motivated

on military powers,

by desires

to gain

etc.),

but they were also deeply

power within

Catherine Conaghan goes so far as to argue that

the military hierarchy).

authoritarianism in Fujimori

s

Peru was not a function of formal design. What made the political system authoritarian

were the people

who

inhabited the institutions and the extremes to which they were

willing to go in sendee to Fujimori.

committed

to

democratic principles that resulted

courts to check Fujimori

institutions

She argues

s

that

it

was

the absence of leadership

in the total failure

of Congress and the

abuses of the system because they profited from the

of clientelism and corruption.

1MI

But does

this analysis

apply

perverse

to civil-military

relations?

Contrary to popular (and even scholarly) ideas about military institutions. Peru

armed forces tend towards factionalization nearly

as

much

as

its

political party

s

system

does. But if institutionalist and rationalist explanations of civil-military relations

seem

complicated by the fact that the military behaved neither rationally nor as a unitary actor

under Fujimori,

it

remains nevertheless clear that institutional weaknesses within the

represented major obstacles to reforming the civil-military relationship after the
the Fujimori government. For. as discussed above, the

deep reservoir of public support and respect

l

'°

Conaghan Fujimori

s

Peru 2005.

p.

66.

that

armed forces continued

allowed them to recover

much

fall

to

state

of

enjoy a

of their

.

strategic bargaining strength in the years of the

state institutions

security

and

their inability to provide the physical,

demanded by

institution

Toledo administration. The weakness of

economic and psychological

the public boosted the reputation of the

which, whatever

effectiveness and dignity

past failings, did operate with

its

armed forces

as one

some degree of order,

qualities sadly lacking in the political sphere.

Perhaps the biggest challenge to traditional rationalist explanations of civilmilitary relations

over the

last

is

that the sources

of military power have changed so fundamentally

twenty years. Though the threat of a military coup continued to be used by

Peruvian military leadership and by Montesinos. even by the

had recognized

coup

is

among

how empty

such threats had become. As Marcel Rubio has written,

the least likely of the potential

political conflicts.

The lower

weapons

credibility of military

necessarily imply a major weakening of military

hard

power

from a type of

power derived not only from Fujimori
but also

on the military

the perception

among

institution capable

11

s

monopoly on

s

the public

used by the military

threats,

1

994.

p.

in

however, does not

relative to their civilian

military’

today arises from other

overthrows of civilian governments, today

soft

power. Under Fujimori, the military

dependence on
ideas

in the area

1
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s

of counterinsurgency and on

and among many politicians

130-13

s

their support for his autogolpe.

that

it

was

the only state

of guaranteeing order, security and progress for the country.

Rubio Commentary

a

the military enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s due to

their ability to threaten or carry out military

military enjoys influence

to be

coup

power

governments. The political influence enjoyed by the
sources; in place of the

1980s the armed forces

late

1

'

1

Virtually universal to civil-military experts in Peru

civilians in

that

is

the recognition that the absence of

government with any understanding of military issues deeply problematizes

government

s

assertion of authority over the military.

Given the greater public
long for Toledo and

favorability attached to the

members of Congress

armed

forces,

had more

to realize that they

it

did not take

to lose

by

continuing to challenge the military than they had to win. The fact that the most genuine

and decisive measures to combat military impunity
the courts

and

that these

in the area

measures were not translated

into or

of human rights came from

backed by equally strong

Though

steps from the legislature or executive should not entirely surprise us.

system suffered from the same low levels of public

members of the

much more
in

legal

trust as the

the judicial

Congress and President

system do not rely upon public approval for

their positions.

Their

armed

forces) repeatedly.

The most powerful challenges were on matters

of the need to restrict the jurisdiction of the military justice system, the traditional tool

ded vering members of the armed services effective impunity, but the
favor of more restrictive interpretations of the role of the

or

emergency

1

TC

armed forces

in

fol-

also argued in

states

of

"

status.

Barometro Estudio 255 Feb 2005. This
trust/ distrust for

poll indicated the following levels

of

the institutions of the state: Military 54.6/41.3. Congress 7.8/89.4.

Judicial branch 14/83.1. central

High

,

secure position enabled them to take on the single most respected institution

the state (the

exception

152

government 12.4/82.4. Constitutional Tribunal 24.7/60.7.
NGOs trusted by

levels of distrust extended to parts of civil society as well, with

37.3/distrusted by 43.4. Political parties: 6.3/92.2.
Lv'

David Lovaton Palacios Justicia militar y Estado de derecho: Empezando. por fin.
No. 166. Oct 2004. Though a new law was finally passed in Congress in 2005
stipulating new rules for military engagement in such cases, the wording of the legislation
was vague enough to provoke concern. For example, the legislation limits states of
emergency to cases in which real and eminent danger are present, but it does not clarify

kieele.

However,

the legal system remains in flux, with courts jurisdictions

rulings force highly dependent

upon

political decisions.

As Chapter

V

and

their

when

indicates,

court rulings demonstrate patterns contrary to the desires of the legislature or executive,

the default response

result

is

is

for those bodies to

a legislative and legal morass in

simply rearrange the power of the courts. The

which

the rule of law slides further into decay.

Recently, both president and congress have sided with the military courts in their struggle
to reassert control

of human rights accountability, further buttressing the tradition of
1

separate military fueros which had

seemed

to be at

an end

in

2001 That special courts
.

continue to be created and dissolved, and that the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal

itself

can be so easily voided by legislative and executive decisions points to

how

far

Peru has to travel before the rule of law will be consolidated.
Political culture clearly plays a role in the

accountability.

Among many members

autonomy and corporate

identity,

ongoing

battle

over

human

rights

and leaders of the armed forces, the culture of

and a self-perception of the military as an institution

especially charged with overseeing the safety and stability of the state, persists.

seems

is

widespread resistance

institution itself has participated in large-scale

which institution has
Mira Oct 2005.

the

pow er

to

is

determine whether

M

to the idea that the

w rongdoings and

responsibility outside the corrupt leadership. There

There

1990s was corrupt and

to be universal recognition that military leadership in the

controlled by Montesinos. but there

^4

to accepting

rejection of the truth of the

this level

of danger

exists.

CVR.

En La

Hurtado Meza Una reflexion sobre la fuerza armada peruana a partir del informe
final de la Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliation 2005: Alegria Bases para un
modelo de relaciones entre el poder politico y el mando militar desde una perspectiva
democratica 2003: Serra El Estado: Papel de la Fuerza Armada y de la Seguridad.
I

Notas sobre su control democratico 2003.
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for a variety

of reasons. Chief among these reasons

is

the fact that five of the twelve

commissioners (Tapia. Degregori. Ames. Macher. and Bernales) are politically oriented
to the Left,

and the

(in the military s eyes)

exaggerated number of deaths reported by the

Commission. Current and former leaders of the armed forces have argued
treats

Sendero Luminoso as a

political party, thereby lending

than deserved, and that the goal of the commission

whole based on isolated events

for

was

it

a

more

that the

CVR

legitimate status

to disparage the institution as a

which only individuals

directly involved should be

blamed.

The Peruvian armed forces see

their counter-subversive experience as directly

opposite to that of other Latin American militaries accused of human rights violations,
not least because they were not the

losses, operated

command of a

under the

war and appear

numbers of

democratically elected civilian government, and

in defeating the

in the perception

to be

large

1

were ultimately victorious
of Peruvians share

main aggressors. They suffered

genuine subversive

threat.

"

Large numbers

of the armed forces as heroes of the anti-subversive

persuaded by the argument that members of the armed forces

deserve protection from prosecutions conducted by an illegitimate legal system and a

Left-dominated

NGO community.

Hurtado Meza argues

CVR.

that the surprisingly

rather than producing an

debate about Peru

political

Fujimori

s

high level of violations reported by the

open debate and genuine

recent pass.

The

political parties

""

Hurtado

final

de

la

of AP. PPC.

supporters, the military and conserv ative sectors of the Catholic

s

immediately and deeply rejected the findings of the

1

self-reflection, served to polarize

Meza Una

Comision de

armada peruana
Verdad y Reconciliation 2005.

reflexion sobre la fuerza
la

CVR. Given

the

APRA.
Church

maze of lies

a partir del informe

uncovered

in the

months

after

Fujimori

from grace, the public divided over the

s fall

varied interpretations of the truth offered up by the political class.

some members of the armed

A

sense that, though

forces undoubtedly committed excesses during the

countersubversive campaign, the armed forces remained the most trustworthy institution

of the

state ultimately prevailed as politicians

credibility.

and the courts continued

The public sense of insecurity strengthened

to lose public

the desire to see the

armed forces

take on a central role in fighting ongoing threats to internal national security (both from

remnants of subversive groups and

While

human
that

institutional

weaknesses and

rights accountability, in the

determined

its

common

outcome.

By

end

2006.

gain from identifying themselves with

it

it

criminality) and socioeconomic security.

political culture

was

deeply shaped the debate over

the rational calculation

was only too obvious

human

of political actors

that politicians

rights causes. Valentin

Paniagua

bid for the presidency quickly disintegrated, while Alan Garcia and Ollanta

propelled forward despite grave concerns about their
violations. Verbal assaults

private interests once

on the

own

had
s

little

to

renewed

Humala were

involvement in human rights

NGO community as serving foreign, subversive or

more became

a popular form of political rhetoric, and public

interest in the question of military prosecutions

had died

out. President

Toledo was

all

too

willing to deploy the military to distribute food and medicine across the countryside,

where the

rest

of the Peruvian

Policy change
institutionalization of

is

state

continues to have a

weak

presence.

an end point in the Risse-Sikkink model, one followed by the

human

rights

norms

into state behavior.

But the

political reality in

Peru indicates that questions as complicated as responsibility and accountability for

human

rights violations are too contentious a question to be settled so easily. Institutions
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remain

the legal system,

in flux, particularly in

favor of civilian

concrete steps

in

trials for

human

rights violators at work.

is

no clear prevailing norm

Though

in

the Peruvian state took

2001 and 2002 to institutionalize internationally-accepted norms

establishing the rule of law and

IACHR

where there

human

such as the return to the

rights accountability

and the wholesale adoption of its decisions

the failure to reform the civilian

court system lent the return of human rights cases to the military jurisdiction an

appearance of legitimacy and even justness. Politicians self-interests, for a time so tied
to the

that

theme of truth and justice according

campaign

at

Human

numerous

TAN

s

conception,

now

ran contrary to

points.

rights accountability

military relations in Latin

to the

remains a sticking point

America. Despite the impressive

across the region in favor of bringing those accused of

civilian courts, obstacles exist.

As

in

the reform of civil-

momentum

human

that has built

rights violations to

trial in

scholars continue to explore the threats to democratic

consolidation, and to explore the possibilities of non- and quasi-democratic regime

consolidation, so too must

nationally, they

more

recognize that as transnational norms are adopted

undergo deep change. In Peru, where

violent subversive

public should

we

movement, uncertainty

demand from

state

violence mirrored an even

as to the degree of accountability the

the state remains. There, and throughout Latin .America,

corruption and ineptitude on the

pan of democratic governments undermine

the

development of the rule of law and the consolidation of democratic legitimacy and
norms.

When

the political leaders of these states calculate they have

more

to gain

by

solidifying the foundations of effective governance and respecting the courts

of the law to

citizens than

all

transitional justice

becomes

from protecting the armed forces from accountability,

a reality.

But

Integrating an appreciation of the

this is far

from a foregone conclusion.

power of transnational

change with a realization of the

precipitate such

activist

institutional, cultural

of resistance to such change brings us closer to explaining change
military relations. Rather than treating adoption of

outcome of TAN campaigns,
actor occasionally

issues

the study

empowered

but typically facing

Though such networks

application

I

human

rights

more powerful

to

and rational sources

in this

norms

have offered favors treating

to alter state

networks

area of civil-

as the inevitable

TANs

as a political

behavior on even the most sensitive policy
actors

who do

are not elected and cannot be

not share their interests.

removed from

their positions, they

too derive influence in large part from public legitimacy. Networks enjoy the flexibility

and mobility

to

probe the

state

and

can gain leverage over their target

power relationships
this

moment

state

the

community

government.

to find the points at

And

in

moments when

members

traditional

often find themselves receding from

circles.

outcome of transitional justice becomes a

determined in thousands of individual court cases, relevant
control over the direction of the process.

Where

legal question, a matter to be

human

legislatures

maintain the capacity to impede

human

its

networks lose

autonomy, they

rights accountability there.

discussed in the Peruvian case study would

rights

and executives remain

willing to intervene directly in the judicial sphere, interrupting

TAN members

which they

on policy. But once

are upset, the}' can exert a powerful influence

has passed, network

decision-making

Once

interstate

w ish

Though few of the

to delay prosecutions

until judicial

autonomy and effectiveness were

fully institutionalized, in the long-term the

absence of that autonomy makes the judiciary a problematic mechanism of transitional
justice.

For Peru and for the region, then, transitional justice remains a work

Empirical investigation into societal attitudes towards

attitudinal

human

in progress.

rights prosecutions

and

change within the armed forces of the region might well help indicate what

legacy transitional justice will leave behind.
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APPENDIX
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Model of Human Rights Change
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